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Introduction
Ethnicity does not matter in the long-term perspective. Such was the conclu-
sion formulated by a new generation of ‘Africanists’ in the 1970s and 1980s, and 
it was a kind of scientific revolution. Its defenders held that in sub-Saharan 
Africa, ethnicity had mainly been created through European colonial rule, and 
was, therefore, an entirely artificial concept.1 For a period that roughly coin-
cides with the 15 years between 1975 and 1990, the attack against the well-
established idea of primordial ethnic groups in Africa – which had dominated 
anthropological thought from the colonial period onwards – seemed to win 
the day.2 In spite of Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger’s initiative to under-
stand the ‘invention of tradition’ with a view to identifying the creation of 
group sentiment in a comparative and global approach, however, reflections of 
historians working on group identity in the African continent have rarely 
entered the debates on global history.3 While migration and connection – for 
example, over the Atlantic or the Indian Ocean – are essential themes in global 
historical studies, they do not yet interact with the analysis of ethnicity that 
1 This is neatly summarised in Amselle, Jean-Loup, ‘Ethnies et espaces: pour une anthropolo-
gie topologique’, in Jean-Loup Amselle and Elikia M’Bokolo (eds.), Au cœur de l’ethnie: 
ethnies, tribalisme et État en Afrique (Paris: La Découverte, 1985), 11–48, 23 (‘La cause paraît 
donc entendue: il n’existait rien qui ressemblât à une ethnie pendant la période 
précoloniale’).
2 Key texts of this trend are the following: Amselle and M’Bokolo (eds.), Cœur; Amselle, Jean-
Loup, Mestizo Logics: Anthropology of Identity in Africa and elsewhere (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1998), 11–8; Ranger, Terence, ‘The invention of tradition in colonial Africa’, in 
Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), 211–62, 247–50; Ranger, Terence, ‘The invention of tradition revisited: 
the case of colonial Africa’, in Terence Ranger and Olufemi Vaughan (eds.), Legitimacy and 
the State in Twentieth-Century Africa (London: Macmillan, 1993), 62–111; Vail, Leroy, 
‘Introduction: Ethnicity in Southern African History’, in Leroy Vail (ed.), The Creation of 
Tribalism in Southern Africa (Berkeley – Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991 
[reprint of James Currey, 1989]), 1–19, 6–7; Ranger, Terence, ‘Missionaries, migrants and the 
Manyika: the invention of ethnicity in Zimbabwe’, in ibid., 122–3; Jewsiewicki, Bogumil, ‘The 
Formation of the Political Culture of Ethnicity in the Belgian Congo, 1920–1959’, in ibid., 
324–49, 326–30.
3 Sachsenmaier, Dominic, Global Perspectives on Global History: Theories and Approaches in a 
Connected World (Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 57.
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has been at the heart of debates in African history.4 This book hopes to make a 
contribution to finding the connection.
In the public debate about ethnicity, the new interpretations from social 
anthropology and historical research on sub-Saharan Africa have had very lit-
tle impact from the outset.5 Even the ‘subjects of analysis’, including elites that 
would eventually read such studies, do not at all seem to feel that they live 
according to roles constructed by others. Among the local populations, we 
encounter a general feeling of certainty that ethnic criteria explain group affili-
ation and group hostilities.6 One might even argue that while ethnicity was 
deconstructed as a guiding principle by historians and anthropologists, the 
concept has become increasingly important for political and social relations in 
many parts of sub-Saharan Africa. Not only is it employed by political analysts 
and journalists from outside, who wish to simplify African topics for their read-
ers or audience,7 but African populations seem to embrace it, without being 
manipulated to do so: categories of ethnicity appear to play an essential role in 
their life.
A good example of the reappearance of ethnic solidarity after periods of rup-
ture is the effect of the 2007 elections in civil-war-torn Sierra Leone. In this 
small West African country, ethnic categories had been eclipsed in many areas 
during the 1990s, as a consequence of the Revolutionary United Front (ruf) 
rebellion.8 The civil war dramatically destabilised the existing patron-client 
networks based on ethnic labels.9 However, ethnic categories had not disap-
peared from national politics, as exemplified by the surprise win in the electoral 
4 Manning, Patrick, ‘African and World Historiography’, Journal of African History 54(2), 2013, 
319–30, 325–6.
5 MacGaffey, Wyatt, ‘Changing Representations in Central African History’, Journal of African 
History 46(2), 2006, 189–207, 189–91.
6 Chabal, Patrick, and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument (Oxford: 
James Currey – Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 61–2.
7 See the critical discussion in MacEachern, Scott, ‘Genes, Tribes, and African History’, Current 
Anthropology 41(3), 2000, 357–84, 361–3.
8 Gershoni, Yekutiel, ‘War without End and an End to a War: The Prolonged Wars in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone’, African Studies Review 40(3), 1997, 55–76, 60; Richards, Paul, Fighting for the 
Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone (Oxford: The International African 
Institute – James Currey, 1996), 90–5, Keen, David, Conflict & collusion in Sierra Leone (Oxford: 
James Currey – New York: Palgrave, 2001), 13–4, 82–92; others challenge the complete break-
down of ethnic solidarity, see Bangura, Yusuf, ‘Strategic Policy Failure and Governance in 
Sierra Leone’, Journal of Modern African Studies 38(4), 2000, 551–77, 543.
9 Van Gog, Janneke, Coming back from the bush: Gender, youth and reintegration in northern 
Sierra Leone (Leiden: African Studies Centre, 2008), 79–84.
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contest of 2007 on an ethnic ticket of the All People’s Congress (apc) candidate 
Ernest Bai Koroma. The apc victory seemed to indicate a return to the experi-
ences of the late 1950s and 1960s, when the Sierra Leone People’s Party (slpp) 
and the apc had fought for electoral victory, before the country had become a 
one-party state in 1978.10 Bai Koroma was supposed to have won the presidency 
as the candidate of the Temne, one of the two largest ethnic groups in Sierra 
Leone (together with allied groups from the north of the country).11 It seemed 
that ethnic thinking had (again) taken the lead in this West African country, 
and had not been destroyed through the destabilising experience of wide-
spread banditry, warlordism, and gang wars.
However, other examples from West Africa appear to show the opposite 
trend, at least at first glance. In Senegal, electoral behaviour and ethnicity do 
not seem to be at all linked: it has been held that ethnicity has lost its role and 
that the independent Republic of Senegal has been remarkably free from eth-
nic dispute as a consequence of successful social management.12 The obvious 
exception has been the separatist rebellion in Senegal’s southern province of 
Casamance, where the Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance 
(mfdc) is undoubtedly dominated by Jola-speakers. Nevertheless, the move-
ment’s leaders often describe their goals as ‘regionalist’ and not as ‘ethnic’ 
(while Wolof-speakers in the region indeed fear the ‘Jola’ as dangerous 
‘autochthons’).13
In other Senegalese regions, it is far more difficult to find signs of tensions 
arising around ethnic labels. It would, however, be worthwhile investigating 
10 Fisher, Humphrey J., ‘Elections and Coups in Sierra Leone, 1967’, Journal of Modern African 
Studies 7(4), 1969, 611–36.
11 Fridy, Kevin S., and Fredline A.O. M’Cormack-Hale, ‘Sierra Leone’s 2007 elections: monu-
mental and more of the same’, African Studies Quarterly 12(4), 2010/11, 39–57.
12 Diouf, Makhtar, Sénégal: Les Ethnies et la Nation (Dakar: Les Nouvelles Editions Africaines 
du Sénégal, 1998), 233.
13 Diouf, Mamadou, ‘Between Ethnic Memories & Colonial History in Senegal: The mfdc & 
the Struggle for Independence in Casamance’, in Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh, and Will 
Kymlicka (eds.), Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa (Oxford: James Currey – Athens/oh: 
Ohio University Press, 2004), 218–39, 218–9; Toliver-Diallo, Wilmetta J., ‘The Woman Who 
Was More than a Man’: Making Aline Sitoe Diatta into a National Heroine in Senegal’, 
Canadian Journal of African Studies 39(2), 2005, 338–60, 346; Foucher, Vincent, ‘Les 
‘évolués’, la migration, l’école: pour une nouvelle interprétation de la naissance du nation-
alisme casamançais’, in Momar Coumba Diop (ed.), Le Sénégal contemporain (Paris: 
Karthala, 2002), 375–424, 388; Evans, Martin, ‘Insecurity or Isolation? Natural Resources 
and Livelihoods in Lower Casamance’, Canadian Journal of African Studies 39(2), 2005, 
282–312, 302; Interview with ‘I. Sow’, Kabrousse, 28 Jan. 2006.
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whether hostilities of an ethnic nature existed in earlier phases, i.e. during 
periods of the nineteenth and twentieth century. Wolof-speakers and Sereer-
speakers seem to have been hostile to each other, and the ‘Pëls’ (Fulbe), as 
cattle owners, were an obvious target of negative stereotyping.14 As we will see, 
closer analysis of available archival documentation helps to recover narratives 
that were for a long time obscured, simplified, and standardised, in local mem-
ory and ‘traditional’ accounts.15
In the present-day Trans-Volta Region of Ghana and in south-west Togo,16 
ethnic allegiance is presented as irrelevant by central authorities. However, it 
has remained an important category of self-definition and has been crucial 
during moments of violent regime change. In particular, the Ewe-speakers of 
Ghana’s Trans-Volta Region claim to have been an underprivileged minority 
before the ascendancy to power in Accra of Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings in 
the 1980s and the electoral victories of the National Democratic Congress 
(ndc) after 2008. The Ewe case relates to the question of stability of national 
boundaries, as the Ewe language community can be found on both sides of the 
international border between Ghana and Togo. Cross-border claims of the 
Ewe-speaking community in the 1940s are, probably, the most outstanding 
West African case of political leaders demanding a revision of colonial borders 
and the creation of an ethnically homogenous territory.
All over West Africa – and elsewhere during the twentieth century, includ-
ing in Western Europe as Bambi Ceuppens and Peter Geschiere have shown – 
ideas of autochthony and of ethnic claims have frequently been intertwined 
with questions of an ‘authentic’ or ‘traditional’ organisation of power.17 In the 
colonial period, this search for ‘authenticity’ was both a rural and an urban 
14 ‘Pël’ is an expression in Wolof. Whenever I refer to the label given to members of this 
group, I will generally use ‘Fulbe’ or Fulfulde-speakers (Pulaar-speakers).
15 Interview with Ajjumà Niane, (Sereer) village chief of Niack-Sérère, in the hinterland of 
M’Bour, Senegal, 1 February 2008. Interestingly, the memory of those tensions has largely 
disappeared nowadays, but the many episodes of violence are vivid in evidence from the 
1950s.
16 I will speak of the ‘Trans-Volta Area’ – seen from Ghana – in describing the geographical 
zones of what is today Ghana’s Volta Region, the eastern part of Ghana’s Eastern Region 
(the Keta Peninsula and the region of Aflao and Denue), and the Republic of Togo’s 
Maritime and Plateau Regions (including the Préfectures of Golfe, Zio, Vo, Yoto, Haho, and 
Klouto).
17 Ceuppens, Bambi, and Peter Geschiere, ‘Autochthony: Local or Global? New Modes in the 
Struggle over Citizenship and Belonging in Africa and Europe’, Annual Review of 
Anthropology 34, 2005, 385–407.
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phenomenon.18 Colonial administrations needed collaborators at the regional 
and local level in order to guarantee the payment of taxes, the organisation of 
‘native justice’ and of forced labour, and the exercise of political and social 
control. So-called ‘headmen’, ‘chiefs’, and ‘paramount chiefs’, and their eventual 
competitors, therefore all had a say when it came to defining local histories 
and ethnic identifications.19 This engagement normally followed a clear logic, 
as questions of identification could be useful in making claims to ‘authenticity’ 
and ‘authentic rule’.20 Chieftaincy as a principle came under attack in the late 
colonial period and partly after independence; but it was only in rare cases 
fully removed, and it retained a role in the maintenance of ‘tradition’.21
In the border area between Togo and Ghana, chieftaincies are, to the pres-
ent day, still fairly intact, at least on the surface of the institution. In current-
day Ghana, chiefs appear to have considerable social prestige, while the 
decades of the Eyadéma dictatorship have made them a kind of ‘traditional 
bureaucrat’ in neighbouring Togo.22 By contrast, in the case of Senegal, chiefs 
lost their official role in district administration after 1959, although the institu-
tion continues to exist at village level.23 In Sierra Leone, the power of the chiefs 
waned only slowly under the independent state from 1961, as ‘traditional rulers’ 
continued to be of some importance during electoral events and in local 
18 On terminology, compare Farrar, Tarikhu, ‘When African Kings Became ‘Chiefs’: Some 
Transformations in European Perceptions of West African Civilization, c. 1450–1800’, 
Journal of Black Studies 23(2), 1992, 258–78, 259–60; Terray, Emmanuel, ‘Sociétés segmen-
taires, chefferies, Etats acquis et problèmes’, in Bogumil Jewsiewicki and Jocelyn 
Letourneau (eds.), Mode of Production. The Challenge of Africa (Sainte Foy: Safi Press, 
1985), 106–15.
19 Catherine Boone has offered masterful reflections on the relationship between regional 
elites – chiefs and others – and the nascent central states, see Boone, Catherine, Political 
Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice (Cambridge 
etc.: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 34–6.
20 Lombard, Jacques, Autorités traditionnelles et pouvoirs européens en Afrique noire (Paris: 
Armand Colin, 1967); Gocking, Roger S., ‘Indirect Rule in the Gold Coast: Competition for 
Office and the Invention of Tradition’, Canadian Journal of African Studies 28(3), 1994, 
421–46, 433–4. The expression ‘chieftaincy’ will be used in the absence of a better term.
21 Spear, Thomas, ‘Neo-Traditionalism and the Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa’, 
Journal of African History 44(1), 2003, 3–27, 15–6.
22 Rathbone, Richard, Nkrumah and the Chiefs: The Politics of Chieftaincy in Ghana 1951–60 
(Oxford: James Currey – Accra: F. Reimer – Athens/oh: Ohio University Press, 2000), 2–3; 
Nieuwaal, E. Adriaan B. van Rouveroy van, L’Etat en Afrique face a la chefferie: le cas du 
Togo (Paris: Karthala, 2000), 48–9.
23 Interview with Ajjumà Niane, (Sereer) village chief of Niack-Sérère, 1 February 2008.
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administration. In spite of the civil war experiences of the 1980s and 1990s, 
Sierra Leone’s chiefs retained some of their prestige in the rural areas.24
Ethnic claims are thus strongly connected to problems of the local and 
regional organisation of power, and therefore remain, in the contemporary 
period, an important category of political discussion.25 Although this does not 
yet prove the importance of the concept under pre-colonial and colonial con-
ditions, it needs to be taken into account as a factor. In a second step, global 
historians need of course to ask if this trend only holds importance in sub-
Saharan Africa. On the conceptual level, I will therefore discuss, later in this 
introduction, how the category is used in different parts of the world, and in 
the second chapter I will analyse the broader set of identifications on which 
individuals and groups relied in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
It is indubitable that in the post-colonial period, a number of major con-
flicts in the African continent have been caused or reinforced by perspectives 
of ethnic group antagonism.26 ‘Autochthons’ have been mobilised against 
‘strangers’, and violence has been justified by rhetoric about different ‘tribes’ 
and the stealing of rightfully possessed land.27 In this context, the shock of the 
Rwanda, Burundi and Congo massacres had the most forceful impact on 
research paradigms and on the view of African group solidarity in a global 
comparison.
 The Shock of the Great Lakes Massacres
With regard to violence defined as ‘ethnic’, post-colonial West Africa has rarely 
been on the centre-stage (with the exception of northern Ghana and Côte 
d’Ivoire in the 1990s and 2000s). On the contrary, the Central African experi-
ence of the 1990s has had a massive impact on public and scientific debates, 
and led to a revision of central premises in research on Africa. The Rwandan 
24 Jackson, Paul, ‘Reshuffling an Old Deck of Cards? The Politics of Local Government 
Reform in Sierra Leone’, African Affairs 106(422), 2007, 95–111, 101–2.
25 In Boone, Topographies – the main comparative approach to African policies in West 
Africa – ethnicity only has minor importance, see 335.
26 Bayart, Jean-François, L’Etat en Afrique: La Politique du Ventre (Paris: Fayard, 1989), 79.
27 Azam, Jean-Paul, ‘Looting and Conflict between Ethnoregional Groups: Lessons for State 
Formation in Africa’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 46(1), 2002, 131–53, 133; Boone, 
Catherine, Property and Political Order in Africa: Land Rights and the Structure of Politics 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 91–9. See also the new magisterial Lentz, 
Carola, Land, Mobility, and Belonging in West Africa: Natives and Strangers (Bloomington/ 
in: Indiana University Press, 2013).
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massacres were debated in the media as ‘tribal killings’ to be read through a 
primordial pattern of ancient solidarities and blood feuds.28 Amongst schol-
ars, events in Rwanda, Burundi and Congo-Kinshasa strengthened the case of 
those who had continued to argue for the primordialist view. It was undeniable 
that the massacres of 1994 in Rwanda had found widespread support with a 
population that had defined itself as ‘Hutu’, and that the events were linked to 
ethnically-framed violence that had taken place between 1959 and 1962. 
‘Constructivists’ had to admit that the ethnic categories played the decisive 
role in the violence, although they insisted that the categories were not at all 
predetermined, but actively created and maintained under colonial rule, and 
manipulated by a weakened post-colonial regime.29 These scholars continued 
to emphasise that the Tutsi and Hutu are only marginally distinct with regard 
to factors like language, which are usually referred to in order to define ethnic-
ity; and that the distinction was originally crafted through social facts.30
The position held by Central Africa in the discussion about ethnicity as a 
historical factor brings us to questions as to whether such observations can be 
generalised for other parts of sub-Saharan Africa. An astonishing number of 
studies on African history and cultures do not even expound the problem that 
‘Africa’ is only a geographically defined ensemble and, moreover, an artificial 
concept of thought, but not a cultural entity. It is very probable that the par-
ticular idea of a joint ‘African culture’ refers to a political dimension, which was 
developed during the colonial period and has been confirmed by the argumen-
tations of leaders and intellectuals of emancipationist movements active from 
the interwar period. It is difficult to see why ‘African cultures’ should be part of 
a united culture, except if these cultures are described as ‘Black cultures’. 
28 Eltringham, Nigel, ‘Debating the Rwandan Genocide’, in Preben Kaarsholm (ed.), Violence, 
Political Culture & Development in Africa (Oxford: James Currey – Athens/oh: Ohio 
University Press – Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2006), 66–91, 
88–90; Cooper, Frederick, Africa since 1940: The past of the present (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 2; Lemarchand, René, ‘Genocide in the Great Lakes: Which 
Genocide? Whose Genocide?’, African Studies Review 41(1), 1998, 3–16.
29 Mamdani, Mahmood, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the 
Genocide in Rwanda (Oxford: James Currey, 2001), 56–102; Chrétien, Jean-Pierre, Le défi de 
l’ethnisme: Rwanda et Burundi, 1990–1996 (Paris: Karthala, 1997), 30–7; Gahama, Joseph, 
and Augustin Mvuyekure, ‘Jeu ethnique, idéologie missionnaire et politique coloniale: Le 
cas du Burundi’, in Jean-Pierre Chrétien and Gérard Prunier (eds.), Les ethnies ont une 
histoire (second edition, Paris: Karthala, 2003), 303–24, 312.
30 Wimmer, Andreas, ‘Elementary strategies of ethnic boundary making’, Ethnic and Racial 
Studies 31(6), 2008, 1025–55, 1034; Prunier, Gérard, The Rwanda Crisis, 1959–1994: History of 
a Genocide (London: Hurst, 1997), 35–40.
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Evidently, phenotype as a criterion for group definition is absurd and unac-
ceptable for any scholar working on sub-Saharan Africa (or at least it should 
be). But if sub-Saharan Africa cannot automatically be considered as a homo-
geneous cultural unit, there are some other aspects that contribute to common 
experiences, at least for a couple of larger regions. Coastal West Africa, between 
the mouth of the Senegal River and the Niger Delta, offers a good selection of 
cases from a larger region, and these cases invite comparison. Historical expe-
rience fills the gap between communities. The regional trajectory of colonial-
ism and the contact of the region with the system of the Atlantic slave trade, 
are in fact two forceful common experiences. They were shared by many 
African populations, at least by those of West and Central Africa’s coastal belt 
between 1450 and 1960. It has to be pointed out that this emphasis on the expe-
rience of contact with the wider world does not imply a Eurocentric perspec-
tive; the history of contact and of the evolution of colonial rule was crucial for 
the historical experience of populations.
 Ethnicity and Global History (and Historiography)
While ethnicity has become a factor in studies that are part of the move towards 
global history, such studies have mainly favoured the question of networks and 
shifts in identification during migration and diaspora situations.31 The move 
towards a global labour history is exemplary for showing the importance of pro-
cesses in ‘non-western’ parts of the world.32 More often than not, however, it 
has not tackled concepts that are very much ‘reserved’ for one particular world 
31 Zeuske, Michael, ‘Historiography and Research Problems of Slavery and the Slave Trade in 
a Global-Historical Perspective’, International Review of Social History 57(1), 2012, 87–111; 
Davis, Nathalie Zemon, ‘Decentering History: Local Stories and Cultural Crossings in a 
Global World’, History and Theory 50(2), 2011, 188–202; Mohapatra, Prabhu P., ‘Eurocentrism, 
Forced Labour, and Global Migration: A Critical Assessment’, Inter national Review of Social 
History 52(1), 2007, 110–5; Mckeown, Adam, ‘Global Migration, 1846–1940’, Journal of World 
History 15(2), 2004, 155–89; O’Rourke, Kevin, and Jeffrey Williamson, Globalization and 
history: The evolution of a Nineteenth Century Atlantic Economy (Boston: mit Press, 1999); 
Bose, Sugata, A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in an Age of Global Empire 
(Cambridge/ma: Harvard University Press, 2006); Manning, Patrick, Navigating World 
History: Historians Create a Global Past (Basingstoke – New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003).
32 Eckert, Andreas, ‘What is Global Labour History Good For’, in Jürgen Kocka (ed.), Work in 
a Modern Society: The German Historical Experience in Comparative Perspective (Oxford: 
Berghahn, 2010), 169–81; Bennett, James, ‘Reflections on Writing Comparative and 
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region, or, as I will point out, has not attempted to interfere where the 
categories and parameters used for a concept of importance in historical 
 interpretation – like ‘ethnicity’ – are quite different for each particular world 
region.33 Understanding ethnicity as phenomenon in a larger region and put-
ting it into a broader framework of interpretation is therefore an essential 
approach.34 At the same time, it is fully compatible with demands for a global 
history that argue with the moral importance of the issue: it belongs to Jerry 
Bentley’s moral wagers to test the importance of a concept for one region – 
coastal West Africa in our case – and to put it afterwards into a larger frame-
work of global debate.35
Some scholars argue that ‘ethnicity’ as a factor of cultural difference works 
similarly in entirely distinct geographical arenas of the world.36 Their argu-
ment is perhaps not completely groundless, but existing designs that compare, 
for example, conditions in the Balkans with ‘tribes’ in Central Asia and warring 
groups in Sierra Leone, lack historical grounding and reflection about the cat-
egories of group identification. In other words, before attempting a compari-
son that brings in examples from various continents, it would be preferable to 
obtain more reliable analytical results for the history of ethnic affiliation in any 
of the regions taken as exemplary. Also, the use of ‘ethnicity’ as a category 
needs to be more broadly questioned.
The incongruent employment of ethnic affiliation as a category is indeed 
very problematic for global historical studies, and an immense concern for any 
study that wishes to bring African history into broader, global debates. 
Transnational Labour History’, History Compass 7(2), 2009, 376–94; Van der Linden, 
Marcel, Workers of the World: Essays toward a Global Labor History (Leiden: Brill, 2008).
33 This fits essentially into the (somewhat polemical) critique in Chakrabarty, Dipesh, 
Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000); Levander, Caroline, and Walter Mignolo, ‘The global 
south and world dis/order’, The Global South 5(1), 2011, 1–11.
34 See Manning, Navigating, 7.
35 Bentley, Jerry H., ‘Myths, Wagers, and Some Moral Implications of World History’, Journal 
of World History 16(1), 2005, 51–82.
36 Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War’, American 
Political Science Review 97(1), 2003, 75–90, 78; Mueller, John, ‘The Banality of ‘Ethnic War’, 
International Security 25(1), 2000, 42–70, passim; Henderson, Errol A., ‘Culture or 
Contiguity: Ethnic Conflict, the Similarity of States, and the Onset of War, 1820–1989’, 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41(5), 1997, 649–68, 650–1; Montalvo, José G., and Marta 
Reynal-Querol, ‘Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars’, American Economic 
Review 95(3), 2005, 796–816, 803; Bonneuil, Noël, and Nadia Auriat, ‘Fifty Years of Ethnic 
Conflict and Cohesion: 1945–94’, Journal of Peace Research 37(5), 2000, 563–81, 571–4.
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The abundant number of very different definitions is striking, confusing, and 
makes onerous the attempt to get to a more precise picture.37 Particularly 
remarkable is the extremely variable use of the word ‘ethnic’ itself; slightly 
 different meanings in different languages further confuse the issue; and, most 
problematically and most importantly, the employment of the expression in 
different geographical contexts is enormously divergent.38 A view on the global 
dimensions of ethnicity as a phenomenon will therefore help with the under-
standing of categories for a discussion of identifications within global history.
For sub-Saharan Africa, ‘ethnicity’, as a trope, has somewhat replaced the 
colonial concept of ‘tribe’. In academic use, ‘tribe’ has become an unacceptable 
term – and rightly so, as it is based on a biased and negative image of static 
communities and of underdevelopment, an image that follows colonial tradi-
tions. The terminological change towards ‘ethnicity’ probably enhanced the 
accuracy of group descriptions and eradicated some biases. ‘Ethnic group’ now 
appears to be a widely accepted concept for the African continent, whether 
scholars regard those groups as ‘primordial’ or as ‘constructed’.
However, specialists of sub-Saharan Africa tend to forget that the picture is 
different in other geographical zones. In the Americas, the notion of ethnicity 
as a concept to describe group identifications is far more hybrid, and often 
contradictory. As for Amerindian groups as a subject of study, the expression 
‘ethnic group’ is employed for smaller communities, and, ultimately, also for 
language groups (like Apache, Crew, etc).39 The same is true for the descen-
dants of Maroon communities – communities of refugee slaves organised in 
37 Alonso, Ana María, ‘The Politics of Space, Time and Substance: State Formation, 
Nationalism, and Ethnicity’, Annual Review of Anthropology 23, 1994, 379–405, 390.
38 It is impressive to note on which geographic regions genuine ‘ethnographic’ work has 
been done (and which have been totally left out), see the map in Naroll, Raoul, and 
Richard G. Sipes, ‘A Standard Ethnographic Sample: Second Edition’, Current Anthropology 
14(1/2), 1973, 111–40, 113.
39 See, for example, Talbert, Carol, ‘The Resurgence of Ethnicity Among American Indians: 
Some Comments on the Occupation of Wounded Knee’, in Frances Henry (ed.), Ethnicity in 
the Americas (The Hague: Mouton, 1976), 365–83, 374–7; Albers, Patricia C., ‘Changing 
Patterns of Ethnicity in the Northeastern Plains, 1780–1870, in Jonathan D. Hill (ed.), 
History, Power, and Identity: Ethnogenesis in the Americas, 1492–1992 (Iowa City: University 
of Iowa Press, 1996), 90–118, 92–4; Operé, Fernando, Historias de la frontera: el cautiverio en 
la América hispánica (Buenos Aires – Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica de 
Argentina, 2001), 15–21. A change can be identified in some more recent studies, such as 
Reséndez, Andrés, Changing National Identities at the Frontier: Texas and New Mexico, 
1800–1850 (Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 45–55, although he still 
speaks of ‘detribalized Indians’. For a comparative view on (older) research on sub-Saharan 
African and Amerindian groups, see Leach, Edmund, ‘Tribal Ethnography: past, present 
��Introduction
<UN>
the hinterland of the Caribbean and North American plantation zones. For 
those communities of the American continent, ‘ethnic group’ is sometimes 
used as an expression interchangeable with the older ‘tribe’, which still occa-
sionally appears.40 However, in the context of the nation-states in the Americas, 
‘ethnicity’ embodies a completely different concept. Here, it is linked to the 
origins of immigrant communities or to the status of ‘autochtony’ (for native 
groups or indígenas, for example). Particularly with regard to immigration into 
the United States, groups defined as ‘ethnic groups’ would be ‘the Irish’ or ‘the 
Italians’, ‘the Polish’, or ‘the Latinos’ (ultimately distinguished in sub-groups 
like the Cubans, Puerto Ricans, Mexicans etc).41 This use of the concept of 
‘ ethnic group’ already refers to origins expressed through a ‘national’ or ‘proto-
national’ community. In these examples, the Afro-Americans are usually 
presented as a singular ‘ethnic group’.42 For the Americas, this employment of 
the concept creates a simplified and artificial contradiction between ‘tribal 
zones’ and ‘organised societies’ where the ‘ethnic’ identification of immigrants 
is linked back to an established national community. The examples of classifi-
cation in the Americas therefore show how complicated (and biased) the 
employment of the category of ethnicity frequently is.
Concerning Europe, the use of classifications prompts similarly worrying 
reflections. The expression ‘ethnic’ appears to be mainly reserved for the 
Balkans region, and much less for the broader area of Eastern Europe.43 It is 
very unlikely that the category of ‘ethnic group’ would be employed for the 
Czechs or the Slovakians when discussed in the context of the Austro-Hungarian 
and future’, in Elizabeth Tonkin, Maryon McDonald, and Malcolm Chapman (eds.), History 
and Ethnicity (London: Routledge, 1989), 34–47, 44.
40 See the ‘classical overview’ in Price, Richard, ‘Introduction: Maroons and Their 
Communities’, in Richard Price (ed.), Maroon Societies: Rebel Slave Communities in the 
Americas (third edition, Baltimore – London: Johns Hopkins, 1996), 1–30, 20–2, 29.
41 A new example is Wirth, Christa, Memories of belonging: descendants of Italian migrants 
to the United States, 1884–present (Leiden – Boston: Brill, 2015).
42 ‘White ethnicity’ was then formulated against the Afro-American ‘otherness’, see Stein, 
Howard F., and Robert F. Hill, The Ethnic Imperative: Examining the New White Ethnic 
Movement (University Park – London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977), 23–6; 
Alba, Richard D., Ethnic Identity: The Transformation of White America (New Haven – 
London: Yale University Press, 1990), 23–5; and, especially, Merton, Joe, ‘Rethinking the 
Politics of White Ethnicity in 1970s America’, Historical Journal 55(3), 2012, 732–56.
43 Some exceptional studies do not have these geographic limits. See Northrup, David, 
‘Becoming African: Identity Formation among Liberated Slaves in Nineteenth-Century 
Sierra Leone’, Slavery & Abolition 27(1), 2006, 1–21, 2, or Jalali, Rita, and Seymour Martin 
Lipset, ‘Racial and Ethnic Conflicts: A Global Perspective’, Political Science Quarterly 
107(4), 1992–3, 585–606, 591–2, 594–5.
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Empire before 1918 (here, scholars tend to employ the expression ‘multi-
national’ instead of ‘multi-ethnic’).44 By contrast, for the conflicts in the Balkans 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, ‘ethnic group’ is a typical category of 
distinction.45
In public debates, this choice might again reflect a certain kind of racist 
preconception. The inconsistent employment of the concept of ‘ethnicity’ 
in different zones of Europe is at least suspect: from this perspective, the 
Balkan wars as somewhat ‘archaic’ incidents where groups clashed over 
deep ‘ethnic’ roots and allegiances, appear as fundamentally different from 
conflict in ‘civilised’ parts of Europe. From such a point of view, the use of 
the expression ‘ethnic cleansing’, which became popular in representing the 
massacres of ‘Serbo-Bosnian’ troops and of the Yugoslav (‘Serbian’) army 
during the two war phases in the first and the second half of the 1990s, is not 
really surprising. The category of ‘ethnic group’ is also employed in order to 
describe the different sides during the conflict in former Yugoslavia.46 In 
some cases, the use of this expression seems simply absurd, and is, from an 
empirical point of view, contradicted by facts: thus, during the 1990s civil 
war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, any distinction through ethnic criteria is 
entirely inappropriate, while religious practice was partly crucial for mobil-
isation. Attempts to publicly brand the Muslim population of Bosnia-
Herzegovina as ‘Turks’, show the artificial nature of ethnic concepts in this 
context. Individuals speaking the Shtokavian variant of the Serbo-Croatian 
language, and not being descendants of migrant populations were defined 
as ‘Turkish’ in war propaganda because of their Muslim religious practice: 
this demonstrates very well how flexible definitions of belonging can be 
44 There is a certain notion of describing a ‘tribal phase’ for Europe only for the period until 
the early medieval incursion of migrating groups, see Armstrong, John A., Nations before 
Nationalism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 27–32; Applegate, 
Celia, ‘A Europe of Regions: Reflections on the Historiography of Sub-National Places in 
Modern Times’, American Historical Review 104(4), 1999, 1157–82, 1181–2.
45 This remarkable fact is often implicitly understood, but rarely discussed, see Hobsbawm, 
Eric, ‘Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe today’, Anthropology today 8(1), 1992, 3–8, 3. 
Groundbreaking new studies for the context of ethnic mobilisation in the Balkans under 
declining Ottoman rule are Mirkova, Anna M., ‘“Population Politics” at the End of Empire: 
Migration and Sovereignty in Ottoman Eastern Rumelia, 1877–86’, Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 55(4), 2013, 955–85, and Nielsen, Jørgen S., Religion, ethnicity and con-
tested nationhood in the former Ottoman space (Leiden – Boston: Brill, 2012).
46 See Mueller, ‘Banality’, 44–58; Chrétien, Jean-Pierre, ‘Introduction’, in Jean-Pierre Chrétien 




handled.47 This being said, it remains an impressive fact that the expression 
‘ethnicity’ only very rarely appears in other European contexts. Outside of 
south-eastern Europe, violent conflict between the central state and 
regional groups has rarely led analysts to employ the term ‘ethnic’.48
The Spanish state is the obvious Western European example to illustrate the 
terminological differences inside European history. Few of the observers would 
call ‘the Spanish’ an ethnic group (even in a study of migration); but, likewise 
few scholars would address ‘the Catalans’ or ‘the Basques’ or other regional 
identifications as ‘ethnic’ (although this position has recently changed through 
the manipulative effort of Catalan ‘nationalist’ politicians).49 On the contrary, 
in academic studies, those group solidarities would probably be called ‘regional 
identities’ and described as ‘nations’ in (mostly politically motivated) analyses 
that favour the autonomist positions of some regionally active political move-
ments (in which ‘nation’ reflects an older sense, with a meaning of regional 
group in a neutral sense).50 However, it remains to be asked why Catalan (or, 
perhaps, Bavarian, or Auvergnat), should count as a ‘regional identity’ – but 
Wolof, Temne, or Ewe is characterised as an ‘ethnic group’.
More worrying and confusing from the global historical point of view, and 
very close indeed to similar problems to be found in North America regarding 
immigrant communities, it frequently occurs that individuals of (allegedly) vis-
ible African or Caribbean origins are described as members of an ‘ethnic group’, 
namely as ‘Black’ (ultimately vis-à-vis ‘Caucasian’).51 The latter complication in 
47 See the (thought-)provoking discussion in Cahen, Michel, La nationalisation du monde: 
Europe, Afrique – L’identité dans la démocratie (Paris – Montreal: Harmattan, 1999), 
179–94.
48 Cohen, Ronald, ‘Ethnicity: Focus and Problem in Anthropology’, Annual Review of 
Anthropology 7, 1978, 379–403, 384.
49 See for the long-term perspective, Elliott, John H., ‘Self-Perception and Decline in Early 
Seventeenth-Century Spain’, Past & Present 74, 1977, 41–61, 46, 60; Payne, Stanley, 
‘Nationalism, Regionalism and Micronationalism in Spain’, Journal of Contemporary 
History 26(3–4), 1991, 479–91, 484–5; Ben-Ami, Shlomo, ‘Basque Nationalism between 
Archaism and Modernity’, Journal of Contemporary History 26(3–4), 1991, 493–521, 504, 
514–5. More recent studies based on the analysis of archival data are Valverde Contreras, 
Beatriz, El Orgullo de la Nación: la Creación de la Identidad Nacional en las Conmemoraciones 
Culturales Españolas (1875–1905) (Madrid: csic, 2016); and Harrington, Thomas S., Public 
Intellectuals and Nation Building in the Iberian Peninsula, 1900–1925: the alchemy of identity 
(Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2015).
50 Inglehart, Ronald F., and Margaret Woodward, ‘Language Conflicts and Political 
Community’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 10(1), 1967, 27–45, 37–9.




labelling will be discussed when we come to the relationship between the con-
cepts of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘race’, but the severe problems of this definition are evi-
dent from the outset. Racial preconceptions are visibly inherent in the process 
of labelling: as we have seen, even in scholarly debates – mostly in sociology, 
political science, and migration studies – the expression ‘ethnic’ is mainly 
reserved for Africans, Amerindian North Americans, and groups of ‘tribal Asia’ – 
such as in ‘failed states’ like Afghanistan – or for ‘Arab tribes’, or for foreigners 
in the context of immigration. Therefore, the use of the concept is often 
employed for regions imagined as marginal, and for groups perceived as still 
not integrated into orderly political settings.52 Certainly, this does not mean 
that scholars consciously regard those groups as socially or culturally inferior, 
but the difference in the employment of the categories is, without any doubt, 
biased and disturbing.
 Exemplary Experiences in West Africa
I will attempt in this book to come from one broader, West African region to 
results on global issues of identification and community-building. My com-
parative design will include the Wolof living today in the post-colonial coun-
tries of Senegal and the Gambia, the Temne of present-day Sierra Leone, and 
the Ewe of the contemporary countries of Ghana and Togo (Map 1). Much 
more than some weak linguistic similarities and resemblences with regard to 
patrilineal family structures, the three groups share a broader historical experi-
ence. I will in what follows enumerate relevant factors; the early interaction 
with European merchants, the spread of larger religions imported from out-
side, and the confrontation with measures of colonial control and activities of 
taxation, are quite similar for all cases.
All linguistic groups that are known about had been fairly stable in their 
group structures in West Africa’s coastal regions.53 They all had an early experi-
ence with European merchants coming to their respective coasts to trade, 
mostly in relation to the traffic of slaves.54 The Wolof-speakers in the states of 
Kajoor, Bawol, Siin, or Saluum in Senegal and the different smaller communities 
52 Poutignat, Philippe, and Jocelyne Streiff-Fenart, Théories de l’ethnicité (second edition, 
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1999), 59.
53 Hair, P.E.H., ‘Ethnolinguistic Continuity on the Guinea Coast’, Journal of African History 
8(2), 1967, 247–68, 266–8.
54 Fage, J.D., ‘Slavery and the Slave Trade in the Context of West African History’, Journal of 
African History 10(3), 1969, 393–404, 396.
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ruled by Wolophone elites in the region of the Gambia River participated as 
much in the trade as groups on the Sierra Leonean coast and African merchants 
in the Volta River region and the coastal lagoons further eastwards.55 Even pop-
ulations that refused an active participation in the trade, had to position them-
selves with regard to such practices.56
Therefore, the Wolof, Temne and Ewe, and their neighbours, were influ-
enced by their early interactions with Europeans.57 Wolof-speakers had been 
neighbours of French factories and fortresses since the later seventeenth cen-
tury (and they had known other European merchants from the fifteenth 
century).58 Temne-speakers had to cope with the neighbourhood of the British 
colony of Sierra Leone only from 1787, but they had earlier contacts with 
Europeans.59 The Ewe were integrated in networks at the Keta Lagoon that 
linked them to the Danish in the region, and with British merchants at Little-
Popo.60 The three regions therefore had a considerable number of middlemen 
as catalysts in a certain political and cultural homogenisation of the societies: 
such as the Signares in Gorée, Creole settlers and their Temne partners; and 
intermediaries in the Gold Coast’s southern coastal plains.61
In religious terms, all three groups were entangled, during the period 
between the mid-nineteenth century and the 1960s, in a process of religious 
conversion and homogenisation. This process has sometimes been dis-
cussed in the literature as a reaction to the shock of colonisation and of the 
55 Thornton, John K., Africa and Africans in the making of the Atlantic World, 1400–1680 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 68–9; Law, Robin, and Kristin Mann, 
‘West Africa in the Atlantic Community: The Case of the Slave Coast’, William and Mary 
Quarterly 56(2), 1999, 307–34, 316–9.
56 Klein, Martin A., ‘The Slave Trade and Decentralized Societies’, Journal of African History 
42(1), 2001, 49–65, 56–7; Searing, James F., ‘“No Kings, no Lords, no Slaves:” Ethnicity and 
Religion among the Sereer-Safèn of Western Bawol, 1700–1914’, Journal of African History 
43(3), 2002, 407–29, 412–3.
57 Eltis, David, and Lawrence C. Jennings, ‘Trade between Western Africa and the Atlantic 
World in the Pre-Colonial Era’, American Historical Review 93(4), 1988, 936–59, 952–3.
58 Sinou, Alain, Comptoirs et villes coloniales du Sénégal: Saint-Louis, Gorée, Dakar (Paris: 
Karthala – Editions de l’ORSTOM, 1999).
59 Kup, Peter Alexander, A history of Sierra Leone: 1400–1787 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1961), 68–81, 89–91.
60 Strickrodt, Silke, ‘A Neglected Source for the History of Little Popo: The Thomas Miles 
Papers ca. 1789–1796’, History in Africa 28, 2001, 293–330.
61 Spitzer, Leo, The Creoles of Sierra Leone: Responses to Colonialism, 1870–1945 (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), 75.
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Afro-European cultural encounter.62 It was a slow process. The vast majority 
of Wolof-speakers or Temne-speakers cannot be considered practising 
Muslims in the second half of the nineteenth century: the Wolophone elites 
had officially become Muslims, but even after Nasir al-Din’s jihad in the sev-
enteenth century, the effect of Islam on the majority of the Wolof popula-
tions remained limited before the 1870s.63 Temne-speakers of Sierra Leone 
lived in regions adjacent to the geographical centres of jihads of the eigh-
teenth century, but the majority of the Temne did not come under a stable 
Muslim influence before around 1900, in spite of relative proximity to reli-
gious centres such as Timbo and Forékaria.
Both communities – Wolof and Temne – were less concerned by the effect 
of jihads, but most of their members turned to the Muslim faith through the 
long-term work of itinerant clerics (‘marabouts’). The process often advanced 
more notably under the conditions of colonial rule, when the ‘pacification’ of 
large regions had enhanced the mobility of preachers. The European colonis-
ers in the end became the staunchest collaborators of the Sufi brotherhoods. 
They favoured the social role of those religious groups, and employed them as 
62 Crowder, Michael, West Africa under Colonial Rule (fourth edition, London: Hutchinson, 
in association with Benin City: Ethiope Publishing Corporation, 1976 [1968]), 31–42.
63 Curtin, Philip D., ‘Jihad in West Africa: Early Phases and Inter-Relations in Mauritania and 
Senegal’, Journal of African History 12(1), 1971, 11–24, 13–4.







































auxiliaries in the task of controlling the zones of the West African interior – in 
particular in the cases of the Muridiyya and the Tijaniyya in Senegal, for 
 example.64 At the end of the colonial period, the Temne and Wolof popula-
tions had in their overwhelming majority become Muslims.
The religious evolution of the Ewe is analogous to the advancement of Islam 
in Senegambia and Sierra Leone. In the region east of the Volta River, the new 
impact of the Christian religion followed similar patterns. Protestant mission-
ary efforts protected by the German and British colonial rulers, later followed 
by Catholic colleagues, guaranteed that Ewe-speakers gradually converted.65 
The link to official colonial policies of this missionary effort was even stronger 
than cooperation with Islamic leaders in other parts of West Africa: missionar-
ies more directly took part in educational matters, and they held the keys to 
access to particular linguistic and professional skills that helped to start careers 
under colonial rule (something that Muslim brotherhoods could not offer). In 
all three cases, European officials regarded religious leaders as allies and col-
laborators in the control of the region, regardless of whether they were 
Christians or Muslims.66
Reactions to socio-economic change under European rule are also compa-
rable. All three communities were inclined to resist the tax demands of the 
new colonial states. The Hut Tax War by the Temne-speakers in 1898 rebel-
ling against British tax measures was the most impressive case. In the Volta 
River area, Ewe-speakers evaded tax demands using the colonial border, 
which they also profited from for contraband trade.67 In the coastal regions 
of Senegal south of Dakar and Rufisque, mass flights happened as well, 
although the refugees were Sereer-speakers rather than Wolof-speakers. In 
the Gambia, Wolof-speaking groups also fled from tax payments using their 
‘borderland situation’.
We can thus rely on a set of common experiences shared by the three larger 
population groups that are the focus of my study.
64 Robinson, David, ‘France as a Muslim Power in West Africa’, Africa Today 46(3–4), 1999, 
105–27; Grandhomme, Hélène, ‘La politique musulmane de la France au Sénégal (1936–
1964)’, Canadian Journal of African Studies 38(2), 2004, 237–78, 244–6.
65 Debrunner, Hans, A Church between Colonial Powers: A Study of the Church in Togo 
(London: Lutterworth, 1965), 134–6.
66 Ellis, Stephen, and Gerrie ter Haar, ‘Religion and Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Journal of 
Modern African Studies 36(2), 1998, 175–201, 187–92.
67 Nugent, Paul, Smugglers, Secessionists & Loyal Citizens on the Ghana-Togo Frontier: The Lie 
of the Borderlands Since 1914 (Athens/oh: Ohio University Press – Oxford: James Currey – 
Legon: Sub-Saharan Publishers, 2002), 35–8.
chapter ��8
<UN>
I will also show that another factor – that of the basic political organisation 
of communities – is crucial to the use of ethnic categories. For this reason, it 
makes sense to compare communities with important differences in their 
political structures, which were influential from 1850 or earlier onwards.68 The 
negative relationship between the formalisation and the strength of state struc-
tures on the one hand, and reliance on solidarities formulated through ethnic 
terms on the other hand, will be a principal observation in this analysis.
Political entities in Senegambia were mostly ‘strong pre-colonial states’ 
within a ‘relatively stable political system’.69  They were dependent upon larger 
pre-colonial administrative routines and institutions – including regular taxes, 
ruling dynasties, and a certain type of provincial government and officials. In 
the southward direction towards the Gambia River, Wolof-speakers still held 
political power, but the units in place were far smaller: in many cases, these 
Wolophone rulers were themselves subjects of Mandinka-speakers or Fulfulde-
speakers. Therefore, for the Wolof-speaking members of such communities, 
political institutions were experienced as far less reliable.
Both the Temne and the Ewe had less elaborate political structures than 
those existent in Senegambia. Among Temne-speakers, political leaders never 
controlled larger territories. Some had at least a certain charisma as war lead-
ers, but they did not command a provincial administration in their own right. 
Amongst the Ewe, the picture is mixed. Anlo on the Keta Lagoon, and Peki 
close to the Volta River, are two political units that could rightly be counted as 
pre-colonial states. After 1833 Peki had a certain influence, for decades, over a 
larger group of Ewe-speaking inhabitants of the region. Anlo made a name for 
itself, in the coastal areas, as a rather important political player. However, as 
I will discuss in detail, political leadership did not bring with it any more for-
malised, more durable position of power. I will shed light on the relationship 
between the pre-colonial political experience, and the emergence of identifi-
cations in the colonial period, through the long-term perspective used in this 
study.
Finally, we come to the effect of urbanisation as an experience under colo-
nial rule, with beginnings that are even older. All three cases involved rural 
populations that fed one or more growing urban centres in the vicinity of their 
main regions of settlement – Accra and Lomé in the case of Ewe-speakers; 
Dakar and, to a much lesser degree, the agglomeration of Bathurst in the 
Gambia for Wolof-speakers; and Freetown and the Sierra Leone Peninsula for 
68 Compare the methodology chosen in Boone, Topographies, 38–42.
69 Colvin, Lucie Gallistel, ‘Theoretical Issues in Historical International Politics: The Case of 
the Senegambia’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History 8(1), 1977, 23–44, 24–5.
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Temne-speakers.70 While it is an exceedingly linear vision to consider the 
migration experiences into these urban centres as an automatic process of lan-
guage homogenisation among neighbouring ethnic groups, it is nonetheless 
evident that migration and concentration of groups helped to reinforce cul-
tural change. The unknown living conditions in the urban environment could, 
however, also strengthen ethnic modes of self-identification: in the sense of 
identities that facilitated getting along in a foreign and possibly hostile envi-
ronment.71 These changes eventually spilled back into the communities of 
origin, by processes of constant exchange between the latter and the migrant 
communities in the cities.
Therefore, we find on the one hand considerable similarities in the histori-
cal trajectories of the three population groups used as case studies: their inte-
gration into the Atlantic slave trade, their early encounters with European 
merchants and company personnel, their similar experience of the European 
conquest, and the colonial contribution to the rise of a regional majority reli-
gion, which all follow comparable patterns. These common historical trajecto-
ries posed similar problems for the communities in question, and, in particular, 
for their political elites and rulers. On the other hand, the three groups anal-
ysed find themselves at very different degrees on the scale of pre-colonial state 
organisation. I will still discuss ‘state’ and ‘state institutions’ as one variable for 
forming identifications, in contrast to ethnic status, community affiliation, 
family group, or religion.
A comparison of three groups is challenging. This is even more the case if 
the results are supposed to be put into a global historical perspective. The 
approach necessitates a methodology that diverges from the standard reper-
toire of area studies, and is flexible to the needs of comparison and integration 
into larger trends.
 The Methodological Panorama: A (Critical) Return to Colonial 
Sources and the Afro-European Encounter
Global history has long gone beyond the point where it had to receive input 
from specialists on sub-Saharan Africa to overcome its Eurocentric nature, as 
70 Tabouret-Keller, Andrée, ‘Language Use in Relation to the Growth of Towns in West Africa – 
A Survey’, International Migration Review 5(2), 1971, 180–203, 191–4, 196.
71 Unfortunately, the study of John Wiseman on post-colonial urban riots in West Africa 
completely omits the variable of ethnicity, see Wiseman, John, ‘Urban Riots in West 
Africa, 1977–85’, Journal of Modern African Studies 24(3), 1986, 509–18, 512–3.
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Steven Feierman had expressed it in the 1990s.72 Historians, who are trying to 
discuss regional phenomena against the background of global patterns or 
trends, are now aware that Eurocentric biases are present in many of the written 
sources.73 For comparative studies which often need to follow situations seen as 
scandals and larger themes of discussion that were defined by the interaction of 
the colonial state and local populations, these written sources remain the prin-
cipal resource. It is frequently a considerable challenge to identify them, and to 
put them into comparative designs. As long as a global historian starting out 
from regional analysis in Africa is able to tackle the problem of Eurocentrism in 
the written sources, these sources are crucial for new, comparative designs. This 
is not at all a step back into conservative views on methodology and source 
material. It needs to be seen as a re-evaluation of sources for important open 
questions to find broader designs that are interesting for global history.
Historians working on sub-Saharan Africa have, over the last five decades, 
established new standards in the employment of source material. They have 
become increasingly opposed to the Eurocentric and sometimes openly racist 
vision that characterised research on Africa until independence (and some-
times far beyond).74 This vision has been tackled by ambitious area studies, 
where historians have sought interdisciplinary approaches through the 
employment of field interviews and the quest for oral traditions in particular.75 
The principal idea was to find alternative voices and to bypass the monopoly of 
documents written by the colonisers. This process has been successful in many 
respects, and particularly so where detailed regional studies on small commu-
nities are concerned.
72 Feierman, Steven, ‘African histories and the dissolution of world history’, in Robert H. 
Bates, V.Y. Mudimbe, and Jean O’Barr (eds.), Africa and the Disciplines: The Contributions 
of Research in Africa to the Social Sciences and Humanities (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1993), 167–212.
73 Iriye, Akira, Global and Transnational History: The Past, Present, and Future (Basingstoke – 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 11–2; Lucassen, Jan; Leo Lucassen and Patrick 
Manning, ‘Migration History: Multidisciplinary Approaches’, in Jan Lucassen, Leo 
Lucassen, and Patrick Manning (eds.), Migration History in World History: Multidisciplinary 
Approaches (Brill: Leiden – Boston, 2010), 3–35, 12.
74 As becomes evident from Ali Mazrui’s critical comment on Hugh Trevor-Roper’s discus-
sion of ‘African history’ in a public television lecture, see Mazrui, Ali A., ‘European 
Exploration and Africa’s Self-Discovery’, Journal of Modern African Studies 7(4), 1969, 
661–76, 668–70.
75 Chrétien, Jean-Pierre, ‘Confronting the Unequal Exchange of the Oral and the Written’, in 
Bogumil Jewsiewicki and David Newbury (eds.), African Historiographies: What History for 
Which Africa? (Beverly Hills – London – New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1986), 75–90, 88–9.
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Obviously, the reliance upon oral information brings a number of problems 
with it regarding the verification of empirical data. Documents can be re-
encountered, but for interviews the situation is mostly impossible to repro-
duce.76 A number of historians have discussed these problems in more detail, 
and have given practical advice for the use of oral information.77 In spite of 
these debates, some of the broader implications that a strong reliance of the 
historian upon field interviews causes would still need more discussion. I do 
not intend to offer such a discussion in my book, as my study can only employ 
these results from more regional and local approaches to question my own 
interpretation. My study will hopefully give a basis for new fieldwork. The 
research design employed here is not that of a local history; therefore, oral 
interviews do not have the same importance. Comparative analysis cannot be 
based on the isolated, village-level field interviews, and not even upon unsys-
tematic interviews with political and social leaders, which are also typical for 
local histories. A good comparison of identifications over broader regions 
needs particular moments in which these identifications are mobilised; these 
moments are spread over a region and can often only be found with recourse 
to the unifying effect of the colonial encounter, and to colonial observations. 
Crucial moments of mobilisation are the situations of – administrative – 
encounters with agents of the colonial power, when spokeswomen or spokes-
men of communities presented their identifications to these agents. This 
historical encounter can mainly be found in written sources, of which an 
important percentage has remained entirely uninterpreted.
For the broad and comparative research design, I will thus rely on an approach 
where the interaction between local populations and structures of colonial rule 
guides us towards the critical encounters in which identifications were pre-
sented and renegotiated. This approach allows me to profit from archival docu-
mentation in new, innovative ways (concentrating on ‘the African voice’ inside 
this documentation). Oral testimony may give additional illustration, and 
76 Cooper, Frederick, ‘Africa’s Pasts and Africa’s Historians’, Canadian Journal of African 
Studies 34(2), 2000, 298–336, 315; Wright, Donald R., ‘Requiem for the Use of Oral Tradition 
to Reconstruct the Precolonial History of the Lower Gambia’, History in Africa 18, 1991, 
399–408, 399–400. If the interviews are not recorded, the methodological problem is even 
greater. Nevertheless, many ‘Africanists’ have decided that it is better to renounce the 
recording of oral data. For example, Adam Jones remarks that ‘some informants were 
disturbed’ by the use of tape recorders; therefore, he only very rarely employed them, see 
Jones, Adam, ‘Some reflections on the oral traditions of the Galinhas Country, Sierra 
Leone’, History in Africa 12, 1985, 151–65, 151.
77 Tonkin, Elizabeth, Narrating our pasts: The social construction of oral history (Cambridge – 
New York – Victoria: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 113–5.
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insights from neighbouring fields – namely anthropology – will certainly be 
employed, but I will mainly rely upon lifting new archival sources, and giving an 
important reinterpretation of others that are already known.78
Oral testimony still holds another role. Anthropological observations by 
European visitors were often integrated into local perceptions and group iden-
tification. In some cases, the results of interviews held in the colonial period 
were used in local strategies of argumentation. For example, the ‘traditional 
ruler’ of Kudje in Buem State in former British Togoland, as a local informant, 
referred explicitly to European scholarship in a 1964 complaint to post-colonial 
Ghanaian president Kwame Nkrumah. In this account, with which the ruler 
tried to foster his claims for an independent paramount chieftaincy, Akuamoa 
iv referred to the early correspondence of missionaries in the area. This cor-
respondence, which Akuamoa had read in its published form, then became 
the cornerstone of the chief ’s argumentation. His ingenious employment of 
available historical information, reinterpreted as part of his oral narrative, 
shows that informants were quite apt to integrate older oral information they 
had found in published form.79
Also – in the same region – the monumental account on the Ewe by Jakob 
Spieth was reread in its German version by locals who had obtained profi-
ciency in the German language before 1914. They subsequently translated 
their impressions into demands for political privileges in the 1950s, for exam-
ple with regard to the conflict between the communities of Ho-Dome and 
Ho-Bankoe disputing the paramount chieftaincy of Ho Division. The two 
communities in conflict based their claims on oral narratives that consis-
tently built in references to the authority of the ‘Western scholar’!80 Similar 
78 Henige, David P., The Chronology of Oral Tradition: Quest for a Chimera (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1974), 55–70.
79 Public Records and Administration Department, Ho Branch, Ghana (praad (Ho 
Branch)), NA/47 (unclassified dossier), Nana Akuamoa, Nifahene of Buem Traditional 
Area and Chief of Kudje, to Kwame Nkrumah, President of Ghana, The Humble Petition of 
Nana Akuamoa iv, Nifahene of the Buem Traditional Area, Volta Region, most respectfully 
sheweth: (without number), 15 August 1964, p. 4.
80 Public Records and Administration Department, Accra, Ghana (praad (Accra)), adm 
39/1/458, Hayi Komla, Stool Father of Bankoe; Philip Keh, Regent of Bankoe; Joseph Akpo, 
Stool Owner of Bankoe; and others, Resolution of Bankoe Divisional Council with 
Constitutional, Political, and Historical Backgrounds for Recognition as Independent Division 
in Ho Town. (without number), 2 Aug. 1951, p. 1. The Assistant District Commissioner asked 
the Bankoe Community to lend him this German work! See praad (Accra), adm 39/1/458, 




attempts have occurred in many other zones of coastal West Africa, and they 
show the openness of the material to reinterpretation, even with the help of 
‘European results’.
Migration claims are one of the typical elements of information that was 
orally given to colonial administrations in moments of interaction. Informants, 
who wished to sustain the privileges of their group, were often engaged in 
 presenting long traditions of such migration.81 While the experience of long- 
distance movement has become a principal issue of global historical appro-
aches, little has been achieved in view of understanding traditions of migration 
as claims for political primacy and demands for land. In a global history per-
spective, it would be an important future challenge to discuss the role of such 
traditions in the world and over time.82
It appears, therefore, to be reasonable to concentrate here on African 
voices as they appear in documentation. This appearance is, as I will show, 
very frequent. The key moments are characterised by the entanglements of 
the colonial encounter, in which informants had to ‘sell’ their role and their 
privileges, i.e. present them as ‘authentic’ to the colonial authorities. 
However, this approach naturally brings us to question, once again, the reli-
ability of written material. If we want to use it to analyse the mobilisation of 
identifications and even claim that the voices of Africans can be filtered out 
of Eurocentric biases, we need to discuss its problems. Obviously, much of 
the documentation was produced by an administration of rulers who were 
relatively unfamiliar with local realities, whose impressions were skewed by 
cultural preconceptions and stereotypes, and who did not quite understand 
the strategic elements of using group labels – such as ‘Temne’, ‘Wolof ’, or 
‘Ewe’.
Colonial administrators were interested in a number of basic tasks, such as 
taxation and recruitment of labour. Self-perceptions of colonial subjects were 
not necessarily a part of their concerns. From the nineteenth century onwards, 
some European officials were nevertheless engaged in pseudo-academic clas-
sification, as ethnographic ‘amateurs’, although largely in an insensitive and 
unreflective manner. However, some of these filters have become better 
81 Those legends of migration are frequently very problematic, see, among others, the cri-
tiques of Forkl, Hermann, ‘Publish or Perish, or How to Write a Social History of the 
Wandala (Northern Cameroon)’, History in Africa 18, 1990, 77–94, 88–9; Laumann, Dennis, 
‘The History of the Ewe of Togo and Benin from Pre-Colonial to Post-Colonial Times’, in 
Benjamin Lawrance (ed.), A Handbook of Eweland: The Ewe of Togo and Benin (Accra: 
Woeli Publishing Services, 2005), 14–28, 16.
82 See, however, Lentz, Land, 212–23.
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understood, as far as the role of anthropology under colonial rule and its 
shaky categories are concerned.83 Local Africans were seen as indispensable 
as a labour force, but ‘modernisation’ was only an issue with regard to a small 
group of them. For the rest of the colonial subjects, regarded as members of 
static communities, European officials took the ‘tribal’ group criteria that 
were no longer considered useful for ‘modern’ national societies, as adequate 
and inevitable.84 This created flawed categorisations and an idea of simple 
social mechanisms. Moreover, as Emily Lynn Osborn has pointed out, transla-
tors and other intermediaries in West Africa (and in other colonial contexts) 
swamped European colonial administrations with manipulated information 
or erroneous interpretations.85
Nowadays, the critical historian is able to cope with these challenges. 
Moreover, administrative reports carry an underestimated amount of voices of 
African informants – and the historian, with some precautions, is able to anal-
yse them in order to explain group solidarities.86 Also, the colonial context 
needed some element of accurate reporting and of engaged analysis, and 
information coming from ‘native clerks’ normally had sufficient grounding in 
their societies of origin to bring in at least some of the respective narratives 
circulating in these societies.87 In other words, even if intermediaries attempted 
83 Urry, James, ‘“Notes and Queries on Anthropology” and the Development of Field Methods 
in British Anthropology, 1870–1920’, Proceedings of the Royal Anthropological Institute of 
Great Britain and Ireland 1972, 45–57, 48–50; Sibeud, Emmanuelle, Une science impériale 
pour l’Afrique?: la construction des savoirs africanistes en France 1878–1930 (Paris: Editions de 
l’EHESS, 2002); Conklin, Alice, In the Museum of Man: Race, Anthropology, and Empire in 
France, 1850–1950 (Ithaca/ny: Cornell University Press, 2013); Grosz-Ngaté, Maria, ‘Power 
and knowledge, the representation of the Mande world in the works of Park, Callié, Monteil 
and Delafosse’, Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines 28(3–4), 111/112, 1988, 485–511; Lentz, Carola, 
Ethnicity and the Making of History in Northern Ghana (Accra: Woeli Publishing Services, 
2007 [first published Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006]), 93; MacGaffey, Wyatt, 
‘Death of a king, death of a kingdom? Social pluralism and succession to high office in 
Dagbon, northern Ghana’, Journal of Modern African Studies 44(1), 2006, 79–99, 82.
84 Cooper, Frederick, Decolonization and African society: the labor question in French and 
British Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 48, 58–60, 154.
85 Osborn, Emily Lynn, ‘“Circle of Iron:” African Colonial Employees and the Interpretation 
of Colonial Rule in French West Africa’, Journal of African History 44(1), 2003, 29–50.
86 Moreover, rumours and gossip appear in European documents from the colonial period – 
but the rumours conveyed by the colonial documentation are the contemporary rumours. 
See White, Luise, Speaking with Vampires: Rumor and gossip in colonial Africa (Berkeley – 
Los Angeles – London: University of California Press, 2000), 58–85.




to manipulate European officials, not everything they transmitted as informa-
tion was incorrect or invented.
With regard to political entities and their relationship to communities, 
European administrators were particularly interested in more strongly central-
ised regional structures, which they perceived as being in a ‘decadent’ or ‘prim-
itive’ state, but as comparable to the results of nation-building in the European 
continent and elsewhere in the world.88 Where no identifiable structures were 
immediately found, it was often judged appropriate to create them, to in effect 
give the locals back ‘what had been theirs’. Classifying the customary behav-
iour of the surrounding ‘people’, or ‘peoples’, was thus regarded a necessary 
undertaking in order to govern those groups in ‘appropriate ways’. It is evident 
that such an enterprise again left much space for misunderstandings and mis-
takes, and opened the doors to processes of invention of traditions – even if 
Europeans understood some of the basic terminology of group labels in the 
region.
It is a central goal of this book to understand whether the labelling of groups 
was only a top-down process fuelled by the colonial administration and by its 
closest collaborators. Several scholars have made this point over the years, but 
they have rarely analysed the concrete situations where communities or some 
of their representatives explained or ‘sold’ their group identifications to the 
agents of the colonial state. Therefore, I will attempt to understand under 
which conditions such concepts were crafted and received, adapted and uti-
lised over time by the locals themselves. I will then interpret the preconditions 
of group conflict in the different West African regions.
Mediated by the colonial documents, it is possible to find out when local 
groups relied on particular arguments and labels to engage in a creative com-
munication, in which those labels assisted them eventually to gain their point. 
During the colonial period, locals had no choice but to engage in discussion of 
those categories when approaching European administrators. Access to land, 
quests for political leadership, demands for administrative autonomy were all 
issues in which opinions about ethnic solidarity were important. Many of 
those formulations are documented, through petitions, letters, and process 
minutes. What they tell us about ethnic affiliation may not be the established 
truth over the centuries, nor need they reflect the effective cultural bonds dur-
ing a circumscribed period. Nonetheless, such documents describe the limits 
of formulating solidarity, they correspond to how far local leaders could go in 
88 Wilks, Ivor, ‘Asante nationhood and colonial administrators’, in Carola Lentz and Paul 
Nugent (eds.), Ethnicity in Ghana: the limits of invention (Basingstoke: Macmillan – New 
York: St. Martin’s, 2000), 68–92.
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calling for group solidarity; they also show on which occasions an ethnic argu-
ment is really feasible.
This debate over ethnicity and solidarity is an aspect that in documents 
makes itself visible in important ways. For colonial documents whose authors 
had an established knowledge of the employment of local information, and 
with an awareness of the vested interests of informants appearing within the 
sources, profound analysis is nonetheless possible. Unsurprisingly, it is still 
more difficult to describe the situation at the end of the pre-colonial period 
through European documentation. However, even in that period, European 
visitors sometimes show good knowledge of local conditions and group rela-
tions, and in the more important cases it appears plausible that they must have 
repeated claims of reliable local informants (although this has to be pointed 
out on a case-by-case basis). Although such travellers’ accounts are, of course, 
‘Eurocentric’ in the sense that we do not normally learn who exactly their 
informants were, there is no need to reject the information contained therein 
altogether, particularly if these accounts are compared with later, colonial 
sources.89 The changes of the conquest period (between 1840 and 1900 for our 
West African cases) lead in practice to an engaged discussion of group solidari-
ties, and to the temporary appearance of extremely violent struggles. During 
these struggles, both the support of the European invaders, and that of imag-
ined ethnic brethren, were frequently welcome. It is thus unsurprising that 
those circumstances offer us a large range of material, as local populations had 
to redefine their alliances and to reformulate their claims, which they did by 
interaction with the European conquerors.
The approach chosen in this study is, given the complexities outlined above, 
both modest and bold. I hope to interpret how, in their interactions with a 
frequently under-informed European administration, African communities 
(and, usually, their elites and spokesmen) in coastal West Africa presented 
themselves. Under which circumstances did they refer to ethnic labels? Can 
we make out a sort of consistent pattern that describes such recourse to eth-
nicity? Did the establishment of colonial rule after the turbulent period of 
conquest stimulate a more frequent employment of such ethnic labels – 
through their imposition on local societies by colonial classification, for exam-
ple, as has frequently been argued in the literature? Or would the stabilisation 
of (alien) political structures mean that the recourse to ethnicity became less 
attractive? And, finally, how could such results usefully be put into a panorama 
of global patterns, concerning the use of ethnic claims?
89 Ross, David, ‘Mid-Nineteenth Century Dahomey: Recent Views vs. Contemporary 
Evidence’, History in Africa 12, 1985, 307–23.
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Africans used their claims to belong to groups of a particular identity under 
very divergent circumstances. In the phase of colonial conquest, such claims 
were usually made to ‘inform’ a potential European partner about the legiti-
macy of warfare in a given region. The goal was to convince Europeans of the 
necessity of intervening in favour of the ‘traditionally legitimate’ party. In the 
post-conquest phase, with local warfare effectively banned, questions of local 
power inside the colonial structures, and access to land, became more impor-
tant. The conquerors set up or employed ‘authentic’ native courts, where such 
questions would abundantly be discussed.90 European administrators became 
increasingly convinced until the end of the First World War, that an ‘authentic’ 
local administration was both useful and just. Officials in the field were thus 
eager to understand the group settings in the regions they ruled, and were 
more and more open to accepting information from the African side. African 
local authorities were the first to approach colonial agents, in order to obtain 
the latter’s support in land cases in which they referred to the ‘traditional 
rights’ of their respective group in a number of cases.91 However, while the 
brokering of ‘traditional rights’, and access to traditions of origin, were nor-
mally linked to local power, other individuals were not necessarily excluded 
from the process. In fact, particularly for the well-known case of the pre- 
colonial state of Asante coming under British control, it is frequently claimed 
that locals, including socially marginal groups such as unmarried young 
women, were very quickly informed about loopholes in the new set-up of 
administrative regulations that would allow them to obtain more individual 
rights.92 The same seems to have happened regarding access to land, and land 
claims in which individuals were remarkably capable in finding tactics to 
bypass the authority of local elders and chiefs were a common phenomenon in 
many zones under colonial rule.93 It did not take these individual applicants a 
long time to see the value of well-presented versions of group history. Therefore, 
they quickly began to submit their own ‘traditional’ claims before the colonial 
administration.
90 Benton, Lauren, ‘Colonial Law and Cultural Difference: Jurisdictional Politics and the 
Formation of the Colonial State’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 41(3), 1999, 
563–88, 571.
91 Berry, Sarah, ‘Debating the Land Question in Africa’, Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 44(4), 2002, 638–68, 644–5.
92 Allman, Jean, ‘Rounding up Spinsters: Gender Chaos and Unmarried Women in Colonial 
Asante’, Journal of African History 37(2), 1996, 195–214, 209–13.
93 Austin, Gareth, ‘“No Elders were present:” Commoners and Private Ownership in Asante, 
1807–96’, Journal of African History 37(1), 1996, 1–30, 20–2.
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For a comparative historical study, using the European administrator as an 
involuntary intermediary, who collected, filtered, and interpreted claims of dif-
ferent forms of group allegiance, still bears the risk of a distortion of facts due 
to misinformation, misunderstandings, or simple lack of interest from the 
European side. Nevertheless, this method also has simple but unquestionable 
advantages. Accessibility and testability of the employed documentation is 
one part of this picture.94 Moreover, the engagement of the European admin-
istrators also allows the historian to formulate a broader perspective on pro-
cesses. In a way, the colonial administration, by collecting material, already 
guides the scholar to locations where ethnic mobilisation was perceived to be 
strongest. By contrast, the fact that in some broader regions ethnicity does not 
appear at all as a particular topic in administrative reports, has – even in 
accepting the misunderstandings conveyed in some of the material – usually 
some significance. Obviously, in these cases, the historian is first obliged to 
inquire if the regional administration was particularly uninterested or inac-
tive, or if the local situation was particularly complex to understand: however, 
long-term absence of any notions of ethnic classification, by a number of dif-
ferent individual administrators, given the growing interest of the metropoles 
in drafting ‘authentic native legislations’, is certainly a significant fact.95
In the context of colonial rule, it is equally necessary to keep in mind that 
the different European administrations bear some distinctions, although 
those distinctions were perhaps not as influential as scholars have long 
believed them to be.96 In their discourse, British administrators laid far more 
emphasis on the maintenance of ‘authentic’ local structures. One might thus 
expect that in the British-ruled territories appearing in my West African 
 comparison – Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast Colony, Togoland under British 
Mandate from 1914, and to a certain extent the Gambia – the engagement of 
the administration in classifying individuals according to ethnic criteria would 
have been far greater. However, the French concept of ‘association’ led to the 
same effects. This concept became part of the French strategy of administra-
tion in the first two decades of the twentieth century, and more strongly so 
after the First World War. All in all, while theory and rhetoric emphasised a 
94 This is indirectly admitted even for Central Africa in Vansina, Jan, ‘Deep-down Time: 
Political Tradition in Central Africa’, History in Africa 16, 1989, 341–62, 364.
95 The view of Stephen Ellis on source problems, mainly formulated for the post-colonial 
period, is also true for the pre-colonial and colonial phases, see Ellis, Stephen, ‘Writing 
Histories of Contemporary Africa’, Journal of African History 43(1), 2002, 1–26, 12–4.
96 Goldberg, Melvin, ‘Decolonisation and Political Socialisation with Reference to West 
Africa’, Journal of Modern African Studies 24(4), 1986, 663–77, 666–72.
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fundamental difference between British and French ways of administration, 
the administrative reality of both appears to have been rather similar. The two 
colonial regimes attempted to cope with local structures and to integrate 
them into the system of administration (which was an inevitable necessity as 
both administrations remained unwilling to invest too much of their funds in 
direct local administration).97 Therefore, it is, despite difficulties, possible to 
base a large, comparative study of African group affiliations on the informa-
tion conveyed in documentation produced in these contexts. Of course, to 
come to innovative results, I need to point out the strategies and interests of 
the African informants; I will show how they can be disentangled from the 
broader, generalising, simplifying, and racist perspective of the European offi-
cials working in sub-Saharan Africa.
 Structure, Sources, and Limitations
Ethnic labels, whether long-standing or recent, constructed or ‘primordial’, are 
not only an African phenomenon but a problem that needs to be discussed in 
a global panorama. Moreover, such labels are never the only marker of identi-
fication. The nature of ethnicity is, quite frequently, defined on unstable 
grounds, and different scholars speak of different things when discussing ques-
tions of ‘identity’. The picture is complicated further by the obvious links of 
ethnic sentiment to other modes of self-definition, such as ‘religion’, ‘nation’, 
‘state’, or, even, ‘race’ (the latter as a highly problematic, imagined category 
usually relying on perceptions of phenotype), plus, whenever we cross over 
into a more local arena, feelings of family or kin solidarity. Family and kinship 
are difficult to conceptualise in a broader matrix, as they are dominated by 
more localised patterns. The other different categories can, however, be 
deployed in a larger debate, in which they either combine with and ultimately 
reinforce the effects of ethnic group sentiment, or function as alternatives and 
counter-elements.98
Chapter 2 will engage in a conceptual discussion of ethnicity and of the 
various other categories of identification that can be set in relation to ethnic 
97 Dimier, Véronique, Le gouvernement des colonies, regards croisés franco-britanniques 
(Brussels: Ed. de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2004), 206–14; Kiwanunka, M. Semakula, 
‘Colonial Policies and Administrations in Africa: The Myths of the Contrasts’, African 
Historical Studies 3(2), 1970, 295–315, 302–3.
98 Guyer, Jane I., ‘Household and Community in African Studies’, African Studies Review 
24(2/3), 1981, 87–137, 90–2, 97–102.
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sentiment, in West Africa and the world. My discussion will here at first address 
the frequently confusing debate about ethnicity as a category, including an 
overview of the contrasting positions of ‘primordialists’ and ‘constructivists’ 
and an evaluation of the unstable ‘compromise’ formulated during the last two 
decades. This chapter also needs to address the often unclear use of the expres-
sion ‘ethnic’ in different disciplines and contexts.99 I will give an outline of my 
own approach in discussing identifications for group-building processes and 
mobilisation, which is partly obliged to Daniel Posner’s concept of rational 
behaviour in the employment of categories of ‘identity’ during elections in 
sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere. Consequently, in my approach, the reader 
will need to understand ethnic affiliation as one alternative in a portfolio: ‘the 
nation’, ‘the state’, ‘religion’ and ‘racial factors’ can have, under particular cir-
cumstances, a stronger appeal to group members in order to build a larger, 
coherent community. The discussion of the different categories of identifica-
tion will allow for the presentation of alternative possibilities for group mobili-
sation, and those will subsequently be discussed in the case studies.100
As has been explained above, my comparative analysis of processes of eth-
nic mobilisation will rely on three principal case studies, each of which involves 
a larger community that is, today, considered to be an ethnic group (the Wolof, 
Temne, and Ewe). This analysis will naturally include the complex relations of 
the three communities with their direct neighbours. Relationships with neigh-
bours are obviously important factors, as the concept of ‘otherness’ formulated 
on either side, often characterises the process of creating, maintaining, and 
employing internal group identifications.
Given the limitations of oral methods for this larger and comparative 
approach, which I have amply discussed above, my analysis will mostly rely on 
archive-based interpretation. For each territory, the interpretation of processes 
over a period of, roughly, 110 years (and some decades more in the case of Sierra 
Leone, where the process of pre-conquest diplomatic interaction becomes 
important by the first half of the nineteenth century), will be based on a larger 
territorial and one or two smaller, sub-regional narratives. The territorial narra-
tive relies on the interpretation of ‘self-perceptions’ that local populations 
99 It has to be emphasised that, already, the terminology ‘primordial’ versus ‘constructivist’ 
is quite obsolete. Barbara Ballis Lal proposed ‘compulsory ethnicity’ versus ‘ethnicity by 
consent’, but this vocabulary presents the same problems, see Ballis Lal, Barbara, 
‘Perspectives on Ethnicity: Old Wine in New Bottles’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 6(2), 1983, 
154–73, 166–8.
100 Posner, Daniel N., Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa (Cambridge – New York – 
Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2005), passim, esp. 217–49.
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offered to the officials of the colonial state. I claim that those officials, while 
frequently misunderstanding elements of local relations and identifications, 
had a strong interest in pointing out problematic regions that were marked by 
constant conflicts. Even if not always consciously, the same officials normally 
have a tendency to indicate if those group conflicts had to do with tensions 
referring to particular group labels. Such a research technique does of course 
not simply amount to reproducing the many schematic stories about ancient 
‘tribal’ (ethnic) enmities, which so fascinated many officials in the field. On the 
contrary, where group mobilisation is concerned, local individuals themselves 
approach the administration with ‘traditional claims’ and ‘traditional histo-
ries’. Those are frequently preserved in the official documentation. As has been 
pointed out above, those claims do not necessarily enlighten us about the pre-
cise facts of regional and local identifications – local claimants frequently 
crafted stories to underline their claims – but, by following over the decades 
the strategies of locals to ‘sell’ their identifications to the colonial administra-
tion, it is possible to point out evolutionary patterns and, if applicable, the 
modes of employment of the concept of ethnic solidarity.
The sub-regional setting describes, per case, one or two local regions, which 
appear particularly promising in relation to the larger territorial conditions. 
The more detailed cases can be found in regions where the group regarded for 
the comparison had a complex standing, normally because of conflicts with 
other groups, ups and downs in the assertion of political power, and shifts in 
the perspective on local identifications. The sub-regions – like the Petite Côte 
around Joal-Fadiouth in Senegal and Lower Saloum in the Gambia in the case 
of Wolof-speakers; the region of Port Loko for the Temne-speakers; the sur-
roundings of Avatime in regard to the Ewe-speakers – are analysed in detail 
through data from an in-depth study of archival information. For the local 
view on group interactions I also use data from some selected local interviews 
(which with regard to the analytical approach taken, only guided as to princi-
pal patterns and questions). It has to be emphasised that I consider the regions 
selected as sub-regions as representative for the cases discussed, exactly 
because they tend to be encountered at the conflict-ridden margins of regions 
inhabited by the respective groups, where identifications often had an even 
more crucial function for group cohesion.
Six West African and nine European archives have been consulted during 
the work on this comparative study. Among the West African archives, those of 
Ho in Ghana (the former administrative capital of British Togoland), those of 
Lomé in Togo, and those of Banjul in the Gambia have very rarely been used in 
studies on colonial history, and their interpretation can be regarded as highly 
innovative. The National Archives of Ghana in Accra contain a vast selection of 
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documents, utilised successfully for the historiography of the coastal regions 
(Asante and the Fante states, Accra and the regions east of the Volta River). 
However, they are far less studied for the history of the Trans-Volta region and 
Togo. (The more recent books of Paul Nugent, Benjamin Lawrance, and Sarah 
Greene, and the older studies of D.E.K. Amenumey, can only be considered as 
a start that still leaves many questions open). The Sierra Leone Archives are 
characterised by a problematic process of reorganisation, and reliance upon 
them is more complicated.101 Finally, the Archives Nationales Sénégalaises are 
one of the most-consulted African archives, but also the home of an outstand-
ingly large selection of documents, including both the administrative files on 
the French Colony of Senegal, and those concerning the Government-General 
of French West Africa. The latter give access to documents concerning eight 
former French territories.
Each of the three cases discussed here is first presented in a general pan-
orama, introducing the different (language) groups to be found in the respec-
tive territories, the more generalising results of sociological studies on those 
groups, the religious situation, and the specific experience of European con-
quest. Depending on the case, I also address a certain ‘state-of-the-art’ on eth-
nic interpretations, presenting the existing knowledge around 1850, and 
attempting to comment on the sources of those broader descriptions, and on 
their terminology and perspective. In subsequent parts of each chapter, I will 
concentrate on situations of intense regional debate about group rights, as 
they were defined in the interaction with colonial administrations. In this con-
text, all the case studies have to follow a certain chronology that addresses key 
moments of community evolution in relation to the colonial encounter.
We find three typical situations for discussion about group labels led by the 
local populations themselves, belonging to particular phases. First, the actual 
situation of conquest, embedded in complex diplomatic exchange, is of great 
importance. It forced local populations to explain to the coloniser their pre-
dilections for certain forms of regional or local organisation, and it allowed 
ambitious individuals to counter established rules and narratives, and for-
merly subservient groups to elicit a reorganisation of local structures of 
power and dependency. The second key phase has to do with the reorganisa-
tion of administrative structures, during attempts at installing civilian rule, in 
the period of the First World War and the early 1920s. From that moment 
onwards, candidates with a claim to ‘authenticity’ had more chances to suc-
ceed. However, they had to know how to employ group labels and ‘traditional 




histories’ in the dialogue with the colonial administrators. Finally, the intro-
duction of political reforms and participation rights between the end of the 
Second World War, and the mid-1950s, was an impetus from outside, but was 
rapidly appropriated by the locals. In all sub-regions analysed here, these 
stages entirely changed the equilibrium of forces. The possibility for a grow-
ing number of local individuals to vote, and therefore to influence, at least in 
part, the political evolution of their constituencies would now link group 
identifications to party allegiance and tensions between political movements. 
This has been aptly put by Carola Lentz in the formula of ‘the time when poli-
tics came’. Lentz’s analysis also points out that the introduction of party poli-
tics in sub-Saharan Africa was, for many rural populations, a far more 
impressive rupture than was national independence.102 The integration into 
larger political structures made it necessary for groups and their leaders to 
reconsider the importance of their group sentiments, eventually using them 
as a lever of mass mobilisation.
For those, and for the other more singular periods, I will thus analyse cases 
of mobilisation and identification of locals, in their interaction with the colo-
nial officials. This analysis will, in theory, privilege our principal sub-regional 
cases, but integrate them in a broader, global discussion of local identity poli-
tics and mobilisation strategies. In Chapters 3 (on Senegambia), 4 (on northern 
Sierra Leone), and 5 (on the Trans-Volta Region and Western Togo), I will point 
out how, over the above-mentioned period of approximately 110 years, local 
populations ‘sold’ their group identifications to colonial administrators, some-
times, if not frequently, with clear tactical motives. The explanations given for 
the different processes will be strongly linked to the role of political organisa-
tion and statehood; in other words, it will be shown that ethnicity had a role 
especially where the mechanisms of statehood failed or were non-existent.
This brings us back to the limitations of this study. First of all, given the con-
clusion of the methodological discussion, I do not regard it as practicable to 
carry out any statistically significant or larger qualitative interview series; my 
approach favours a broader perspective. Indeed, this should in the end be one 
of the particularly strong points of the present book. Second, the broader 
approach will be grounded in reliable local and sub-regional case studies, but it 
depends on the perspective of the representatives of the colonial power for the 
act of selecting those cases. Nevertheless – as argued above – while it might be 
correct to describe the colonial administration as racist, generalising, and often 
ill-informed, colonial officials had a natural interest in finding and defusing 
group conflicts, and they were the usual persons to be approached in conflicts 
102 Lentz, Ethnicity, 199.
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for land and power. They thus collected what was offered to them as ‘local tradi-
tion’. Only the employment of this pre-selecting mechanism allows us to bring 
the huge amount of potential source material into a manageable form.
Third, the source material appears, at first glance, to sometimes be uneven. 
While the cases of the Wolof and the Ewe rely on documents that are mainly 
retrieved from African archives, and – at least for the twentieth century – on 
documentation that has so far scarcely been used or that is even unknown, the 
discussion of Temne interaction with colonial structures needs more input 
from European archives, which is due to conditions of access to materials. The 
different locations of documents can also lead to certain (although rather 
slight) differences concerning the time period studied. On the Wolof, the archi-
val documentation is more or less balanced, with a strong input from archival 
documents stored in France and the United Kingdom for the period before 
1914, and a near exclusiveness of the more detailed documentation from 
African archives for the period after the Second World War. The Temne case, on 
the contrary, has a certain bias in favour of the second half of the nineteenth 
century and the 1920s, two periods during which British officials were most 
interested in bundling documentation and depositing it in the Colonial Office. 
In the Ewe case, early documentation is particularly available from (sometimes 
printed) British files kept in the Colonial Office, and from the documents of 
the German administration of the new colony of Togo, while the British admin-
istration in Keta also left some valuable dossiers in the National Archives of 
Ghana in Accra. From 1915, this picture is completely reversed, with an increas-
ing amount of detailed local descriptions, most of those to be found in Accra, 
Lomé, and Ho.
Those biases are no real obstacle to carrying out the comparison. On the 
contrary, the approach permits us to bridge certain lacunae in local material. 
Moreover, the existence of missionary societies in all three geographical 
arenas – most prominently the Pères du Saint-Esprit (Holy Ghost Fathers) in 
coastal Senegal, the missionaries of the Church Missionary Society in Northern 
Sierra Leone, and those of the Norddeutsche Missionsgesellschaft (Bremen 
Mission) in the area east of the Volta River – also contributes to making the 
individual regional situations more comparable. This refers, above all, to mis-
sionary documentation in the second half of the nineteenth century, before 
the actual conquest, when those missionaries had a more pronounced diplo-
matic role.103
103 See also: Van der Geest, Sjaak, and Jon P. Kirby, ‘The Absence of the Missionary in African 
Ethnography, 1930–65’, African Studies Review 35(3), 1992, 59–103, 84.
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In sum, even with the given limitations, the detailed and research-based 
comparative approach represents a study design that is as such entirely novel 
for historians of sub-Saharan Africa. The results can therefore be expected to 
lead to new interpretations, and will consequently be brought into a debate on 
group affiliation that links the perspectives of African and global history. Such 
a perspective constitutes important progress in debates on ethnicity.
<UN>
chapter 2
Group Identifications: African and Global 
Categories
 Defining African Ethnicities against a Global Background
Discussions about group identifications in sub-Saharan Africa, and elsewhere 
in the world, are today dominated by a somewhat odd parallelism between 
different concepts, which are rarely understood as alternatives. This relates to 
the factors of ethnicity, religion, and the post-colonial nation-building proj-
ects: in the case of West Africa, for some regions, like Nigeria, the debate now 
favours religion almost exclusively as a divisive problem; in Ghana and Sierra 
Leone, regional and ethnic factors are broadly discussed; for Côte d’Ivoire, 
scholars seek explanations for what they regard as the failure of nation- 
building. The different factors, to which we can add family, kinship, and mod-
els of political organisation, are rarely brought into a larger panorama. 
Moreover, they are not really seen as different options for identification for an 
individual or for a group.1
The current chapter endeavours to give the reader a solid general idea about 
ethnic sentiment as a conceptual factor in sub-Saharan Africa and in its global 
dimensions. It addresses key problems in this context: the debate about the 
nature of ethnicity, with its slowly changing arguments over the last five 
decades; and the quest for a working definition of ethnic groups. Concerning 
the former, it is necessary to engage with a basic discussion of whether ethnic 
identification is a long-lasting ‘traditional’ fact or a construction under condi-
tions of colonial rule: that is, would a member of a certain community have 
automatically been inclined to identify herself or himself as belonging to her 
or his ethnic group, or was she or he usually led or even manipulated to do so? 
The second problem is also quite intriguing. As we will see, scholars from dif-
ferent fields and experts on different geographical regions fill the flexible 
adjective ‘ethnic’ with quite distinct meanings. This situation makes it neces-
sary to elaborate a useful definition for our context. Finally, the sub-chapters 
will refer to various elements of mobilisation, through alternative forms of 
identification. While religion is more evident as a factor, and will be directly 
1 Diouf, Mamadou, ‘Des Historiens et des Histoires, pour quoi faire? L’Histoire africaine entre 
l’état et les communautés’, Canadian Journal of African Studies 34(2), 2000, 337–74, 347–8.
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tackled in the case studies, it has to be questioned from the outset how ‘ethnic-
ity’ can be imagined in its relation to the nation-building project, to ‘racial’ 
phenotypes, and to the political organisation of communities.2
As we have seen, the recourse to ethnic group mobilisation appears to 
be widespread in many of the recent conflicts in very different zones of sub- 
Saharan Africa. Moreover, in everyday life, individuals frequently refer to their 
own ethnic characteristics, and still more to those of ‘strangers’ and ‘others’.3 
The same individuals might make jokes about the ‘typical’ character of mem-
bers of other ethnic groups; during elections they vote for candidates they 
regard as members of their own ethnic constituency; they tend to introduce 
themselves to visitors and conversation partners as part of the respective com-
munity.4 In this respect, it is difficult even for the most critical and ‘construc-
tivist’ observer to discuss away ethnic allegiance as a factor in contemporary 
African societies, especially where the distribution of resources is at stake. For 
other parts of the world, the problem is not posed as such, with the exception, 
again, of ‘native’ communities of the Americas or ‘tribal structures’ in Asia.
Obviously, this observation does not give an answer to whether ethnicity, as 
a factor in community life, has long been such an important variable in group 
perceptions and a longstanding, historical problem in community relations.5 
Also, in sub-Saharan Africa it has been a conceptual challenge that is hotly 
disputed by scholars. Today it is occasionally claimed that at least the academic 
conflict is more or less resolved.6 However, the attempts to formulate a coher-
ent opinion or even a consensus on the historical role of ethnicity have not 
produced any more recent syntheses; all in all, there is still no broader analysis 
of the changes in African ethnic identification over time, or one that would 
include a view on ethniticy in other parts of the globe.
After nearly forty years of intense discussions, most scholars tend to use the 
concept of ethnicity as one variable regarding identifications of individuals, 
2 Wallerstein, Immanuel, ‘The Construction of Peoplehood: Racism, Nationalism, Ethnicity’, in 
Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (eds.), Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities 
(London – New York: Verso, 1991, translation of orig. Paris: La Découverte, 1988), 71–85, 77–9.
3 Hargreaves, John D., ‘From Strangers to Minorities in West Africa’, Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society 31, 1981, 95–113, 98–9.
4 De Jong, Ferdinand, ‘A Joking Nation: Conflict Resolution in Senegal’, Canadian Journal of 
African Studies 39(2), 2005, 389–413, 400–1.
5 Burgess, M. Elaine, ‘The resurgence of ethnicity: myth and reality’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 
1(3), 1978, 265–85, 278–80.
6 Nevertheless, as Carola Lentz argued, it is surprising how rapidly the frontlines reappear in 
some discussions, see Lentz, Carola, ‘“Tribalism” and ethnicity in Africa: a review of four 
decades of Anglophone research’, Cahiers des Sciences Humaines 31(2), 1995, 303–28, 307–8.
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and for group solidarity. However, there is no impetus anymore towards 
 discussion, in broader designs, of the historicity of the phenomenon of ethnic 
 solidarity, which continues to be little illuminated.7 Arguably, the most repre-
sentative recent opinion (if seldom taken as the explicit point of reference) is 
presumably expressed in Bruce Berman’s discussion on ethnic groups. 
According to Berman, most of Africa’s ethnic labels existed already in the nine-
teenth century, that is, at the moment of colonial conquest, and probably ear-
lier. However, they would have changed their meaning entirely, and their 
importance as a medium of group solidarity would have grown over the years. 
The crucial point in Berman’s argumentation is probably the claim that none of 
the ethnic groups of post-colonial times had already been present as such (with 
an important function as regards group mobilisation) in the pre-colonial phase 
of sub-Saharan Africa.8 While thought-provoking, this idea is probably too 
simple: both P.E.H. Hair’s and Walter Rodney’s studies make it clear that many 
of the labels had a meaning for group organisation before 1850 – and if it was 
structurally different, one would need need to ask what the difference was.9
In any case, nowadays a number of studies, frequently through the employ-
ment of a micro-perspective, refer to a rather flexible interpretation of ethnic-
ity as a factor of group identification. The scholars in question discuss evolutions 
inside particular groups, which in the post-colonial period are understood (and 
describe themselves) as ethnic groups. They claim that the experiences of the 
respective communities are flexible ones, and they attribute much of the pro-
cess of developing larger and more cohesive group identifications to the neces-
sities of frequently complicated conflicts and alliances, increased by the 
insecurities of resource distribution in the post-colonial states. According to 
such a perspective, ethnicity becomes both a previously existing concept of 
group solidarity, and a particular tool in concrete situations of group conflict. 
This interpretation does not really explain the motives and the context for the 
use of ethnic solidarity instead of other emotional affiliations. Nonetheless, on 
the widely agreed platform of such a compromise, the once-impulsive schol-
arly debates about ethnicity have become far less aggressive.
This had indeed been very different in the 1970s and 1980s. It is useful 
to recall the origins of the debate, as this enhances our understanding of the 
7 Scherrer, Christian P., Ethnicity, Nationalism and Violence: Conflict management, human 
rights, and multilateral regimes (Aldershot – Burlington: Ashgate, 2003), 50–3.
8 Berman, Bruce, ‘Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: the Politics of Uncivil Nationalism’, 
African Affairs 97(388), 1998, 305–41, 325–6.




crucial issues still at stake in current discussions about ethnic identification. In 
fact, the debate was in part so extraordinarily heated due to the particular colo-
nial legacy in anthropology (with its effects on historical studies). In this con-
text, the constructivist view was a sharp attack against research positions that 
had remained influential in the first phase after the independence of most 
colonial territories. Although to a lesser degree, the disciplines of history and 
sociology also became entangled in the debate.
Many of those European researchers, who had started to work under the 
financially well-equipped late colonial administrations of the 1940s and 1950s, 
shared a number of common scientific ideas (or working hypotheses) about 
African and other ‘tribal’ populations. These ideas were thus linked to the 
‘ideological’ background of colonial rule. In part, they conformed to the 
approaches of European administrators who had been engaged in classifying 
groups to facilitate their own administrative work.10
The basic assumption that, in Africa and ‘tribal Asia’, identity was mostly 
related to ‘tribal’ solidarities remained for colonial administrations one essen-
tial basis of relations with such populations. As a basis for defining Africans 
and ‘tribal Asians’, it encouraged the analysis of their group organisation 
according to seemingly reliable ‘tribal’ characteristics. Modernisation, and the 
introduction or strengthening of principles of capitalist economy in local com-
munities, seemed to have an impact on those ‘tribal’ structures, but, still, the 
latter were considered as essential and stable.11 The employment of the expres-
sion ‘ethnicity’ (as an alternative to ‘tribal’ or ‘tribe’) starts only in the 1940s and 
in the early phase of the discussion, the meaning of this expression is blurred. 
Not until the 1970s did ‘ethnicity’ develop into a ‘pertinent category’ in the 
broader debate about group relations in sub-Saharan Africa, and other regions 
where research on regional groups was carried out.12
Other factors were soon pointed out as having an influence in the consolida-
tion of ethnic ties, but the interrelations were rarely explained.13 Religion was 
often understood as such a factor: it stands either in competition with other, 
including ethnic, solidarities; or it can claim universal adherence, trying (under 
10 This is reflected in works like Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., ‘The Peoples of Nigeria: The Cultural 
Background to the Crisis’, African Affairs 66(262), 1967, 3–11, 5.
11 Balandier, Georges, ‘Structures sociales traditionnelles et changements économiques’, 
Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines 1(1), 1960, 1–14, 6–7.
12 Poutignat and Streiff-Fenart, Théories, 22, 24–6.
13 Berman, Bruce; Dickson Eyoh, and Will Kymlicka, ‘Conclusion: African Ethnic Politics & 
the Paradoxes of Democratic Development’, in Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh, and Will 
Kymlicka (eds.), Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa (Oxford: James Currey – Athens/oh: 
Ohio University Press, 2004), 317–23, 318.
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most conditions with little success) to make other forms of allegiance disap-
pear. In certain cases, religions appeared to be a vehicle for ethnic group- 
building, and in some occasions they even offered a lever for ethnic change.14 
Regarding the many existing African religions, it was not only the conversion 
to Islam or Christianity that made such a fundamental impact. Some other, 
more local religions also had a significant impact on group identifications. As 
in the case of the cult of Tongnaab in northern Ghana, new followers of local 
religions took other ethnic labels.15
Professional situation and the related status position is another category 
that might overlap with ethnic sentiment: effectively, where ‘ethnicity’ is 
employed as a concept to describe situations of migration, it has been argued 
by sociologists that the disappearance of professional and status difference 
contributes to a diminution of ethnic tensions.16 Migration, mainly from rural 
into urban contexts, can have an influence on the ethnic self-perception of an 
individual: this problem, which had already been discussed by colonial offi-
cials, also became an early standard subject for anthropologists working on 
sub-Saharan Africa.17
‘Tribes’, as a central category for early anthropologists, were mostly regarded 
as static units. The ‘primordialist’ view treated the members of those groups as 
inevitably connected, although it usually remained undiscussed whether this 
bond was to be explained through ‘genetic’ links, or through a centuries-long 
experience of ‘cultural’ unity.18 Anthropology and colonial administration inter-
acted strongly in this process of creating the image of timeless communities.19 
14 Devisse, Jean, ‘Islam et ethnies en Afrique’, in Jean-Pierre Chrétien and Gérard Prunier 
(eds.), Les ethnies ont une histoire (second edition, Paris: Karthala, 2003), 103–15, 110–2; 
Brown, Graham K., ‘Legible Pluralism: The Politics of Ethnic and Religious Identification 
in Malaysia’, in Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd (eds.), Ethnicity and Religion: Intersections 
and Comparisons (London – New York: Routledge, 2011), 31–52.
15 Allman, Jean, and John Parker, Tongnaab: The History of a West African God (Bloomington 
– Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2005), 144.
16 Hechter, Michael, ‘The political economy of ethnic change’, American Journal of Sociology 
79(5), 1974, 1151–78, 1176.
17 Gluckman, Max, ‘Tribalism in Modern British Africa’, Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines 1(1), 1960, 
55–70, 57–8.
18 Alonso, ‘Politics’, 392; Zolberg, Aristide R., ‘The Structure of Political Conflict in the New 
States of Tropical Africa’, American Political Science Review 62(1), 1968, 70–87, 73–4. These 
positions link to older anthropological theory, such as that of Lévi-Strauss, Claude, Race et 
Histoire (Paris: Denoël, 1987 [1952]), 19–23; Van den Berghe, Pierre L., The Ethnic Phenomenon 
(New York – Oxford: Elsevier, 1981), 20–7.
19 Miller, Joseph C., ‘History and Africa/Africa and History’, American Historical Review 
104(1), 1999, 1–32, 15.
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European officials, at least the ones who were more interested in crafting an 
‘adequate’ administration of colonial populations, took much of the informa-
tion they utilised for local governance from the work of early anthropologists. 
Those results contributed in colonial Africa to an administrative worldview, in 
which the ethnic affiliation of the African subjects was a key variable. It was a 
particularly prominent concept when those officials discussed the practical 
organisation of the territories, and whenever they attempted to make local 
structures more ‘authentic’.
A large percentage of the European administrators believed themselves to 
be facing homogeneous ‘tribes’, and they became used to simply taking them 
as a reality. However, a form of administration that was based in theory on the 
principle of ethnic (‘tribal’) categorisation, suggested the use of specialists in 
anthropology. In the interwar period and under the late colonial states, colo-
nial governments financed a growing number of missions of anthropologists 
that were to study the structures and ‘customs’ of certain circumscribed groups. 
The authority of these scholars gave further strength, of course, through the 
practice of their work in the field, to the idea of the African continent and 
some parts of Asia as worlds of ‘tribes’.20 In turn, European officials gladly 
‘profited’ from the fresh information on the subject, and built on more recent 
interpretations offered by the specialists. In these ways, colonial anthropology 
also had an impact on political organisation in sub-Saharan Africa: based on 
anthropological results, administrators attempted, for example, to limit the 
number of candidates for chieftaincies – as structures of ‘indirect rule’ – to 
‘eligible candidates’, who belonged to the right ‘tribe’ and ‘traditional’ family, 
according to the rules and customs of the ‘tribe’.21 The close relation between 
the administrative and the academic sector guaranteed the dominance of the 
‘primordialist’ view until the decade of the 1960s, and it also appeared to be 
destined to shape the newly emergent scholarly field of African history.22  
20 See the sublime analysis of Ekeh, Peter P., ‘Social Anthropology and Two Contrasting Uses of 
Tribalism in Africa’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 32(4), 1990, 660–700, 662–6.
21 Waller, Richard, ‘Acceptees & Aliens: Kikuyu Settlement in Maasailand’, in Thomas Spear 
and Richard Waller (eds.), Being Maasai: Ethnicity & Identity in East Africa (Oxford: James 
Currey – Dar-es-Salaam: Mkuki Na Nyota – Nairobi: eaep – Athens/oh: Ohio University 
Press, 1993), 226–57, 237–42.
22 Mercier, Paul, ‘Remarques sur la signification du “tribalisme” actuel en Afrique noire’, Cahiers 
Internationaux de Sociologie 31(2), 1961, 61–80, 78–9; Gluckman, Max, Order and Rebellion in 
Tribal Africa (London: Cohen and West, 1963), 223–4; Stevenson, Robert F., Population and 
Political Systems in Tropical Africa (New York – London: Columbia University Press, 1968), 
160–87; Van Velsen, J., The Politics of Kinship: A Study in Social Manipulation among the 
Lakeside Tonga of Nyasaland (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1964), 6–7.
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In 1961, the respected specialist of Togolese history – and former district admin-
istrator in Togo – Robert Cornevin could still write that ‘The black person of 
Africa feels spontaneously the value of the history of his ethnic group’.23 Within 
the historiography of various world regions, this position was doubtlessly 
strongest for the African continent, while for West Asia, Central Asia, the 
Indian sub-continent, and especially China, historians focused more rapidly 
on the nation-state projects, and ethnic groups were regarded as unmodern 
minorities.24
As we have seen, the 1970s and 1980s marked a change in the scientific study 
of group organisation in sub-Saharan Africa. This change led to the dominance 
of a ‘constructivist’ perspective, according to which both agents of the colonial 
power and African political leaders with a clear interest in gaining and main-
taining the control of potential followers, had a stake in the creation (or, uliti-
mately, ‘invention’) of ethnic groups.25 By the 1960s, some scholars were 
pointing to the flexibility of ethnic self-assertions, particularly again in the 
case of migration to urban centres, where for the sake of local protection, indi-
viduals were observed to sometimes turn to members of other ‘tribes’, building 
patronage networks independently from ethnic solidarity.26 In 1970, Aidan 
Southall argued that many groups in sub-Saharan Africa and ‘tribal Asia’ did 
not conform to the classical criteria of ‘tribe’, as those solidarities had not 
existed before in their own and their neighbours’ perception. In accordance 
with this particular vision, ethnic groups had only come into being during the 
colonial period as a response to certain problems.27 However, scholars still dis-
tinguished between a de facto core of ethnic identification, and parts that 
could be more easily manipulated.28
23 Cornevin, Robert, ‘L’Histoire des Peuples de L’Afrique Noire: Branche de L’Ethnologie ou 
Science à Part Entière?’, Journal of African History 2(1), 1961, 15–23, 19.
24 McCarthy, Susan, Communist Multiculturalism: Ethnic Revival in Southwest China (Seattle 
– London: University of Washington Press, 2009), 37–8.
25 Bierschenk, Thomas, ‘Rituels politiques et construction de l’identité ethnique des Peuls 
au Bénin’, Cahiers des Sciences Humaines 31(2), 1995, 457–84, 474–7.
26 Wallerstein, Immanuel, ‘Ethnicity and National Integration in West Africa’, Cahiers 
d’Etudes Africaines 1(3), 1960, 129–39, 133; Sandbrook, Richard, ‘Patrons, Clients, and 
Factions: New Dimensions of Conflict Analysis in Africa’, Canadian Journal of Political 
Science 5(1), 1972, 104–19, 115–8.
27 Southall, Aidan W., ‘The Illusion of Tribe’, Journal of Asian and African Studies 5(1–2), 1970, 
28–50, 34–5.
28 Mitchell, James Clyde, ‘Perceptions of Ethnicity and Ethnic Behaviour: An Empirical 




The discussions of the 1970s were the first step in the reversal of research 
positions on ethnic identification, and this reconfiguration had a clear focus on 
the African continent.29 This was followed by the impact of the books of 
Amselle and M’Bokolo during the 1980s: their arguments shattered the ‘primor-
dialist’ position.30 The latter was pushed onto the defensive and nearly unable 
to respond for a period. The existence of primary affinities and the automatic 
affectivity of individuals to members of groups identified as ethnic peers was 
apparently refuted.31 However, even under these unfavourable circumstances, 
the ‘primordialist’ view on ethnic sentiment was not entirely defeated; more-
over, during the whole of the 1980s, it notably continued to retain its hold over 
public discussions in the media, where the same images of irrationality and 
‘savageness’ continued to prosper, especially for Africa, but also for some Asian 
regions.32 With more academic impact, it also continued to dominate over 
parts of research in political science.33 These facts only added to the vigorous-
ness of ‘constructivist’ critique. The aggressiveness of the debate made even 
more moderate formulations of ‘primordialist’ views unacceptable.
‘Constructivist’ scholars often attempted to link their arguments to other 
contemporary debates, such as around clientelism and migration contexts. 
Wherever particular importance is given to the impact of client-patron 
 networks – which, in view of their social and economic role, are an essential 
category particularly in both colonial and post-colonial African regions, and 
probably also under pre-colonial conditions – this could be connected to the 
creativeness of ethnocultural solidarities. In fact, René Lemarchand had 
already in the 1970s interpreted ethnocultural ties as a translation of patron-
client relationships.34
29 Gallagher, Joseph T., ‘The Emergence of an African Ethnic Group: the Case of the 
Ndendeuli’, International Journal of African Historical Studies 7(1), 1974, 1–26, 1–3.
30 Southall, Aidan W., ‘The Ethnic Heart of Anthropology’, Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines 
25(100), 1985, 567–72, 572.
31 Eller, Jack David, and Reed M. Coughlan, ‘The poverty of primordialism: the demystifica-
tion of ethnic attachment’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 16(2), 1993, 183–202, 195–6.
32 Campbell, Aidan, ‘Ethical Ethnicity: A Critique’, Journal of Modern African Studies 35(1), 
1997, 53–79, 57–60; Vanhanen, Tatu, ‘Domestic Ethnic Conflict and Ethnic Nepotism: 
A Comparative Analysis’, Journal of Peace Research 36(1), 1999, 55–73, 66.
33 Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler, ‘On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa’, Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 46(1), 2002, 13–28, 22; Bates, Robert H., ‘Ethnicity and Development in 
Africa: A Reappraisal’, African Economic Review 90(2), 2000, 131–4, 134.
34 Lemarchand, René, ‘Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa: Competing 
Solidarities in Nation-Building’, American Political Science Review 66(1), 1972, 68–90, 69–70; 
Isaacman, Allan, and Derek Peterson, ‘Making the Chikunda: Military Slavery and Ethnicity 
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A very different contribution came from researchers writing about ‘ethnicity’ 
as a category during migration – in which the variable had a distinct sense.35 
The first generation of scholars who were engaged in this field normally worked 
on the sociology of migration in so-called industrial countries. They came, 
nonetheless, to some substantially similar results concerning ethnocultural sen-
timent. Hence, in relation to the classic country of migration studies, the United 
States, scholars argued that the awareness of ethnic links rose in particular peri-
ods.36 For example, Cuban exiles migrating into the us in the 1960s appeared to 
underline their Cuban ethnicity only from the 1970s onwards, to obtain socio-
economic advantages. (As I will discuss below, it is questionable whether a 
scholar working on sub-Saharan Africa would accept ‘Cuban’ as an appropriate 
ethnic category, but for the sociology of migration such data as given by inter-
viewees is widely accepted.)37 Another alternative in those migration contexts, 
however, was to seek joint group identities with other communities, so that dif-
ferent origins were fused into a common identification and led to a new ethnic 
sentiment in its own right. This describes the classic case of ‘Hispanic identity’ 
in North America, which is mirrored in other cases of immigrant groups.38 Such 
phenomena, typical for ethnicity in migration contexts, are much more rarely 
documented for sub-Saharan Africa.39 It is unsurprising that ethnicity as a cat-
egory in global historical studies on migration, such as in settler colonies, also 
functions in the same sense.40 However, the global historical debate on migra-
tion was based on an idea of groups that left very much open when and why the 
classification as ‘ethnic group’ was ultimately adequate.41
in Southern Africa, 1750–1900’, International Journal of African Historical Studies 36(2), 2003, 
257–81, 263–4, and, Newitt, Malyn, ‘Kinship, Religion, Language and Political Control: 
Ethnic Identity among the Peoples of the Zambesi Valley’, in Alexander Keese (ed.), Ethnicity 
and the long-term perspective: the African experience (Berne: Peter Lang, 2010), 67–92, 88–9.
35 Francis, E.K., Interethnic Relations: An Essay in Sociological Theory (New York – Oxford – 
Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1976), 172–89.
36 Modood, Tariq, ‘Multiculturalism, Ethnicity and Integration: Some Contemporary 
Challenges’, in Tariq Modood and John Salt (eds.), Global Migration, Ethnicity and 
Britishness (Basingstoke – New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 40–62.
37 Portes, Alejandro, ‘The rise of ethnicity’, American Sociological Review 49(3), 1984, 383–97, 386.
38 Nelson, Candace, and Marta Tienda, ‘The structuring of Hispanic ethnicity: historical and 
contemporary perspectives’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 8(1), 1985, 49–74, 53.
39 Hirst, Michael A., ‘Tribal Migration in East Africa: A Review and Analysis’, Geografiska 
Annaler, Series B, 52(2), 1970, 153–64, 163.
40 Bashford, Alison, ‘Immigration restriction: rethinking period and place from settler colo-
nies to postcolonial nations’, Journal of Global History 9(1), 2014, 26–48, 45.




In the 1990s, some attempts were made to find a conclusion for the debate 
around ethnicity. Various scholars insisted that while ethnic groups were origi-
nally invented, they now constitute a strong reality.42 Even with the invention 
of group identifications in the colonial period, they claim that ‘the historicity 
does not diminish the reality’. As for the Taita of Kenya, Bill Bravman defended 
the interpretation that, under particular circumstances, groups (including 
Africans) created a necessary feeling of community, expressing it through for-
mulations of ethnic sentiment.43 For other geographical zones, like the Upper 
Volta region, scholars hold that, while ethnic labels existed before 1850, ethnic-
ity was, between the second half of the nineteenth century and the 1920s, no 
vital criterion, and did not lead to alliances between village communities.44 
Mahir Şaul and Patrick Royer argue that, at least in this broader region, descent 
groups were usually ‘multi-ethnic’, ‘ethnicity itself was unstable’, and that ‘we 
simply do not know what labels such as “Bobo”, “Marka”, or “Bwa” might have 
meant at that time’.45
However, while the tone of the debate has become less aggressive, many 
scholars maintain the idea of a dominant role that (colonial) invention had in 
the formation of ethnic solidarity especially in Africa. This is well exemplified 
by Gerald Wright’s latest article on colonial manipulation. According to Wright, 
formulating group identities was a complicated process in which, however, 
ethnic arguments were negligible before the nineteenth century. Concerning 
the Gambia River region, he holds that many individuals now defining them-
selves as part of the ‘Mandinka tribe’ refer in their self-identification to the 
results of European studies from the colonial period. Thereby, they accept a 
label found for them by Europeans and even read the products of older, mostly 
42 Bayart, Etat, 76–8; Berman, Bruce; Dickson Eyoh, and Will Kymlicka, ‘Introduction: 
Ethnicity & the Politics of Democratic Nation-Building in Africa’, in Bruce Berman, 
Dickson Eyoh, and Will Kymlicka (eds.), Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa (Oxford: James 
Currey – Athens: Ohio University Press, 2004), 1–21, 3.
43 Bravman, Bill, Making Ethnic Ways: Communities and Their Transformations in Taita, 
Kenya, 1800–1950 (Portsmouth/nh: Heinemann – Nairobi: eaep – Oxford: James Currey, 
1998), 14. See also: Gordon, David M., ‘History on the Luapula Retold: Landscape, Memory 
and Identity in the Kazembe Kingdom’, Journal of African History 47(1), 2006, 21–42, 
35–7.
44 Colleyn, Jean-Paul, and Danielle Jonckers, ‘Ceux qui refusent le maître, la conception du 
pouvoir chez les Minyanka’, Africa 53(4), 1983, 43–58, 52–3.
45 Şaul, Mahir, and Patrick Royer, West African Challenge to Empire: Culture and History in the 




European and North American, scholarship in order to refine their own ‘tradi-
tional’ accounts on group experiences.46
Carola Lentz offers a more balanced conclusion. She argues in her overview 
of tendencies in the debate on ethnicity that it now seems to be obvious that 
ethnic labels were not purely invented under colonial rule, although the colo-
nial impact had certain distinguishable effects. Social inequalities induced by 
the colonial rulers, the work of cultural brokers between European administra-
tions and local populations, and the tendencies towards more essentialism as 
provoked by the integration of interested groups of persons into structures of 
collaboration and ‘indirect rule’, all seem to have contributed to the local fixa-
tion on ethnic identifications. In this context, Lentz comments that certain 
conditions made the maintenance of those modified group identifications 
attractive for individuals and group leaders, and that this did not only happen 
under colonial rule.47
Other scholars also emphasised that while ethnic labels are constantly used, 
they can, nonetheless, easily be changed. In cases when they suit the individ-
ual, such switches of identification appear rather often. For example, some 
individuals claim at a given moment never to have belonged to a certain group, 
although their migration background from a particular region seems to be 
obvious. Examples of this type might be cited from a large number of African 
regions and related studies, and have been amply discussed for Gikuyu-
speakers (‘Kikuyu’) settling in or close to Maasai communities in Kenya.48
A ‘softer’ variant of this position towards the construction of ethnic identifi-
cation refers to processes of ‘assimilation’ and to the permeability of groups. 
This perspective does not entirely discard the idea of distinguishable ethnic 
entities ‘existing before’, but holds that they became activated under specific 
circumstances, namely in frontier situations. This position was quite early 
 formulated by Fredrik Barth, who held that, from the anthropologist’s point 
of view, the decisive criterion for group cohesion should not be the range of 
 cultural elements defining the group from inside, but its boundaries with 
neighbouring communities. In this perspective, borders between groups are 
46 Wright, Donald R., ‘“What Do You Mean There Were No Tribes in Africa?”: Thoughts on 
Boundaries – and Related Matters – in Precolonial Africa’, History in Africa 26, 1999, 409–26, 
420–1.
47 Lentz, Carola, ‘“Tribalismus” und Ethnizität in Afrika – ein Forschungsüberblick’, 
Leviathan 23, 1995, 115–45, 134–5.
48 Galaty, John G., ‘“The Eye that Wants a Person, Where Can It Not See?” Inclusion, Exclusion 
& Boundary Shifters in Maasai Identity’, in Thomas Spear and Richard Waller (eds.), Being 
Maasai: Ethnicity & Identity in East Africa (Oxford: James Currey – Dar-es-Salaam: Mkuki 
Na Nyota – Nairobi: eaep – Athens: Ohio University Press, 1993), 174–94, 188–9.
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permeable when it comes to individuals.49 Newer studies on ‘borderlands’ do 
not directly follow the perspective of Barth, as they do not regard boundaries 
as either division lines or permeable membranes, but focus on the creative use 
of the border to the advantage of populations on both sides and on the cre-
ation of ‘borderland identities’.50 By contrast, Barth’s position finds an echo in 
other fields of research from the 1990s.51
As we can see from those discussions, colonial simplification is definitely 
only one part of the picture of ethnic group-building. Today, the ‘primordial-
ists’ certainly have more to say than just repeating colonial ‘knowledge’.52 
Moreover, their position continues to correspond more strongly to the con-
temporary visions expressed by African and other ‘tribal’ populations. In the 
post-colonial period, it would be unusual to meet locals who would admit that 
their group of reference has changed its ethnic allegiance over the decades. If 
one takes at face value the accounts of interviewees, the ‘primordialist’ per-
spective appears as natural.53 Informants tend to give versions in which, nor-
mally, they themselves and their forefathers have never modified their identity. 
Only language and religion are potentially changeable; ethnocultural senti-
ment, on the contrary, appears to be immutable. This means we still find an 
undiscussed (but important) contradiction between the dominant perspective 
on identity elaborated by most researchers – a vision of ethnicity as largely 
crafted and flexible, albeit ultimately linked to local modalities – and the 
results won through a principal methodological tool that scholars on African 
societies tend to employ. To formulate it the other way round: ‘constructivists’ 
who rely on contemporary oral interviews are likely to come up with results 
that contradict their expectations.
However, while the grounds for giving a clear definition of concepts of eth-
nic solidarity are extremely shaky, I will nonetheless attempt to formulate a 
49 Barth, Fredrik, ‘Introduction’, in Fredrik Barth (ed.), Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: the 
social organization of cultural difference (Bergen: Univ. Forl., 1969), 9–38.
50 Nugent, Smugglers, 272–3; Saïbou, Issa, Ethnicité, frontières et stabilité aux confins du 
Cameroun, du Nigeria et du Tchad (Paris: Harmattan, 2012).
51 Wimmer, ‘Strategies’, 1038–41; Lamphear, John, ‘Aspects of ‘Becoming Turkana’: 
Interactions & Asmilation Between Maa- & Ateker-Speakers’, in Thomas Spear and 
Richard Waller (eds.), Being Maasai: Ethnicity & Identity in East Africa (Oxford: James 
Currey – Dar-es-Salaam: Mkuki Na Nyota – Nairobi: eaep – Athens/oh: Ohio University 
Press, 1993), 87–104, 92–5.
52 Poutignat and Streiff-Fenart, Théories, 101.
53 Williams Jr., Robin M., ‘The Sociology of Ethnic Conflicts: Comparative International 
Perspectives’, Annual Review of Sociology 20, 1994, 49–79, 58.
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working definition.54 Given the strongly varying forms of employment of the 
category, this definition needs to be congruent with the latest results of schol-
arship, but avoid the larger debate on so-called ‘ethnicity’ of migrant commu-
nities. This definition necessarily has a ‘constructivist’ note: because what 
individuals claim to be plays an important role in the creation of solidarity – 
which is obviously not the only criterion of belonging, but cannot simply be 
left out of the discussion. Ethnic groups can be described as self-declared com-
munities whose spokesmen define them as groups with a common history and 
traditions, and who cling to this common identification independently from 
state structures and institutions. By contrast, a sentiment relying on political 
institutions is also imaginable and may in the widest sense be called ‘state 
patriotism’, or, if the relationship between the largest existing political struc-
ture and the population within its borders is the central factor of identifica-
tion, may refer to the equally vague concept of ‘nation’. Ethnocultural solidarity 
exists, however, independently of the state; on the one hand, its implications 
are thus narrower than those of the inhabitants of particular (and, ultimately, 
reasonably ‘successful’) states that have, as a group, become somewhat galvan-
ised into a broader community identification. On the other hand, ethnic soli-
darity thus defined supersedes the frontiers of the village and kinship level, 
and is normally abstract from the level of the family: one village community 
would usually not be sufficient to circumscribe an ethnic identification, and in 
many cases the local identification as translated through village solidarity, 
rivals rather than supports ethnic feelings. The crucial role of self- representation 
during encounters explains why my study is especially interested in the 
exchange between groups and the colonial powers.
Ethnic solidarity as defined by the accounts given by individuals is in most 
cases reinforced through certain cultural factors, although this picture is 
 complicated.55 Certainly, the most important markers of ethnic identification 
tend to change from community to community, and even within communi-
ties.56 Language is one typical basis for inducing an ethnocultural community 
 sentiment: most communities claiming ethnic solidarity have one idiom. 
Nonetheless, not every linguistic group is an ethnic group, and this criterion is 
54 De Vos, George, and Lola Romanucci-Ross, ‘Ethnicity: Vessel of Meaning and Emblem of 
Contrast’, in George De Vos and Lola Romanucci-Ross (eds.), Ethnic identity: Cultural 
Continuities and Change (Palo Alto: Mayfield, 1975), 363–90, 364.
55 Banton, Michael, ‘The sociology of ethnic relations’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 31(7), 2008, 
1267–85, 1275.
56 Mahmood, Cynthia K., and Sharon L. Armstrong, ‘Do ethnic groups exist? A cognitive 
perspective on the concept of cultures’, Ethnology 31(1), 1992, 1–14, 9.
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not obligatory for constituting ethnic solidarity: in particular, the spectacular 
case of Rwanda provides an important counter-example, where language dif-
ference was not at stake.
Cultural forms and types of behaviour, such as common institutions of 
organisation, festivals, folklore like dances or songs, professional particulari-
ties, marriage patterns, or architecture can obviously contribute to ethnic soli-
darity. They are frequently commented on whenever group leaders explain the 
nature of their ethnic community, but their existence is not crucial for the 
identification. These elements are thus important whenever a dominant dis-
course within the group identifies them as crucial, not, as older anthropologi-
cal research has tended to make us believe, automatically. More important is 
the question of historical tradition, which is always more or less invented, but 
gives legitimacy to the feeling of unity inside the community, and the idea of a 
common destiny. I insist that such a definition is useful for a global historical 
perspective, and not at all only for sub-Saharan Africa or ‘tribal Asia’. Its use 
challenges the view according to which the concept is irrelevant in the ‘west-
ern world’, without conceding to the view of the historians of global migration, 
who often do not find any distinction between ‘ethnic group’ and ‘nation’.
During the decades of colonial rule, anthropologists tended to link the category 
of ‘tribe’ to physical attributes. Even with the colonial bias in studies of ethnicity 
attacked by contemporary scholarship, those ideas continue to circulate and to 
play a role in public debates both in the former metropoles, in the international 
media, and in African societies. The notion of ‘race’, however, also plays another 
role in the African context in particular. Under colonial rule, opinion leaders in 
different African societies attempted to forge a pan-African identity, and under 
those conditions, questions of both ‘race’ – as a common element for the colonial 
subjects – and ‘ethnicity’ – described as ‘tribalism’, and as the main obstacle to the 
objective of African unity – were discussed as diametrically opposed.
 Race
‘Race’ is a category that according to its variable definitions overlaps with ‘eth-
nicity’ in many popular, but also in some scientific, contexts of discussion.57 
Categorisation by the criterion of ‘race’, in the sense of a fictitious, phenotype-
based category, gains importance by being an essential problem of relations 
between colonial rulers and ruled populations during the period of European 
domination. Moreover, ‘racial issues’ were sometimes employed to minimise 
57 Poutignat and Streiff-Fenart, Théories, 45.
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inter-group conflicts through the definition of scapegoats, which tied together, 
for a normally limited period, the members of hostile groups.
Racial conflict is especially typical for sub-Saharan Africa under colonial 
rule insofar as it defines in large parts the relations between colonisers and 
colonised elements inside the system. It obtained a particular and very aggres-
sive meaning whenever the colonial encounter involved frequent contact situ-
ations between African populations and European settlers. This factor is less 
important for the populations of West Africa, where European settlement was 
uncommon. The inter-community conflicts between West African populations 
compared in this book, cannot be described as conflicts characterised by the 
phenotype of the individuals concerned. Members of one group were not able 
to identify those of a different and, ultimately, hostile group through the latter’s 
physical appearance (although they might sometimes believe they could).58
In the interior of West Africa, we nonetheless find some regions in which 
‘racial’ conflicts exist. In parts of the Sahel zone, where ‘mixed’ populations with 
different skin colourings are neighbours, ‘Moorish’ populations in Mauritania 
and part of the Tuareg communities in Mali and Niger, are defined as ‘white’ 
population groups.59 However, apart from several itinerant clerics who enjoyed 
considerable respect among Muslims in West Africa, members of those groups 
did not appear in West Africa’s coastal regions.
‘Race’ as a concept of categorisation plays a role both for reasons of termi-
nology, and for the above-mentioned fact that ‘racial issues’ could be utilised to 
bridge existing conflicts between West African communities. The first point 
will bring us back to the pitfalls of theory. I have already highlighted the prob-
lem of overlapping categories of identifications: since in migration contexts 
and migration studies regarding Europe and the Americas, ‘ethnicity’ is now 
sometimes equated to skin colour, it is important to make these distinctions. 
Linking our discussion to broader and global questions of belonging and iden-
tification, ‘race’ is indeed a complex element of distinction and mobilisation. 
Its relationship to ethnocultural sentiment is remarkably variable. On the one 
hand, elements perceived as ‘racial’, which are normally expressed by skin 
colour, can support perceptions of ethnic difference.60 On the other hand, 
58 These alleged genetic differences as reflected in phenotype are still presented as a matter 
of fact in older, pre-genocide literature; see: Van den Berghe, Phenomenon, 29.
59 Féral, Gabriel, ‘Administrations comparées en pays nomade’, in Edmond Bernus, Pierre 
Boilley, Jean-Louis Triaud and Jean Clauzel (eds.), Nomades et commandants: administra-
tion et sociétés nomades dans l’ancienne A.O.F (Paris: Karthala, 1993), 105–12, 111.
60 Other (constructed) physical-biological categories, like racial ‘odour’, could be added to 
these imagined differences, see Beer, Bettina, ‘Geruch und Differenz: Körpergeruch als 
Kennzeichen konstruierter “rassischer” Grenzen’, Paideuma 46, 2000, 207–30, 221–3.
5�Group Identifications
<UN>
‘race’ can be understood, in a way, as an alternative concept to ethnicity. A 
‘racial’ perspective frequently excludes the existence of smaller ethnic identifi-
cations and facilitates more global interpretations.
The very notion of ‘race’ as a factor of distinction is frequently imprecise. In 
some cases, so-called ‘racial’ aspects overlap with issues of ‘ethnicity’, often in 
ways that make it complicated to distinguish well between the employments of 
the two terms. This has had a strong impact on academic analysis, in particular 
on sociological studies. It is also mirrored in the everyday use of the word ‘eth-
nic minorities’, which frequently refers to coloured immigrants in European 
countries and even to Afro-Americans in the case of the United States. The ter-
minological problems imported with such a methodological concept, when-
ever it is used in a context of immigration (or for migration studies), are easily 
understandable: they lead us into situations in which, for example, Americans 
or Europeans with African descent are defined as an ‘ethnic minority’ or ‘ethnic 
group’. From a perspective of categories, this is highly problematic. In the North 
American case, the African origins of the individuals concerned are usually, of 
course, at a distance of at least two centuries, and the ‘Afro-Americans’ imag-
ined as an ‘ethnic minority’ do not, furthermore, really have common cultural 
characteristics, their own language, or historical traditions (although, obvi-
ously, the latter are sought in revivalist movements). For historians it should be 
absurd that the ‘Afro-American’ community is defined as an ‘ethnic group’, with 
skin colour as the near-exclusive criterion of distinction, ultimately paired with 
a group history of particular social differences that is, however, unlikely to be a 
convincing element of any possible ethnic group identification.61
Furthermore, one needs to question the values conveyed by the term ‘race’, 
even if this term is employed in a purely academic sense. Indeed, this category is 
inappropriate as it relates to imagined characteristics seen as typical for a group 
of a particular skin colour. We thus need, obviously, to strictly apply it in terms 
of phenotype, describing visible physical characteristics of a person that are per-
ceived by others and considered by them to be ‘racial’.62 The term as I employ it, 
as expressing an element that can cause a certain amount of group affiliation 
through perceived otherness, describes a basis of racist hostility, which is legiti-
mised through both visible and imagined bio-physical distinctions.
Occasionally, those ‘racial’ definitions have enjoyed a considerable influence 
in the argumentation of elite groups, both of the European rulers formulating 
61 See a discussion of this problem in Aronson, Dan R., ‘Ethnicity as a Cultural System: an 
Introductory Essay’, in Frances Henry (ed.), Ethnicity in the Americas (The Hague: Mouton, 
1976), 9–19, 13–5.
62 Nayak, Anoop, ‘After race: Ethnography, race and post-race theory’, Ethnic and Racial 
Studies 29(3), 2006, 411–30, 411, 414, 419.
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a doctrine of superiority, and, in the case of the African populations, as a force-
ful counter-mobilisation. With respect to the African ‘racial argument’, this 
perception related to the experiences of African visitors going to Europe in 
greater numbers from the late nineteenth century. Originally, those visitors had 
mostly arrived as missionary students and guests, but, later on, a small number 
became enrolled as more or less regular students at European public universi-
ties. Those Africans were confronted with racial definitions in the metropoles, 
and they developed a strong self-perception of being entirely different from the 
colonial rulers. The experiences followed established patterns: from the begin-
nings of the Atlantic slave trade, European merchants had sent their Eurafrican 
offspring to Europe in order to give them a (Christian) education, and these 
were soon accompanied by the sons of some African traders.63
However, from the second half of the nineteenth century, the group of 
African residents in different European contexts became substantially larger. 
As students coming from the African continent were frequently concentrated 
in restricted areas, this created a sort of pan-African experience of living in 
Europe. Such an experience was closely related to hostilities that those 
migrants faced in their transitional living environment because of their skin 
colour.64 Therefore, Africans having lived in Europe were more eagerly ready to 
take a pan-African perspective – in ways that individuals from various parts of 
Asia did not experience. From the first half of the twentieth century, those 
impressions increasingly led to situations in which, confronted with the colo-
nial systems, individuals defined themselves principally as ‘African’.65 It is no 
surprise that after the Second World War, under the impact of the wave of colo-
nial reformism, African student organisations in Europe, such as the famous 
Fédération des Etudiants d’Afrique Noire en France (feanf), became the most 
ardent supporters of the idea of a pan-African liberation. They formulated far 
more radical positions than the ‘nationalists’ who had lived permanently in 
their African countries.66
63 Northrup, David, Africa’s discovery of Europe: 1450–1850 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), 147–9; Pasquier, Roger, ‘Un Explorateur Sénégalais: Léopold Panet, 1819?–1859, 
African Historical Studies 2(2), 1969, 307–17, 313–4.
64 Bah, Thierno, ‘Les étudiants de l’Afrique noire et la marche à l’indépendance’, in Charles-
Robert Ageron and Marc Michel (eds.), L’Afrique noire française: l’heure des Indépendances 
(Paris: cnrs Editions, 1992), 41–56.
65 Derrick, Jonathan, Africa’s ‘Agitators’: Militant Anti-Colonialism in Africa and the West, 
1918–1939 (London: Hurst, 2008), 91–7.
66 Benoist, Joseph-Roger de, ‘feanf and the colonial authorities’, in unesco (ed.), The role 
of African student movements in the political and social evolution of Africa from 1900 to 1975 
(Paris: unesco, 1994), 109–21.
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From the European point of view, the definition of Black Africans as ‘alien 
beings’ had been a typical phenomenon during the whole of the early modern 
period. Such alienation was sometimes probably only instrumental: it justified 
enslavement, and somehow legitimised the fact that Christian European plant-
ers imported, exploited, mistreated and killed Black African slaves in ways that 
were mostly unimaginable in European countries. The tremendous expansion 
of the practice of slavery within the plantation zones of the Americas posed a 
moral problem which needed to be resolved.67 The practice of denigrating 
Black Africans as the literal offspring of early biblical sinners made sense in 
this context: it allowed the European sellers and owners to regard the enslave-
ment of Black Africans as retribution and justice.68 This argumentation made 
it possible for the European colonial establishment in the Americas to main-
tain a regime in which the roles of master and slave were factually distributed 
according to skin colour.69 At the beginning of the period of colonial con-
quests, around 1850, racial conceptions were thus already deeply entrenched 
in European perspectives. With regard to the African continent, they led – 
mediated through the above-mentioned life experiences of African individuals 
in Europe – to counter-formulations from the African side, which were then 
conveyed back to local movements.
However, while racial conflict is mostly discussed regarding the relations 
between African populations (Black) and European merchants and colonisers 
(White), it has to be pointed out that the phenomenon appears in the African 
continent in a number of very diverse circumstances. These are equally as 
important as the role of the pan-African argument. As I have indicated for parts 
of West Africa, another typical sphere of ‘racial’ conflicts is that between ‘Arabs’ 
and ‘Black Africans’ in the Southern Sahel Zone: in those regions, ‘Arab’ or 
‘Moorish’ raiders, landlords, and traders introduced Black Africans for trade 
into slave networks leading to North Africa and, less frequently, to the Middle 
East.70 The legacy of the related conflicts can still be felt in what is today 
described in the media as a ‘racial border’, running through the contemporary 
67 A useful starting point is Forster, Robert, ‘Three Slaveholders in the Antilles: Saint-
Domingue, Martinique and Jamaica’, Journal of Caribbean History 36(1), 2002, 1–32, 4–7.
68 One example is Jordan, Winthrop D., White over black: American attitudes toward the 
Negro, 1550–1812 (fifth edition, Chapel Hill: University of South Carolina Press, 1979).
69 Drescher, Seymour, ‘White Atlantic? The Choice for African Slave Labor in the Plantation 
Americas’, in David Eltis, Frank D. Lewis, and Kenneth L. Sokoloff (eds.), Slavery in the 
Development of the Americas (Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
31–69.
70 Clarence-Smith, William Gervase, Islam and the Abolition of Slavery (New York – Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 70–2.
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state of Mauritania eastward through Mali, Niger, and, with a particular impact, 
Chad and Sudan. In Mauritania, the ‘Moorish’ majority periodically treats 
‘Black’ Mauritanians as ‘foreigners’ and as ‘Senegalese’, although these popula-
tions have settled for a period of many centuries – at the very least – north of 
the Senegal River. Questions of social status, relating to the fact that ‘Black 
Africans’ frequently have slave ancestors, have kept this situation in a problem-
atic imbalance: indeed, in the post-colonial ‘Islamic Republic’, political alli-
ances between ‘Black’ and ‘White’ Mauritanians, while frequently existent, 
appear to be far less stable than those created on either side of the colour line.71
The role of pan-African mobilisation is, however, far stronger when con-
fronted with non-European immigrant groups in the territories south of the 
Sahara. For West Africa, Lebanese immigration is a phenomenon that led to a 
‘racially’ defined antagonism. The three regions discussed in the case studies 
are principal territories of Lebanese immigration. These immigrant families 
had very different backgrounds in relation to their regions of origin: they were 
from both Christian (mainly Maronite) and Shiite or Sunni Muslim back-
grounds, and village networks from Lebanon played a decisive role in this 
immigration. Lebanese traders subsequently enjoyed considerable success in 
local retail trade in West African territories.72
It has to be said that, as far as historians have been able to judge, Lebanese 
merchants have been an important factor within the colonial economies 
emerging in West Africa since the late nineteenth century. The Lebanese only 
partly pushed other, Black African contenders out of the retail market. In many 
cases, such a market had never really existed, at least not in any larger form. 
Lebanese merchants and their families simply occupied an obvious niche in 
local trade networks, which had been left unfilled by African traders.73 In rural 
Senegal, for instance, those merchants are remembered as a rather beneficial 
force: interviewees have a tendency to claim that with Lebanese participation 
in the local retail trade (which at present has largely disappeared in rural areas), 
the access to vital goods had been far easier than is the case nowadays.74
71 McDougall, E. Ann, ‘Setting the Story Straight: Louis Hunkanrin and “Un Forfait Colonial”’, 
History in Africa 16, 1989, 285–310, 285–6.
72 Winder, Bayly, ‘The Lebanese in West Africa’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 
4(3), 1962, 296–333, 301, 305.
73 Falola, Toyin, ‘The Lebanese in Colonial West Africa’, in J.F. Ade Ajayi and J.D.Y. Peel (eds.), 
People and Empires in African History: Essays in Memory of Michael Crowder (London – 
New York: Longman, 1992), 121–41.
74 Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes, France (cadn), Fonds ‘Anciennes Colonies’, 
Fonds Dakar, 197, Lami, French Governor of Senegal, Territoire du Sénégal – Cercle de 
Thiès: Rapport Politique 1950 (without number), 20 March 1951, 18.
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Nevertheless, the Lebanese were the victims of recurrent riots in most West 
African countries. This was in particular the case for urban communities with 
a certain degree of prosperity.75 As I will discuss below concerning the ques-
tion of ‘nationality’, economic crises in the years of the First World War and the 
1930s, growing infrastructural engagement of the colonial powers from 1945, 
and perceived injustice in the acquisition of wealth by Lebanese businessmen 
all provoked violent encounters between these merchants and local street 
mobs. Such tensions also led to the formation of associations and parties that 
had a clear anti-Lebanese programme. Frequently, the colonial powers indi-
rectly allowed for such tensions and for the subsequent violent clashes. Even if 
European officials sympathised with the Lebanese settlers and understood 
their difficult position, they would normally not intervene against rioters, or 
would only intervene very slowly. As the British administrators of the Sierra 
Leonean Port Loko District argued, it was sometimes rather difficult to take 
sides in conflicts between ‘raw natives with the most elementary ideas’ and 
‘vile Syrians’.76
The example of Lebanese immigration shows that ‘racial’ tensions were 
indeed not only limited to racism of the colonisers towards the colonised pop-
ulations. The existence of those different ‘racial’ lines of conflict does, however, 
not mean that the creation of difference through colour is in any way  inevitable. 
Hostilities between Black and non-Black inhabitants of sub-Saharan Africa 
were typical for the colonial period and probably widespread before, but the 
‘racial’ frontier was far from being impenetrable: aspects of phenotype were 
never deterministic in creating regional hostilities, and they did not constitute 
an effective barrier for individuals.
I already referred to Fredrik Barth’s assumption that groups define them-
selves mainly through designation and constant redefinition of the frontier 
separating them from other local communities. Gunnar Haaland has found evi-
dence of that phenomenon for Darfur, in Sudan: the agricultural ‘Black’ Fur of 
the region could, at least for many decades until the early post-colonial phase, 
rather easily become integrated into the group of the nomadic ‘Arab’ Baggara. In 
those processes of shifts between identity groups, skin colour did not obviously 
impede the change from one community to the other. It is plausible that such 
75 Kaniki, Martin H.Y., ‘Attitudes and Reactions towards the Lebanese in Sierra Leone 
during the Colonial Period’, Canadian Journal of African Studies 7(1), 1973, 97–113, 
101–3.
76 The National Archives, Public Record Office, Kew, London, United Kingdom (tna, pro), 
CO/267/595, District Administrator of Port Loko District, Annual Report 1921: Port Lokko 
District, Northern Province (without number), without date, 2.
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phenomena of blurred ‘racial’ boundaries are typical for many ‘racial border 
regions’.77
Evidently, ‘racial’ solidarity as a category is far more difficult to create than is 
ethnic sentiment, for the simple reason that it needs to rely on the perception 
of physical otherness. Except in cases where ethnic hostilities were deliber-
ately linked to elaborate stories of physical distinction, these ‘racial’ issues 
were thus not complementary to ideas of difference through ethnic solidarity. 
On the contrary, ‘racial’ images could help to extinguish temporarily the impact 
of ethnic or other community conflicts, by giving a platform of unity.78 In the 
African case, such ‘unity’ could be directed both on a pan-African ideological 
basis against the ‘White’ colonisers, or, far more often indeed, against third par-
ties, such as Lebanese immigrants in West Africa. Like ‘race’, other overarching 
concepts also surged and were set against ethnic distinction; this is the case of 
the idea of ‘nation’ that became popular in the colonial world from the inter-
war period, and in sub-Saharan Africa after 1945.
 The Problem of Nation
Like ethnicity, the group identification described as ‘nation’ refers to a senti-
ment that transgresses communal and regional frontiers.79 Having been for-
mulated as a socio-political concept in Europe and European settler colonies 
in the Americas, the ‘nation’ is an ‘imagined community’ that involves, like 
ethnic groups, a common tradition, language (in most cases), and common 
cultural aspects.80 Indeed, some scholars do not distinguish between the two 
concepts: they rightly point to the fact that a distinction is frequently artificial, 
77 Haaland, Gunnar, ‘Economic Determinants in Ethnic Processes’, in Fredrik Barth (ed.), 
Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: the social organization of cultural difference (Bergen: Univ. 
Forl, 1969), 58–73, passim; see also Cooper, Frederick, From Slaves to Squatters: Plantation 
Labor and Agriculture in Zanzibar and Coastal Kenya, 1890–1925 (New Haven – London: 
Yale University Press, 1980), 163.
78 Falola, Toyin, and Kwame Essien, ‘Introduction’, in Toyin Falola and Kwame Essien (eds.), 
Pan-Africanism, and the politics of African citizenship and identity (New York: Routledge, 
2014), 1–10.
79 The ‘classical text’ on the nation as ‘imagined community’ continues to be Anderson, 
Benedict, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London: Verso, 1991), 83–111.
80 Interestingly, in the debate about emerging concepts of ‘nation’, scholars also distinguish 
between ‘primordialists’ and ‘modernists’, see Smith, Anthony David, The Ethnic Origins of 
Nations (Oxford – New York: Blackwell, 1986), 7–13.
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and they follow in a way the terminology employed by early European travel-
lers. The latter had classified the populations they encountered ‘overseas’ 
(including in sub-Saharan Africa) as ‘nations’, without, however, insinuating 
the same idea of community that the concept of ‘nation’ would describe in the 
nineteenth century.81 By contrast, other scholars see an incompatibility 
between the concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘ethnic group’, and hold that the appear-
ance of ethnic solidarity in a given country normally challenges the cohesion 
of the ‘nation’, through ‘tribalist’ political activities or autonomous cultural 
manifestations.82
For Africa, the case becomes still more complicated because the concept of 
‘nation’ arrived later than in Europe, in the Americas, and in East Asia – and it 
is important for the global historian in particular to compare these trajectories. 
It was an imported concept taken from the European colonisers, and employed 
and redefined by a new African elite educated in colonial and metropolitan 
institutions.83 These ‘educated natives’, ‘évolués’, or ‘assimilados’, as they were 
called in the different colonial terminologies, rapidly pointed to the tensions 
between ‘national’ goals and ethnic solidarities.84 Thus, most aggressively in 
the late colonial period and in the first years after decolonisation, Africa’s polit-
ical elite coming to power juxtaposed the ‘modern’ concept of the ‘nation’ with 
the ‘ancient’ and ‘irrational’ notions of ethnicity.85 The constant attacks of 
African statesmen against ‘tribalism’ – frequently contradicted by the hidden 
patronage networks favouring the respective ethnic constituencies of the sev-
eral national leaders – made it difficult to discuss in a more neutral way the 
distinction between ethnic and national solidarity.86
81 Brass, Paul R., Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison (New Delhi – Newbury 
Park – London: Sage Publications, 1991), 62–3.
82 See, also: Wherry, Frederick F., ‘The nation-state, identity management, and indigenous 
crafts: Constructing markets and opportunities in Northwest Costa Rica’, Ethnic and 
Racial Studies 29(1), 2006, 124–52, 145–6.
83 Rotberg, Robert I., ‘African Nationalism: Concept or Confusion?’, Journal of Modern 
African Studies 4(1), 1966, 33–46, 39–40, 46.
84 Davis, Thomas J., and Azubike Kalu-Nwiwu, ‘Education, Ethnicity and National Integration 
in the History of Nigeria: Continuing Problems of Africa’s Colonial Legacy’, Journal of 
Negro History 86(1), 2001, 1–11, 6.
85 Emerson, Rupert, ‘The Problem of Identity, Selfhood, and Image in the New Nations: The 
Situation in Africa’, Comparative Politics 1(3), 1969, 297–312, 299.
86 Kymlicka, Will, ‘Nation-Building & Minority Rights: Comparing Africa & the West’, in 
Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh, and Will Kymlicka (eds.), Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa 
(Oxford: James Currey – Athens/oh: Ohio University Press, 2004), 54–71, 64–5.
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Obviously, we cannot make a distinction between ‘nations’ and larger ‘eth-
nic groups’ that would cover all cases to a sufficient degree.87 A key difference 
between the two concepts can be found in the relation of group identification 
to territory, and in the insistence of ‘nationalists’ that they be governed by uni-
tary political institutions.88 The emergence of the concept of ‘nation’ as a his-
torical process during the nineteenth century is a filling out of geographical 
space. In many cases, imagined or already existing practical borders had to be 
filled by a nascent national community.89 For ethnic solidarity, this relation-
ship is far less evident: the link of ethnicity to tradition highlights the role of 
important or even sacred places, but the idea of control over a geographical 
territory is far less prominent.
Another of the criteria of distinction between the categories might be found 
in the distinct role of culture, as defined for ‘national communities’ by Ernest 
Gellner. He held that the concept of ‘nation’ includes a deterministic belief in 
the superiority of the national community’s culture, imagining a future situa-
tion of ‘national control’ of this culture over a certain territorial space.90 By 
contrast, the concept of ‘ethnic group’ is more strongly referring to the past, 
and to past group ‘rights’, either inherited or ‘spear-won’. Another tendency to 
define ‘national sentiment’ as distinct from ‘ethnic solidarity’ refers to the 
extension of the programme: according to this view, only communities of a 
larger size could develop a national perspective. Again, however, it seems that 
such terminology is unlikely to be applied for African groups. These reflections 
bring us back to the role of borders in the African continent.91
As I have mentioned above, ‘nation’ as a concept has importance for West 
Africans in the post-colonial period.92 From the transitions of power, African 
government leaders have more or less energetically attempted to forge the dif-
ferent groups of inhabitants in the respective territories into national com-
munities. This project was declared a major goal of African parties by the late 
colonial states of the 1950s, but, in the long-term perspective, ‘nations’ as imag-
ined communities rarely emerged in the African continent. It belongs to the 
wisdom of political scientists analysing African politics that the instability of 
87 Poutignat and Streiff-Fenart, Théories, 46–7.
88 Hobsbawm, ‘Ethnicity’, 4.
89 Balibar, Etienne, ‘The Nation Form: History and Ideology’, in Etienne Balibar and 
Immanuel Wallerstein (eds.), Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities (London – New 
York: Verso, 1991, translation of orig. Paris: La Découverte, 1988), 86–106, 96–100.
90 Gellner, Ernest, Nations and Nationalism (London: Blackwell, 1983), 55–8.
91 Poutignat and Streiff-Fenart, Théories, 52–3.
92 Fage, J.D., ‘Continuity and Change in the Writing of West African History’, African Affairs 
70(280), 1971, 236–51, 243–4.
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post-colonial states can partly be attributed to this lack of support for national 
projects, which appears to be an essential problem in many African societies 
after independence.
It is easy to understand that, when it comes to the question of institutions, 
the very nature of African post-colonial states is highly unfavourable to stimu-
lating such national loyalty. State structures in post-colonial sub-Saharan 
Africa are frequently weak. Those structures were transferred without much 
preparation from a model of control introduced by the European rulers, and 
they have proven to be largely inadequate to guarantee the protection and a 
rudimentary well-being of the inhabitants of many of the countries in ques-
tion. In the ‘normal’ pattern of evolutions of post-colonial African states – a 
pattern that has remained prominent from independence to the end of the 
twentieth century and beyond – we mainly find the particular type of state 
that has so masterfully been discussed by Jean-François Bayart: state structures 
with a core of activity around the centre of political power, and with concen-
tric circles of patronage networks around this centre.93 Large parts of the 
African societies have not been covered by those structures. The representa-
tives of the state in the more peripheral or remote regions of the countries, are 
frequently regarded as completely detached from local interest and local 
necessities, or even despised as parasites by the local inhabitants.94 Access to 
resources has been uneven in such structures: only those populations enjoying 
a regular presence in the capital or in key areas of the country as defined by the 
ruling elites, or those belonging to patronage networks through influential 
intermediaries, have been able to participate in the exercise of and the struggle 
for political power.
This weakness of post-colonial African state structures can be illustrated 
through an analysis of the particular situations of political crisis that were 
already common in the decade after the transitions of power. Whenever the 
governments of the post-colonial states were challenged, this challenge rarely 
concerned groups outside of the core community and the key regions. Not sur-
prisingly, the first coups d’état in sub-Saharan Africa after decolonisation, in 
the 1960s, left the countryside rather untouched.95 After a phase of initial 
destabilisation and violent protest in the capital, army leaders profited from 
the occasions and exploited the ‘national’ crisis to usurp political power. 
93 Bayart, Etat, 281–308.
94 Wunsch, James S., ‘Refounding the African State and Local Self-Governance: The 
Neglected Foundation’, Journal of Modern African Studies 38(3), 2000, 487–509, 498.
95 Nkendirim, Bernard A., ‘Reflections on Political Conflict, Rebellion, and Revolution in 
Africa’, Journal of Modern African Studies 15(1), 1977, 75–90, 79.
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Starting in Congo-Brazzaville in 1963, this same pattern was repeated several 
times over. Dahomey (present-day Benin) in 1963 or Upper Volta (present-day 
Burkina Faso) in January 1966 are two more examples of urban protests led by 
trade union militants that gave the national army the excuse to topple the 
elected presidents. It has to be emphasised that in all those cases, ethnic senti-
ment, if it was at all mentioned, played a minor role. On the contrary, the logics 
of the nation-state as they had been defined by the nationalist discourse, and 
the lack of a power base for the dominant elites, permitted the military to claim 
political leadership in the respective states. This process started nearly always 
at the centre of the state structure, in the capital and its urban agglomeration.
The weak links between the urban centres and their agglomerations as 
cores of political power and the ‘countryside’ have been very powerful obsta-
cles, which ultimately disallowed a leading function for ‘national’ feelings in 
the identification repertoires of African groups and individuals. In Europe, in 
the United States, and in the former British Dominions (and in parts of Latin 
America that had long been dominated by European settlers converted into a 
Creole elite) conditions were different: here, the process of nation-building 
started in the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth century, and it conse-
quently had a longer-lasting impact on local solidarities. Notably, and perhaps 
more importantly, in the respective cases, such creation of widely important 
national sentiment went hand in hand with a forceful penetration of the coun-
tryside by political structures.
It is true that in the different geographical areas of the above-mentioned 
larger zones of Europe, former European settler colonies, and Latin America, 
nationalist fervour was, in part and mostly in the beginning, an elite sentiment. 
However, in the course of the nineteenth century, in most cases, it began to 
have a strong effect on the rural zones and became, to a certain degree, a mass 
phenomenon. Broader access to an education system that was increasingly 
unified and controlled from above; army conscription; mass elections, and a 
considerable use of sites of memory and cultural manifestations were behind 
the widespread dissemination of nationalist ideas. Due to the limitations 
inherent in the colonial systems, all these phenomena are partly or completely 
absent from the political scenery of colonies. However, for the African territo-
ries before 1960 this effect was strongest for the large majority of populations 
that lived far away from the administrative capitals.96 While the colonial pow-
ers commemorated their respective empires as part of their own ‘national 
agenda’, and celebrated the deeds of the ‘heroes’ of the colonial period; while 




the colonial administrations sometimes turned to the commemoration of fra-
ternity between Africans and Europeans (referring, for example, to the African 
contribution during the World Wars, which was immense in the case of the 
French war effort), they were not inclined to give room to any ‘national’ feeling 
that could be turned against the metropole.97
However, even after independence and in the first two decades after 
decolonisation, larger efforts to create such national sentiment inside the 
African states remained relatively rare. While most African statesmen con-
tinued to pay lip service to ‘the nation’, we do not find much concrete 
engagement to foster feelings of national unity. In the field of the (physical) 
sites of memory, there were some occasional efforts to stimulate the growth 
of national sentiment. Nevertheless, it is occasionally difficult to decide if a 
‘national monument’, such as the costly arc de triomphe of Banjul (erected 
after the 22 August 1994 coup d’état), in the Gambia, was really constructed 
as an embodiment of an imagined nation’s glory, or for the apotheosis of a 
particular leader.98
Moreover, in the case of the African states, an additional problem for the 
distribution of the concept of the nation-state is posed by the rather banal 
fact that the physical borders of colonial territories, which became indepen-
dent countries, had naturally been set by external forces. As has been dis-
cussed over decades, colonial borders have, in a huge majority of cases, no 
connection whatsoever to boundaries of pre-colonial states or groups as 
they existed before 1850.99 Not surprisingly, the ‘primordialists’ amongst his-
torians and anthropologists claim that colonial borders create, as a matter 
of fact, serious problems. According to the ‘primordialist’ position, these 
97 Michel, Marc, ‘“Mémoire officielle”, discours et pratique coloniale: le 14 juillet et le 11 
novembre au Sénégal entre les deux guerres’, Revue Française d’Histoire d’Outre-Mer 
77(287), 1990, 145–58; on the lack of ‘African’ sites of memory, see also Fall-Sokhna, 
Rokhaya, and Abdoulaye Touré, ‘Les lieux de mémoire: des sources historiques encore 
peu exploitées au Sénégal’, in Ibrahima Thioub (ed.), Patrimoine et sources historiques en 
Afrique (Dakar: Université Cheikh Anta Diop de Dakar – Union académique internatio-
nale, 2007), 105–11, 108–10.
98 Wiseman, John A., ‘Letting Yahya Jammeh off Lightly’, Review of African Political Economy 
72, 1997, 265–76; Mbodj, Mohamed, ‘L’invention d’une tradition: anciens sites et nouvelle 
mémoire ou les ambiguïtés de la célébration de l’indépendance de la Gambie en 1965’, in 
Odile Goerg (ed.), Fêtes urbaines en Afrique: espaces, identités et pouvoirs (Paris: Karthala, 
1999), 229–54, 243–9.
99 Deveneaux, Gustav K., ‘The Frontier in Recent African History’, International Journal of 
African Historical Studies 11(1), 1978, 63–85, 74–5.
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borders cut the communication between members of the same ‘tribe’, or 
ethnic group.100
Given the existence of those ‘artificial borders’, the evolution of self- 
perceived nations in the sense of the nineteenth century, as was typical for the 
European experience, is quite distant for some regions in their post-colonial 
phase, but especially for the African realities after independence. Where 
African leaders appeal to the ‘nation’ as a principle of unity, they transpose an 
artificial concept, which is questionable in its appropriateness for the particu-
lar, historically-grown situations in the African continent. At best, from this 
point of view, such an appeal might be a weak call to mobilise a certain num-
ber of individuals, just like a slogan coming from a charismatic leader. However, 
it is highly unlikely to make the same individuals respond to it in a sustained 
emotional way. Such an interpretation would mean that ‘nation’ as a concept 
cannot really become an element of reference in the identification repertoire 
of an African individual.101
These prognostics about a possible role for ‘the nation’ in the African con-
text seem to follow a clear, historically-grounded logic in a global comparison. 
However, as with other group categories, the reality on the ground is not as 
schematic. In the following pages, I will demonstrate this through a number of 
incongruities between the classical perspective that insists on the inadequacy 
of the conception of ‘nation’ for sub-Saharan Africa, and some empirical find-
ings in a global history perspective which at least cast doubt on this vision.
First of all, boundaries in the sense of borders between ‘nations,’ may have 
been artificial constructs, but they have nonetheless been filled with an emo-
tional meaning. This becomes obvious from the agency of the African resi-
dents in the redefinition of certain border regions, which has been pointed 
out in many innovative ways by Paul Nugent. Although the boundaries in 
themselves had been negotiated by representatives of the European colonial 
powers, and although these borders frequently cut through language groups 
and ethnic communities, they became in many cases themselves a vivid and 
100 Davidson, Basil, The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State (London: 
James Currey – Harare: Baobab Books – Nairobi: E.A.E.P. – Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 
1992), 224–42; Fanso, Verkijika G., ‘Traditional and colonial African boundaries: concepts 
and functions in inter-group relations’, Présence Africaine 137–40, 1986, 58–75. See an early 
challenge in Zartman, I. William, ‘The Politics of Boundaries in North and West Africa’, 
Journal of Modern African Studies 3(2), 1965, 155–73, 160.
101 For ‘dual citizenship’ in Kenya, with reference to both the nation and the ethnic groups, 
see Ndegwa, Stephen N., ‘Citizenship and Ethnicity: An Examination of Two Transition 
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advantageous part of the local reality.102 Even as a European concept, which 
had only scarcely been remodelled by African leaders for their own purposes, 
the separation of two ‘nations’ by a physical border could develop its own 
dynamics.
Obviously, the experience of national borders in sub-Saharan Africa is far 
less related to military conflict and to objectives of territorial control than else-
where.103 The latter motives had been common in nineteenth- and early 
 twentieth-century Europe, with tensions and military clashes being frequently 
linked to a perceived necessity of ‘national expansion’. This being said, and 
while West African governments have mostly respected the territorial integrity 
of neighbouring countries, it would be an exaggeration to claim that conflicts 
between governments of neighbouring African post-colonial states have never 
been related to questions of the national border.104 At least within nationalist 
arguments and in attempts for mobilisation, reference has abundantly been 
made to the suspected aggressive goals of neighbouring national governments. 
An instructive case for this problem, particularly for the 1960s, is the example 
of Ghana and Togo.
After national independence of both West African states, the Ghana-Togo 
border has been a constant source of friction. These tensions have a long pre-
history. Togo had had its first colonial border with the then-British colony of 
the Gold Coast during its period under German rule; until 1914, this German 
colony included regions further to the west and covered parts of the current-
day Ghanaian Volta Region. On those (colonial) grounds, the first independent 
Togolese governments formulated territorial claims towards an entire region 
governed by the neighbouring country. By contrast, the Ghanaian governments 
in Accra insisted on their rights for control over large parts or even the whole 
of the independent Togolese territory. They argued that in 1960 a majority of 
the ‘Togolese people’ had been robbed of their desired opportunity to unite 
with the Ghanaian state.105 Both claims are nowadays largely, if not always, 
detached from any ethnic perspective, although they are not ignorant of the 
102 Nugent, Paul, ‘Arbitrary lines and people’s minds: a dissenting view on colonial boundar-
ies in West Africa’, in Paul Nugent and A.I. Asiwaju (eds.), African Boundaries: Barriers, 
Conduits and Opportunities (London – New York: Frances Pinter, 1996), 35–67, 41–6.
103 Kacowicz, Arie M., ‘“Negative” International Peace and Domestic Conflicts, West Africa, 
1957–96’, Journal of Modern African Studies 35(3), 1997, 367–85, 382.
104 Kornprobst, Markus, ‘The Management of Border Disputes in African Regional Sub-
Systems: Comparing West Africa and the Horn of Africa’, Journal of Modern African Studies 
40(3), 2002, 369–93, 388.
105 Austin, Dennis, ‘The Uncertain Frontier: Ghana-Togo’, Journal of Modern African Studies 
1(2), 139–45, 142; and Bening, R. Bagulo, ‘The Ghana-Togo Boundary, 1914–1982’, Africa 
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fact that border-crossing communities have continued to have an existence in 
both states. The example of the Ghana-Togo border shows that, for a period of 
some decades, even violent conflicts were an imaginable outcome during bor-
der tensions between two post-colonial African states. In this case as in others 
in sub-Saharan Africa, the governments of both states formulated their claims 
with clear reference to national territorial demands and necessities. Therefore, 
the employment of national demands as justification for aggressive state 
behaviour is, in principle, an option in sub-Saharan Africa as it was in other 
parts of the post-colonial world. However, claims for nation-building often 
remained as a concept in the drawer, and have in any way been less prominent 
than in Europe and other parts of the globe.
Obviously, border conflicts are not the only way in which a ‘national’ per-
spective has played a role for individuals and groups in sub-Saharan Africa, in 
particular for the period after independence, but sometimes even before. As in 
Europe, particularly in the case of post-First World War Eastern Europe, the 
term ‘nation’ could be employed to construct a concept of a regional commu-
nity, but in a sense that clearly was to exclude certain ‘minority groups’. In com-
parable ways to settings of conflict between groups distinguished as different 
on ‘ethnic’ terms, such distinctions between we-groups and outsiders were 
sometimes based on mainly emotional behaviour. As the concept of ‘nation’ is, 
however, a particularly young category in the case of the African continent, the 
exclusion of individuals from the national community can mostly be inter-
preted as a step to change and polarise the balance in a country’s resource 
distribution.
In these scenarios, out-groups are usually accused not only of belonging to 
another ethnic group, but also of holding their allegiance to another nation 
(and, if these distinctions are made, to the government of another state). In 
many cases, this argumentation is overtly connected to questions of  ethnicity.106 
The ‘nation’ is, in such circumstances, formulated as a frontier against an inter-
nal enemy, as David Cappell has expressed it for Côte d’Ivoire as an African 
example. The situation in that country between 2002 and 2011 is very probably 
the most illustrative recent West African example for inclusion and exclusion 
under concepts formulated as ‘national’, and for its overlaps with ethnic 
claims.107 The conflict appears at first glance as one between northern and 
Spectrum 18(2), 1983, 191–209. The turbulent relations of Ghana and Togo will reappear in 
chapter 5.
106 Smith, Origins, 154–7.
107 Cappell, David A., ‘The Nation as Frontier: Ethnicity and Clientelism in Ivorian History’, 
International Journal of African Historical Studies 22(4), 1989, 671–96.
65Group Identifications
<UN>
southern alliances of ethnic groups, combined with a religious antagonism 
between Muslims and non-Muslims.108 However, this simplified picture cor-
responds more to rhetoric and less to long-standing allegiances. With increas-
ing force during the 1990s, Ivorian governments, and leading politicians in the 
electoral context, had employed a discussion of different variants of a national 
community, to mobilise the involved groups. During the years of civil war, this 
national argument was formulated by both sides. Côte d’Ivoire therefore con-
stitutes an excellent example of how these mechanisms work, in the African 
continent and beyond.
The growing national dimension of conflict in Côte d’Ivoire was, however, 
particularly the work of President Laurent Gbagbo and his Front Populaire 
Ivoirien (fpi) government in power in Abidjan until 2011. The propaganda of 
the fpi based itself on the question of the ivoirité (the Ivorian identity) of any 
resident, as a principle of adherence to the Ivorian nation.109 It was formulated 
in sufficiently vague terms, in order to be enlarged when necessary, so as to 
include allies of the government. After 2000, this principle was crucial in 
 decision-making processes, as it allowed integrating individuals in or exclud-
ing them from the in-group of citizens. The northern rebel groups were of het-
erogeneous composition, but could thus be lumped together as an external 
threat.110 They were often characterised as ‘Mossi foreigners’ (Mosi being the 
main language group in the northern neighbouring country), as ‘Burkinabè’, 
and, consequently, as intruders from Burkina Faso paid by the government of 
the neighbouring state. This strategy did not always work. However, more often 
than not, inhabitants of southern Côte d’Ivoire proved to be sensitive to those 
arguments, and their impact might explain in part the resilience of the troops 
supporting the Gbagbo government.111
108 Vidal, Claudine, ‘La brutalisation du champ politique ivoirien 1990–2003’, in Jean-Bernard 
Ouédraogo and Ebrima Sall (eds.), Frontières de la citoyenneté et violence politique en Côte 
d’Ivoire (Dakar: codesria, 2008), 169–81, 174–6.
109 Zoro, Epiphane, ‘“Je suis un Sidibé de Tiémélékro”. L’acquisition de la nationalité ivoiri-
enne à titre originaire: critère juridique ou critère anthropologique?’, in Jean-Bernard 
Ouédraogo and Ebrima Sall (eds.), Frontières de la citoyenneté et violence politique en Côte 
d’Ivoire (Dakar: codesria, 2008), 79–87, 84–6; Arnaut, Karel, ‘Mouvement patriotique et 
construction de “l’autochtone” en Côte d’Ivoire’, Africa Development 33(3), 2008, 1–20, 8–10.
110 A polemic view is given in Blé Kessé, Adolphe, La Côte d’Ivoire en guerre: le sens de 
l’imposture française (Paris: Harmattan, 2005).
111 Colin, Jean-Philippe, Georges Kouamé, and Débégnoun Soro, ‘Outside the autochthon-
migrant configuration: access to land, land conflicts and inter-ethnic relationships in a 
former pioneer area of lower Côte d’Ivoire’, Journal of Modern African Studies 45(1), 2007, 
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This type of conflict, in which the limits between ethnically defined vio-
lence and a struggle for inclusion into or exclusion from ‘the nation’ are blurred, 
appears to have become typical throughout the whole of sub-Saharan Africa, 
at least from the 1990s. In East Africa, the logics of the group conflict in Kenya 
in 2007/08 have some striking similarities with the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire.112 
Coming briefly back to the region of Central Africa, it can be argued that a 
similar strategy of exclusion was for a long time successfully employed in 
Congo-Kinshasa, during the late years of the decades-long reign of authoritar-
ian President Joseph-Désiré Mobutu. The Banyamulenge, a numerous, Tutsi-
speaking group in the east of the country, were labelled ‘Rwandans’ by the 
Congolese government, thus excluding them symbolically from the ‘nation’ 
and portraying them as tools of a genuinely ‘foreign’ movement. Again after 
1998, this stigmatisation through a ‘national’ argumentation made the 
Banyamulenge ‘foreigners’ fair game for plunderers from other groups in east-
ern Congo. Ironically, these attacks made the Banyamulenge actively seek con-
tact with the Rwandan government, in order to obtain protection, and the 
group’s ‘Rwandan-ness’ therefore became a self-fulfilling prophecy. It did not 
follow any determined paths, but it became true through the permanent vio-
lence against a group having been a part of the range of communities living in 
Congo-Kinshasa, which after its exclusion from the Congolese ‘nation’ needed 
a protector from outside in order to survive.113
In the three African cases mentioned, as in others, important material 
resources were at stake. Under their attraction, the reference to ‘the nation’ 
allowed local groups to claim the rights of locals ousting foreigners from the 
unauthorised use of such ‘national’ resources. This mechanism of designating 
33–59, 49–53; Babo, Alfred, L’ ‘étranger’ en Côte d’Ivoire: crises et controverses autour d’une 
catégorie sociale (Paris: Harmattan, 2013).
112 Odhiambo, E.S. Atieno, ‘Hegemonic Enterprises & Instrumentalities of Survival: Ethnicity 
& Democracy in Kenya’, in Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh, and Will Kymlicka (eds.), 
Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa (Oxford: James Currey – Athens/oh: Ohio University 
Press, 2004), 167–99, 173–4; Muigai, Githu, ‘Jomo Kenyatta & the Rise of the Ethno-
Nationalist State in Kenya’, in ibid., 200–17, 211–2. On the evolution of 2007/08 post- 
electoral violence, see Anderson, David, and Emma Lochery, ‘Violence and Exodus in 
Kenya’s Rift Valley, 2008: Predictable and Preventable?’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 
2(2), 2008, 328–43; and Bratton, Michael, and Mwangi S. Kimenyi, ‘Voting in Kenya: 
Putting Ethnicity in Perspective’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 2(2), 2008, 272–89.
113 Vlassenroot, Koen, ‘Citizenship, Identity Formation & Conflict in South Kivu: The Case of 
the Banyamulenge’, Review of African Political Economy 29(93–4), 2002, 499–515; Willaume, 
Jean-Claude, Banyarwanda et Banyamulenge: Violences ethniques et gestion de l’identitaire 
au Kivu (Brussels: cedaf, 1997), 83–99.
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certain groups as ‘non-nationals’ and, consequently, as out-groups, appears in 
many places. Quite visibly, these measures were even easier to employ if the 
attacked group was an overseas immigrant group, where so-called ‘racial’ fac-
tors as discussed above could be brought into the discussion. I have already 
pointed to the Lebanese in West Africa as targets in such processes, and the 
Indians and other Asians in South and East Africa constitute a second large 
immigrant group in the African continent.114 The experiences of these differ-
ent communities are important here because they represent the earliest tar-
gets of the employment of arguments that we could describe as ‘national’, or 
‘proto-national’ – the latter term is appropriate if we want to point out that 
they started to be used long before national independence.
The Lebanese communities of West African territories and countries, such 
as Senegal, the Gambia, Guinea-Conakry, Sierra Leone, or Ghana, were from 
1900 and over many decades the victims of ‘racial’ riots initiated by local 
African inhabitants. These riots had begun to occur well before the end of colo-
nial rule: they had a certain long-standing tradition and notoriety.115 The repre-
sentatives of the colonial state occasionally contributed to those hostilities, 
particularly if they favoured principles of colonisation that tended to ‘protect’ 
African societies from obnoxious ‘foreign’ influences. However, if colonial 
administrators encouraged African militants to attack Lebanese settlers, this 
was mainly so through their passiveness in policing activities. There is little 
doubt that it was usually local African groups themselves who took the initia-
tive against the ‘foreigners’.
In 1919, African inhabitants of the city of Freetown in Sierra Leone destroyed 
the stores of ‘Syrian’ merchants established there for some decades already. 
What appeared to be a spontaneous riot was probably a pre-organised action, 
and quite representative of the negative opinion the locals had developed 
towards the immigrants.116 Similar disturbances would reappear again and 
again, in different West African territories, under different colonial rulers. In 
the 1940s and 1950s, the protracted anti-Lebanese sentiment in large parts of 
the African (urban) populations could even be manipulated by European 
 settler leaders – a marginal community in the West African context – who 
114 Ogutu, Matthias A., ‘Commercial Specialisation and Adaptation of Ethnic Groups’, Journal 
of Modern African Studies 11(3), 1973, 465–9.
115 Arsan, Andrew, Interlopers of empire: the Lebanese diaspora in colonial French West Africa 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
116 Abdullah, Ibrahim, ‘Rethinking the Freetown Crowd: The Moral Economy of the 1919 




wanted to hide their own racist positions about Africans behind a common 
front against Lebanese merchants.117
Under colonial conditions, the arguments employed by rioters against such 
‘Asian’ immigrant groups were a mixture between ‘racial’ and territorially 
defined claims. According to this logic, the Lebanese were regarded as 
excluded from a community that can best be described as ‘proto-national’. 
This does not mean that during the violence against Lebanese inhabitants of 
Dakar or Freetown the rioters would clearly define themselves as ‘Senegalese’ 
or ‘Sierra Leoneans’; mostly, this feeling of community spirit against ‘foreign’ 
groups was only defined through the criteria of exclusion. Nevertheless, it is 
remarkable that the motions of hatred that mobilised the urban African 
groups against foreigners excluded from the ‘proto-nation’ were, in many 
cases, highly effective.118
Hostile positions of the African inhabitants of different West African regions 
towards Lebanese settlers continued after national independence, and have 
frequently entered the national institutions.119 Individuals from Lebanese 
families have now been living on African soil for generations, but their gener-
ally negative image has been well preserved into the post-colonial period.120 In 
the last five decades, the legacy of the anti-Lebanese hostilities has had an 
impact on the legislative process in a number of countries, as many national 
governments have introduced laws tending toward the gradual exclusion of 
the Lebanese from citizenship and the related rights. These measures were 
ultimately identifiable as concessions to frustrated supporters of the govern-
ments; the Lebanese seemed to be a suitable scapegoat for the failure of ‘the 
nation’s’ economic and social efforts.
For our understanding of ‘nation’ as juxtaposed with ‘ethnicity’, the argu-
mentation in favour of those measures is as interesting as the similarities in the 
more general rhetoric of exclusion. Indeed, we encounter the same strategy of 
117 Keese, Alexander, ‘Colons français, politiciens africains et marchands libanais au Sénégal 
colonial’, Africa (Roma) 60(2), 2005, 201–20; Bierwirth, Chris, ‘The initial establishment of 
the Lebanese community in Côte d’Ivoire, ca. 1925–45’, International Journal of African 
Historical Studies 30(2), 1997, 325–48; Archives Nationales Sénégalaises, Dakar, Senegal 
(ans), 11D1/162, Forget, Assistant Commissioner of Bignona, to Police Commissioner, 
commanding the Fourth Mobile Unit of Sûreté, Ziguinchor, Comportement des Libano-
Syriens (n° 73), 7 November 1956, 1–3.
118 Leighton, Neil O., ‘The Lebanese in Sierra Leone’, Transition 44, 1974, 23–9, 28.
119 Luke, David Fashole, and Stephen P. Riley, ‘The Politics of Economic Decline in Sierra 
Leone’, Journal of Modern African Studies 27(1), 1989, 133–41, 137–8.
120 Leichtman, Mara A., ‘The legacy of transnational lives: Beyond the first generation of 
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argumentation as in the case of the above-mentioned conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire 
or in Congo-Kinshasa: the main argument brought forward against the rights 
of citizens or residents of Lebanese origin relies on the assumption that the 
Lebanese adhere to a foreign ‘nation’. They are said to be unlikely to show loy-
alty to the African state, as they are identified as clients of a Middle Eastern 
government.121 ‘The Lebanese’ are thus defined as an out-group with respect to 
‘the nation’, in much the same way as ‘unwelcome’ ethnic groups in other con-
texts. The case of ‘the Indians’ in East and Southeast Africa resembles the 
Lebanese experience up to a point. Populations of Indian origin had quickly 
assumed a dominant position in many parts of the commercial sector, which 
they maintained over the decades of colonial domination. As ‘foreigners’, they 
became a convenient scapegoat for late colonial and post-colonial mobilisa-
tion.122 In East (and southern) Africa, the impact of the colonial heritage was 
very strong in those respects. In territories where the colonial rulers had 
favoured a kind of segregation based on skin colour, the segmentation into 
different ‘racial’ groups thus imposed long outlived, in the minds of the popu-
lations concerned, the end of colonial domination. It eventually led to the legal 
discrimination of ‘Indian’ residents.123
From these cases we can point to a number of facts concerning group iden-
tifications and the concept of ‘nation’ in sub-Saharan Africa, as opposed to 
global historical patterns. First, differences in skin colour (‘racial’ differences) 
were helpful for militants, proto-national and nationalist leaders, and politi-
cians, to define certain groups as out-groups from the perspective of the 
‘nation’. This made groups of long-distance immigrants, such as Middle Eastern 
or South Asian groups, particularly easy targets of violence. Second, the prin-
ciple of ‘nation’ could also be turned against particular ethnic groups by claim-
ing that the latter were ‘foreigners’. Third, conflicting territorial claims by 
post-colonial governments, such as in the conflict between Ghana and Togo, or 
a devastating civil war, such as in Côte d’Ivoire or in Eastern Congo-Kinshasa, 
added to the violence of such clashes. However, the different categories of con-
flict were not obligatory: it appears that the exclusion of the ‘other’ from the 
121 Akyeampong, Emmanuel K., ‘Race, Identity and Citizenship in Black Africa: The Case of 
the Lebanese in Ghana’, Africa 76(3), 2006, 297–323.
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1910–1945’, International Journal of African Historical Studies 26(3), 1993, 575–607, 584–7; 
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‘proto-nation’ was a very useful principle even when all those above-mentioned 
conditions were non-existent.
In the African continent, we find an early tendency to attack individuals 
defined as ‘nationals’ (one might again be inclined to say ‘proto-nationals’ for 
the late colonial period) of a neighbouring territory under conditions when 
such ‘foreigners’ were competitors for positions and goods. A dramatic exam-
ple from the late colonial period, from 1958, is the experience of Togolese and 
Dahomean workers living in Abidjan. During an upsurge of apparently socially 
motivated riots, these ‘foreign’ labourers became the victims of attacks and 
many were transported out of near-independent Côte d’Ivoire and back to 
their countries of origin, with the tacit consent of the then autonomous Ivorian 
government.124 Since the advent of national independence in Ghana, particu-
larly at moments of internal social tensions, the same has regularly occurred 
with Nigerians employed as labourers on Ghanaian soil, who were expelled in 
several situations.125 In the latter cases, ‘proto-national’ or national criteria 
were introduced into the debate, as members of the in-group hoped to obtain 
resources withdrawn from the expelled ‘foreigners’. Moreover, the ensuing 
riots allowed reaffirming alliances of different ethnic groups that could thus be 
built to back the newly independent governments.126 However, scholars should 
not underestimate the (perhaps surprisingly) emotional bond of the involved 
individuals to the national principles in question; there is no need to regard 
them as entirely instrumental. As in nineteenth- or early twentieth-century 
Europe, questions of national exclusion could have a great impact on the senti-
ment of individuals as group members and transform themselves into 
entrenched attitudes.
Some factors under colonial rule benefited the emergence of ‘proto-national 
sentiment’ among populations that had not known any former links between 
their respective communities. Thus even before the independence of the 
African states, such a sentiment was created through the implementation 
and experience of territory-wide elections. It was, obviously, the European 
 administrations that formulated the initial rules of the game and installed new 
institutions according to territorial principles. However, the African elites 
internalised this territorial and ‘proto-national’ perspective of emergent mass 
124 Keese, Alexander, ‘Introduction’, in Alexander Keese (ed.), Ethnicity and the long-term per-
spective: the African experience (Berne: Peter Lang, 2010), 9–29, 13.
125 Peil, Margaret, ‘The Expulsion of West African Aliens’, Journal of Modern African Studies 
9(2), 1971, 205–29, 206, 212, 218.
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democracy. They regarded themselves as being in connection with a particular 
territory whenever they had to interact with the delegates of other colonial 
units. In the federal institutions of colonial French West Africa, for example, 
the ‘Dahomeans’ and the ‘Senegalese’ above all, but also the ‘Ivorians’, the 
‘Nigeriens’, the ‘Guineans’ or the ‘Soudanese’ appear on the political stage as 
clearly distinguished, self-conscious groups (in spite of existing overlaps). 
Their representatives often focused on the well-being of the populations of a 
(proto) national territorial space.127 More than any ‘tribal’ solidarities, the obli-
gations of governments to this national self-definition contradicted the pan-
African rhetoric that, on the surface, appeared to be so dominant in the public 
sphere in the 1950s and 1960s.
It might be argued that, in spite of these examples, ‘national’ criteria of 
affiliation have been less important for many African individuals than they are 
for Europeans, Americans, or Asians. Nevertheless, those ‘national’ feelings 
began to play a role rather early in the colonial phase, and they continue to 
express their real presence through simple acts of affiliation. National enthusi-
asm on the occasion of sports events, particularly regarding football, and 
becoming most visible during the Africa Cups, is a significant sign of the 
importance of this national affiliation. In some earlier, particularly spectacular 
cases, such as the near football war between Gabon and Congo-Brazzaville in 
1962 leading to the deportation of hundreds of ‘foreigners’, national sentiment 
produced through such events could even be transformed into political con-
flict between the governments of states.128
These notions of national sentiment are now sometimes, and under partic-
ular circumstances, stronger than ethnic solidarities. While we have no study 
so far attempting to analyse the relationship between the two categories from 
a long-term perspective, it can nevertheless be underlined that in some cases 
members of an ethnic group separated by a border, identified more with the 
community defined through the ‘nation’, than with their ethnic peers at the 
other side of the borderline.129 This also eclipses any identification as ‘border-
landers’ in the sense of Nugent’s reflections. As in the case of the border 
between Benin and Nigeria, both sides hold explicitly national stereotypes of 
127 Benoist, Joseph-Roger de, La balkanisation de l’Afrique Occidentale française (Dakar: 
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129 Miles, William F.S, and David A. Rochefort, ‘Nationalism versus Ethnic Identity in sub-
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the others.130 It must of course be repeated that available research on ‘national’ 
versus ethnic and regional sentiment in border areas and beyond is, for sub-
Saharan Africa, still quite insufficient. Nevertheless, the examples mentioned 
give us indications that the ‘national’ variable can, at least sometimes, be the 
more important one. Thereby, many regions of the African continent join a 
global mainstream.
As a whole, we need to draw one major conclusion from this discussion: we 
have to take ‘national’ sentiment into account as a point of reference for 
African individuals. Moreover, in its ‘proto-national’ forms – with reference to 
a territory created by colonial conquest and administrative organisation – it 
figures far earlier in regional histories than the nationalist manifestations of 
the post-Second World War period, and, afterwards, the independences. We 
can show cases of ‘proto-national’ solidarity and mobilisation from the mani-
fest establishment of colonial rule over large parts of sub-Saharan Africa 
around 1900. This sentiment grew through the decades of setting up a colonial 
administration through territorial institutions. It may be true that the condi-
tions for the emergence of such solidarities were clearly set from outside, but 
Africans soon referred to those solidarities. These references included the out-
right reappropriation and employment of ‘proto-national’ and ‘national’ per-
ceptions in the struggle for material resources, in which African leaders applied 
those criteria quite masterfully. National feelings nonetheless have remained a 
weaker factor in sub-Saharan Africa, as compared to other regions. This being 
said, they had an impact on the portfolio of identifications that African indi-
viduals have. As we have seen, this can under some circumstances even lead 
individuals into a type of violent action that has, in fact, nothing to do with 
ethnic solidarities.
 States and Their Rulers
Consequently, it is correct to say that the populations (or a part of the popula-
tions) of a given territorial unit can define themselves as a ‘nation’ – but that 
this is not a necessary process. Such a perspective emphasising the merger of 
different populations, in which the state is a ‘hybrid paterfamilias…building 
community out of difference’ is a possible outcome of such processes – but it is 
not an automatic result.131 The national perspective might give particular 
130 Flynn, Donna, ‘“We are the border”: identity, exchange and the state along the Bénin-
Nigeria border’, American Ethnologist 24(2), 1997, 311–30, 326.
131 Alonso, ‘Politics’, 396.
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opportunities for an extremely emotional link between the territory and its 
inhabitants, as is typical in Europe or North America, and less frequent in sub-
Saharan Africa. However, individuals could also have the option to directly 
identify with existing structures of political power, expressed through ‘the 
state’.132 In this case, it is not of particular interest for an individual to formu-
late a tradition concerning ‘national’ language and culture. It is amply suffi-
cient for the individuals in question to be accustomed to interact with 
institutions of local power, and to address those institutions to ultimately 
obtain basic needs, in particular protection. Such customary behaviour will 
potentially lead local groups to identify in more durable ways with the political 
structures.
Obviously, the relations of an individual with institutions of power are not 
at all necessarily depersonalised. Without referring too much to the Weberian 
model of ideal types of organisation of power, we could clearly say that 
 traditions of power and charismatic elements are very much part of the rela-
tions between a local group or an individual and political structures that can 
be described as ‘state’ structures.133 In many cases, the individual feels and 
expresses solidarity with the representative of power, such as the local ruler, 
while the ruler of course does not know the individual personally. ‘Crown’, 
‘state’ or ‘realm’ are here, in their effects of binding the loyalty of the individual, 
to be understood in a similar function. The range between a feeling of adher-
ence to a patria in the early modern sense of the word, which is allegiance to 
the power of a crown and of a ruling dynasty, and an impersonal state patrio-
tism formulated, in particular, in post-Second World War Europe as an ‘anti-
dote’ against ideological radicalisation, may be quite wide. Nonetheless, the 
effect of adhering to particular institutions of power, being expressed through 
reference to concrete persons or not, is, as a category in an individual’s identi-
fication repertoire, nearly the same.
Through such a conclusion, we will also avoid engaging too deeply in the 
debate about the definition of ‘the state’, as this debate often focuses on 
 questions of terminology, and suffers greatly from misunderstandings be tween 
 different languages within the different countries of scholarship. Indeed, 
Anglophone researchers are frequently at odds in their terminology with col-
leagues from European countries. In particular, German-speaking scholars 
have in the past been very strict in their terminology regarding the criteria of 
132 Connor, Walker, ‘A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a…’, Ethnic and 
Racial Studies 1(4), 1978, 377–400, 380–2.
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definition of the ‘state’. According to Wolfgang Reinhard’s outstanding mono-
graph on the evolution of statehood, it would be gradually allowable only from 
the late eighteenth century for territorial units to be addressed as states (or 
‘modern states’). Evolutionary criteria such as a certain degree of bureaucrati-
sation, specialised offices, and a tax and contribution system abstracted from 
the person of a ruler or the tradition of a ruling dynasty, are regarded as man-
datory in defining this ‘modern state’.134
Anglophone historians are less strict when it comes to characterising terri-
torial rulerships as states. For them, the decisive criterion is the existence of 
structures of power related to territorial control, but these structures do not 
need to be too formalised. ‘State’ in this sense is a more flexible concept. Its 
existence would be defined more through the results of successful control over 
larger population groups, than through the methods applied and through their 
degree of formalisation.
This second, more flexible approach allows us to discuss political units 
under colonial rule, including in sub-Saharan Africa, between the period 
before the European conquest and the end of the colonial regimes according 
to their degree of ‘statehood’, meaning the level of centralisation and effective 
control over populations. It is difficult to understand those results in their 
eventual continuity with earlier pre-colonial periods: our limitations are 
extreme, due to a lack of sources. Any attempt to analyse the nature of West 
African political entities of the pre-colonial period faces the near-irresolvable 
problem of distinguishing mythical from historical elements. We can be rather 
certain, however, that territorial entities before 1800 were in general little 
‘advanced’ regarding a formalisation of power structures. This is not dissimilar 
to other parts of the globe, as in the same period in both Europe and the 
Ottoman Empire, and in other Muslim empires of Asia and North Africa, exces-
sively formal institutions were also rather the exception than the rule.135 
Although the level of territorial control was in many cases already far more 
successful than in the African continent, the government of territories 
remained frequently organised through a web of patronage relations, heredi-
tary functions, and efforts to discipline the periphery.
134 Reinhard, Wolfgang, Geschichte der Staatsgewalt: Eine vergleichende Verfassungsgeschichte 
Europas von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart (second edition, Munich: C.H. Beck, 2000), 
16–7.
135 See the analysis of Christian Windler on the beylik of Tunis before the French protectorate 
in 1881 in Windler, Christian, La Diplomatie comme Expérience de l’Autre: Consuls Français 
au Maghreb (1700–1840) (Geneva: Droz, 2002), 282–90.
75Group Identifications
<UN>
In this context, it has to be said that it also makes little sense to imagine, for 
the period before the nineteenth century, a Europe that has already advanced 
from ‘feudalism’ to a type of pre-bourgeois period in contrast to a sub-Saharan 
Africa still dominated by ‘feudal’ structures. Marxist scholars have made this 
claim for the African context – where, interestingly enough, it connects to the 
logic of Modernisation Theory, the ‘capitalist’ theory with its apogee in the 
1960s and still influential afterwards, which explains different levels of eco-
nomic development in distinct world regions with velocities in the evolution 
of socio-political structures. However, any attempts at classifying sub-Saharan 
African power structures as ‘feudal’ are entirely artificial.136 Within African 
political entities, control of land and control of the means of production are 
rather unimportant compared to the factor of access to manpower, as expressed 
in the concept of ‘wealth-through-people’: it is difficult to imagine larger 
African communities as ‘feudal’.137 On the contrary, early West African states 
have been discussed as successful in regard to the two basic tasks of organising 
essential ‘services’, notably in a savannah region where access to food and sta-
bility of trade routes were the central goals, or in a coastal tropical forest zone, 
where slave-raiding and a higher population density made smaller units with 
appropriate protective power more attractive. Perhaps the greatest obstacle to 
any process of bureaucratisation in the African continent was the absence of 
reliable and widely available script systems to be employed for administrative 
processes; even with some local languages expressed in a written form with 
Arabic characters, we do not know, for West Africa, any broader process of 
appropriation of written languages for the purposes of control and raising of 
tribute, for example.138
Following the strict definition according to Reinhard, many of these entities 
could not be considered as ‘states’. With several rulers of West African political 
units attempting, in the course of the eighteenth century, to improve the effi-
ciency of their structures – perhaps in relation to the expansion of slave trade-
related contacts – the situation slowly changed. While such efforts may seem 
minimal in contrast to European developments in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth century, they sharpened nonetheless the discrepancies in West African 
regions between more strongly centralised political entities and their neigh-
bours organised at village level. Building on a tradition that involved the use of 
136 Jensen, Rolf, ‘The Transition from Primitive Communism: The Wolof Social Formation of 
West Africa’, Journal of Economic History 42(1), 1982, 69–76.
137 See Levtzion, Nehemia, Ancient Ghana and Mali (New York: Africana, 1980).
138 Herbst, Jeffrey, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 41–6.
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professionalised army units, some rulers elaborated, above all, a more sophis-
ticated structure of military organisation. This was backed up, however, by the 
employment of a more formalised and increasingly effective system of tax-
raising, tributes, and internal administration.139
The pre-colonial entities of Asante and Dahomey, being forerunners in the 
eighteenth century, are classical examples for such processes of ‘state-building’ 
in West Africa. Asante appears as most strongly developed in those respects: in 
the Asante capital, Kumase, we even find attempts at formalising rules through 
the employment of Arabophone scribes by the territorial administration. As 
written language was discovered as a particularly efficient means for the codi-
fication of rules, these attempts illustrate a broader change within the mentali-
ties of regional representatives of power.
However, regarding the nature of local repertoires of identification in 
West Africa, these refined methods and trends towards bureaucratisation as 
employed by Asante’s officials were probably not a necessary factor for an 
attachment of locals to the power structures they lived in. Even with some-
what looser institutions, the regular appearance of representatives of admin-
istrative power amongst them, either for tribute-raising or for protection, 
clearly shaped the perceptions of local populations. Moreover, in the more 
densely populated coastal zones, where a large number of smaller political 
units (again called ‘states’ in the less strict English terminology) existed, the 
representatives of political power were active in sometimes quite engaged 
attempts at local diplomacy and alliance-building. Such diplomatic efforts, 
whose outcomes were frequently known to the subjects, contributed to the 
creation of an in-group perception that referred to the ‘state’: the success of 
diplomacy was regarded as success for the whole community.140
It appears that state-related solidarities could in some cases produce even 
stronger effects on the individual. For Akyem Abuakwa in present-day Ghana, 
for which we have one of the most detailed analyses of such sentiments in the 
population, Richard Rathbone has argued for the emergence of a feeling of 
‘citizenship’. This akyemfo sentiment, to refer to the expression in the Twi lan-
guage, is clearly separated from ethnic and ‘national’ notions. It allowed local 
139 In English terminology, it thus seems appropriate to distinguish between ‘specialised 
states’, ‘segmentary states’, and ‘stratified communities’, see Southall, Aidan W., ‘State 
Formation in Africa’, Annual Review of Anthropology 3, 1974, 153–65, 155–7.
140 Boahen, A.A., ‘Fante diplomacy in the eighteenth century’, in Kenneth Ingham (ed.), 
Foreign Relations of African States (London: Butterworths, 1974), 25–49; Irwin, Graham W., 
‘Precolonial African Diplomacy: the Example of Asante’, International Journal of African 
Historical Studies 8(1), 1975, 81–96.
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populations to identify themselves as belonging to a given political structure. 
In a process that was both from the top down and from the bottom up, the 
inhabitants of Akyem Abuakwa relied on and felt obliged to the pre-colonial 
‘state’.141 In this context, it has rightly been pointed out that it would be 
improper and overzealous to assume that in similar cases state identification 
naturally overlaps with a particular ethnic identification. As Archie Mafeje has 
made clear for Bunyoro and other interlacustrine kingdoms in Central Africa, 
many African states were indeed multi-ethnic projects.142
It would be interesting to follow the evolution of such sentiments of state 
loyalty during the colonial and post-colonial phases. We find little research car-
ried out concerning this particular question.143 In most studies, the state as an 
independent variable is superseded with regard to the motivations of local 
populations by ethnicity or ‘the nation’. For the pre-colonial situation, it is fre-
quently claimed that African populations were mainly organised by kinship 
groups and networks, which would have blended into a loose-knit framework 
of larger political entities. From such a perspective, one could then argue, for 
the colonial period, that the institutions created by the colonisers were 
regarded as a reality that was so foreign and distant in comparison to the for-
mer local realities that these new institutions did not allow for any identifica-
tion.144 However, we need to review that opinion in light of the above-mentioned 
experience of slow centralisation of some political units in West Africa before 
the end of the nineteenth century.
Moreover, it is a well-known and remarkable fact that African elites were in 
time won over to cultural values introduced from the colonial metropoles, and 
that a considerable number of those Africans actively ‘assimilated’ to European 
cultural standards, as French colonial officials called it.145 While the colonial 
141 Rathbone, Richard, ‘Defining Akyemfo: The Construction of Citizenship in Akyem 
Abuakwa, Ghana, 1700–1939’, Africa 66(4), 1996, 506–25.
142 Mafeje, Archie, The Theory and Ethnography of African Social Formations: The Case of the 
Interlacustrine Kingdoms (London: codesria, 1991), 47.
143 An exception (but with a limited empirical fundament) is Englebert, Pierre, ‘Pre-Colonial 
Institutions, Post-Colonial States, and Economic Development in Tropical Africa’, Political 
Research Quarterly 53(1), 2000, 7–36.
144 Ekeh, Peter, ‘Individuals’ Basic Security Needs & the Limits of Democracy in Africa’, in 
Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh, and Will Kymlicka (eds.), Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa 
(Oxford: James Currey – Athens/oh: Ohio University Press, 2004), 22–37, 28; Herbst, 
States, 90–3.
145 Sabatier, Peggy, ‘Did Africans Really Learn to Be French? The Francophone Elite of the 
Ecole William Ponty’, in G. Wesley Johnson (ed.), Double Impact: France and Africa in the 
Age of Imperialism (Westport – London: Greenwood Press, 1985), 179–87.
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state was in many cases nearly invisible in the more peripheral regions of the 
colonies, it is nevertheless a crucial task to analyse how it was regarded by inhab-
itants of the regions where the European presence could be felt more directly. 
The processes of identification with colonial rule and the particular forms of 
administration created by the Europeans still await such analysis. The meagre 
data that has so far been presented concerning the question of African attitudes 
towards the colonial state as substitute for the pre-colonial political entities 
does not even allow us, for the moment, to speculate upon these attitudes.
Finally, for the post-colonial situation, we also lack in-depth studies point-
ing to such identifications of individuals with the state structures they lived in. 
It has been argued – as I pointed out – that the post-colonial African state is an 
expression of the ‘politics of the belly’, but it is unclear whether individuals 
that constantly had to interact with the organisms of the state, however inef-
ficient, might feel they belong to the respective entity.146 Nonetheless, there 
has been a consensus that the leaders of dominant African parties, and indeed 
of other political movements as well, were eager to create their own symbols of 
affiliation: in many cases their leadership included its own variant of identity 
politics, with the formulation of founding myths as an alternative to ethnic 
solidarity and to ‘harden’ the national structures.147 Finally, the gap between 
the state level and its agents on the one hand, and the (marginalised) local 
populations on the other hand, might have led to the creation of a certain type 
of ‘civil society’ – but we still do not know how these forms relate to either the 
existing state structures or to ethnic sentiment.148 With those different vari-
ables of identification presented, it remains now for me to discuss how they 
relate to each other in the empirical cases and in a broader, global, history, and 
to interpret under which model conditions we can imagine them to 
interact.149
146 Bayart, Etat, 309–13.
147 Hayward, Fred M., and Ahmed R. Dumbuya, ‘Political Legitimacy, Political Symbols, and 
National Leadership in West Africa’, Journal of Modern African Studies 21(4), 1983, 645–71, 
652–3, 658–9; Forrest, Joshua, ‘The Quest for State ‘Hardness’ in Africa’, Comparative 
Politics 20(4), 1988, 423–42, 435–7.
148 Lemarchand, René, ‘Uncivil States and Civil Societies: How Illusion Became Reality’, 
Journal of Modern African Studies 30(2), 1992, 177–91, 186–7; Owusu, Maxwell, ‘Domesticating 
Democracy: Culture, Civil Society, and Constitutionalism in Africa’, Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 39(1), 1997, 120–52, 129–30; Nyang’oro, Julius E., ‘Reform Politics and the 
Democratization Process in Africa’, African Studies Review 37(1), 1994, 133–49, 147.




 The Complexities of Choice
According to ‘constructivist’ theories, ethnic affiliation is a question of deci-
sions made consciously or in reaction to decision processes carried out at a 
certain level of the individual’s community. Village communities, clans, or 
migrating groups are all possible entities within which to locate this level of 
decision.150 Normally, scholars seek decision-making processes at a very high 
level: the main protagonists are believed to be regional politicians, party lead-
ers, and sometimes the heads of rebellious groups. Still more typical, according 
to the analysis frequently presented in contemporary ‘constructivist’ scholar-
ship, the architects of ethnic sentiment are very often foreign to the local com-
munities: they might be representatives of the colonial power, or, in another 
very prominent setting, the members of a new political elite that, with decolo-
nisation, became powerful through ethnic manipulation. As I remarked, the 
latest ‘constructivist’ historiography does not necessarily continue with this 
radical position and is more differentiated, but the principal idea of external 
manipulation continues to be an essential element of the debate.
There remains, however, the question from which basis the mobilisation 
through identifications starts, or where exactly the manipulators begin with 
their work.151 A model that seeks to explain ethnic solidarity convincingly 
probably needs to approach the fact that in at least apparently similar situa-
tions, groups are mobilised through notions of ethnic sentiment, of religion, of 
social status, of regional interest, or others, the latter including the categories 
of ‘race’, ‘nation’ and ‘state solidarity’ that I have discussed in detail. John 
Thompson, while focusing excessively on the interplay of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘class’ 
to the detriment of other alternatives, has rightly pointed to the fact that all 
complex societies are characterised by what he calls ‘structural ambiguities’.152 
Such alternative choices have likewise been discussed for the importance of 
the categories of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘race’ in relation to ‘religion’.153
150 Owusu, Maxwell, ‘Democracy and Africa – A View from the Village’, Journal of Modern 
African Studies 30(3), 1992, 369–96, 383–4; Geschiere, Peter, ‘Applications of the Lineage 
Mode of Production in African Studies’, Canadian Journal of African Studies 19(1), 1985, 
80–90, 92–3.
151 Ake, Claude, ‘Charismatic Legitimation and Political Integration’, Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 9(1), 1966, 1–13, 10–1.
152 Thompson, John L.P., ‘The plural society approach to class and ethnic mobilization’, 
Ethnic and Racial Studies 6(2), 1983, 127–53, 131–2.
153 Stanczak, Gregory, ‘Strategic ethnicity: The construction of multi-racial/multi-ethnic reli-
gious community’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 29(5), 2006, 856–81, 870–2.
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This leaves us with the question of agency, which, in the African case, is so 
often sought in the activities of either colonial officials or African opinion-
makers. We find a recent counter-attempt to lay the emphasis on the potential 
of decision-making as held by local populations. This explanatory attempt 
alleges that individuals are able to ‘calculate’ the usefulness of ethnic solidarity, 
and activate this variable when it is advantageous or promising for larger goals. 
This idea had already been elaborated, under the keyword of ‘situational eth-
nicity’, in scholarly approaches of the early 1980s.154 However, only in most 
recent times has this perspective been at the forefront of studies.
In a recent monograph, Daniel N. Posner measures the potential of ‘situa-
tional ethnicity’ for understanding the ethnic factor in sub-Saharan Africa dur-
ing post-colonial elections. He creates a model according to which individuals 
are perfectly able to play the ethnic card whenever they really believe this 
choice to be useful. Posner holds that the individuals concerned can select from 
a repertoire or portfolio of affiliations, which include ethnicity, but which also 
comprise other variables such as ‘race’, religion, or region of origin. As far as this 
is rationally possible, voters of African countries seem to calculate (or estimate) 
the respective strength of different available group configurations, and then 
select the appropriate element on which to rely for electoral success. In some 
cases and for some individuals, ethnic affiliation is likely to be the right choice.155
Nonetheless, even as part of an identifications repertoire, the local voters 
can define the category of ‘ethnicity’ in quite different ways. Focusing on the 
case of elections in post-colonial Zambia, Posner characterises ‘language’ and 
‘tribe’ as the two main variants available for a definition of ethnic group solidar-
ity, at least in this particular South Central African country. However, the author 
comments that other identifications can also be addressed as parts of (and, 
thus, integrated into) the concept of ethnic identification, such as, in particular, 
religion and regional sentiment. Thus, in Posner’s view, the category of ethnic 
solidarity has a great flexibility; it depends on an ad hoc consensus of the com-
munity to decide about the basic criteria for describing the ethnic in-group.156
154 Okamura, Jonathan Y., ‘Situational ethnicity’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 4(4), 1981, 452–65, 
454–5.
155 Decalo, Samuel, ‘The Process, Prospects and Constraints of Democratization in Africa’, 
African Affairs 91(362), 1992, 7–35, 9–10, 13.
156 Posner, Institutions; see also: Salomone, Frank A., ‘Becoming Hausa: ethnic identity 
change and its implications for the study of ethnic pluralism and stratification’, Africa 
45(4), 1975, 410–25, 422; Schultz, Emily A., ‘From Pagan to Pullo: Ethnic Identity Change in 
Northern Cameroon’, Africa 54(1), 1984, 46–64, 50–1.
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Posner’s point of view is highly stimulating insofar as he offers a usable 
interpretation of the aspect of choice in group identifications. Moreover, he 
also explains the limits of such choice. His individuals and groups have their 
instrumentalist perspective of ethnic affiliation: they decide their affiliation by 
an (attempted) perspective of finding the best strategy to secure power and 
material assets through electoral success.157 Nonetheless, the more essential 
point of Posner’s analysis is his claim that individuals live with a certain port-
folio of ways of identification, with which they ultimately have to work in order 
to succeed. The same portfolio, however, does not offer an infinite range of 
alternatives of identification for a given situation: possibilities of choice are 
sensibly limited by the elements that are present inside it. Other social scien-
tists have possibly already expressed the idea of an identifications repertoire, 
but Posner’s perseverance has been crucial to point out the importance of the 
idea.158
While Posner’s perspective is inspiring, its basic conclusions are, of course, 
impossible to simply transfer from the restricted field of electoral behaviour in 
a particular southern African country to the more general patterns of ethnic 
alliance-building and ethnic conflict in sub-Saharan Africa and in global his-
tory over the last decades and centuries. It is correct that, in recent decades, 
strong links have been found between the ethnic self-description of group 
members, and their voting behaviour.159 In the post-independence years, lead-
ing African politicians held that parliamentary democracy had to be elimi-
nated on the grounds that elections were likely to wake ‘tribal’ dissension. This 
idea seems to be partly confirmed by recent scholarly studies.160
157 Mozaffar, Shaheen; James R. Scarritt, and Glen Galaich, ‘Electoral Institutions, 
Ethnopolitical Cleavages, and Party Systems in Africa’s Emerging Democracies’, American 
Political Science Review 97(3), 2003, 379–90, 388.
158 Posner, Daniel N., ‘Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa’, American Journal of 
Political Science 48(4), 2004, 849–63, 852–4.
159 Gray, Robert F., ‘Political Parties in New African Nations: An Anthropological View’, 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 5(4), 1963, 449–61, passim.
160 Mousseau, Demet Yalcin, ‘Democratizing with Ethnic Divisions: A Source of Conflict?’, 
Journal of Peace Research 38(5), 2001, 547–67, 551–2; Smith, Zeric Kay, ‘The Impact of 
Political Liberalisation and Democratisation on Ethnic Conflict in Africa: An Empirical 
Test of Common Assumptions’, Journal of Modern African Studies 38(1), 2000, 21–39, 34; 
Udogu, E. Ike, ‘The Issue of Ethnicity and Democratization in Africa: Toward the 
Millennium’, Journal of Black Studies 29(6), 1999, 790–808, 804–6; Jackson, Robert H., and 
Carl G. Rosberg, ‘Popular Legitimacy in African Multi-Ethnic States’, Journal of Modern 
African Studies 22(2), 1984, 177–98, 188–91.
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Voting is a process with established rules, to which all participating parties 
commit themselves at least for the given moment, and the final act of voting is 
introduced by a long and normally relatively safe preparatory phase.161 During 
this phase, individuals have a range of opportunities to study the given situa-
tion, including from some distance, and reflect upon electoral strategies. In 
other situations in which conflicting parties do not have a regulatory frame-
work it is obviously far more difficult to see behind choices of allegiance an 
elaborated strategic behaviour.162 Nevertheless, there have also been attempts 
to look at ethnically motivated civil wars through the prism of rational 
choice.163 Information is again an important factor in this context. In rural set-
tings and in areas of underdeveloped infrastructure in particular, it is plausible 
that individuals positioning themselves as group members had only scant 
information about the more general panorama and suffered from a lack of 
means of communication.164
Nonetheless, while it is obviously impossible to transpose Posner’s model 
on to situations of group conflict in general, his approach gives important 
impetus. In particular, his idea of identification repertoires is quite fertile.165 In 
my own analysis, I will gladly draw on a part of Posner’s approach. In the case 
studies, I will focus on ethnic affiliation as part of a portfolio, together with 
other factors, which might under particular circumstances rival its role. Those 
factors must be regarded as viable alternatives in some phases of the existence 
of groups, and more so under conditions of colonial rule.
The approach of more or less rational (sometimes also emotional) choice 
gains credibility by the fact that many of the local identifications are far from 
being contradictory to ethnic sentiment. In some cases, they even seem to 
 interact with one another; and, according to Thomas Hylland Eriksen, a ‘semi- 
overrule’ of conflicting identities between two groups can be observed in cases 
in which group members or group leaders, or both, declare another category of 
161 Horowitz, Donald L., Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley – London: University of California 
Press, 1985), 261–440; Londregan, John; Henry Bienen, and Nicolas van den Walle, 
‘Ethnicity and Leadership Succession in Africa’, International Studies Quarterly 39, 1–25, 21.
162 Muller, Edward N., and Erich Weede, ‘Cross-National Variation in Political Violence: 
A Rational Action Approach’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 34(4), 1990, 624–51, 628–9.
163 Azam, ‘Looting’, 137–41, 146–8.
164 Smith, Susan J., ‘Negotiating ethnicity in an uncertain environment’, Ethnic and Racial 
Studies 7(3), 1984, 360–73, 365–7.
165 On additional approaches on the ‘autonomy of the individual’, see Douglas, Mary, ‘How 
Identity Problems Disappear’, in Anita Jacobson-Widding (ed.), Identity: Personal and 
Socio-cultural (Uppsala – Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International – Atlantic 
Highlands: Humanities Press, 1983), 35–46.
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identification as more appropriate for the solution of a particular problem.166 
Thus we find indications that individuals, in the process of group-building, have 
a tendency to draw on various alternatives, to evaluate them according to their 
immediate needs, while respecting as well existing alliances based on these alle-
giances, which make it difficult to simply change the latter.167 Moreover, larger 
groups appear to be favoured over smaller units when it comes to processes of 
ethnic mobilisation. This result points to the strategic context of ethnic visions.168
In a recent article, Rogers F. Brubaker and Frederick Cooper have argued 
that insistence on the flexibility of categories of identification questions the 
concept of ‘identity’ in itself. They have also warned against the use of catego-
ries that play a role for individual or group identifications, as these categories 
have to be accounted for by demonstrating at which particular moments they 
gain importance.169 While the first point is of course justified, it must never-
theless be said that there are myriads of ethnic, religious, social, and other alle-
giances that are effectively barred to an individual or to a group of individuals. 
Therefore, if the researcher keeps in mind that the repertoire has its (frequently 
rather strict) limits, the concept of different and overlapping categories of 
identification retains its importance. Brubaker’s and Cooper’s second point 
corresponds to what I intend to do in this book.
The West African case studies will thus attempt to address the different 
aspects of discussing group identifications. They will analyse the evolution of 
ethnic identifications according to the recent, consensual approach that 
regards ethnicity as a complex mixture of pre-colonial (although not necessar-
ily ‘primordial’) and later ‘constructed’ affinities. Their examination will set 
ethnic solidarity in the matrix of repertoires, in which it has to position itself 
in relation to aspects of identification such as ‘the nation’ and ‘race’, not omit-
ting regional and smaller, village solidarities. It will also bring the state into this 
panorama as another, strongly neglected, problem for both the pre-colonial 
political entities and the colonial state. Finally, I will question the plausibility 
of rational behaviour as an explanation for position changes regarding the 
individuals’ group identities, and bring the results into a global historical 
perspective.
166 Eriksen, Thomas Hylland, ‘Complexity in social and cultural integration: Some analytical 
dimensions’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 30(6), 2007, 1055–69, 1062.
167 Green, Elliot G., ‘Understanding the Limits to Ethnic Change: Lessons from Uganda’s “Lost 
Counties”’, Perspectives on Politics 6(3), 2008, 473–85, 480–1.
168 Cohen, David William, and E.S. Atieno Odhiambo, ‘Ayany, Malo and Ogot: Historians in 
Search of a Luo Nation’, Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines 27(107), 1987, 269–86, 277–9.
169 Brubaker, Rogers, and Frederick Cooper, ‘Beyond “Identity”’, Theory and Society 29(1), 2000, 
1–47, 6, 11–2.
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chapter 3
Wolof and Wolofisation: Statehood, Colonial Rule, 
and Identification in Senegal
 Unwelcome Identifications: Colonial Conquest, Independence, and 
the Uneasiness with Ethnic Sentiment in Contemporary Senegal
The ethnic friction which characterises classic interpretations of African states 
is remarkably absent in Senegalese society. Senegal is often presented as a soci-
ety dominated by Wolof-speakers, particularly in the urban agglomeration of 
Dakar, which has assimilated large groups of immigrants both socially and lin-
guistically.1 This has increasingly led scholars to define Senegal as a predomi-
nantly ‘Wolof society’, whose language is spreading widely (which is sometimes 
seen as being linked to Murid Islam as well). The Wolof language has migrated 
from the region of the capital and other urban communities, such as Saint-
Louis, Tivaouane, Thiès, Diourbel, and Kaolack, into the southern coastal belt 
towards the Gambian border. This has strongly influenced the interpretation 
of the history of what is present-day Senegal. Pre-colonial states are therefore 
often described as ‘Wolof states’; their ruling dynasties – if there were any – are 
defined as ‘Wolof ’. The Wolof nature of Senegal’s political structures is not seri-
ously in question.2
As Senegambia is located on the early modern sea routes to India and the 
slave ports of the so-called Guinea Coast, information on its inhabitants was 
available to Europeans from an early period. Such information was also pro-
vided by Eurafricans, who were most strongly present in Casamance and the 
Cacheu-Bissau area.3 Moreover, European officials managed commercial fac-
tories on Senegalese land for centuries, starting as early as the sixteenth cen-
tury, although their interest was often focused more on the acquisition of 
slaves and less on the concrete political realities in the hinterland. Nevertheless, 
1 Diouf, Mamadou, ‘Assimilation coloniale et identités religieuses de la civilité des originaires 
des Quatre Communes (Sénégal)’, Canadian Journal of African Studies 34(3), 2000, 565–87, 570.
2 Diop, Abdoulaye Bara, La société Wolof: tradition et changement: Les systèmes d’inégalité et de 
domination (Paris: Karthala, 1981), 16–7.
3 Mark, Peter, ‘The Evolution of “Portuguese” Identity: Luso-Africans on the Upper Guinea 
Coast from the Sixteenth to the early Nineteenth Century’, Journal of African History 40(2), 
1999, 173–91.
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commercial activities brought early contact with pre-colonial states such as 
Kajoor, Bawol, Waalo, Jolof, Siin, Saluum, Fuuta Tooro, Bara in present-day 
Gambia, and Kaabu in Casamance (Map 2).4
From the time of the French conquest in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, the available source material on local communities becomes more 
reliable. After the final French victory in the internecine wars in the interior of 
4 Becker, Charles, ‘Histoire de la Sénégambie du XVe au XVIIIe siècle: un bilan’, Cahiers d’Etudes 
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Senegal, colonial domination allowed for a more comprehensive documenta-
tion of the political realities of the territory: after 1850, the French had an early 
presence on the coast in the settlements of Joal and, for some time, Nianing, 
and in the nascent peanut production centre of Kaolack in Saluum, and the town 
of Fatick in Siin (Map 3).5 To the south, the British enclave colony of the Gambia, 
5 Brooks, George E., ‘Peanuts and Colonialism: Consequences of the Commercialization of 
Peanuts in West Africa, 1830–70’, Journal of African History 16(1), 1975, 29–54, 43–4; Klein, 
Martin A., Islam and Imperialism in Senegal: Sine-Saloum, 1847–1914 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 


























































Map 3 The Petite Côte in Senegal
87Wolof and Wolofisation
<UN>
and the French Casamance completed European control. The remaining rebel 
movements from the pre-colonial states were in the end unable to cope with 
the European conquest. The groundwork was thus laid for further investigation 
into local communities, in an attempt to create a working administration.
Nonetheless, before the 1920s the French did not create any blueprints for a 
‘good administration’ according to what they regarded as ethnic customs. 
Priorities were, indeed, very different. Senegal was considered an early model 
colony, characterised by prosperous peanut cultivation, which absorbed a con-
siderable part of the colonisers’ economic concerns.6 Senegal was also one of 
the most ‘Europeanised’ African colonies in terms of political participation. 
Following earlier experiments, in 1848 the emerging Second French Republic 
had conferred voting rights on the Black African and métis (mixed) populations 
of France’s Senegalese colonies.7 Immigrants to the early French outposts, the 
so-called Quatre Communes (Four Communes: Saint-Louis, Rufisque, Gorée 
Island, and the future capital of Dakar, becoming a settlement area in the 
1860s), were thus able to enjoy, at least in the long term, the corresponding 
political privileges, which by 1900 came close to those of European citizens.8 
These privileged Senegalese were in stark contrast to the large majority of more 
than 90 per cent of sujets (subjects) living outside of the territory of the four 
towns, and were in 1914 the first constituency to send an African representative 
into a European parliament, the French National Assembly. This distinction 
would long be at least as essential in political terms as any categorisation on 
ethnic grounds; it also defined a rural-urban divide.9 Later, Senegalese national-
ism consequently came to be built on the idea of the urban elites representing 
the ‘civilised centre’ of West Africa.10 In the post-colonial state of Senegal, the 
legacy of this tendency towards an elitist and ‘Europeanised’ political culture 
6 Kanya-Forstner, A.S., The Conquest of Western Sudan: A Study in French Military 
Imperialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 28–44; Klein, Islam, 43–4.
7 Diouf, Mamadou, Le Kajoor au XIXe siècle: Pouvoir ceddo et conquête coloniale (Paris: Karthala, 
1990), 130–3; Johnson, G. Wesley, The Emergence of Black Politics in Senegal: The Struggle for 
Power in the Four Communes, 1900–1920 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), 26–8.
8 Diouf, ‘Assimilation’, 582; Hargreaves, John D., ‘Assimilation in Eighteenth-Century 
Senegal’, Journal of African History 6(2), 1965, 177–84, 181–2; Johnson, Nancy Kwang, 
‘Senegalese “into Frenchmen”? The French Technology of Nationalism in Senegal’, 
Nationalism & Ethnic Politics 10(1), 2004, 135–58.
9 Diouf, Mamadou, ‘L’idée municipale: Une idée neuve en Afrique’, Politique Africaine 74, 
1999, 13–23, 21.
10 Bornstein, Ronald, ‘The Organisation of Senegal River States’, Journal of Modern African 
Studies 10(2), 1972, 267–83, 282; Foltz, William J., From French West Africa to the Mali 
Federation (New Haven – London: Yale University Press, 1965), 137–8.
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was represented by the Parti Socialiste Sénégalais (pss), successor of the Union 
Populaire du Sénégal (ups), and by political leaders Léopold Sédar Senghor and 
Abdou Diouf.
Ethnic sentiment in Senegal has not in an outright way been denied by the 
post-colonial political elite, but between the Second World War and the 1970s 
it was largely downplayed. Ethnic labels appeared in official demographic sta-
tistics of the post-colonial Republic of Senegal, but not in elite discourse.11 In 
the rhetoric of political leaders, any existing cultural difference was compen-
sated for by a general feeling of harmony and unity. New attempts in the 1990s 
to create ethnic associations in Senegalese territory largely failed.12 This might 
explain why scholars have often accepted the idea of a post-colonial Senegal 
that was harmonious with regard to ethnic oppositions.
In linguistic terms, the post-colonial country has indeed become a largely 
Wolophone society; this dominance had already become visible in the 1950s. In 
the present day, up to 90 per cent of the Senegalese are more or less fluent in 
Wolof.13 Fluency in the colonial language, French, has dwindled to a mere 20 
per cent, and knowledge of some French vocabulary has rather become a mark 
of distinction for urban speakers.14 Already in the nineteenth century, even 
among the African elites of the French outposts, Wolof had enjoyed the role of 
a lingua franca.15 If we accept the results of anthropological research from the 
11 Adamolekun, Ladipo, ‘Bureaucrats and the Senegalese Political Process’, Journal of 
Modern African Studies 9(4), 1971, 543–59, 551–2; Barker, Jonathan, ‘Political Space and the 
Quality of Participation in Rural Africa: A Case from Senegal’, Canadian Journal of African 
Studies 21(1), 1987, 1–16, 11–2; Fatton, Robert, ‘Clientelism and Patronage in Senegal’, 
African Studies Review 29(4), 1986, 61–78, 71–2; Beck, Linda J., ‘Senegal’s “Patrimonial 
Democrats”: Incremental Reform and the Obstacles to the Consolidation of Democracy’, 
Canadian Journal of African Studies 31(1), 1997, 1–31, 8–9; Boone, Catherine, ‘State Power 
and Economic Crisis in Senegal’, Comparative Politics 22(3), 1990, 341–57, 345–7.
12 Coulon, Christian, ‘La tradition démocratique au Sénégal: histoires d’un mythe’, Studia 
Africana 10, 1999, 69–83, 81.
13 McLaughlin, Fiona, ‘Senegal: The Emergence of a National Lingua Franca’, in Andrew 
Simpson (ed.), Language & National Identity in Africa (Oxford etc.: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 79–97, 90–1.
14 McLaughlin, ‘Senegal’, 96–7; McLaughlin, Fiona, ‘Dakar Wolof and the configuration of an 
urban identity’, Journal of African Cultural Studies 14(2), 2001, 153–72.
15 Jones, Hilary, ‘From Mariage à la Mode to Weddings at Town Hall: Marriage, Colonialism, and 
Mixed-Race Society in Nineteenth-Century Senegal’, International Journal of African Historical 
Studies 38(1), 2005, 27–48, 35–6; Jones, D.H., ‘The Catholic Mission and some aspects of 
 assimilation in Senegal, 1817–1852’, Journal of African History 21(2), 1980, 323–40, 328; Sackur, 
Amanda, ‘The Development of Creole Society and Culture in Saint-Louis and Gorée, 
1719–1817’ (unpublished PhD thesis, School of Oriental and African Studies, 1999), 96–100.
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colonial period, the role of Wolophone merchants and Murid marabouts 
helped to steadily broaden the language community between 1890 and 1960.16 
It appears to have pushed other language communities such as the Pulaar (the 
regional variant of Fulfulde), Sereer, and Jola into the background; from 1945 
migration flows to and from the urban centres of Dakar and Saint-Louis had a 
strong effect on this process. Many of the immigrants became almost exclu-
sively Wolof-speaking.17 Social pressure also had a linguistic impact on such 
processes, in particular in post-colonial public education. For a long period 
there was little opposition to this trend.18
Official figures on ethnic groups over the post-colonial period do not mirror 
the trends in linguistic affiliation: in 1988, the ‘Wolof ’ percentage of the popu-
lation is given as 43.7 per cent, compared with 14.8 per cent ‘Sereer’, 12 per cent 
‘Pël’, 11.2 per cent ‘Tukulor’, 5.5 per cent ‘Diola’, and 4.6 per cent ‘Mandinka’; 
other, smaller groups (counted as ethnic) include the ‘Sarakole’ with 1.1 per 
cent, the ‘Bambara’ with 1 per cent, the ‘Balante’ with 0.7 per cent, and the 
‘Laobe’ with 0.4 per cent. The ‘Lebu’ are counted as part of the Wolof popula-
tion in the 1976 and 1988 censuses.19
Contrary to studies of Wolof language, Wolof as an identification from a his-
torical perspective is barely present in research on Senegambia. Current his-
torical research focuses much more on ‘Wolof ’ institutions and religion than 
on the broader identification of the communities. Many scholars seem simply 
to consider it to be expected that in states where the ruling dynasty was 
Wolophone, most of the local populations defined themselves as ‘Wolof ’. In 
the interpretation of oral historical traditions, the categories of language on 
the one hand, and cultural group identification on the other hand, are also 
frequently blurred.20
16 Mersadier, Y., Budgets Familiaux Africains: Etude chez 136 familles de salariés dans trois 
centres urbains du Sénégal (Saint-Louis: Centre ifan – Sénégal, 1957), 13.
17 Barbary, Olivier, ‘Dakar et la Sénégambie: Evolution d’un espace migratoire transnational’, 
in Momar Coumba Diop (ed.), Le Sénégal et ses voisins (Dakar: Sociétés – Espaces – 
Temps, 1994), 142–63, 144–8.
18 Flis-Zonabend, Françoise, Lycéens de Dakar (Paris: François Maspero, 1968), 29–30.
19 Lopes, Carlos, Kaabunké: Espaço, território e poder na Guiné-Bissau, Gâmbia e Casamance 
pré-coloniais (Lisbon: Comissão Nacional para as Comemorações dos Descobrimentos 
Portugueses, 1999), 54–72.
20 This relationship remains usually quite vague, as in Diouf’s monograph on Kajoor: ‘Il 
existe une unité et une identité de stratification sociale dans la société Wolof malgré la 
pluralité des formations politiques, dont les fonctions varient selon les désignations ou 
des charges spécifiques à tel ou tel royaume’; see Diouf, Kajoor, 43; Gamble, David P., The 
Wolof of Senegambia: together with notes on the Lebu and the Serer (London: International 
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With regard to post-colonial issues, it seems difficult to define what 
‘Wolof ’ as an identification really means. One of the leading sociologists 
working on Wolof culture during the post-colonial period, Donal Cruise 
O’Brien, points out this problem: ‘Informants often find it difficult to specify 
either in general terms who can be identified as a Wolof, or even whether 
they themselves should be categorised as Wolof … There are no fixed ethnic 
boundaries here, no lines of battle drawn up by colonial experience, on the 
whole no primordialism, rather what may be (for the state) a helpful ambi-
guity and flux’.21 Historians working on group relations in Senegambia nor-
mally do not share this view. In Vincent Monteil’s classic studies, the Wolof 
ethnicity already appears as a homogeneous bloc and as a vital factor within 
the political entities.22 James Searing, in his important studies on the struc-
ture of the Senegambian states of Kajoor and Bawol in the nineteenth cen-
tury, argues for group identity along the same general lines, and the Islamic 
Muridiyya brotherhood is often presented as the group religion of ‘the 
Wolof ’.23
But Wolof language also seems to have a role in underscoring the power of 
dignitaries of one particular community. Praise and song performances were 
essential cultural elements in both pre-colonial and colonial times to sustain 
customary rights to land and status for the Wolophone nobility. This social func-
tion of the language continues to be important. As regards the performances, 
African Institute, 1957), 44–5; Diop, Société Wolof, 138–52; Barry, Boubacar, Le Royaume du 
Waalo: Le Sénégal avant la Conquête (Paris: François Maspero, 1972), 87–106; Diop, Samba, 
The Oral History and Literature of the Wolof People of Waalo, Northern Senegal: The Master 
of the Word (Griot) in the Wolof Tradition (Lewiston/ny – Queenston – Lampeter: Edwin 
Mellen, 1995), 69–125; Sonko-Godwin, Patience, Ethnic groups Of The Senegambia: a Brief 
History (Banjul: Sunrise Publishers, 1994 [1988]), 20–7; Fall, Yoro, ‘Les Wolof au miroir de 
leur langue: quelques observations’, in Jean-Pierre Chrétien and Gérard Prunier (eds.), Les 
ethnies ont une histoire (second edition, Paris: Karthala, 2003), 117–23, 117, 121–2; and Diouf, 
Kajoor, 31–5, 37–40.
21 O’Brien, Donal Cruise, ‘The shadow politics of Wolofisation’, Journal of Modern African 
Studies 36(1), 1995, 25–46, 27.
22 Monteil, Vincent, Esquisses Sénégalaises (Wâlo – Kayor – Dyolof – Mourides – Un vision-
naire) (Dakar: Publications de l’Institut Fondamental d’Afrique Noire, 1966), 72, 121.
23 Searing, James F., ‘God Alone Is King’: Islam and Emancipation in Senegal. The Wolof 
Kingdoms of Kajoor and Bawol, 1859–1914 (Portsmouth/nh: Heinemann, 2002), xxi–xxii; Sy, 
Cheikh Tidiane, La Confrérie Sénégalaise des Mourides: Un Essai sur l’Islam au Sénégal (Paris: 
Présence Africaine, 1969), 76–87. See also Glasman, Joël, ‘Le Sénégal imaginé: évolution 
d’une classification ethnique de 1816 aux années 1920’, Afrique & Histoire 2, 2004, 111–39, 112.
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those were carried out by a particular griot or praise-singer caste, the jéwél, who 
managed social relations between Wolof-speakers.24
Obviously, the test case for the importance of an ethnic Wolof identification 
was contact with ‘others’. In coastal Senegambia, Wolof-speakers historically 
neighboured the groups of the ‘Tukulor’, the ‘Sereer’, the ‘Jola’, the ‘Fulbe’ (or 
‘Pël’), the ‘Lebu’, and the ‘Mandinka’, in addition to some smaller communities. 
Their interaction with the Wolophone populations was essential for the latter’s 
self-description.
The Tukulor, a Fulfulde-speaking group, are in Senegambia most prominent 
in the north-east, but they can also be found in pockets in all of its northern 
parts, and even in the southern coastal regions and in Casamance. Tukulor 
cultural identifications are mainly regarded as being linked to the Tijaniyya 
branch of local Islam, and to the region of Fuuta Tooro, which for the pre-
colonial period is now sometimes depicted as a genuine ‘Tukulor state’. In 
Fuuta Tooro, the Tukulor have kept their distance from Wolophone communi-
ties and have rarely intermarried.25
As concerns Fuuta Tooro, its populations were characterised by the Jihad 
experiences of the marabout Nasir al-Din in the late seventeenth century, and 
the campaigns of Al-Hajj Umar Tall and his successors between 1850 and the 
1880s.26 From the beginning of the twentieth century, Tukulor populations 
increasingly started to migrate to the population centre of Dakar. Initially, they 
showed a clear tendency to marry inside of their own group, which was main-
tained into the early 1960s. Yet in linguistic terms, acculturation to the Wolof 
language was strong, although it was criticised by a part of the local elite of 
Fuuta Tooro.27
24 Patterson, Amy S., ‘A Reappraisal of Democracy in Civil Society: Evidence from Rural 
Senegal’, Journal of Modern African Studies 36(3), 1998, 423–41, 431; Irvine, Judith T., ‘When 
is Genealogy History? Wolof genealogies in comparative perspective’, American 
Ethnologist 5(4), 1978, 651–74; Leymarie, Isabelle, Les griots wolof du Sénégal (Paris: 
Maison-Neuve & Larose: 1999), 32–4.
25 Cantrelle, Pierre, ‘L’endogamie des populations du Fouta Sénégalais’, Population (French 
Edition), 15(4), 1960, 665–76, 666–7; Dilley, Roy M., ‘Spirits, Islam and Ideology: A Study of 
a Tukulor Weavers’ Song (‘Dillere’)’, Journal of Religion in Africa 17(3), 1987, 245–79, 253.
26 Perinbam, B. Marie, ‘Islam in the Banamba Region of the Eastern Beledugu, C. 1800 to 
C.  1900’, International Journal of African Historical Studies 19(4), 1986, 637–57, 641; 
Robinson, David, ‘The Umarian Emigration of the Late Nineteenth Century’, International 
Journal of African Historical Studies 20(2), 1987, 245–70, 252–3.
27 ans, 11D1/973, Plan de Protection [du Territoire du Sénégal]: Chapitre ii: Hypothèses (with-
out number), without date [1957], 11; Diop, Abdoulaye Bara, Société Toucouleur et Migration 
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In contrast to the Tukulor, the Sereer populations of Senegambia were, in 
the nineteenth century, not concentrated in one major political structure. 
Some, including the Noon, the Safèn, and other Sereer-speaking groups, lived 
on the margins of the political entities; they were said to reside in autonomous 
‘clans’ in the forest. Sereer-speakers were known for matrilinearity and spirit 
worship and were thus characterised by overgeneralising French administra-
tors and anthropologists.28 Generally, some scholars have drawn a distinction 
between ‘true Sereer’ and those being ‘assimilated to Wolof culture’. From this 
perspective, some Sereer groups refused to have any stratified political organ-
isation, and employed the label ‘you Wolof ’ (nga Wolof) as an insult, while 
some ‘Sereer states’ were said to be ruled by a ‘Wolof elite’, such as in the case 
of Siin.29
These opinions seem to find some support in the fact that in the 1860s the 
Buur Saluum (the ruler of the pre-colonial state of Saluum) had a senior official 
specifically responsible for the administrative and military coordination of the 
local elite, an official who was called Jaraf Wolof – which seems to point to a 
state organisation, in which the elite defined itself as ‘Wolof ’.30 For Siin, French 
documents from the conquest phase indicate that its population was predomi-
nantly Sereer. However, the reports of Ernest Noirot, the first French adminis-
trator of a short-lived Sine-Saloum district, already cast doubt on this view. 
Noirot argues that while the majority of Siin’s inhabitants appear to be Sereer, 
(Enquête sur l’Immigration Toucouleur à Dakar) (Dakar: Publications de l’Institut Français 
d’Afrique Noire, 1965), 186–7; McLaughlin, Fiona, ‘Haalpulaar Identity as a Response to 
Wolofization’, African Languages and Cultures 8(2), 1995, 153–68; Diouf, Kajoor, 20.
28 Barker, Jonathan, ‘Stability and Stagnation: The State in Senegal’, Canadian Journal of 
African Studies 11(1), 1977, 23–42, 31.
29 Ba, Abdou Bouri, ‘Essai sur l’histoire du Saloum et du Rip’, with ‘Avant-propos’ by Charles 
Becker and Victor Martin, Bulletin de l’IFAN, Série B 38(4), 1976, 813–60, 816–26; Sarr, 
Alioune, ‘Histoire du Sine-Saloum (Sénégal)’, with ‘Introduction, bibliographie et notes’, 
by Charles Becker, Bulletin de l’IFAN, Série B, 46(3–4), 1986–1987, 211–83, 247–51; Gamble, 
Wolof, 14; Diouf, Kajoor, 21; Gosselin, Gabriel, ‘Ordres, castes et Etats en pays Sérèr 
(Sénégal): Essai d’interprétation d’un système politique en transition’, Canadian Journal 
of African Studies 8(1), 1974, 135–43, 136–7; Klein, Islam, 9–21; Searing, James F., ‘Conversion 
to Islam, Military Recruitment and Generational Conflict in a Sereer-Safèn Village 
(Bandia), 1920–1938’, Journal of African History 44(1), 2003, 73–94, 92.
30 anf, Papiers Ernest Noirot, 148/AP/3/1/4, Noirot, administrator of Sine-Saloum, to De la 
Mothe, Governor of Senegal, Rapport sur la participation des contingents du Saloum à la 
campagne dirigée contre le Bourba Djiolof. (without number), without date, transcription 
in Martin, Victor; Charles Becker, and Mohamed Mbodj (eds.), ‘Trois documents d’Ernest 
Noirot sur l’histoire des royaumes du Siin et du Saalum (Sénégal)’, Bulletin de l’IFAN, série 
B 42(1), 1980, 37–85, 56.
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the ceddo (the members of the military) are to be seen as a rather sizeable, 
separate group.31 The unreliable early statistics tell a similar story: the first cen-
sus of the new protectorate of Siin indicates a huge majority of Sereer-speakers, 
and, indeed, no Wolof-speakers at all!32 The more detailed censuses for the 
newly-created district of Thiès, which included many coastal communities for-
merly belonging to Siin, show that at least in the areas of Joal and Nianing, 
huge groups of local Wolof-speaking inhabitants had previously been subjects 
of the Buur Siin.33 In Saluum, the great majority of its inhabitants in the inter-
war period could be described as Wolof-speaking, and the adoption of the lan-
guage by the rest of the local communities has been presented as an ongoing 
process.34 These contradictions show how complex the issue of identifications 
on the Petite Côte was, even at this early stage.
31 anf, Papiers Ernest Noirot, 148/AP/3/3/111, Noirot, Notes sur le pays de Sine: Ses frontières 
– son sol – sa population – sa constitution – ses cultures – son commerce – dénombrement de 
la population – état de la population par villages et par catégorie d’individus. (without num-
ber), without date [1892], in Martin, Becker, and Mohamed Mbodj (eds.), ‘Documents’, 
64–5.
32 Becker, Charles; Victor Martin, Jean Schmitz, and Monique Chastanet, with contribution 
by Jean-François Maurel and Saliou Mbaye, Les premiers recensements au Sénégal et 
l’évolution démographique: Présentation de documents (Dakar, orstom, 1983), 14–29, 
reproduces data from Noirot’s first census of Siin in 1891, to be found in ans, ggaof 22G 
42, and from Lefiliatre’s 1904 census, kept in ans, ggaof, 1G 290.
33 Becker, Martin, Schmitz, Chastanet, Maurel, and Mbaye, Recensements, 94, reproduces 
data from the ‘Recensement du Cercle de Thiès de 1904’; cadn, Fonds ‘Anciennes 
Colonies’, Fonds Dakar, 293, Gautier, Inspector of Administrative Affairs, Territory of 
Senegal, Rapport au Chef de Territoire – Exécution de l’ordre de mission n° 3903 du 15 Juin 
1957: Etude des possibilités éventuelles de la réunion des deux cantons de Sanghaïe et 
Ngayokhème en province de Sanghaïe-Ngayokhème – (application des dispositions de 
l’article 28 de l’arrêté n° 1978 APA/2 du 20 Mars 1957) (n° 17C/IAA/JJG), 10 Aug. 1957, 5; cadn, 
Fonds ‘Anciennes Colonies’, Fonds Dakar, 192, Michel, Inspector of Administrative Affairs, 
Rapport: Subdivision de Fatick (Affaires Politiques) (n° 1), 11 March 1945, 1, 3.
34 Pélissier, Paul, Les paysans du Sénégal: Les civilisations agraires du Cayor à la Casamance 
(Saint-Yrieix: Fabrègue, 1966), 384–5, 452–3. On the legends of ‘Wolof immigration’ into 
Saluum, see cadn, Fonds ‘Anciennes Colonies’, Fonds Dakar, 293, Gautier, Inspector of 
Administrative Affairs, Territory of Senegal, Rapport au Chef de Territoire – Exécution de 
l’ordre de mission n° 3903 du 15 Juin 1957: Etude des possibilités éventuelles de la réunion des 
trois cantons de Djilor, Sokone et du Niombato en une province dite du Bas-Saloum (applica-
tion des dispositions de l’article 28 de l’arrêté n° 1978/APA.2 du 20 Mars 1957) (n° 10C-IAA/
JJG), 3 Aug. 1957, 7. On the ‘Wolof majority’ in statistics of the subdivision of Foundiougne, 
see 19. For Wolof group behaviour in seasonal migration, see cadn, Fonds ‘Anciennes 
Colonies’, Fonds Dakar, 195, Administrator of Subdivision of Foundiougne, Subdivision de 
Foundiougne – Rapport Politique, Année: 1956 (without number), without date, 4. On 
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The Lebu of the Cap-Vert Peninsula (concentrated in settlements such as 
Yoff, N’gor, and early Dakar) have been treated as a singular ethnocultural 
group in anthropological studies throughout the twentieth century, although 
some researchers see them as speaking a ‘dialect’ of the Wolof language.35 The 
ethnic distinction was made in professional and religious terms. The Lebu are 
presented as specialists in fishery, and as followers of their own Islamic-
syncretist religious brotherhood, committed to the rules set in the late nine-
teenth century by Saidi Limamu Laye, a Sufi saint venerated on the Peninsula 
of Cap Vert.36
However, the Layen brotherhood was not exclusive to the Lebu. Wolophone 
immigrants from the Waalo became a majority of its members, although they 
eventually became ‘assimilated’ (lébouisés). The Lebu apparently had a clear 
notion of insiders and outsiders as regards membership of the group but what 
it meant to be a ‘convert’ was complicated, and land rights were connected to 
‘Lebu-ness’ and Lebu political rights. This idea of a community developed from 
the start of the French protectorate over the Cap-Vert Peninsula in 1857.37
As in the case of the Lebu, Sufi Islam, with its strong emphasis on the per-
sonal relationship between the marabout and his disciples, offered an alterna-
tive approach to group organisation.38 Religious leaders attempted to avoid the 
Saluum, see Blundo, Giorgio, ‘Mbootaay: istituzioni associative tradizionali dei Wolof 
Saalum-Saalum (Senegal)’, Africa (Roma) 45(3), 1990, 384–409.
35 Versluys, Eline, ‘Multilingualism and the City: The Construction of Urban Identities in 
Dakar (Senegal)’, City & Society 20(2), 2008, 282–300, 286; Duchemin, G.J., ‘La République 
lébou et le peuplement actuel’, Etudes sénégalaises 1, 1949, 289–308; Diouf, Mamadou, 
‘Identité ethnique et vie politique municipale: Les Lébu de Rufisque’, in Jean-Pierre 
Chrétien and Gérard Prunier (eds.), Les ethnies ont une histoire (second edition, Paris: 
Karthala, 2003), 283–302. Some local historians seem to hold that the Lebu are a mixture 
(‘brassage’) of Sereer and Wolof; Mamadou Diouf points to lack of research since 1990, see 
Diouf, Kajoor, 19.
36 Gallais, Jean, ‘Dans la grande banlieue de Dakar: les villages lébous de la presqu’île du 
Cap-Vert’, Cahiers d’Outre-Mer 26, 1954 (avril-juin), 137–54.
37 Laborde, Cécile, La Confrérie Layenne et les Lébou du Sénégal: Islam et culture tradition-
nelle en Afrique (Bordeaux: Centre d’Etudes d’Afrique Noire, 1995), 47, 62–3; Diop, Momar 
Coumba, and Mamadou Diouf, ‘Enjeux et contraintes politiques de la gestion municipale 
au Sénégal’, Canadian Journal of African Studies 26(1), 1992, 1–23, 7; cadn, Fonds 
‘Anciennes Colonies’, Fonds Dakar, 293, Claude Michel, Administrator of the Banlieue of 
Dakar and chargé du village indigène of Médina, Note sur l’Organisation Coutumière 
(Sociale et Politique) de la Collectivité Léboue de Dakar – Texte écourté pour être rendu plus 
objectif, suivant les indications de la Direction des Affaires Politiques et Administratives.- 
(without number), 1st Nov. 1933, 1–2.
38 Diop, Société Wolof, 247–62.
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divisive effect of tensions between regional and language groups. From 1850 
until the independence of Senegal, the Tijaniyya and the Muridiyya, two strong 
Sufi brotherhoods, were particularly influential. The Tijaniyya, over the nine-
teenth century, played a leading role in two Jihads and expanded geographi-
cally into the Sokoto Caliphate of Northern Nigeria; parts of present-day Mali; 
the north-eastern areas occupied by Tukulor populations (and some Fulfulde-
speaking nomads) of Senegal; and the city of Kaolack. Tijani power was built on 
an alliance, negotiated from the last decades of the nineteenth century, between 
the French authorities and Ibrāhīm Niasse and other Tijaniyya leaders.39
The Murids, following the early attempts by their erstwhile leader Cheikh 
Amadu Bamba, won over the populations of both Bawol and Kajoor.40 Their suc-
cess has often been seen as a challenge to the ‘feudal order’ within ‘Wolof’ peas-
ant communities. In creating new villages in the area of Diourbel, the disciples of 
Amadu Bamba attempted to make belonging to Murid Islam the dominant sense 
of identification. Nevertheless, while this approach does not pay much attention 
to ethnic solidarities, in recent studies Murid Islam has often been described as a 
religion exclusive to the Wolof populations, and as a dividing line between the 
ethnic categories of ‘Wolof’ and ‘Sereer’.41 For instance, the negative characterisa-
tion of the ‘Wolof states’ as states inhabited by plunderers in much of the research 
– as exemplified in Cheikh Anta Babou’s discussion of the ‘devastating effect of 
political violence in the Wolof society’ – mainly reflect a Murid vision of ‘pagan’ 
state organisation.42 The troops of these pre-colonial states, the ceddo, were 
largely regarded by the Murids (and the Tijanis) as alcoholic heathens.
Other forms of identification operated as alternatives to possible ethnic 
solidarity, but also to religious group-building, in Senegal. Under colonial rule 
the status of slave or former slave, informally maintained long after the eman-
cipation of the late nineteenth century, was one such factor.43 Profession 
39 Seesemann, Rüdiger, The Divine Flood: Ibrāhīm Niasse and the Roots of a Twentieth-Century 
Sufi Revival (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Kané, Mouhamed Moustapha, 
‘L’empreinte de l’islam confrérique sur le paysage commercial sénégalais: islam et société 
en Sénégambie’, Islam et sociétés au sud du Sahara 8, 1994, 17–41, 20–2.
40 Behrman, Lucy, ‘The Political Significance of the Wolof Adherence to Muslim 
Brotherhoods in the Nineteenth Century’, African Historical Studies 1(1), 1968, 60–78.
41 Charles, Eunice A., ‘Shaikh Amadu Ba and Jihad in Jolof ’, International Journal of African 
Historical Studies 8(3), 1975, 367–82, 369; Searing, ‘God’, 20–1; Babou, Cheikh Anta, Fighting 
the Greater Jihad: Amadou Bamba and the Founding of the Muridiyya of Senegal, 1853–1913 
(Athens/oh: Ohio University Press, 2007), 56, see also 80.
42 Babou, Fighting, 55.
43 Moitt, Bernard, ‘Slavery and Emancipation in Senegal’s Peanut Basin: The Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Centuries’, International Journal of African Historical Studies 22(1), 1989, 27–50, 30–1.
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could have a similar function, and lead to very divisive identifications, particu-
larly if they were linked to caste traditions.44 Some of these caste identifica-
tions could be interpreted as ethnic: thus, jewel making was a reputed domain 
widely associated with ‘the Wolof ’, and river navigation and piloting with the 
‘Sarakole’.45
Group relations on Senegal’s Petite Côte and in the large hinterland of this 
coast were particularly complex as this region was an area of frequent and sig-
nificant contact between groups that came to be regarded, in the post-colonial 
state, as clearly different: specifically, the Sereer and Wolof. Here, Wolof-
speaking inhabitants constantly had to deal with neighbours from different 
linguistic groups. For this reason, the geographical setting provides us with 
some outstanding material that shows how sense of identification changed 
over time. These results will be contrasted with conditions in the territory of the 
former pre-colonial states of Kajoor and Bawol to the north – ruled by 
Wolophone dynasties – and with those in the British-ruled Gambia to the south.
 An Ethnic Pattern in the Mid-Nineteenth Century? Perception and 
Negotiation of Wolof Group Identification at the Brink of the 
French Conquest
With the expansion of French control and the establishment of colonial rule, 
the encounter between colonial administrators and Wolof-speakers led to a 
certain perception of the colonial subjects, bolstered by newly obtained infor-
mation. Started by the Governor of Senegal, Léon Faïdherbe, in the 1840s and 
1850s, the French intensified their military campaigns in the region from the 
1870s, relying on a complex network of allies.46 In this early phase, systematic 
information-gathering was difficult, as conditions within the French colonies 
only became more stable after 1900.47
44 Diouf, Kajoor, 28; Diop, Société Wolof, 33–45; Tamari, Tal, ‘The Development of Caste 
Systems in West Africa’, Journal of African History 32(2), 1991, 221–50, 225.
45 On jewel makers, see ans, 11D1/5, District (Cercle) Commissioner of Bas-Sénégal, Notice 
sur Villes de l’A.O.F.: Satisfaction à 3358/C. du 16 Mai 1940 (n° 5), without date; on river 
 navigators ans, 11D1/1059, Security Service of Senegal, Renseignements Généraux (without 
number), without date, 1–2.
46 Barrows, Leland Conley, ‘Some paradoxes of pacification: Senegal and France in the 1860s’, 
in B.K. Swartz and Raymond E. Dumett (eds.), West African culture dynamics: archaeological 
and historical perspectives (The Hague – Paris – New York: Mouton, 1980), 515–44, 537–40.
47 ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 1D11, Lafont to Faidherbe, Governor of Senegal (without 
number), 7 March [1858]; Crowder, Africa, 75–80; Echenberg, Myron, Colonial conscripts: 
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Nevertheless, some information coming from the Senegalese populations 
was indeed processed during this early colonial period, and from the first 
decades of the twentieth century colonial administrators were instructed to 
collect historical accounts of the different regions. The stabilisation of colonial 
political structures on the ground altered the conditions of how local popula-
tions defined their ethnic identification. Another factor was the decreasing 
importance of ‘assimilation’ as a theoretical objective of the colonisation. 
Where important local positions had not in the meantime been filled with 
favourites of French officials, official policy returned to a tendency of restoring 
the ‘traditional dynasties,’ favouring in particular veterans who were members 
of ‘noble families’. The seven former states on Senegalese territory ceased to 
exist, but their dynasties retained some influence because of the colonial pol-
icy, which used anthropological work as well to find ‘authentic’ political 
structures.48
In the four-tiered system of the French administration in the West African 
colonies, the power of ‘traditional’ chiefs (chefs de canton, who sometimes 
formally served a ‘traditional’, honorific chef de region, and who were supe-
rior to village chiefs or headmen, the so-called chefs de village) cannot be 
underestimated. Older research has portrayed the chiefs as mere puppets of 
the French administrative system. However, in practice the chiefs had a rela-
tively large amount of room for manoeuvre, and could use the colonial struc-
tures (the native code or indigénat, and their own role in the recruitment of 
forced labourers and soldiers) to intimidate local opponents and unwilling 
peasants.49
Within the search for ‘authenticity’, French administrators felt encouraged 
to codify ‘indigenous customs’. The ‘native codices’ (coutumiers) classified 
what the administrators ‘identified’ as different ethnic communities. ‘Native 
courts’ (tribunaux indigènes) were the practical expression of this new policy. 
The chiefs would accordingly have to prove that they were really competent 
the Tirailleurs sénégalais in French West Africa, 1857–1960 (Portsmouth/nh: Heinemann – 
London: James Currey, 1991), 63–4; Michel, Marc, Les Africains et la Grande Guerre: L’appel 
à l’Afrique (1914–1918) (Paris: Karthala, 2003), 23; Lunn, Joe, Memoirs of the Maelstrom: 
A Senegalese Oral History of the First World War (Portsmouth/nh: Heinemann, 1999), 
121–30.
48 Conklin, Alice, A mission to civilize: the republican idea of empire in France and West Africa, 
1895–1930 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 162–70; Robinson, David, ‘Ethnography 
and customary law in Senegal’, Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines 32(126), 1992, 221–37, 232–4.
49 Zucarelli, François, ‘De la chefferie traditionnelle au canton: évolution du canton colonial 
au Sénégal 1855–1960’, Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines 13(50), 1973, 213–38, 234–5.
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and knowledgeable regarding the ‘customs’ of their populations.50 This new 
demand for authenticity indicated a clear sympathy for ‘traditional’ and ethno-
cultural arguments, and also showed local and regional opposition groups a 
way to challenge the existing rulers: the opposition could accuse these rulers of 
being ‘unauthentic’.51
Before the middle of the nineteenth century, the labels of ‘Jolof ’, ‘Jaloffa’, or 
‘Gyloffa’ appear in many European reports from local representatives and trav-
ellers.52 It remains rather unclear what is meant by the labels. In many cases, 
however, the expression did not refer to language; ‘visitors’ were more inter-
ested in political power, and knowledge about the earlier existence of the Jolof 
Empire as a pre-colonial political entity, destroyed long before the establish-
ment of the first commercial outposts by Europeans, explains most of these 
views. On the whole, ‘Jolof ’ appears as a political entity, but the name ‘Wolof ’ 
had variable meanings in the sources.
Documentation on local political entities during the early phase of the 
French conquest, in the 1840s and 1850s, is still scant. From the 1860s, our mate-
rial platform broadens: the process of a changing use of ethnic labels in the 
conquest phase is documented through a multitude of reports describing 
interactions between Africans and Europeans and highlighting ‘the African 
voice’. The monograph of Abbé David Boilat, an African priest who had spent 
much time in France, arguably represents the first such document. Boilat 
explicitly described himself as a ‘child of the land’, eager to point out the ‘cor-
rect terms’ for the different Senegalese groups. Significantly, he was the first to 
criticise the tendency of European travellers to regard all Pulaar (or Fulfulde-
speakers) as members of a single group; he insisted that the group name ‘Pël’ 
only described the semi-nomadic and acephalous cattle-breeder societies, but 
not other Fulfulde-speakers in the region, such as the Tukulor.53
In his account, Boilat holds that distinguishing Senegalese groups by sight 
was extremely difficult and he discarded any racial-biological distinction. The 
reference to language is obvious for his description of groups, but Boilat also 
regarded the Lebu as ‘Wolof ’ who had simply taken a different name. Therefore, 
local groups would have chosen their labels to suit their needs. With regard to 
the Sereer-Noon, Boilat distinguished them from the other inhabitants of the 
50 Van Hoven, Ed, ‘Representing Social Hierarchy: Administrators-Ethnographers in the 
French Sudan: Delafosse, Monteil, and Labouret’, Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines 30(2), 1990, 
179–98, 186–9.
51 Zucarelli, ‘Chefferie’, 221.
52 Hair, ‘Continuity’, 249–50.
53 Boilat, David, Esquisses sénégalaises (Paris: Librairie Bertrand, 1853), 384.
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region, including from other Sereer-speakers.54 Of course, this is in plain con-
tradiction to later descriptions, both from French administrators and anthro-
pologists, and from local interviewees, who all presented the Noon populations 
as a definite part of the Sereer ethnic group. However, it is likely that Boilat 
reflected exactly how the members of this latter group wished to be character-
ised in the middle of the nineteenth century.
Unlike earlier European accounts, the observations of Boilat tackle in part 
the question of Wolof sense of identification, although, as in the case of Kajoor, 
he mostly associates Wolofness with the Muslim religion. Citing Fara Kaba, the 
military leader (farba ju rëey) of the Damel Meysa Tend Joor, Boilat makes ‘the 
Wolof ’ appear as converts to Islam, in contrast to the Sereer-Noon and Sereer-
Safèn, described by the Kajoor nobility as savage ‘tribes’.55 However, the author 
did not enquire about traditional stories of their origins from the Wolof-
speakers. On the contrary, he returned in this respect to Sereer identifications 
and origins, for which he relied on Tukulor sources describing them as immi-
grants from the Fuuta Tooro who had finally settled in Bawol.56 Boilat’s account 
of Siin is perplexing, as he holds that while the Sereer played a strong numeric 
role in this state – he frequently mentions the role of Siin’s ‘Sereer aristocracy’ 
as part of the state hierarchy – he believed these Sereer populations accepted 
Wolof rule, in particular that of the Muslim king Ramat Diouf.57 On Saluum, 
Boilat’s information is far less precise.58
In contrast to Boilat’s study, Yoro Diaw’s account shows how a sentiment of 
Wolofness could be formulated by the local elites. Diaw was a member of a 
noble family from Waalo, the pre-colonial state in the northern interior of 
Senegal, who had undergone an education at the Ecole des Otages in Saint-
Louis – a school where selected sons of rulers under French domination 
obtained, while being hostages of the colonial power, a ‘French education’. As 
chief in the Waalo region, his translated accounts convey a perception of com-
mon Wolof identifications.59 However, Diaw’s notebooks illustrate the same 
54 Boilat, Esquisses, xv, 43, 59.
55 Boilat, Esquisses, 174; Klein, Martin A., ‘Social and Economic Factors in the Muslim 
Revolution in Senegambia’, Journal of African History 13(3), 1972, 419–41, 427; Diouf, Kajoor, 
150–1.
56 Boilat, Esquisses, 179.
57 Boilat, Esquisses, 123, 141, 145–6. It is worth noting that this contradicts the argument of 
Klein, Islam, 8–9.
58 Boilat, Esquisses, 180.
59 Boulègue, Jean, ‘A la naissance de l’histoire écrite sénégalaise: Yoro Dyao et ses modèles 
(deuxième moitié du XIXème siècle, début du XXème siècle)’, History in Africa 15, 1988, 395–
405, 395–6. As is usual for studies on Wolophone communities, Boulègue represents 
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initial fixation present in many parts of the colonial administration – the clas-
sification of locals according to clear categories – and his account was very 
much a product of a particular type of ‘colonial thinking’.60
A third major account on the situation in the 1860s is the exhaustive report 
by Emile Pinet-Laprade on the Sereer. This was a colonial document, based 
largely on information provided to its author by Wolof merchants active in the 
Cap-Vert peninsula and on the Petite Côte. The informants describe the Sereer 
with a clear view from outside.61 The Sereer appear in this report as first-com-
ers on the Petite Côte, having been led into the region by the Gëlwaar dynasty; 
the Gëlwaar are said to have come from Kaabu, and they would have been 
relatives of Jola groups from which they had broken away. According to the 
Pinet-Laprade account, the children of the founding father of those Sereer 
conquerors, Massa Wali Dione, had established the states of Siin and Saluum. 
The ‘traditional’ explanation is that Sereer groups entered geographic spaces 
that were uninhabited, and then became isolated, forming sort of ethnic pock-
ets.62 However, in Eastern Bawol, the Sereer groups were said to have mixed 
with the Wolof; they would have adopted a language derived from Wolof, and 
were distinguished in the period of the author as ‘M’Balugiafèn’.63 The account 
shows complexities for which even the contemporary informants had no 
answer, and which contradict later ethnic interpretations of group solidarity.
The French, for their part, quickly built up their own know-how in adminis-
tering larger groups within the Senegambian territories. Intruding more and 
more into the political scenario of the Cap-Vert peninsula, then of the Petite 
Diaw’s work from an ethnic perspective, without giving sufficient explanation on this 
issue: ‘Il était le premier Wolof à écrire l’histoire de son peuple’ (395).
60 Dyâo, Yoro, ‘Légendes et coutumes sénégalaises: les cahiers de Yoro Dyâo’, in Revue 
d’ethnographie et de sociologie, 3–4, 1912, published and annotated by Henri Gaden (Paris: 
E. Leroux, 1912), 119–37, 191–202; Sall, Tamsir Oumar, ‘Yoro Dyao, un aristocrate Waalo-
Waalo dans le système colonial’, Cahiers du cra 5, 1987, 161–76, passim.
61 Despite Bathily’s claim in Bathily, Abdoulaye, ‘Aux origines de l’africanisme: Le rôle de 
l’œuvre ethnohistorique de Faidherbe dans la conquête française du Sénégal’, in Cahiers 
de Jussieu 2: Le Mal de Voir (Paris: Union Générale d’Editions, 1976), 77–107, 97–100, Léon 
Faïdherbe’s own studies are far less fertile on the group identity of Wolophone popula-
tions, see Faïdherbe, Léon, Notices sur la Colonie de Sénégal et sur les pays qui sont en 
relations avec elle (Paris: Arthus Bertrand, 1859), 28–43, and Faïdherbe, Léon, Le Sénégal: 
La France dans l’Afrique Occidentale (Paris: Hachette, 1889), 153, 354, 364, 431, 482.
62 ans, ggaof, 1G 33, Pinet-Laprade, Governor of Senegal, Notice sur les Serères peuplade 
répandue sur la partie des côtes occidentales d’Afrique, comprise entre le Cap Vert et la rivière 
de Saloum (without number), without date, 1–5.
63 ans, ggaof, 1G 33, Pinet-Laprade, Notice…, 3.
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Côte, French officials increased their knowledge of the different pre-colonial 
states.64 Inquiry into group identifications around the new administrative 
posts of Rufisque, Dakar, Joal and Kaolack allowed a number of new comments 
about the social relations of local groups. As far as it concerned the Wolof-
speaking rulers of the Senegalese interior, such as in Bawol and Kajoor, the 
French were obviously concerned with ‘states’ as a main category. Much of the 
information usually came from informants at the upper level of the social hier-
archy. The process of identifying population groups soon advanced for Kajoor, 
whose rulers were forced to formally cede a part of their territory in 1858; the 
rest of the state was finally annexed after the defeat of the war leader and ex-
Damel, Lat Joor, in the battle of Dexxelé in 1886. From the 1870s, the French 
believed they had identified distinct ethnic groups within this state: namely 
‘Wolof ’, ‘Lebu’, ‘Sereer’, and ‘Peul’. Such a conclusion was in plain contradiction 
with the official version given by informants from the upper echelons of the 
political hierarchy of Kajoor.65 The Damel of Kajoor and his provincial officials 
described the composition of their state according to three criteria: in terms of 
the warrior profession of the ceddo, the military elite at the service of the 
dynasty; the importance of local Muslim clerics providing the religious frame-
work for the inhabitants of the region; and the authority of the Damel himself, 
and of the ruling families. It is not surprising that the ruling authorities of 
Kajoor wished to give the French such an image of a homogeneous entity. Even 
so, ethnocultural conflict between groups was not indicated as a factor in the 
official account of the mid-nineteenth century.66
For Bawol, the second so-called ‘Wolof state’ on Senegalese territory, which 
controlled, on the Petite Côte, the growing fishing village of M’Bour, the situa-
tion was basically the same in the second half of the nineteenth century.67 
Members of French military campaigns against this political entity attempted to 
identify different groups of subjects of the Teeñ, the paramount ruler of the ter-
ritory, as belonging to particular ethnic groups.68 However, this categorisation 
largely failed: due to confusing social relations within this pre-colonial state, the 
64 In 1900 there was one big attempt to bring knowledge on Senegal’s ‘races’ into a single 
study, based, however, on group stereotypes, see Lasnet, Alexandre-Bernard, ‘Les Races 
du Sénégal. Sénégambie et Casamance’, in Exposition Universelle de 1900, Les Colonies 
 françaises, Une mission au Sénégal, Ethnographie, botanique, zoologie, géologie par mm. 
Dr. Lasnet, Aug. Chevalier, A. Cligny, P. Rambaud (Paris: Challamel, 1900), 1–190.
65 Diouf, Kajoor, 181–215.
66 ans, ggaof, 1G 36, Notice sur le Cayor (without number), ca. 1870.
67 Diouf, Kajoor, 153–4.
68 The French also attempted to compile an ‘ethnicised’ history of the state of Bawol. This 
pointed to ‘Sereer kings’ before the takeover of power of the Wolophone geej, but the 
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French mainly focused on Bawol’s large population of Sereer-speakers, which 
were, in reality, at the margins of political power and of ‘Wolof institutions’.69
Following the accounts of informants from Saluum, French visitors and dip-
lomats claimed at an early stage that this state consisted of different communi-
ties, but that such categories of belonging did not affect its political organisation. 
French Spiritan missionaries coming to the court of the successive Buur 
Saluum Bala Adama N’Diaye, Koumba Ndama Mbodj, and Samba Laobe Fall in 
the course of the 1850s commented with surprise that the state contained a 
pluri-lingual society, where the languages of Wolof and Sereer were both very 
much in use.70 In his own correspondence with the French authorities in 
Gorée, the Buur Saluum, Samba Laobe Fall, expressed the same particular con-
cept of rule over a community defined by criteria of the dynasty.71 The central 
elements of this concept were the loyalty of the different jaraf, the provincial 
notables, and of the ceddo troops, to the local throne. The Buur Saluum never 
referred to any ethnocultural characteristics of the populations under his 
rule.72 However, when questioned by British military officer Smyth O’Connor 
in 1855, the Buur Saluum Koumba Ndama Mbodj gave an image of ‘his’ subjects 
that mixed supposed ethnocultural and state loyalty: the ruler held that beyond 
the borders of his state lived the ‘wild tribes’ of Bawol; the Sereer and the Lebu; 
and even the inhabitants of Siin were presented as physically and culturally 
different.73 Those who lived ‘in tribes’ stood outside the state’s society; there 
was no need even to mention identification as Wolof.
The Buur Saluum’s fellow ruler, the Buur Siin, ruler of the neighbouring state 
closer to the coast, was in conflict with recalcitrant populations who had chal-
lenged his authority and later managed to be included in the French zones of 
influence and protection around Portudal, Nianing, and Kaolack.74 These 
‘tradition’ is far from clear. See for that Martin, Victor, and Charles Becker, ‘Les Teeñ du 
Baol: Essai de chronologie’, Bulletin de l’IFAN, série B, 38(3), 1974, 449–505, 463.
69 ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 312, Aquilichini, Resident of Portudal, to French 
Commissioner of Gorée (n° 74), 6 April 1866.
70 agcse, 3 I 1.5a5, Gallais, Quelques notes sur l’origine de Joal, sur les Wolofs et les Cérers, 
extraites des lettres datées de Joal (without number), without date [ca. 1850], 16.
71 On Saluum genealogy, see Boulègue, Jean, ‘Contribution à la chronologie du royaume du 
Saloum’, Bulletin de l’IFAN, série B 28(3–4), 1966, 657–62, passim.
72 ans, 11D1/1111, Traduction d’une lettre du roi de Salum arrivée à Gorée en Juin 1859 (without 
number), without date.
73 Smyth O’Connor, Luke, ‘Account of a Visit to the King of Bur Sin, 64 Miles to the North of 
the Gambia’, Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society of London 3(6), 1858–1859, 
377–9, 378–9.
74 Diouf, Kajoor, 176.
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coastal ‘Sereer’ had, from the point of view of the Buur Siin, Koumba Ndoffène 
Fa Mak Diouf, decided to leave the good political order of things, which was 
reflected in the use of the ethnocultural group label for these outsiders.75 
Nonetheless, Siin counted for the French and local sources as a Sereer entity.76 
Massa Wali Dione, the abovementioned Sereer hero, was described by infor-
mants from Joal-Fadiouth as the founding father of the state of Siin. However, 
the relationship of this state to other, ‘Wolof ’, entities was not very clear from 
such accounts.77 Early European visitors to Siin agreed that the pre-colonial 
state and its existing institutions were the point of reference for local popula-
tions, not language or customs – and they argued that these political institu-
tions were quite close to comparable ones in Kajoor, Bawol, and Saluum.78 The 
missionaries visiting the court of the Buur Siin Amadiouf Gnilane Faye Diouf 
in 1851 were eager to remark that he behaved ‘exactly like a Wolof leader’. Such 
instances of behaviour that was ‘typical for Wolof aristocrats’ perplexed the 
early missionaries.79 It is, however, interesting to note the aftermath of the 1871 
assassination of Buur Siin Koumba Ndoffène Fa Mak Diouf during a visit to the 
town of Joal, now belonging to the French zone on the coast of Senegal. A short 
struggle for the throne which occurred between Semu Mak Diouf, the son of 
the late Buur, and Sanu Mone Faye, his half-brother, was mediated through the 
dynastic rules of the Gëlwaar. Those dynastic rules, Spiritan missionaries 
explained, were not ethnic customs, but the norms of a pre-colonial state.80
After those initial descriptions of self-definition on the basis of the state 
hierarchies, it is useful to have a closer look at regional cases. In the settle-
ments of the region of the Petite Côte belonging to the state of Siin, in particu-
lar in those close to Joal, there was no notion of an ‘automatic’ Sereer 
75 On Koumba Ndoffène Fa Mak Diouf as Buur Siin, see Diouf, Niokhobaye; Charles Becker, 
and Victor Martin, ‘Chronique du Royaume du Sine, suivie de Notes sur les Traditions 
Orales et les Sources écrites concernant le Royaume du Sine’, Bulletin de l’IFAN, série B 
34(4), 1972, 702–77, 725–30.
76 Reinwald, Brigitte, Der Reichtum der Frauen. Leben und Arbeit der weiblichen Bevölkerung 
in Siin/Senegal unter dem Einfluß der französischen Kolonisation (Münster – Hamburg: 
lit, 1995), 61 (on the use of Wolof language in Siin), 67–71.
77 agcse, 3 I 1.5a5, Gallais, Complément des notes sur la mission de Joal. Royaume de Sine – 
Sérères – Wolofs – Joal. (without number), without date [ca. 1850], 1; Reinwald, Reichtum, 
154–65.
78 Compare ans, ggaof, 1G 33, Pinet-Laprade, Notice sur les Serères…, 7–8.
79 agcse, 3 I 1.5a5, Gallais, Notes sur la mission de Joal (without number), without date 
[1851], 37.
80 agcse, 3 I 1.11b3, Lamoise to Schwindenhammer, Provincial Superior of the Spiritan 
Mission (without number), 12 Dec. 1871, 5.
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identification. This was so even with a majority of the region’s inhabitants 
speaking Sereer languages, although in towns like Guérèr, according to obser-
vations made by missionaries, lived a considerable number of Wolof-speaking 
families. However, the main difference given by the local inhabitants them-
selves was defined in religious and social terms: a line was drawn between 
‘Marabout’ and ‘ceddo’ families, which meant allegiance either to Islamic reli-
gion or to an institution of the states that was opposed to Islam. The category 
of ‘Sereer’ indicated a clear distinction.81 However, the Sereer-speakers of the 
hinterland of Joal, living, during the early phase of French conquest, under the 
rule of a ‘war chief ’, Akana Dione, described themselves, according to their 
sub-group, as Noon. These Sereer-Noon, as a community living under constant 
military pressure, had formulated the strictest rules concerning group endog-
amy: marriages with ‘foreigners’, as defined on an ethnocultural base, were 
strictly forbidden.82 For such a seemingly isolated group, its members had, 
however, an impressive language capacity that contrasted with the insistence 
of other Sereer-speakers, of N’Dong and of Joal, for example, on not speaking a 
word of Wolof. When the Spiritan missionary Gallais reached the larger village 
of N’Dong in 1851, he was surprised how many villagers spoke Wolof.83 By the 
1880s, this had become even more the case: young men among the Noon of the 
Guérèr region were quite fluent in Wolof. The inhabitants of Diafura, close to 
Guérèr, who approached the Spiritan missionaries as Noon, frequently claimed 
they did not understand a word of Wolof, and the missionaries at first believed 
that it was Sereer which they had to learn. Finally, however, nearly all adults 
spoke good Wolof. As the Spiritans realised after longer contact with villagers 
on the Petite Côte, there was no fixed boundary between the openly Wolophone 
part of the inhabitants of Guérèr, and the openly Sereer-speaking individuals 
in Diafura and its surroundings.84
Several rural populations, in their interactions with French missionaries and 
officers, had obviously understood the political opportunities generated by 
insistence on their difference from the Wolophone populations of the region. 
With the Spiritan missionaries, those villagers were relatively successful: 
81 agcse, 3 I 1.11b3, Strub to Kobès, Coadjuteur (in function of bishop) of the Two Guineas 
(without number), 8 May 1885, 2.
82 ans, 10D5/12, Monographie des Sérères Nones: Les Nones (without number), without date, 
4. The idea of the Sereer being an acephalous society with ad hoc war chiefs is, however, 
difficult to sustain from the archival sources, which are hardly explicit.
83 agcse, 3 I 1.5a5, Gallais, Notes sur la mission de Joal (without number), without date 
[1851], 6.
84 agcse, 3 I 1.11b3, Strub to Kobès (without number), 13 May 1885, 3.
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the missionaries believed for a time that the Noon, as an important ‘indepen-
dent tribe’, had the right to rule over the whole geographic zone to the fringes 
of the French posts of Pout and Thiès and enjoyed a fair claim to protection as 
an independent unit against Bawol and Siin. Those claims were entirely ficti-
tious in terms of political history, as the Sereer Noon were only a dispersed 
group at the margins of those political entities. French military personnel com-
ing into the region from the 1880s were from the outset far more sceptical 
towards Akana Dione’s claims.85
Further northwards on the coast, in Popenguine, there was another type of 
community organisation to be found, which came rather closer to ideas of eth-
nic distinction. In Popenguine, communities were classified into the Sereer 
town and the White (tuubab) settlement, meaning, effectively, French and 
Wolof town. This distinction between both settlements was already part of the 
local vision in the 1880s.86 In this case, language appeared to define the notions 
of ethnic identity, but the distinction was made elsewhere: under pre-colonial 
conditions, prominent Wolophone individuals and French merchants were 
regarded as loyal subjects of the ruler, while the inhabitants of the ‘Sereer town’ 
were more resistant towards the demands of the rulers and notables of Siin 
(and, ultimately, of Bawol, as Popenguine occasionally changed hands between 
both states during periods of warfare). Thus in the end, the question of politi-
cal affiliation played a more important role than ethnic sentiment.
From the 1850s to the 1880s, such demands were still part of a normal 
regional practice. In earlier decades, the Buur’s political decrees for the collec-
tion of tribute had usually been a prelude to plunder. The definition of ethnic 
groups did not play a role in the payment of those ‘taxes’: there was no distinc-
tion between Sereer-speakers and Wolof-speakers as concerning treatment by 
the authorities of Siin.87 Tribute relations and eventual reprisals were esti-
mated on the basis of allegiance to agents of the state. In the 1860s, different 
groups attempted to escape the control of the Buur and to obtain French pro-
tection, such as in the coastal villages of Dionwar and Niodior, whose inhabit-
ants were imprisoned and severely beaten under the orders of local ruler 
N’Diarnou, a vassal of the Buur Siin. The state (or the opposition against the 
state) was the point of reference of group loyalty, not the ethnic group.
85 agcse, 3 I 1.11b3, Strub to Kobès (without number), 25 May 1885, 4–5.
86 agcse, 3 I 1.11b3, Strub to Kobès (without number), 27 Oct. 1885, 2; agcse, 3 I 1.11b3, Strub 
to Kobès (without number), 4 Jan. 1886, 1.
87 ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 314, Bandis to Cools, Commissioner of Gorée (without 
number), 29 Jan. 1868.
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Loyalties on the Petite Côte, and in particular in the interior eastward from 
the coastal belt, were rendered still more complicated by the religious conflicts 
of the 1860s. Several of the village rulers in question, who had come to power 
since 1850, owed their nomination to Islamic zeal and to their installation by 
Ma Bâ, an anti-French religious leader operating in the Siin-Saluum area and 
preaching Islamic Jihad in middle and southern coastal Senegal.88 In the whole 
of his personal correspondence with the French side, Ma Bâ insisted that 
‘Muslim villages’ in the area of the Siin and Saluum Rivers were threatened by 
‘pagan communities’, and his own followers never had recourse to ethnic 
terms. Ma Bâ’s alliance with ex-Damel Lat Joor was also built on Islamic cre-
dentials.89 Religion thus overshadowed other solidarities within the Wolophone 
communities of this particular region.90
Nonetheless, it was above all the nature of state organisation in Senegambia 
that caused the absence of ethnic criteria. The ethnic variant of group categori-
sation was mostly limited to groups at the periphery, and at the margins of 
state control. The Wolof-speakers, wherever they were a leading group in pre-
colonial state structures, never referred to their own ethnocultural sentiment 
in their conversations with the French conquerors. On the contrary, the elders 
and leaders of those communities that were victims of plunder and violent 
tribute campaigns tried the counter-strategies they had at hand: they claimed 
their distinctness from the ruling elite of the pre-colonial states in question. 
Especially the Sereer, but also the Tukulor groups of the Petite Côte, and the 
Lebu, all resorted to these means to prepare armed resistance.
The Petite Côte and its hinterland provide, in the decades after 1850, a num-
ber of detailed examples of these different processes of group resistance. 
During the era of slow French conquest of the Senegalese interior, many local 
88 ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 314, De Beaurepaire to Cools (n° 356), 8 Feb. 1868.
89 ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 318, Lettre [de Maba] parvenue le 10 Juin 1864 (without 
number), without date; ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 318, Ma Bâ to Faïdherbe (without 
number), without date (May 1864); ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 318, Ma Bâ to Pinet-
Laprade, Commissioner of Gorée, and Faïdherbe (without number), without date; ans, 
ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 318, Ma Bâ to Pinet-Laprade (without number), without date; 
Klein, Islam, 79–93; Diouf, Kajoor, 231; Getz, Trevor R., Slavery and Reform in West Africa: 
Toward Emancipation in Nineteenth-Century Senegal and the Gold Coast (Athens/oh: 
Ohio University Press – Oxford: James Currey, 2004), 146–7.
90 The movement of Ma Bâ has later been described as a ‘Tukulor movement’ in the style of 
Al-Hajj Umar’s group of followers, but the overwhelming part of his militants were Wolof-
speakers. See cadn, Fonds ‘Anciennes Colonies’, Fonds Dakar, 192, Michel, Administrative 




leaders saw their chance to profit from the decrease of state control, and 
attempted to build up a reputation of their own. Some of those jaraf even 
established their own autonomous strongholds in the vacuum of power that 
was the consequence of the loss of control by the buur. They still referred to 
the same system of state organisation: thus, even if the rebellious officials led a 
large number of non-Wolophone followers, they usually did not try to build 
their revolt on ethnocultural sentiment, but on networks and resource redistri-
bution. As one example, the chief of Fadial, Moussa Diahame, who had been 
deposed by the Buur Siin and fled before the advent of the latter’s ceddo in June 
1868, was especially prestigious. He built up most of his prestige as a result of 
active patronage, through the distribution of his cows and sheep.91
During the chaotic political situation of the years between 1850 and 1890, 
however, some regional group solidarities crossed the boundaries of the states. 
Wolof-speaking traders from Joal on the Petite Côte and from Gorée strongly 
relied on links to other regions for their commerce. In those networks, they 
cooperated with members of their families and other Wolophone partners, but 
not in the sense of an ethnic solidarity.92 The Wolof-speaking chiefs of the 
areas near Nianing and Kaolack saw no problem in collaborating with Fulbe 
raiders in order to enhance their local power base. New patronage networks 
emerged in which ethnicity continued to play no role. One of these local war-
lords was Songho, operating first as an ally of Makodu, the erstwhile Damel of 
Kajoor, and attempting at the same time to befriend the French.93 Ten years 
later, after the French had put the region of M’Biguen under their own protec-
tion, their relationships towards local rule and individual leaders were com-
plex: Songho had remained a regional leader in the hinterland of the Petite 
Côte in the 1860s and the 1870s, and while he officially cooperated with 
the  French-installed chef de canton, he claimed, at the same time, to be 
under  the authority of Lat Joor, now pretender for the damelship of Kajoor. 
While the erosion of Kajoor, Bawol, and Siin thus led to the establishment of 
leaders working individually, parties in the resulting conflicts nonetheless still 
operated with clear reference to the pre-colonial states.
91 ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 314, Noël to Commissioner of Gorée (n° 394), 3 June 1868.
92 ans, 11D1/1111, Kobès, Acting Bishop of Modon, Divers points qu’il serait important de régler 
dans les négociations avec le roi de Sin en faveur de la Mission de Joal (without number), 
10 Dec. 1855.
93 ans, ggaof, 1G 33, Gorée, Cabinet du Commandant, Note annexée à la Carte du Baol et de 
la partie méridionale du Cayor dressée d’après les renseignements fournis par les Indigènes 
pour le Chef de Bataillon du Génie Pinet Laprade (n° 71), 10 Nov. 1860, 3–4.
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The French attempted to inspire the creation of a rival network, including 
the major Wolof-speaking chiefs and some Sereer-speaking headmen in the 
coastal area. To better control the region of the Petite Côte from 1890, French 
officials wished to counter the claims of Songho, but they also planned eventu-
ally to eliminate those chiefs in the region who were still formally loyal to the 
Buur Siin or to the Teeñ.94 However, many local leaders established their own 
network of clients and managed to ignore for years the overlordship of the 
French-installed Alcati of Nianing, Moktar Diop, and of Lamane Gamou, the 
French stalwart in the region of M’Biguen. The ‘Pël’ – the armed Fulbe com-
munities of cattle-breeders who were readily mobilised for attacks – played a 
central role in this local network; moreover, they were frequently engaged on 
both sides.95
During these events, the Buur Siin also felt – after the conquest of Fatick by 
the French in 1859 and new French territorial claims – that he had to explain 
his own point of view. In his argumentation towards the French opponents, 
the Buur Siin claimed, first, that the villagers in the area in question would 
manipulate information to artificially create tensions between him and the 
French governor. His second and main argument remained dynastic. The 
Buur Siin claimed that he and his fellow ruler and ‘brother’, the Buur Saluum, 
were the representatives of the region’s ‘traditional’ ruling families, holding a 
centuries-old right to govern. This was also explicitly stressed in the context 
of other dynastic claims, such as in the cases of Lat Menguey, former Buur 
Saluum, or of Koumba Ndoffène Fa Mak Diouf, the Buur Siin, who wished to 
defend his rights of succession in Bawol.96 In 1868, the Buur Siin sent more 
envoys to intimidate and discipline the inhabitants of Fadial and of other vil-
lages that had attempted to break away from the state. At the same time, local 
chiefs and translators were dispatched on behalf of the French to insist upon 
the treaties of local communities with the French residents in Nianing and 
94 ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 314, Noël, Administrator of Post of Joal, to Commissioner 
of Gorée (n° 28), 17 March 1868; ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 314, Noël to Commissioner 
of Gorée (n° 399), 16 June 1868.
95 ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 314, Reygane, District Commissioner of Bidjine, to 
Commissioner of Gorée (n° 2), 2 Jan. 1870.
96 ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 318, Lat Menguey, son of Bala, former Buur Saluum, to 
Majojo, Damel of Kajoor, and Faïdherbe (without number), without date (arrived 20 June 
1864); ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 318, Koumba Ndoffène Fa Mak Diouf, Buur Siin, to 
Faïdherbe, Governor of Senegal (without number), without date (arrived 12 Oct. 1864); 
ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 318, Bakar Thilas to Faïdherbe (without number), with-
out date (arrived 1 March 1864).
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Joal.97 For our discussion, it is most interesting that in those negotiations, the 
question of ethnic belonging did not appear. Conflict on the Petite Côte 
remained fixed between the pre-colonial state and local communities, with-
out any need for the conflicting parties to refer to group identifications in an 
ethnic sense.98
Only when the political situation became particularly menacing from the 
point of view of the ruling dynasties did the rulers of Siin or Saluum occasion-
ally formulate the danger of a ‘foreign’ threat represented through a ‘stranger’ 
ethnic group. This appeared to help them to close ranks. Such was the case 
during the conflict between the French and Makodu, who had then become a 
contender for the throne of Siin. Makodu insisted in his speeches and letters 
that the inhabitants of Siin ought to expel all the ‘foreigners’, particularly the 
‘Tukulor’ – thus mobilising against the auxiliary troops of the French army.99 
However, in the nineteenth-century context, such claims were rare. Makodu 
was already in a desperate situation – and the ethnic card appeared only as a 
last resort in situations in which religious, communal or state solidarity no lon-
ger produced the desired effects.
At least, this was the case for the rulers and authorities of the pre-colonial 
states. By contrast, for smaller groups, such as the Lebu, Sereer, or Tukulor liv-
ing in Western Senegal, the situation was quite different. They were under far 
more pressure, and on the Petite Côte their communities could normally not 
rely on any protective state structure. Their former modus vivendi with 
Wolophone rulers of the pre-colonial states had been eroded through the con-
stant warfare in the region from the first half of the nineteenth century. Groups 
97 ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 314, Noël to Koumba Ndoffène Fa Mak Diouf (without 
number), 16 June 1867; ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 314, Noël to Administrator of 2e 
Arrondissement in the Colony of Senegal, Supplément à la lettre N° 399 (without number), 
without date; ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 314, Noël to Commissioner of Gorée (num-
ber illegible), 20 June 1868.
98 ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 318, Lettre [du Roi de Sine] parvenue le 6 Juin 1859 
[Traduction] (without number), without date; ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 318, Lettre 
[du Roi de Sine] parvenue le 6 Juin 1859 [Traduction] (without number), without date; ans, 
ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 318, Buur Siin to Commissioner of Gorée (without number), 
September 1859; ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 318, Farba Diaraf Waly to Mayor of Gorée 
(‘Toubou Saint Jean’) (without number), without date (arrived 8 July 1860); ans, ggaof, 
Fonds Ancien, 13G 318, Buur Siin to Faïdherbe (without number), without date (arrived 
1861); ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 318, Buur Siin to Pinet-Laprade and Faïdherbe 
(without number), July 1860.
99 ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 318, Bakar Thilas, Buur Siin, to Faïdherbe (without num-
ber), 13 June 1863.
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at the margins of political units now still more frequently became the victims 
of plunder. In situations of conflict, such communities occasionally relied on 
ethnocultural mobilisation strategies as a tool for obtaining group cohesion.
In some attempts at classification already carried out by the French in the 
1820s, all West Africans under French rule appear as ‘lébous’.100 This might 
partly be based on a misinterpretation of African information, but it is also 
probable that ‘Lebu’ in the first half of the nineteenth century was more flexi-
ble as a group label. In Jander, a peripheral province of Kajoor in 1860, a French 
agent collected yet another explanation of ‘Lebu’ group identity. According to 
his report, the criterion of difference was mainly based on religious identifica-
tion: those called ‘Leybou’ were simply the inhabitants of villages untouched 
by Islam, where alcohol could be consumed.101 To the Damel of Kajoor and to 
the Teeñ of Bawol, the ‘Lebu’ outside of their area of direct control were there-
fore regarded as legitimate targets of military campaigns.102 This called for 
creating stronger group cohesion between the victims of plunder campaigns, 
under this label, to counter the existing threats.
In the regions between Bargny and the mouth of the Tanma River, traditions 
held the local populations to be a ‘mixture’ of Lebu and Sereer.103 By contrast, 
close to M’Biguen, in Jander, a province of Kajoor slowly detaching itself 
from  the Damel’s control and coming under French influence, the locals 
described the inhabitants of large zones of the area as ‘Ouolofs lébous’! This 
contradicted the logics of ethnic identification. The populations in the region 
spoke a dialect of Wolof (as indeed did several groups of Sereer in Jander, in spite 
of having a different group label). The great majority were non-Muslims, devoted 
to more local cults.104 Their precarious position regarding the Wolophone rulers 
of the neighbouring pre-colonial states made it attractive to rely on this com-
mon identification in cases of crisis. Only after the French conquest did the 
Lebu communities no longer need the group distinction, and it could then 
entirely be replaced by religious affiliation to the teachings of the Layen.
100 ans, ggaof, 1G 9, Villoz, Rapport fait à la commission de Statistique coloniale relativement 
à l’examen des divers mémoires envoyés au Ministère de la Marine et des colonies en réponse 
aux demandes de renseignemens statistiques faites par le ministère concernant le Sénégal et 
les établissemens qui en dépendent (without number), dated 1825.
101 ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 1D17, Vincens, Chef de Génie, Rapport sur la reconnaissance 
militaire exécutée dans le Diander du 24 au 27 8bre 1860 (n° 1), 15 Sep. 1860, 4.
102 ans, ggaof, 1G 33, Commissioner of Gorée, Note sur l’Organisation du Diander (without 
number), without date.
103 ans, ggaof, 1G 33, Pinet-Laprade, Notice sur les Serères…, 3–4.
104 ans, ggaof, 1G 33, Pascal, Notes sur le Diander recueillies par Mr. Pascal, Lieutenant 
D’Infanterie, Commandant le Poste de M’Biguen (without number), without date.
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Such processes of self-definition of local groups towards Wolophone rulers 
are still more complex for the Fulfulde-speakers of Senegal who lived outside 
of the Fuuta Tooro region. In the coastal regions, the ‘Tukulor’ appeared as a 
clearly distinctive group, still much more than the Lebu or the Sereer. They 
were perceived as such not only by the French, but also by the other local 
groups, including notably the Wolof-speakers. For the second half of the nine-
teenth century, this distinction had obvious political reasons. Samba Niang, 
head of a trading firm, reacted to a number of attacks on Fulfulde-speaking 
merchants in the area of Portudal with a new emphasis on Tukulor solidarity. 
Niang managed to mobilise the members of this group to form a strong defen-
sive association; a common group identification justified joint action.105
These Tukulor merchants and soldiers were migrants from three different 
regions in the north-east, including Fuuta Tooro. Wolophone informers told 
Martin, the French Resident of Portudal, that the ‘Tukulor traders’ formed a 
sort of dangerous, ‘tribal’, ‘secret society’. Indeed, the Tukulor of Bawol, of Siin 
and of Saluum, feeling exploited by the ruling dynasties and by the administra-
tion of the pre-colonial states, all stressed, in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, their particular group identification. Apart from adherence to the 
Tijaniyya, their emphasis lay on terms of geographic origin, and the Fulfulde-
speaking merchants described themselves as ‘Muslims from Fuuta Tooro’. 
‘Being Tukulor’ was thus an important trope, repeated over and over again 
even in written correspondence with the French.106
In Dakar, the identification as ‘Tukulor’ was regarded by the Wolophone 
residents as a problematic other, expressed through strong and negative ste-
reotypes. ‘Here, “Tukulor” is above all a synonym for plunderer, thief and liar’, 
commented the French official Martin. Among Sereer-speakers, the opinion 
on the ‘Tukulor’ was similar. In fact, the above-mentioned Samba Niang, self-
styled ‘Tukulor leader’, was able to mobilise some hundred warriors of the 
Fulfulde-speaking community on the coast to attack and to plunder the Sereer 
village of Fallokk, in a vengeance campaign for Sereer banditry. They also 
attacked Joal. During such episodes, the feeling of solidarity between the 
Muslim ‘Tukulor’ was remarkably high: some of the warrior-traders involved in 
the campaign even interrupted their lucrative commercial business in other 
parts of the coast and came down with their arms and dependents into the Joal 
region to defend their ‘brethren’ against the Sereer. Nevertheless, ultimately 
this group was not large enough to match the French counter-activities: Niang 
105 ans, ggaof, 1G 28, Martin to Commissioner of Gorée (without number), 11 June 1863.




and his officers were defeated and rather easily captured by French troops and 
their Wolophone auxiliaries.107 The events in themselves were, however, quite 
significant for an ethnicised style of group mobilisation in Senegambia’s 
coastal areas during a certain period of insecurity. After the failure of Samba 
Niang’s campaign and the stabilisation of political conditions on the Petite 
Côte through rapid French expansion, the ‘Tukulor identity’ of individuals in 
that region and in the Siin-Saluum became dormant for much of the early 
twentieth century. It only reappeared in the period immediately before inde-
pendence, although in an unexpected way.
In the 1860s and 1870s, the Sereer on the Petite Côte had their own visible 
moments of ethnic mobilisation, albeit through a very complex process. Many 
Sereer-speaking communities were obviously content to be spared, by the 
French intervention in this part of the future colony of Senegal, from the con-
stant tribute-raising and raiding by ceddo troops sent by the rulers of the inland 
states. French protection, although combined with new tax obligations, had 
nonetheless led to an improvement in their overall economic situation. For 
those reasons, the inhabitants of many Sereer-speaking village communities in 
the region were ready to collaborate with the Wolof-speaking Alcati of Nianing. 
In the Tanma, the former Sereer-speaking region of Kajoor at the northern mar-
gin of the area analysed here, only a remarkably small number of Sereer vil-
lages refused from the outset to pay their taxes to this ‘Wolof’ middleman.108
Other, smaller groups in the coastal area attempted to obtain more political 
rights through the French conquest of the region of Kaolack. In Nianing, the 
Sarakole and Bambara inhabitants managed first to be treated differently with 
regard to the payment of taxes. Members of both groups argued for their dis-
tinctness as different ethnic groups. In this newly created canton – a colonial 
administrative unit – the strategy was increasingly successful. After a short 
period, the French residents started to regard them as communities that had 
nothing to do with the ‘majority populations’ (Sereer and Wolof) of their 
immediate surroundings. The creation of a local tradition emphasising their 
distinct experiences had the central role in this process, which eclipsed the 
earlier reality of the Nianing region as an area of very different communities 
belonging to one entity.109
107 ans, ggaof, 1G 28, Martin to Pinet-Laprade, Commissioner of Gorée (without number), 
23 June 1863.
108 ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 318, Pinet-Laprade to Faïdherbe (first page is missing, 
missing page numbers), missing date, passim.
109 ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 312, Aquilichini, French Resident in Portudal, to French 
Commissioner of Gorée (n° 99), 31 Jan. 1867.
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Many Sereer communities were, between 1850 and 1900, characterised by 
internal land conflicts having to do with early peanut production, and which 
were detached from any clear Sereer-Wolof dichotomy. This became obvious in 
a series of conflicts of the 1870s in the zone around the French fortress of 
Portudal. After the burial of the paramount chief Dione in early March 1878, 
several hundred ‘Sereer’ warriors assembled in Niangol.110 The French had 
been warned by Wolophone informants about the ‘savagery’ of ‘the Sereer’. 
However, the reality was far more complex: Dione had ruled a group of both 
Wolof-speakers and Sereer-speakers, and he was a former subject of the Buur 
Siin, and a colleague of the Alcati of Nianing supported by the French into the 
1880s. The ‘Sereer’ who then attacked the French garrison were a specific group, 
the inhabitants of two villages, namely Malikunda and Ginko. These warriors 
continued their traditional feud with Sango, the village chief of Niangol, who 
was himself a Sereer-speaker.111 During these particular troubles, the lines of 
conflict were thus between smaller communities, and, as such, entirely misun-
derstood by the French authorities. The latter planned a retaliation campaign 
against ‘the Sereer’ as a whole, but such measures did not correspond to the 
realities of group affiliation in the region.112
The case of Dibur, installed as a tax official by the French in the region of 
Saly in the 1870s, is also instructive. Dibur encountered serious difficulties dur-
ing his task, and was even attacked by Sereer-speaking warriors from Malikunda 
and Cacune.113 Subsequently, the populations of N’Gankul and of Saly armed 
themselves, and defended, as they regarded it, their territory against the 
marauders from the neighbouring villages. The Wolof-speaking canton chief, 
N’Dende Diagne, announced that he felt powerless against the raiders. The 
French resident promised a ‘pacification campaign’ in the region, but French 
troops were now occupied in the east of Senegal, and the campaign did not 
materialise. Consequently, the coastal populations mobilised themselves. In 
the vacuum of power and under instability, the Wolophone settlers of Saly 
took up arms against a ‘Sereer enemy’. Although this enemy was no homoge-
neous Sereer army, but rather a group of pillagers coming from various villages 
110 ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 313, Administrator of 2e Arrondissement in Dakar to 
Brière de l’Isle, Governor of Senegal, Attaque du poste par les Sérères (n° 53), 9 March 1878, 
1; ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 313, Administrator of Post of Portudal to Brière de l’Isle 
(n° 564), 8 March 1878, 1–2.
111 ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 313, Sabatier, Rapport au sujet des faits qui se sont passés 
au poste de Portudal le 5 et le 6 mars 1878 (without number), 10 March 1878, 1–3.
112 ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 313, Administrator of 2e Arrondissement in Dakar to 
Brière de l’Isle (n° 54), 15 Feb. 1879, 2.
113 ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 313, George to Brière de l’Isle (n° 19), 8 Feb. 1879, 1–2.
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in the interior of the coastal belt, formulating an ethnic antagonism was here 
for once a helpful strategy.114
It is essential to point out that mobilisation of that type remained a last 
resort in nineteenth-century coastal Senegambia, employed when the other, 
established structures, which had been useful in containing local violence 
between communities, were ineffective. At the end of the 1870s, the pre- 
colonial states had broken down, and the colonial state did still not work. 
Under those circumstances, ethnic sentiment was sometimes operational as 
an alternative.
 The Difficult Balance: Wolof-Speaking Elites and Local Group 
Opposition, 1900–1945
A part of the colonial conquest involved the creation of structures of authority 
amongst ‘acephalous people’. A large percentage of the local populations on 
the Petite Côte had before been used to overlords from the states of Siin, 
Saluum, and Bawol. Some others, however, had been members of isolated 
groupings. They were now the target (and the victims) of the installation of 
new chiefs, who were, in this early phase, mostly the old allies of the French 
from the military campaigns.115 This development put a strain on the relations 
between rulers and locals, as many of these new chiefs came from other parts 
of Senegambia, that is, from the north and north-east.116 This occasionally 
allowed for forms of ethnic mobilisation, but it did not translate into a simple 
antagonism of (newly installed) Wolof rulers and Sereer subjects.
The Wolophone ruler Madiouf Diouf, installed as chief of Fatick in 1888, is 
an instructive case. He had serious problems in imposing his rule in the area, 
but the Sereer-speakers of Fatick were not his principal enemies. His Sereer 
subjects had no clear opinion about the changes under colonial rule in com-
parison to the rule of the Buur Siin. Diouf’s main adversaries were Wolophone 
merchants from the coastal towns who belonged to a strong network.117
114 ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 313, Lenoir, Director of Political Bureau of Senegal, to 
Administrator of 2e Arrondissement (without number), 14 Feb. 1878, 1–2.
115 Bruschi, Francesca, ‘Politique Indigène et Administration au Sénégal (1890–1920)’, Politico 
70(3), 2005, 501–22.
116 Klein refers to the example of the chiefs Mandiaye Bâ and N’Deri Kani, who were frowned 
upon by Sereer and Mandinka villagers because of being ‘Wolof ’, see Klein, Islam, 154–5.
117 ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 52, Alsace, French Administrator of Sine-Saloum 
Protectorate, to Aubert (n° 560), 9 June 1898; ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 52, Noirot, 
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Some chiefs, who were former veterans and warriors of the French cam-
paigns, encountered great difficulties as they were challenged under ethnic 
labels. Thus, Ismaïla Diop was indeed frowned upon by the Sereer-speaking 
populations of Joal. On religious terms, Diop was a Muslim who had to rule 
over Joal’s Christian community; but he was also attacked by the locals as a 
‘Tukulor’, a ‘foreigner’ who did not belong to the local community. However, 
after ‘traditional’ rule had become established in the Joal region, the ‘Tukulor’ 
identification of chiefs originating from the north of Senegambia ceased to be 
discussed on the Petite Côte.118 It only reappeared, in some cases, in the late 
1940s, when the macro-political configuration in Senegal had again changed.
Situations in which parties nonetheless referred to arguments of group 
affiliation, include questions of commercial rights and licenses, applications 
for administrative posts open to African candidates, and land disputes. The 
case of ‘foreign merchants’ was quite typical. In certain circumstances, chiefs 
and rich planters in coastal Senegambia attempted to profit from ethnic argu-
ments sustained by the colonial discourse. Those chiefs held that it was more 
appropriate for their communities to sell to particular persons from their own 
ethnic grouping. Such strategies worked to exclude ‘foreigners’ to the advan-
tage of family members or clients. However, under colonial rule it was Lebanese 
traders who took over much of the retail commerce, and local rulers came to 
terms with those conditions.119
Furthermore, in the case of local quarrels for chieftaincies, it also remained 
a typical strategy of local pretenders to argue from the perspective of their 
‘land of origin’. Such quarrels became more infrequent in the course of the first 
half of the twentieth century, with the creation of the structures of the colony 
of Senegal being largely completed, but they did not entirely disappear. In 1955, 
Sada Maka Sy, an infamous commercial agent, petitioned for obtaining a chief-
taincy in Goudiry in Senegal’s east, arguing that the canton in question was his 
home region, and that he was descended from the former ruling dynasty.120
Land disputes were a problem in many zones which had shortly before 
come under French ‘protection’, as in the Gossas region of the old kingdom of 
District Commissioner of Sine-Saloum, Bulletin Individuel de Notes [Madiouf Diouf ] 
(without number), without date.
118 ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 52, Alsace, Bulletin Individuel de Notes [Ismaïla Diop] 
(without number), 25 April 1898, 1.
119 ans, 11D1/960, Momar Fall, delegate of the inhabitants of Louga, to the President of the 
General Council of Senegal (without number), 27 December 1946.




Bawol. Occasionally, the ethnic issue was exploited during those disputes, in 
particular if ethnic argumentations were a useful strategy to counter claims 
that referred to the traditions of the pre-colonial states. To give one example, 
when Mamadou Seck, a wealthy merchant, bought a licence to exploit as his 
property a number of fields he had acquired in the village of Thiénaba, he ran 
into serious difficulties with the locals. A group of Sereer-speaking cultivators, 
led by a certain Khaly M’Boup, contested the rights of ‘the Wolof ’ Seck. The 
latter had bought his land title from the Buur Siin Koumba Ndoffène Fa Mak 
Diouf: he thus based his claim on the historical rights of the pre-colonial states. 
His opponents emphasised their ‘Sereer identity’, and argued that only the 
‘sons of the region’ should have the right to own land. This created an ‘authen-
tic’ claim, which was older than any transactions made with a dynasty of ques-
tionable rights. M’Boup and the other claimants insisted that the rulers of Siin 
were a clan of ‘strangers’ and non-Sereer.121
During most of the operations involving the reorganisation of political rule 
under the nascent colonial state on the Petite Côte, transforming the former 
rule of states such as Bawol, Siin or Saluum, one notion of ethnic sentiment 
remained, nevertheless, notably absent: ‘Wolof identity’ was not a major crite-
rion for Wolophone populations to define themselves in dealings with the 
colonial authorities. The label of ‘Wolof ’ was nearly exclusively employed by 
non-Wolophone populations, including in their mobilisation against traders, 
former mercenaries, and Murid marabouts.
Many members of these groups were selected and installed as chiefs of com-
munities or obtained private control over local land.122 Sereer-speakers of the 
whole of the Petite Côte reacted swiftly and aggressively to this perceived 
threat. In 1905, representatives of various Sereer-speaking communities com-
plained bitterly to the Resident of the ‘Sereer Countries’ in former Bawol, 
Jacques, that they were now subject to an ‘invasion’ of ‘Ouoloffs’ from the 
region of the Gandiolais in the north. The Sereer-speakers thus described 
themselves as ‘autochthons’, and condemned Wolophone newcomers as 
‘intruders’; they demanded from the French a substantial change in colonial 
organisation.123
121 ans, 11D1/960, Administrator of Subdivision of Moyen-Saloum to District Commissioner 
of Sine-Saloum, Réclamation Daouda M’Baye (n 2652/MS.), 30 Dec. 1936.
122 Moitt, Bernard, ‘Peanut Production, Market Integration and Peasant strategies in Kajoor 
and Bawol before World War ii’, in Charles Becker, Saliou Mbaye, and Ibrahima Thioub 
(eds.), aof: réalités et héritages: Sociétés ouest-africaines et ordre colonial, 1895–1960 (Dakar: 
Direction des Archives du Sénégal, 1997), 577–92, 585–7.
123 ans, 11D1/1348, Jacques, Deputy Administrator of Thiès, Resident of Pays Sérères, Rapport 
sur la tournée effectuée à travers les Provinces Sérères (du 13 au 21 Mars 1905) par 
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However, those tensions in the region disappeared rather quickly in the 
post-conquest period. This is particularly visible in the case of the new 
Wolophone paramount chief in Nianing, Abd-el-Kader, who had initially had 
great problems in making himself accepted as chief. After 1912, his enemies 
ceased to be Sereer-speaking community leaders. Like in Fatick in the 1880s, 
the opposition movement against the important Wolophone chief consisted of 
the Wolophone elite, and was led by a Wolof-speaker, Babakar M’Bodj, who 
was an employee of the commercial house Maurel & Prom. M’Bodj saw his 
chance to win over a group of Sereer followers through an outright invention 
of tradition; he hired gëwël (griots) to establish a proper genealogy that 
included Sereer antecedents, to win local Sereer support.124 In the end, never-
theless, this was insufficient to mobilise the Sereer-speakers against a ruler 
who had learned to show sufficient regard for the interests of the rural popula-
tions. The year 1912 therefore marked a turning point in the relations between 
Wolof-speakers and Sereer-speakers in Nianing.
The community of the Pulaar-speaking Fulbe (‘Pël’) was excluded from this 
process of diminishing inter-group violence. In the second half of the nine-
teenth century, they had advanced as cattle-breeders and warriors in zones 
under French control, and were described as a clear ‘other’ by all the other 
communities and the colonial rulers themselves.125 Under the rule of Kajoor, 
the Fulbe populations had come to be administered by a political official 
whose post had been created specifically for their control: the post of the dia-
higué. In the state of Kajoor, during the second half of the nineteenth century, 
and notably in the regions of Kaël and Kantar, this post had become a sinecure 
for aged ceddo warriors.126 The sense that ‘the Fulbe’ were distinctive contin-
ued after the French conquest.
Similar mechanisms can be demonstrated for the Laobe, a community that 
probably did not claim to be an ethnic group in its own right in the nineteenth 
century, but presented itself as a community of professional specialists.127 In 
Kajoor, the Laobe had a chief of their own installed by the Damel. Under 
French administration, this post remained, like the diahigué, a reward for suc-
cessful and loyal Wolophone warriors. Ogo Yoro, who was the last of those 
l’administrateur L. Jacques adjoint au Commandant du Cercle de Thiès (without number), 
7 April 1905, 33.
124 ans, 11D1/1357, Marcel de Coppet, District Commissioner of Thiès, Situation Politique pen-
dant le mois de Juillet 1912 (without number), 1 Aug. 1912, 1.
125 Dupire, Marguerite, ‘Réflexions sur l’ethnicité peule’, in Itinérances…pays peul vol. 2 (Paris: 
Mémoires de la Société des Africanistes, 1981), 165–81.
126 ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 51, Rocaché, Bulletin Individuel de Notes [Baïdo Guèye, 
diahigué des peulhs du Kaël et du Kantor] (without number), without date.
127 Diouf, Kajoor, 49.
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‘chiefs of the Laobe’, was removed in 1902 because of illegal tax demands which 
he had forced his subjects to accede to. Only then did the French decide to 
abolish the chieftaincy altogether.128
On the Petite Côte, Fulbe cattle-breeders were less prominent than they were 
in the interior provinces of Kajoor, but both the Buur Siin and the Buur Saluum 
had ‘Pël regiments’.129 The early phase of French rule in the region was charac-
terised by an influx of cattle herds from the Fuuta Tooro profiting from French 
protection on the coast. This led to conflicts in several zones, notably in the 
region of Popenguine.130 The sentiment of strong difference, formulated by 
Wolof and Sereer-speakers on the Petite Côte towards Fulbe communities at 
this particular time, is still very present in oral testimony.131 Eventually, the fact 
that the Sereer-speakers appear to have been traditionally regarded by the Fulbe 
as both allies and potential slaves may have exacerbated those tensions.132
We have little information about the motivations that underlie conflicts 
between Fulbe and other communities in the Petite Côte region. Comparison 
with the north and north-east of the new Colony of Senegal, for which docu-
mentation is better, helps to explain some conflicts.133 French administrators 
were convinced that the pattern of these conflicts was similar in the different 
regions. Clashes between sedentary groups and Fulbe herdsmen were very fre-
quent in the territory of the former pre-colonial state of Jolof, specifically in 
the region around the city of Louga. Bouna N’Diaye, the chief of the province, 
attempted in 1913 to muster French support against the evasiveness of the 
Fulbe who migrated between Jolof and Gët (Guet) (a former province of Kajoor 
128 ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 51, Ferrenes, Administrator-Resident of Thiès, Enquête 
sur les faits reprochés à Ogo Yoro chef des Laobés (without number), 30 Aug. 1902; ans, 
ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 51, Vienne, Administrator of Thiès, to Director of Native Affairs 
of the Government-General of French West Africa, Remplacement des chefs convaincus de 
détournements (n° 145), 27 Oct. 1902, 1–2.
129 anf, Papiers Ernest Noirot, 148/AP/3/1/4, Noirot to De la Mothe, Governor of Sénégal, 
Rapport sur la participation des contingents du Saloum à la campagne dirigée contre le 
Bourba Djiolof (without number), without date, transcription in Martin, Becker, and 
Mbodj (eds.), ‘Documents’, 45–6.
130 ans, 11D1/1348, Jacques, Adjunct Administrator of Thiès, Resident of Pays Sérères, Rapport 
sur la tournée effectuée à travers les Provinces Sérères (du 13 au 21 Mars 1905) par 
l’administrateur L. Jacques adjoint au Commandant du Cercle de Thiès (without number), 
7 April 1905, 33–4.
131 Interview with Ajjumà Niane, village chief of Niack-Sérère, 1 February 2008.
132 On the ‘traditional’ perspective of Fulbe informants on the Sereer, see Monteil, Charles, 
‘Réflexions sur le problème des Peuls’, Journal de la Société des Africanistes 20(2), 1950, 
153–92.
133 Weicker, Martin, Nomades et sédentaires au Sénégal (Dakar: enda, 1993), 52.
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now transformed into an administrative canton) and thereby escaped their tax 
obligations.134
Group conflict between Fulbe and other communities remained a typical 
factor for the whole of the colonial period. The enraged Wolophone aristocracy 
ruling over the different provinces of the region repeatedly discussed with 
French officials what they described as a hereditary conflict with the ‘Pël’.135 In 
this context, the ‘Fulbe’ were more easily targeted than ‘the Sereer’ on the 
Petite Côte: they evaded the disciplinary measures mobilised by the state, and 
their ways of life questioned the legitimacy of the state structures the colonial 
system had recreated.
Ironically, the outcome of this conflict was far from what the paramount 
chief of Jolof had wished to obtain. The French administrator concluded that 
if the ‘Pël’ were so different from Wolof culture, they had to be protected and 
administered separately! In the province of Jolof, the French thus nominated 
two ‘tribal leaders’, who subsequently stabilised their position by helping the 
administration to recruit Pulaar-speakers as soldiers for France’s Moroccan 
campaign and the First World War.136 The colonial state took those accounts as 
a reason to redefine structures through ethnocultural ‘traditions’.
The political organisation of Senegal under established colonial rule illus-
trates the absence of a formulated ‘Wolof ’ group identification. When it came 
to declaring his case for obtaining a local chieftaincy in the area of the Petite 
Côte, Omar Bayo Fall, member of a notable family from the surroundings of 
Diourbel, did not refer to being Wolof. He argued from the platform of the 
particular origins and claims of his family. Consequently, the term ‘Wolof ’ does 
not even once appear in the French administrative documents commenting 
on this application.
Although descended from dynasties of Wolophone dignitaries, Omar Bayo 
Fall showed no interest in pointing out the ethnic side of his family links. He 
could indeed claim descent from Ely Manel Fall who had once ruled the canton 
of M’Bayar in the Diourbel region and the province of Bawol Oriental. Still 
more important, however, from the dynastic point of view, Ely Manel Fall’s 
granduncle had been Meysa Tend Joor, who had been Damel of Kajoor and 
Teeñ of Bawol at the same time. This ruler was, still in the 1940s, described by 
both the French and the Wolophone elite as the ‘last great king of Senegal’.137 
134 ans, 10D4/11, Administrator of Louga, Situation politique (without number), 1 June 1913.
135 ans, 10D4/11, Administrator of Louga, Situation politique (without number), 1 March 1913.
136 ans, 10D4/11, Administrator of Louga, Situation politique (without number), 1 Nov. 1912, 1–2.
137 ans, 11D1/95, Omar Bayo Fall, Notice de Renseignements (Article 12 de l’Arrêté 1688 APA. du 
17.7.43): Candidature: Chef Adjoint du M’Bayar (without number), 25 Feb. 1947; ans, 
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Wherever this was in any way possible for the Wolof-speaking claimants, the 
reference to the pre-colonial states was, henceforth, the most popular way to 
claim political rights.
In a similar case, Ely Manel N’Diaye, son of Kode N’Diaye and chief of the 
‘mixed’ canton of Diaganiao (settled by both Wolophone and Sereer-speaking 
populations) had to explain his origins to French officials. He could boast of 
being a grandson of Sanor N’Diaye, the ex-ruler of the Diobass and ally of the 
French in the conquest of the Siin-Saluum region. Ely Manel N’Diaye sustained 
the heritage claim of his dynasty to bolster his own claims half a century after-
wards – without ever insisting on its ethnic characteristics.138
During most of the nineteenth century, and well into the first half of the 
twentieth century, Wolof-speaking communities and their leaders thus show 
no inclination to insist on their ‘Wolof identity’. This does not mean that the 
concept of ‘being Wolof ’ did not exist. As we have seen, individual leaders 
could, on particular occasions, resort to this concept. However, it is likely that 
they only did so when a conflict did not leave any other reasonable course of 
action: other categories such as religion and loyalty to the local community, 
but also and essentially allegiance to the local state (even if it was a ceddo state 
relying in part on plunder), normally played the more important role. In the 
phase after the French conquest, state functions were taken over by the colo-
nial state. Wolophone elites were very prominent on the colonial side: many 
Wolophone individuals accepted the new principles of the local order as 
favourable, and also decided they did not need the identification as ‘Wolof ’ in 
political life.
An exception were the clashes between Wolophone peasants and Fulbe 
cattle-breeders that appear as ‘ethnicised’ conflicts over the whole of Senegal’s 
colonial period. However, they were strictly limited to certain contact zones, 
although they did not disappear over time.139 It is thus useful to mention here 
11D1/95, Frament, Administrator of Subdivision of Diourbel, Notes de l’Administrateur 
(without number), without date.
138 ans, 11D1/1393, Lemoine, Administrator of Subdivision of M’Bour, Notes sur la Manière de 
Servir de N’Diaye Ely Manel Chef de 9e classe (without number), 31 March 1953, 1.
139 ans, ggaof, 17G 90, Berthet, Director of Political Affairs of the Government-General, to 
Le Coppet, Governor-General of French West Africa (n° 2811/AP/2-1), Rapport sur l’activité 
de la Direction Politique (Décembre 1936–Décembre 1937), 22 Nov. 1937, 13; cadn, Fonds 
‘Anciennes Colonies’, Fonds Dakar, 193, District Commissioner of Linguère, Situation 
Politique du Cercle de Linguère (without number), without date, 1; Guèye, Mamadou Bara, 
Conflicts and alliances between farmers and herders: a case study of the ‘Goll’ of Fandène 
village, Senegal, translated by Jean Lubbock (London: International Institute for 
Environment and Development (iied), 1994), 5–6.
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a spectacular climax of such conflicts: the battle between the two villages of 
Vereck and Kër Matar Binta in 1955.140 This physical battle followed a long-
lasting land dispute. The cattle breeders of Vereck claimed the (re-)possession 
of a strip of land that belonged, through cession, to the neighbouring peasant 
village, which specialised in peanut and food cultivation.141 The inhabitants of 
Vereck, being in an unfavourable legal position, demanded access to the land 
on the grounds of first ownership as ‘Pël autochthons’, i.e. the ‘real natives’ of 
the land.142 They affirmed that the ‘others’, the ‘Ouoloffs’, had never had any 
historical claim to the land. Also, the tomb of Damba Gagne Peinda, Fulbe 
leader and warrior, was said to be situated under a tamarind tree on the land in 
question.143
In 1955, the low-key conflict transformed into a violent battle over the dis-
puted land, in which ethnic mobilisation was the exclusive strategy of the cat-
tle-breeders. By contrast, the mostly Wolophone populations of Kër Matar 
Binta emphasised not their ethnocultural but their religious identification. 
The cleric, Ady ‘Hajj’ Touré, who was a Muslim leader belonging to the Tijaniyya 
brotherhood and a Fulfulde-speaker, had on earlier occasions been the media-
tor between the two communities. Now he was rejected as an arbiter by the 
peasants of Kër Matar Binta, who demanded that a Murid cleric should lead 
the negotiations.144 The different interests at the heart of the conflict led to a 
complex mixture of religious versus ethnocultural claims of mobilisation, 
which made mediation difficult and kept the conflict alive for years to come.145
Such conflicts between ‘Pël’ and ‘Murids’ were still rather frequent in the 
1950s. While we find other violent encounters, as, for example, between 
Fulfulde-speaking herdsmen and Tukulor or Sarakole settlers, Wolophone 
140 ans, 11D1/960, Telegram from Administrator of Subdivision of Darou-Mousty to 
Amouroux, District Commissioner of Louga (without number), 6 April 1955.
141 On the principal specialisation of rural Wolophone populations in the profession of pea-
nut planters, see Ross, Clark G., ‘A Village Level Study of Producer Grain Transactions in 
Rural Senegal’, African Studies Review 25(4), 1982, 65–84, 68.
142 ans, 11D1/960, Amouroux to Jourdain, Governor of Senegal, Rixe entre Peulhs et Ouoloffs 
du 7 Avril 1955 Région Darou-Marnane (n° 147/C), 15 April 1955.
143 ans, 11D1/960, Sall Massamba Kangué, chief of canton of Guet, to Amouroux (n° 511), 
7 April 1955, 1–2.
144 Glover, John, ‘“The Mosque is one thing, the administration is another”: Murid Marabouts 
and Wolof Aristocrats in Colonial Senegal’, International Journal of African Historical 
Studies 33(2), 2001, 351–65.
145 ans, 11D1/960, Officer of Muslim Affairs in Senegal, Note sur l’affaire de Keur Matar Bineta 
(Ouoloffs) contre Véreck (Peulhs) (Compte-Rendu verbal de l’Officier des Affaires Musulmanes 
à son retour de tournée) (without number), without date, 1–2.
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peasants were very frequently seen as the ‘natural opponents’ of the Fulbe 
cattle-owners.146 We learn from El Hajj Mustapha Sarr, a Murid cleric in 
Guinguinéo, that in the village of M’Baré-Banth in Waalo, a similar dispute led 
to constant violence between the Wolof-speaking planter and landlord 
Mamadou Boy and his agricultural workers on the one hand, and Fulbe cattle-
breeders on the other.147 Ethnic terms were rendered particularly attractive by 
the fact that the Fulbe as a group continued to be underrepresented in the 
political structures of the colonial administration, and felt marginalised within 
the colonial state.
However, where Wolof-speaking populations had no immediate conflict 
with Fulbe groups, the situation under colonial rule was less clear. For exam-
ple, Celle N’Diaye, son of the deposed Buur N’Jambur – the former regional 
‘governor’ under the Damel of Kajoor – Birima N’Diaye, who had erected a sort 
of autonomous administration in his region, claimed to be the head of a 
dynasty which had ruled in the region since 1882, and he challenged the canton 
chiefs whom the French had installed. Indeed, Sidy Khouya Diop of Diadj-
Oulingara and Cheikh Toko Diop of Nar-Niomré complained bitterly about the 
patronage network which N’Diaye employed. The latter made it clear that his 
protection was built on the ‘tradition’ of the pre-colonial state, which was not 
only created for the ‘Wolof ’, but also for the ‘Fulbe’.148
In the end, the colonial state partly reiterated those pre-colonial state struc-
tures. While all of the states ruled by Wolophone leaders formally disappeared 
with the French conquest, chiefs retained important prerogatives, at least from 
the perspectives of the ruled subjects. As Wolophone individuals were favoured 
for the respective posts, many readily relied on those new structures, using 
them as had been the case with functions and posts inside the pre-colonial 
146 ans, 11D1/973, Plan de Protection [du Territoire du Sénégal]: Chapitre ii: Hypothèses (with-
out number), without date [1957], 11.
147 ans, 11D1/960, El Hadj Moustapha Sarr, marabout in Guinguinéo, to Jourdain, French 
Governor of Senegal (without number), 4 Feb. 1955.
148 ans, 11D1/960, Birima Cellé N’Diaye to Quinquaud (without number), 7 May 1938, 1–2; 
ans, 11D1/960, B. Cellé N’Diaye, cultivator at Oulingara N’Diaye, Canton of Diadj-
Oulingara, Cercle of Louga, to Deschamps, French Governor of Senegal (without num-
ber), 21 May 1943, 1–2; ans, 11D1/960, District Commissioner of Louga, Résumé de l’Affaire 
Birima Céllé N’Diaye c/Sidi Khouya Diop (without number), 27 Jan. 1939, 1–2; ans, 11D1/960, 
Procès-Verbal d’audition de Témoin, Affaire Sidi Diop et Birima Cellé n’Diaye (6), 1–2; ans, 
11D1/960, Procès-Verbal d’audition de Témoin, Affaire Sidi Diop et Birima Cellé n’Diaye (1) 
(without number), without date.
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states. These new structures were independent of ethnic terms.149 Moreover, in 
urban environments, Wolof-speakers often appeared as ‘assimilated’ Senegalese, 
and they pointed out their Frenchness.150
After the First World War, the importance of ethnic affiliation in Senegal 
appeared to grow, as many French officials wished to create an ‘appropriate 
administration’, conceived on ethnic terms, and they engaged ever more 
strongly in the collection of information and ‘traditions’. The attempt to 
write, from the end of the 1920s and mostly in the 1930s, reliable codices ‘of 
native customs’, is part of this initiative.151 In these monographs, which were 
potentially useful for legal decisions, the administrators assembled data 
about what they held to be the mechanisms of ethnic group organisation. 
Although the risk of misunderstandings was considerable, these works give 
important information about perceptions. They illustrate how Wolophone 
(and Sereer-speaking) populations of the colony, among others, ‘sold’ – or 
described – their group characteristics in conversation with the administra-
tive staff.
In the administrative cercle of Thiès, French administrators realised that 
‘the Sereer’ were considered to be eternally ‘turbulent’ and ‘savage’ by the 
Wolophone chiefs – the years of colonial rule did not change anything in this 
respect. By contrast, the Wolophone populations were characterised as ‘repres-
sive’ by Sereer-speakers. The French officials believed that these negative opin-
ions and stereotypes were the fruit of ‘an animosity that continues to exist’, a 
type of eternal, primordial hostility.152
149 Gastellu, Jean-Marc, ‘Politique coloniale et organisation économique des pays serer, 
Sénégal, 1910–1950’, in Charles Becker, Saliou Mbaye, and Ibrahima Thioub (eds.), aof: 
réalités et héritages: Sociétés ouest-africaines et ordre colonial, 1895–1960 (Dakar: Direction 
des Archives du Sénégal, 1997), 564–76, 569–71.
150 ans, 11D1/1303, Administrator of Subdivision of M’Bour to District Commissioner of 
Thiès, Remplacement Socé Fall Chef Canton M’Bayar Nianing (n° 205/C), 28 December 
1945, 1; Austen, Ralph, ‘Interpreters Self-Interpreted: The Autobiographies of Two Colonial 
Clerks’, in Benjamin N. Lawrance, Emily Lynn Osborn, and Richard L. Roberts (eds.), 
Intermediaries, Interpreters, and Clerks: African Employees in the Making of Colonial Africa 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 159–79, 166.
151 Ginio, Ruth, ‘Negotiating Legal Authority in French West Africa: The Colonial Administration 
and African Assessors, 1903–1918’, in Benjamin N. Lawrance, Emily Lynn Osborn, and 
Richard L. Roberts (eds.), Intermediaries, Interpreters, and Clerks: African Employees in the 
Making of Colonial Africa (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 115–35, 124–5.




The Sereer, being strongly represented (if not over-represented) in the col-
lection of colonial data, remained nonetheless enigmatic from the point of 
view of the French officials. Intra-group differences posed a strong problem. 
Thus, even though an important criterion of ‘Sereer-ness’ seemed to be matri-
lineal group organisation, it was exactly the Sereer-Noon – apparently the 
most prototypically ‘Sereer’ of all those communities – that did not correspond 
to this pattern, as they favoured a patrilineal community organisation!153
Through the codices, French administrators arrived in the end at questions 
of pre-colonial state organisation and its heritage. In their monograph on the 
‘Ouoloffs de Cayor’, the officials of the Thiès cercle (district) commented that 
some chiefs, being descendants from the traditional families of royal slaves, 
were actively insisting on the prerogatives their families had won through par-
ticipation in state structures. This helped them demand, quite successfully (if 
entirely illegally), the asaka from the local peasants: a tithe of the yearly har-
vest.154 While the French officials had found rather a lot to say on the different 
groups classified as ‘Sereer’, they felt unsure about ‘Wolof culture’. In respect to 
the ethnic census of the cercle of Thiès carried out in December 1932, those 
officials commented that discussing ‘the Sereer’ was far more interesting than 
discussing ‘the Wolof ’. Although the latter group represented more than fifty 
per cent of the cercle’s inhabitants, according to the colonial census data, it was 
held that ‘the Sereer’ were far more ‘significant’ as a group than the Wolophone 
populations!155 The French administration had visible difficulties in defining 
Wolof cultural group identification, given its denial of ethnic criteria.
This picture was different in zones where Wolophone rulers had only 
obtained a real foothold in the course of the French wars of conquest, as in the 
Wuli and in other parts that were to become the cercle of Tambacounda.156 In 
Siin, the context of classifying local populations was also more complex: while 
French administrators were tempted to depict the old pre-colonial state as 
‘Sereer’, they came, repeatedly, to the very confusing conclusion that most of 
153 ans, 10D5/12, Monographie des Sérères Nones: Les Nones (without number), without date, 
7–9, 14; ans, 10D5/12, Coutumes des Sérères N’Doute (without number), without date, 2, 5, 7.
154 ans, 10D5/12, Administration of Cercle of Thiès, Cercle de Thiès: Coutume des Ouoloffs du 
Cayor (without number), without date, 14.
155 ans, 10D5/12, Administration of Cercle of Thiès, Codification des Coutumes Indigènes: 
Coutume Sérère (Exécution Circulaire 128 B.P. du 19 Mars 1932 de M. le Gouverneur Général 
de l’Afrique Occidentale Française) (without number), without date, 1.
156 ans, 10D5/12, Hamidou Sy, Commis expéditionnaire à la Résidence de Tambacounda, 
Essai de monographie du pays qui forme le cercle Tambacounda établie par le Commis 
expéditionnaire Hamidou Sy – Prescriptions Circulaire N° 234 ai du 25 Octobre 1930 (with-
out number), 7 Feb. 1939, 2–4.
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the Wolophone chiefs now, in the 1930s, claimed to be the heirs of the ancient 
state.157 The cultural influence of Wolof-speakers in the pre-colonial state was 
so subtle that at first glance it remained unnoticed by the agents of the colonial 
power.
The information assembled by the French did not lead to many concrete 
results, although it did provoke French interference in the structure of the 
councils of dignitaries. On the level of political organisation, we definitely find 
few references to ethnic affiliation, either by the French administrators and or 
by their local informants. Only in Dagana and adjacent cantons did African 
collaborators of the administration argue with the classifications of ‘ouolof ’ 
and ‘peul’. Given the fact that Dagana is to be found at the margins of the for-
mer pre-colonial state structures, and that the abovementioned regular con-
flicts between Pulaar-speaking cattle breeders and Wolophone peasants had a 
particularly strong impact in this region, the recourse to ethnic distinctions 
corresponded to a certain logic.158
In the southern district of Kaolack – in the former region of the pre-colonial 
state of Saluum – some individuals holding leading positions in the ‘tradi-
tional’ hierarchy were referred to as being ‘ouolof ’ or ‘sérère’. French adminis-
trators were, however, mostly interested in a former state that had had a very 
complex set-up of different ‘nobilities’.159 For the other district reports there is 
no indication at all of a possible allegiance of councillors to particular ethnic 
groups. This includes the cantons close to the Petite Côte at the margins of the 
former pre-colonial states of Bawol and Siin before 1945.160
157 Moreover, reports pointed repeatedly to tensions between inhabitants of former Siin and 
former Saluum, which remained hostile to each other, even with the official disappear-
ance of the states in question. See cadn, Fonds ‘Anciennes Colonies’, Fonds Dakar, 293, 
Gautier, Annexe concernant les Terres « Sérère – Sine » du Canton de Gossas (without num-
ber), without date [1957], 5; ans, 10D5/12, Coutume Sérère (Région du Sine): Exécution de la 
circulaire n° 128 AP. du 19 Mars 1931 de Monsieur le Gouverneur Général (without number), 
without date, 1–9.
158 ans, 10D1/36, Philippe, Administrator of Subdivision of Dagana, to District Commissioner 
of Bas-Sénégal, Conseil des Notables (n° 74/C), 6 Dec. 1947.
159 ans, 10D1/36, Administrator of Subdivision of Foundiougne to District Commissioner of 
Kaolack (n° 241), 12 Sep. 1947; ans, 10D1/36, Administrator of Subdivision of Foundiougne 
to District Commissioner of Kaolack, Renouvellement Conseil Notables (n° 315), 17 Nov. 
1947, 1–2.
160 ans, 10D1/36, Glangeaud, Administrator of Subdivision of Guinguinéo, to District 
Commissioner of Kaolack (n° 1764), 15 Nov. 1947, 1–2; ans, 10D1/36, Administrator of 
Subdivision of Kaolack, to District Commissioner of Kaolack and Wiltord, Governor of 
Senegal (without number), 6 Nov. 1947; ans, 10D1/36, Lhomme, Administrator of Subdivision 
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 Elections, New Spoils, and the Flaring Up of Ethnic Struggle: 
Senegal in the Late Colonial Phase, 1945–1960
The remarkable absence of ethnic categories within the group of Wolophone 
inhabitants of Senegal was subject to serious challenges in the 1940s. Politically, 
the end of the Second World War opened up new horizons. A phase of intense 
reform within the French colonial system led to the creation of new political 
roles for local and territorial elites, including as elected councillors at different 
levels, accompanied to a greater or lesser degree by privileges. The local chiefs, 
moreover, now enjoyed access to larger funds, distributed through the French 
economic modernisation programmes. This made the posts even more inviting.
Quite visibly, the Vichy experience and the subsequent phase of, first, war 
economy and, then, liberalisation profoundly changed the political framework 
in which ethnic solidarity was defined.161 For Senegal, this meant from 1944 
that apart from the particular rights of the inhabitants of the Quatre Communes, 
larger groups of Senegalese inhabitants now became entitled to vote. The 
number of enfranchised persons rose from election to election. The voters 
decided, among other issues, upon Senegalese deputies for the French National 
Assembly (one for the ‘citizens’ of the Quatre Communes, one for the bulk of 
Senegal’s colonial populations living outside of this circumscribed area), and 
they elected delegates for a territorial council. These territorial councils were 
concerned with questions that directly affected local life.162
At first glance it seems as if the changes of 1944/45 were destined to have 
little impact on group sentiment. After all, before the more profound reforms 
towards semi-autonomy voted through the loi-cadre of 1956, the prerogatives 
of the new posts were, usually, only consultative.163 This fact, however, did not 
really diminish the attractiveness of the position of deputy. These positions 
were an ideal platform for the creation of patronage networks, which allowed 
the delegates to mobilise resources via their territorial and inter-territorial 
of Fatick, to District Commissioner of Kaolack, Renouvellement Conseils Notables. (n° 1848), 
12 Nov. 1947, 1–2.
161 Ginio, Ruth, French Colonialism Unmasked: The Vichy Years in French West Africa (Lincoln 
– London: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), 182; Lawler, Nancy, ‘Reform and Repression 
under the Free French: Economic and Political Transformation in the Côte d’Ivoire, 1942–
45’, Africa 60(1), 1990, 88–110, 94–8.
162 Chafer, Tony, The End of Empire in French West Africa: France’s Successful Decolonization? 
(Oxford: Berg, 2002), 61–4, 74–5.
163 On the loi-cadre, see Chafer, End, 166–7; Keese, Alexander, ‘“Quelques satisfactions 
d’amour-propre”: African elite integration, the Loi-cadre, and involuntary decolonisation 
of French Tropical Africa’, Itinerario 26(1), 2003, 33–57, 42–4.
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parties, and it helped them build a reputation with the European administra-
tors. Being gatekeepers and brokers of contacts with the colonial rulers, the 
councillors rapidly came to enjoy a considerable prestige. Their position was, 
in theory, a direct threat to the power of the chiefs who had formerly strongly 
monopolised access to the upper echelons of the colonial hierarchy, together 
with the African employees of the same administration. In the end, however, 
both concepts continued to exist in Senegal up to the political threshold of 
independence: the chiefs found themselves patrons among the councillors, 
and the councillors sought to bolster their own prestige with that of having 
chiefs as clients. Occasionally, they would even attempt to bring about the 
installation of a family member to the post of an important chef de canton.164 
This increased the material attraction of the chieftaincies.
Moreover, French attempts at democratisation at the territorial level also 
opened new spaces at the local level: activists called for a position for them-
selves. Schemes and intrigues endangered the position of some formerly well-
entrenched ‘traditional rulers’ who came under significant pressure. This 
process included the case of Meïssa Fall, chef de canton of Joal, whose strate-
gies for coping with the challenge will be analysed in detail below.
Many other chiefs also came under pressure: Meïssa Fall’s colleague and fel-
low Fulfulde-speaker, Konko Ciré Bâ, was faced with similar problems, but he 
was initially successful in dealing with them. His canton, Fandène on the Petite 
Côte, was, as the French characterised it, a ‘mixed canton’, mainly peopled by 
Wolof- and Sereer-speaking populations. Bâ was an outsider from an ethnic 
point of view: he was ‘Tukulor’, with a large family in the north of the colony, in 
the district of Matam. From the 1940s, he was subject to constant pressure from 
local political activists who wanted to see him removed; nonetheless, he 
restored his authority and maintained it well into the 1950s. Only in 1957 did 
the now aged chief lose his standing: his prestige finally evaporated, as a con-
sequence of a revived campaign against his status as ‘stranger’. Frustrated, Bâ 
wished to return to Matam, in his ‘region of origin’. Nevertheless, he still 
attempted, as had been normal in the decades before the Second World War, to 
nominate a successor of his own choice and from his family. In fact, colonial 
officials in the region had supported such procedures over the decades since 
the French conquest, but the political situation had now changed. The French 
administrators thus felt uneasy about the intentions of the ‘foreigner’ Bâ. 
164 The only comparative study on ‘global chieftaincy’ is Newbury, Colin W., Patrons, Clients, 
and Empire: Chieftaincy and Over-Rule in Asia, Africa, and the Pacific (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003); see also Keese, Alexander, Living with Ambiguity: Integrating an 
African Elite in French and Portuguese Africa, 1930–1961 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2007), 86–91.
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While they sympathised with the goals of their long-standing collaborator, 
they did not want to enforce a dynastic succession. Thus, in the late 1950s, even 
the positions of well-established ‘traditional rulers’ had become difficult to 
maintain if they were attacked because of their ‘origins’.165 In 1958, Bâ’s family 
therefore lost the chieftaincy of Fandène.
The upsurge of similar conflicts between different communities included 
Wolof-speakers and other groups in different regions of the colony after the 
Second World War. While before the early 1940s, local political power had 
relied on the pre-colonial states and the colonial order, ethnicity now came 
back into play. Interestingly, French reports commented that antagonisms of 
‘ethnic groups’ in Senegal had diminished after the Second World War, due to 
increased contacts between different groups through migration and better 
lines of communication, particularly between ‘Wolof ’ and ‘Tukulor’. It is obvi-
ous that labour migration after the Second World War and in the urban areas 
was indeed an important phenomenon.166 However, such reports were gener-
ally written in ignorance of the new, political dimension of struggles in the 
rural communities. Observers from the colonial administration were correct 
in that there was no ethnicisation of larger territorial politics in Senegal: there 
was no emergence of ‘ethnic parties’. The main political parties in the terri-
tory absorbed voters in various regions, although it is true that the Senegalese 
branch of the Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière (sfio) – for a 
short period after 1945 being the strongest political party in the whole of the 
colony – had the particular support of the inhabitants of the Quatre 
Communes.167
From the experiences of the conquest period, Sereer-speakers on the Petite 
Côte had shown potential for a mobilisation on ethnic terms. Under the colo-
nial regime before the Second World War, we do not find such initiatives by 
Sereer-speakers. Even after 1945, on the Petite Côte, when Sereer-speaking 
communities started to migrate in large numbers (particularly to Rufisque, 
and later on to Dakar), this had little effect. In the urban context, Sereer-
speakers avoided forming there a diaspora that would have defined itself 
through ethnocultural criteria. Consequently, there was no reflux of ethnic 
165 ans, 11D/1382, Grasset, Administrator of Central Subdivision of Thiès, to District 
Commissioner of Thiès (without number), 7 January 1959.
166 ans, 11D1/973, Plan de Protection [du Territoire du Sénégal]: Chapitre ii: Hypothèses (with-
out number), without date [1957], 10.
167 The Union des Toucouleurs and the Union des Irlabés remained entirely marginal, see 
ans, 11D1/973, Plan de Protection [du Territoire du Sénégal]: Chapitre ii…, 11.
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group sentiment back from the urban areas into the coastal region further 
southwards.168
Instead, in the hinterland of M’Bour, Nianing, and Joal, Sereer-speakers 
employed ethnocultural terms for their regional political goals. As in the two 
last decades of the nineteenth century, such claims were mostly made in rela-
tion to land problems. When on Mar-Lotte Island in the Siin-Saluum delta, a 
Wolof-speaking merchant purchased a large part of the land and attempted to 
drive the local peasants from their fields, the whole area became the scene of a 
dramatic xenophobic outbreak. The locals claimed that, as ‘Sereer’, they had 
the obvious entitlement to the land and would not accept the merchant 
Fabirima Sarr as landowner, as he was a ‘stranger’ to the country. Agents of the 
new owner were attacked and wounded. Sarr himself never dared to travel to 
Mar-Lotte because he feared for his life!169
Before the mid-1940s, Sereer-speaking populations had rarely challenged 
the Wolof-speaking paramount chiefs on ethnic terms; now for a while it 
became frequent.170
In the case of the chieftaincy of Diaganiao, where the French administrators 
had strongly demanded a candidate who would be appropriate from an ethno-
cultural point of view, the representatives of the colonial government did 
finally claim they could not find a suitable ‘Sereer candidate’ for the post. After 
a hasty quest for reliable information on the attitudes of local populations, 
they considered that the appropriate candidates were all Wolof-speaking and 
came from the small group of individuals forming the local elite of merchants, 
middle-level officials and veterans. Contrary to what the colonial administra-
tors had initially feared, the local populations accepted the procedure 
employed by the colonial state; there was not the slightest sign of resistance 
along ethnic lines.171 However, Sereer-speakers now emphasised some local 
cultural traits that were regarded as quite different from ‘Wolof customs’. They 
assembled in secret meetings, from which ‘Wolof strangers’, even if they were 
officially powerful, were excluded. This counter-culture was espoused by a 
168 ans, 11D1/1303, Administrator of Subdivision of M’Bour, Notice de Renseignements concer-
nant le Chef de Canton Sossé Fall – Canton du Bayar-Nianing (Subdivision de M’Bour) 
(without number), 14 Aug. 1944.
169 ans, 11D1/1148, Extrait du Rapport N° 56 iaa du 29 Mai 1953 de Mr. l’Inspecteur des A.A. Le 
Rolle: Subdivision Fatick (without number), without date.
170 ans, 11D1/1303, Rey, Governor of Senegal, to District Commissioner of Thiès, Au Sujet 
Chefferie canton Diaganiao (n° 1112/APA), 30 June 1941, 2–3.
171 ans, 11D1/1303, Administrator of Subdivision of Thiès (Guilatteau?) to District 
Commissioner of Thiès (n° 2/S.T.), 15 Sep. 1941.
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number of young locals on the Petite Côte and in the Siin-Saluum region, and 
became stronger after the Second World War.172
Over the decades of French rule, obvious networks of patronage and pay-
ments had flourished in many of the chieftaincies in the region.173 The para-
mount chiefs had profited from connections they had established with 
Wolof-speaking merchant families, employing them for their own ends. In 
particular they attempted to market peanuts from collective fields on their 
own account, bypassing any community institutions. Such attempts enraged 
the cultivators and, in the overall atmosphere of reform in the second half of 
the 1940s, occasional revolts occurred against ‘traditional rulers’ who had 
behaved in what was perceived as ‘shady’ ways. Even formerly powerful rulers 
like the canton chief, Socé Fall, had to learn that, given the conditions of slow 
liberalisation of colonial rule, ‘their’ subjects were no longer disposed to accept 
exploitative practices.174
Existing patronage networks provoked many political problems on the 
Petite Côte after 1945. As one major example, Kode N’Diaye, the former chief of 
the canton of Nianing-M’Bayard, had built his network on a strictly personal 
base. This included individuals from many linguistic groups and avoided ‘eth-
nic patronage’.175 Local headmen, who campaigned against N’Diaye’s reinstal-
lation in the 1940s, were mainly Sereer-speakers, but they did not have any 
ethnic agenda. They attacked what they described as N’Diaye’s corrupt charac-
ter, not his ‘Wolofness’ or lack of authenticity.176
A second similar case is, again, in the canton of Diaganiao, where the elec-
tion process of a new chief had not led to stable results. Locally, mostly Sereer-
speaking populations protested against the behaviour of Wolof-speaking chief 
172 ans, 11D1/1303, Thérond, Enquête sur les incidents qui se sont récemment produits dans le 
canton de Diaganiao (Cercle de Thiès) (n° 29), 4 June 1941, 2–3.
173 After 1958, the chefs de canton were either removed or integrated into regional administra-
tive structures. In the latter case, they were controlled by the prefects and became 
employees of the post-colonial state; nonetheless, they were still expected to be active in 
‘native jurisdiction’. See Le Roy, Etienne, ‘L’évolution de la justice traditionnelle dans 
l’Afrique francophone’, Canadian Journal of African Studies 9(1), 1975, 75–87, 77–8.
174 ans, 11D1/1303, Administrator of Subdivision of M’Bour to State Advocate in Dakar, Plainte 
pour abus confiance contre ex-chef canton Sossé Fall (n° 104/C.), 29 April 1946, 1.
175 ans, 11D1/1303, Telegram from Larrue, Administrator of Subdivision of M’Bour, to District 
Commissioner of Thiès, Retour Codé N’Diaye Canton Diaganao [sic] (n° 23f/C), 22 July 
1946; ans, 11D1/1303, Larrue to Etcheverry, director of journal ‘Réveil’ (without number), 
17 May 1947.




Ely Manel N’Diaye. Crowds of discontented inhabitants of the canton assem-
bled in front of his residence and demanded his resignation.177 Nonetheless, 
this was not Sereer ethnic xenophobia: N’Diaye had simply gone too far in brib-
ing some dignitaries with gifts of cattle so as to lay his hands on the lucrative 
export trade in the canton. Moreover, during elections, N’Diaye had supported 
the sfio, which by 1951 had cost him the rest of his local support.178 Most of 
the locals were adherents of the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais (bds), founded 
as a split-off from the Socialist movement in 1948 and led by the popular poet-
politician Léopold Sédar Senghor (a ‘son of the land’); local bds militants 
despised the patronage given by the chief to a Wolof-speaking merchant elite 
that remained, for a time, linked to the sfio.179
However, despite the ethnic arguments used against him, Ely Manel N’Diaye 
managed to come to terms with the opposition of a part of the Sereer-speaking 
populations. As the conflict in Diaganiao was about abuses of power and not 
ethnicity, N’Diaye obtained the chance to rebuild his reputation – and he took 
it. On the verge of independence, after an active campaign of courting the can-
ton’s populations between 1952 and 1958, he again enjoyed the very vocal sup-
port of these populations.180
The Sereer-speakers in the region of the Petite Côte continued to accept 
Wolophone candidates for some of the canton chieftaincies. When in the late 
1940s two Wolof-speakers became chefs de canton of important and politically-
contested units – Cheikh Diack in M’Badane-Sassal, and Armand N’Diaye as 
canton chief of M’Bayar – the Sereer-speakers of the two administrative enti-
ties did not attack their nomination, although this would now have been easy. 
The chiefs satisfied the Sereer-speakers through a moderate political pro-
gramme, while some local Wolof-speaking merchants and settlers led the 
177 ans, 11D1/1393, Buffet, Administrator of Subdivision of M’Bour, to District Commissioner 
of Thiès (n° 132), 25 Sep. 1951, 1.
178 ans, 11D1/1393, Goujon, Secretary-General of Senegal, to District Commissioner of Thiès, 
Recensement Diaganiao (n° 824/APA/2), 7 July 1952, 1; ans, 11D1/1393, Amelot, 
Administrator of Subdivision of M’Bour, to District Commissioner of Thiès (n° 723/P.), 26 
March 1948.
179 cadn, Fonds ‘Anciennes Colonies’, Fonds Dakar, 197, Cercle de Thiès: Rapport Politique 
Année 1951 (without number), without date, 4bis–5bis.
180 ans, 11D1/1393, Buffet, Administrator of Subdivision of M’Bour, Notes sur la Manière de 
Servir de N’Diaye Ely Manel Chef de 10e classe (without number), 14 June 1952, 1; ans, 
11D1/1393, Buffet, Notes sur la Manière de Servir de N’Diaye Ely Manel Chef de 10e classe 
(without number), 7 Jan. 1953, 1; ans, 11D1/1393, Administrator of Subdivision of M’Bour, 
Bulletin Individuel de Notes [Ely Manel N’Diaye] (without number), 22 Oct. 1958, 1.
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opposition.181 In places where merchant networks were absent, as in the case 
of the Wolof-speaking canton chief of Thor-Diander (part of the former Jander), 
a canton dominated by Sereer-speakers, the quest for a modus vivendi was less 
complicated. Accordingly, the colonial authorities considered Mamadou Fall 
M’Backé to be a very popular chief, although they found it very surprising.182 
Whenever the local chiefs conformed to the expectations of their ‘subjects’, 
there were few tensions expressed in ethnocultural terms.183
In the case of the reinstallation of Socé Fall, this time as canton chief of 
Nianing, the same mechanisms prevailed. Fall was an heir to the former ruling 
family of Kajoor, through his connection to the lineage of Amady N’Goni Fall. 
In his correspondence, he described himself as a member of the family of the 
Damel, and avoided any reference to being a ‘Wolof ’ ruler.184 He again became 
chief after promising to give up the abuses that had led to his earlier dismissal. 
However, as an sfio follower, he ran into serious trouble with a large group of 
the Sereer-speakers in his canton. After the sequence of electoral defeats of the 
sfio from the end of the 1940s, these protesters increasingly started to attack 
Fall verbally. In the villages of N’Gaparou and Babel, local unrest created a 
small but full-scale rebellion.185 The Sereer-speakers of Malikunda-Sérère even 
sent petitions to Senghor’s bds in which their spokesmen demanded Fall’s 
181 ans, 11D1/1303, Administrator of Subdivision of M’Bour, Notes sur la Manière de Servir de 
Ndiaye Armand Chef de 7e classe (without date), without date [1957], 1; ans, 11D1/1303, 
Administrator of Subdivision of M’Bour, Notes sur la Manière de Servir de Chef de canton 
classe du sixième (6e) [Armand N’Diaye] (without number), 17 March 1958; ans, 11D1/1303, 
Administrator of Subdivision of M’Bour, Notes sur la Manière de Servir de Ndiaye Armand 
Chef de 8e classe (without number), 31 Dec. 1953, 1; ans, 11D1/1303, Jean-Louis Clavier, 
Administrator of Subdivision of M’Bour, to District Commissioner of Thiès, Armand 
N’Diaye (n° 64/C.), 24 June 1949; ans, 11D1/1303, Administrator of Subdivision of M’Bour, 
Bulletin Individuel de Notes [Armand N’Diaye] (without number), 20 Feb. 1948; ans, 
11D1/1303, Larrue to District Commissioner of Thiès, Nomination Armand N’Diaye intéri-
maire M’Bayar-Nianing (n° 50/C), 12 Aug. 1946.
182 ans, 11D1/1303, Lami, District Commissioner of Thiès, to Bailly, Governor of Senegal (n° 
676/AGC), without date, 1.
183 On M’Backé’s successor in 1957, Samba Amadu Diop, see cadn, Fonds ‘Anciennes 
Colonies’, Fonds Dakar, 293, Gautier, Note pour Monsieur le Chef du Territoire du Sénégal: 
Ordre de mission N° 5234 du 29 Novembre 1957 pour se rendre à Thiès…(n° 15 C.IAA/J.I.G.), 
19 Dec. 1957, 3.
184 ans, 11D1/1303, Administrator of Subdivision of M’Bour, Notes sur la Manière de Servir de 
Fall Sossé Chef de 6° classe du Canton de Nianing (without number), 20 March 1958.
185 ans, 11D1/1303, Lemoine, Administrator of Subdivision of M’Bour, to Cornut-Gentille, 
Governor-General of French West Africa (n° 157), 25 Sep. 1953, 1.
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immediate dismissal.186 The bds organised an active movement for his 
removal, peaking during the electoral campaigns of the early 1950s.187 The ‘tra-
ditional authority’ in neighbouring M’Bayar canton, Armand N’Diaye, a bds 
party member, did his best to further add fuel to the fire: he discredited his 
colleague before the colonial authorities through a large number of denuncia-
tory letters.188 Even under these conditions, Socé Fall adapted to the changing 
environment and survived politically. In 1958 he had obviously managed to 
establish good relations with the many Sereer-speaking personalities dominat-
ing village politics.189 Only in 1959 did Socé Fall pay the price for his long- 
standing anti-bds position: the new leaders of government belonging to the 
Union Progressiste Sénégalaise (ups), the successor movement of the bds, 
removed him as revenge for his earlier political attitudes.190
In view of this last instance, we have to be careful to avoid an impression of 
an ethnic bipolarity of political parties. It would be incorrect to define, on the 
Petite Côte and in the Siin-Saluum region, the bds as the ‘Sereer party’ and the 
sfio as the ‘Wolof party’. Among leading Sereer-speaking dignitaries, there 
was a respectable minority of sfio supporters and candidates, and the newly 
appearing ‘ethnic’ debates of the late 1940s cannot simply be translated into 
political allegiance. Ethnic terms only entered into the political battle when it 
was useful on tactical grounds to denounce the ‘otherness’ of a rival in party 
competition.191 The French administration had, rather clumsily, contributed to 
creating the opportunities for conflict expressed through such ethnic terms. 
The colonial village organisation increasingly used ethnic labels: in the 1940s, 
186 ans, 11D1/1303, Socé Fall, canton chief of M’Bayar, to Administrator of Subdivision of 
M’Bour (without number), 27 June 1951, 1.
187 ans, 11D1/1303, Goujon, Secretary-General of Senegal, to District Commissioner of Thiès, 
Chefferies Cantons Nianing et Thor Diander (n° 1175/APA/2), 8 Nov. 1951.
188 ans, 11D1/1303, Socé Fall to Administrator of Subdivision of M’Bour (without number), 
26 June 1951, 1–2. On Armand N’Diaye and party politics, see ans, 11D1/1303, Armand 
N’Diaye, Chief of canton of M’Bayar, to Administrator of Subdivision of M’Bour (without 
number), 17 June 1952, 1.
189 ans, 11D1/1303, Berthet, substitute for Goujon, acting Governor of Senegal, to Administrator 
of Subdivision of M’Bour (n° 1616/APA/2), 15 March 1954; ans, 11D1/1303, Administrator of 
Subdivision of M’Bour, Notes sur la Manière de Servir de Fall Sossé Chef de 6° classe du 
Canton de Nianing (without number), 20 March 1958, 2.
190 ans, 11D1/1303, Valdiodio N’Diaye, Senegalese Minister of the Interior, Arrêté portant fin de 
détachement d’un Chef de Canton (n° 11261/MINT/APA), 5 Nov. 1959.
191 ans, 11D1/1303, Lemoine to District Commissioner of Thiès, Chefferie du canton de l’Aga-
Gohé (without number), 21 May 1954, 2.
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more settlements than ever had an ‘ethnic name’.192 Some of these names had 
existed under pre-colonial conditions: in the case of the Siin-Saluum region, 
an ethnocultural form of settlement had had to do with defence against pillag-
ing campaigns of the ceddos of the local states. Some of the inhabitants of so-
called ‘Sereer’, ‘Tukulor’ and ‘Bambara’ villages in the area underlined their 
distinctiveness through the respective names already in existence at the 
moment of French conquest; and we have references of that type from Boilat’s 
monograph and from reports by early French administrators and Spiritan mis-
sionaries.193 However, due to the activity of the French administration, such 
labelling became a normal colonial routine in the interwar period. In the 1940s, 
we also find a good number of villages labelled as ‘Ouoloff ’.194 Even if much of 
this labelling was due to the interpretation by administrators, such administra-
tive labels proved to be a point of reference that could lead to aggressive group 
relations and violence.
In contrast to the first wave of violence that had targeted some ‘foreign’ 
chiefs on the Petite Côte but had not predominantly relied on ethnic distinc-
tions, the electoral campaign of 1951 antagonised villages under different 
administrative-ethnic labels. The first to be hit were communities that were 
smaller and more vulnerable than those of the Sereer-speakers, as in the vio-
lence between Malikunda-Sérère and Malikunda-Bambara. The Bambara-
speakers voted by a large majority for the Socialists, which provoked the 
outrage of the Sereer-speakers of the neighbouring village and developed into 
a violent struggle for land: the Sereer obviously hoped to expel Bambara-
speakers from the region as ‘strangers’ and lay their hands on their fields! There 
were no signs of older tensions: it was only under the impact of post-war politi-
cal rivalries, orchestrated on the side of the bds by political envoy Jacques 
d’Erneville, that Sereer-speaking villagers began to consider the ‘alien’ charac-
ter of long-standing neighbours.195 In the case of Malikunda and its region, this 
created unprecedented troubles, which, however, did not lead to the final 
expulsion of Bambara-speakers.
192 ans, ggaof, Fonds Ancien, 13G 52, Alsace to Director of Native Affairs of Senegal 
(n° 455), 12 June 1897.
193 ans, 11D/1382, Grasset, Administrator of Central Subdivision of Thiès, to District 
Commissioner of Thiès (without number), 5 Dec.1958; Boilat, Esquisses, 264.
194 ans, 11D/1417, Lami, District Commissioner of Thiès, to State Advocate in Dakar, Affaire de 
M’Badane Sassal (n° 401/AGC), 26 Sep. 1950; ans, 11D/1417, Philippe to Lami, Affaire 
Cheikh Diack (n 95/C), 25 Sep. 1950.
195 ans, 11D1/1303, Socé Fall to Administrator of Subdivision of M’Bour (without number), 
27 June 1951, 1.
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Such friction was only one possible outcome of administrative situations, 
and not an inevitable result. In the village and surroundings of Tiamboledj, 
during the electoral campaign of 1949, the Sereer-speaking village chief Godène 
Diouf had encouraged the villagers to attack neighbouring settlements that 
were regarded and labelled as ‘Bambara’ and ‘Wolof ’. Godène’s own brother, 
Rok Diouf, distanced himself from the chief and protested against these ethni-
cally legitimated attacks. Obviously, Rok Diouf acted in his own interest: by 
convincing the locals to resume their allegiance to the Wolof-speaking canton 
chief, Socé Fall, he also managed in the long run to bypass the dynastic rules of 
his family. Nonetheless, it remains an important fact that both men, Rok Diouf 
and Socé Fall, created a workable alliance that functioned even under condi-
tions of ethnic tensions. It brought the former into the position of village chief 
instead of his brother, and allowed Fall to enlist a group of supporters that had 
previously been on the verge of challenging his rule over the canton on the 
ground of their being ‘Sereer’ and him being a ‘Wolof ’ chief.196 This shows that 
the ethnic terms between ‘Sereer’ and ‘Wolof ’ could be flexible. The interests of 
smaller groups and of individuals remained more important than any ‘primor-
dial sentiment’; only where it was safe to attack a group on ethnic grounds, and 
where the antagonism was linked to clear political party opposition, did it 
remain a continuous phenomenon.
Therefore, even the ethnocultural identifications of smaller groups, like the 
‘Sereer’, were never homogeneous. Oppositions under group labels could be 
reformulated, as sub-group affiliations were also employed for mobilisation 
within the Sereer-speaking regions. During ‘internal’ political struggles in 
‘Sereer villages’ in the second half of the 1940s and in the 1950s, there was no 
trace of any feeling of solidarity ‘between all Sereer’. Most prominently, in parts 
of the canton of M’Bayar-Nianing, the regional Safèn subgroup of the Sereer-
speakers claimed a proper group identity for themselves. As we have seen from 
the early missionary reports from the Petite Côte, such forms of behaviour 
were not entirely new, but they now returned with a stronger political impact. 
The ‘Safèn’ distanced themselves quite ostentatiously from other groups that 
were normally all considered ‘Sereer’. Thus, it was all the more complicated to 
turn a joint Sereer identity against Wolophone chiefs. Grudgingly, the repre-
sentatives of the colonial power reacted to such unwelcome ‘complications’. In 
problematic villages where friction between formerly rather unnoticed ‘sub-
groups’ appeared, such as in Kéniabour, the French decided to select diligent 
196 ans, 11D1/1393, Clavier, Administrator of Subdivision of M’Bour, to District Commissioner 
of Thiès (n° 43/C), 23 May 1949.
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headmen, like Sindak Dione, as village chiefs, who could exert influence on the 
‘occasionally turbulent Safèn populations’.197
Besides conflicts between subgroups, cleavages between generation sets 
were another source of conflict that greatly complicated front lines in the 1940s 
and 1950s. In the village of Godaguène, the (mostly Sereer-speaking) village 
headmen had forced the Wolophone village chief to resign. As a successor, they 
agreed on a local, Sereer-speaking candidate. This decision, however, was 
immediately challenged by a group of young, Sereer-speaking male inhabit-
ants of the settlement, who favoured the return of the dismissed chief who had 
been considerably younger than the new head of the village!198 Hence, in this 
particular case, aspects of generation overruled ethnic solidarities: the younger 
generation preferred to have a sympathetic Wolof ‘stranger’ as village chief to 
being ruled by a candidate of the elders.
In contrast to changes on the Petite Côte, where the political reforms some-
times favoured a limited return of ‘ethnic allegiance’ into the political arena, it 
has to be said that many other parts of the colony remained largely unaffected 
by such mobilisation strategies. This was particularly the case for the north-
western area of Senegal, where the absence of ethnic arguments is impressive 
in comparison. The legacy of even stronger former state structures – the 
uncontested dominance of, namely, Kajoor and Waalo – during the pre-colonial 
period made it easier for the local rulers to keep any ethnic discussions out of 
the debate on local power. This was clear for Amadou Salla Diop, the para-
mount chief of N’Guick. He was accepted as a sufficiently valuable ruler by the 
local populations despite being a ‘foreigner’ in his canton, and there was no 
movement against him that would have been comparable to the ‘troubles’ 
occurring temporarily in many places on the Petite Côte.199 The key issue was 
that Diop’s family had long held the ‘hereditary rights’ to the positions in the 
canton.200 The regions north of Louga, called Thiol in Pulaar by the many 
Fulfulde-speakers settling there, were accepted as the stronghold of the Fall 
197 ans, 11D1/1303, Administrator of Subdivision of M’Bour to District Commissioner of Thiès 
(n° 2290), 4 June 1943.
198 ans, 11D1/1393, Chief of canton of Diaganiao to Administrator of Subdivision of M’Bour 
(without number), 2 Sep. 1946.
199 ans, 11D1/960, Deschamps, Governor of Senegal, to District Commissioner of Louga 
(n° 891/APA/2), 22 Sep. 1943, 1.
200 ans, 11D1/960, Telegram from District Commissioner of Louga to Deschamps, Cantons 
Nord Louga. Désignation nouveaux Chefs du Gandiolais et du Mérina Installation de Chef 
Intérimaire du K/Bacine (n° 147/cf), 18 Nov. 1943, 1; ans, 11D1/960, Michel, Inspector of 
Administrative Affairs, Note au sujet des chefferies du Cercle de Louga (lettre n° 100 du 13 
Septembre 43) (n° 78/IAA), 15 Sep. 1943.
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family.201 In both cases, the point of reference was clearly the pre-colonial 
structure of provinces, which excluded any conflict for power on ethnic 
grounds.
In Kebemer, another canton of north-western Senegal, French officials, in a 
rigorous inquiry, identified ‘Wolof’, ‘Fulbe’, ‘Moors’, ‘Lawbe’, ‘Sereer’ and 
‘Bambara’ populations.202 However, what stabilised social relations in Kebemer 
was its past as part of a province of the pre-colonial state of Kajoor, and as the 
stronghold of the Sall dynasty – such as in the case of Sangone Sall in the ancient 
province of Gët – who had the support of Sufi clerics.203 Presenting themselves 
as the heirs of ‘traditional’ families that had played a role in pre-colonial Kajoor 
was, in fact, a line of argumentation that automatically excluded ethnic argu-
ments. Many such families claimed, in terms of origin, ancestors in different 
regions of Senegambia: it would have been problematic to associate them with 
one ethnocultural heritage. This is obvious from the example of Sakhevar Diop, 
canton chief of Tiilmakka, a region neighbouring Kebemer. He claimed the 
heritage of the families of the Diop and the Sall, and declared that they were 
two ‘mixed’ families, with historical links to both leading Wolof-speaking fami-
lies and to the Fuuta Tooro nobility. Moreover, Sakhevar Diop had long estab-
lished a network of patronage in his canton, a network which was fully 
non-ethnic. This form of organisation of patronage was typical for northern 
Senegal.204 The same type of patronage was exerted by Massamba Kangue Sall, 
201 ans, 11D1/960, Lalourette to Deschamps, Chefferies des Cantons du Nord de la 
Circonscription de Louga (n° 100), 13 Sep. 1943, 1.
202 ans, 11D1/1393, Administrator of Subdivision of Kebemer, Notes sur la Manière de Servir de 
Sangoné Sall chef de Quatrième classe (without number), without date [1958/59], 1.
203 ans, 11D1/1393, Armand, Administrator of Subdivision of Kebemer, Notes sur la Manière 
de Servir de Sangoné Sall chef de Quatrième classe (without number), 3 Mars 1958, 1; ans, 
11D1/1393, Piganiol, Administrator of Subdivision of Kebemer, Notes sur la Manière de 
Servir de Sangoné Sall chef de 4° classe (without number), 23 April 1957, 1–2; ans, 11D1/1393, 
Administrator of Subdivision of Kebemer, M. Sangoné Sall – Chef de Canton de N’Doyène 
Daga Ne Dour (without number), without date. The situation remained so even after the 
disappearance of the Sall family from local power. In the 1960s, the Kebe lineage defended 
its authority on the same grounds, losing it thereafter to the ‘Fall clan’, see Cottingham, 
Clement, ‘Political Consolidation and Centre-Local Relations in Senegal’, Canadian 
Journal of African Studies 4(1), 1970, 101–20, 106.
204 ans, 11D1/1393, Auchapt, Administrator of Subdivision of Kebemer, Notes sur la Manière 
de Servir de Diop Sakhévar chef de hors classe (without number), 30 March 1958; ans, 
11D1/1393, Armand, Notes sur la Manière de Servir de Diop Sakhevar chef de 9ème classe 
(without number), 30 March 1958; ans, 11D1/1393, Piganiol, Administrator of Subdivision 
of Kebemer, Notes sur la Manière de Servir de Sakhaver Diop chef de Canton stagiaire 
(without number), 27 Feb. 1957, 1.
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another representative of the Sall family who successfully ruled over Wolof-
speaking peasants and Fulfulde-speaking herdsmen. While being identified by 
the French as ‘Wolof’, his dynasty, the Sall, claimed to be a ‘Tukulor warrior 
family’ linked to the former ruling family of Fuuta Tooro.205 Meïssa M’Baye Sall, 
the canton chief of M’Baouar, argued effectively with the same mixture of group 
affiliations – and he enjoyed a very similar success in his canton.206
In northern Senegal, this authority, based on pre-colonial state experience, 
was even more stable, although it could be threatened by the intensification of 
conflicts between Pulaar-speaking cattle-breeders and Wolophone peasants. 
From the 1940s, Fulbe leaders became more organised and increasingly aggres-
sive. Fulbe headmen wished, as French administrators interpreted it, to ‘escape 
Wolof tyranny and defend their land against Murid control’. As we have seen 
with regard to the battle of Vereck, the propaganda of Fulfulde-speaking lead-
ers was indeed directed both against the activities of an oppressive ‘other’, ‘the 
Wolof ’, in terms of an ethnic group, and against the attempts at religious 
monopoly by the Murids.207 Under these circumstances, even feared chiefs 
such as Sangoné Sall had considerable difficulties and often failed to ensure 
the loyalty of the Fulbe inhabitants of the area. In particular, the marginal 
zones of such cantons became unruly places until the independence of the 
colony.208 Here – but only here – sporadic tensions relying on an ethnocultural 
basis could be perpetuated into long-lasting struggles.
The evolution of the 1940s and 1950s, with a renewed popularity of ethnic 
arguments peaking in some parts of the Petite-Côte, but which was normally 
not very lasting in the coastal zones and their hinterland, is reflected in the dis-
cussion about ‘tradition’. Unfortunately, we face a lack of transcribed material, as 
the oral ‘traditions’ of Senegalese gëwel (griot) culture were only rarely written 
205 ans, 11D1/1393, Administrator of Subdivision of Kebemer, Notes sur la Manière de Servir de 
Sall Massamba Kangue chef de hors classe (without number), 30 March 1958, 1; ans, 
11D1/1393, Auchapt, Administrator of Subdivision of Kebemer, Notes sur la Manière de Servir 
de Sall Massamba Kangué chef de Canton Hors classe (without number), 20 June 1959.
206 ans, 11D1/1393, Auchapt, Notes sur la Manière de Servir de Sall Meïssa M’Baye chef de la 
hors classe (without number), 20 June 1959; ans, 11D1/1393, Administrator of Subdivision 
of Kebemer, Notes sur la Manière de Servir de Sall Meïssa M’Baye chef de la hors classe 
(without number), without date [1958], 1; ans, 11D1/1393, Piganiol, Administrator of 
Subdivision of Kebemer, Notes sur la Manière de Servir de Sall Meïssa M’Baye chef de Hors-
classe (without number), 27 Feb. 1958, 1.
207 ans, 11D1/973, Plan de Protection [du Territoire du Sénégal]: Chapitre ii: Hypothèses (with-
out number), without date [1957], 11.
208 ans, 11D1/1393, Administrator of Subdivision of Kebemer, Notes sur la Manière de Servir de 
Sangoné Sall chef de Quatrième classe (without number), 3 Mars 1958, 1.
�39Wolof and Wolofisation
<UN>
down. The French only slowly started with such collections in the interwar 
period and after the Second World War, and they never created any larger cor-
pus. Nevertheless, some ‘traditions’ were put in writing during the period. The 
Library of Saint-Louis in 1941 registered a ‘traditional account’ by Amadu Wade, 
a member of the former ruling dynasty of Waalo, which can be regarded as 
‘authorised’. Wade’s account is significant as it provides an ‘official’ founding 
myth of Waalo. This founding myth presents perceptions of different groups 
that are highly relevant to our discussion.209
The presentation of the distinct groups is enlightening. The narrator of the 
account identifies the ‘Peulhs’ and the ‘Sérères’ as part of a refugee group com-
ing from the north, and being involved in the foundation of the new states in 
the region, like Fuuta Tooro and Waalo. The subjects of the Buur Siin, who comes 
from the south to swear allegiance to the dynasty of Waalo, are explicitly char-
acterised as Sereer.210 In reality, the emergence of the Wolof language, which, 
according to the account, had not existed as an ‘indigenous language’ before, is 
described as result of the effort of the inhabitants of Siin and Waalo to create a 
state language for the Grand Ouolof, a large territorial structure that can be 
identified with the mythical Kingdom of Jolof. Here, the legendary N’Diadiane 
N’Diaye (or Njajaan Njay), first Brak of Waalo, becomes the first king.211
The occasionally confusing account shows clearly, in accordance with my 
interpretation of ‘Wolof identification’ in the pre-colonial and colonial peri-
ods, a conception of ‘being Wolof ’ that is entirely different from other group 
labels in the region. In the Wade account, the quality of ‘Wolof-ness’ is deliber-
ately connected to state structures. It is also true that other family traditions 
like that of the Diass, asserting themselves as centuries-long claimants to 
monarchic power in Waalo, present things differently.212 Their version is closer 
to the influential report given to the French at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury by Yoro Diaw. The Chief Legbi Bigué N’Diaye, in his account of the founda-
tion of Waalo, claims that ‘Wolofs and Peuls arrived together in the Jolof ’. This 
version thus distinguishes from the outset the two labels as different ethnic 
groups and distinct units. However, it has to be said that the Diass legend was 
209 Bomba, Victoria, ‘Genealogies of the Waalo matrilineages of Dioss, Logre and Tédiègue: 
versions of Amadou Wade and Yoro Dyao’, Bulletin de l’IFAN, Série B sciences humaines 
41(2), 1979, 221–47.
210 ans, 10D4/33, Le Oualo, account given by Amadou Wadde (‘de Dagana’), translated into 
French by Cissé Amadou Bassirou, librarian in Saint-Louis (without number), May 1941, 1–2.
211 ans, 10D4/33, Le Oualo…(without number), May 1941, 6.
212 The most recent discussion of the founding myths takes the importance of ‘Wolof ’ group 
sentiment as a given, see Sall, Samba Lampsar, Ndiadiane Ndiaye et les origines de l’empire 
Wolof (Paris: Harmattan, 2011).
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little more than a very brief account in comparison to the more substantial and 
influential founding legend given by Wade.213 Finally, Boucar Boydo’s ‘found-
ing legend of the Fulbe’ was also very different from the account of ‘the Wolof ’: 
the Fulbe myth refers from the outset to the ‘Peul’ as an ethnic community. The 
Fulfulde-speakers felt marginalised in the confrontation with Wolophone 
peasants and rarely took part in the material improvement from which the 
colony profited between 1945 and 1960. During their mobilisation attempts, 
leaders emphasised strongly their Fulbe identification.214
As a whole, even with the politicisation of rural regions in the colony of 
Senegal after 1945, the component of ethnic conflict still remains small. Only 
occasionally and for some communities, does the researcher find a local aware-
ness of the opportunities given by ethnic arguments, particularly in order to 
oust ‘strangers’ and to obtain their positions or land. However, as a sentiment, 
it was of little appeal, unstable, and mingled with feelings of allegiance to 
other sub-groups. In this situation, most of the Wolophone chiefs in the north-
ern, but also in the southern coastal hinterland of Senegal, were easily able to 
recover their reputation after attacks. To stabilise their position against local 
unrest, potential riots, and the critique from the colonial administration, they 
needed to adapt to a degree in terms of political style. Such Wolophone chiefs 
kept a low profile and abandoned some of the abuses that had characterised 
former methods of local rule, or those of their predecessors.
In the regions between the Senegal River and the Siin-Saluum area, the cat-
egory of being ‘Wolof ’ was rarely voiced in any conflicts. It was atypical as a 
category used to organise group mobilisation. While Wolophone populations 
appear to have been aware of the possibility of referring to ‘Wolof identifica-
tion’, they rarely did. State structures as point of reference, eventually bolstered 
through a centuries-long historical experience, were far more important in 
local perceptions. Where under colonial rule the continuities were evident, as 
in the cercle of Louga or in parts of the cercle of Thiès, this legacy of self- 
categorisation was easier still to maintain. Here, important families relied 
explicitly on accounts of their past glory, which linked them to dynasties of 
provincial influence, as in Kajoor, Waalo, or, to a lesser extent, Bawol. Further 
southwards, the existing state structures had been removed, and while some of 
the new, Wolophone chiefs had links to the dynastic families of Siin or 
Saluum, most did not boast such important relatives. Nonetheless, after the 
213 ans, 10D4/33, Chronique des Diass (communiqué par le Chef Legsi-Bigué N’Diaye du Yeng-
Yeng Géboul) (without number), without date.
214 ans, 10D4/33, Ka Boucar Boydo, Congrès de l’Union des Peuls: Rapport d’ensemble par 
M. Boucar Bayde (without number), 9 Oct. 1957, 1, 5.
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 disappearance of the pre-colonial states, the colonial administration had 
immediately filled the vacuum in provincial organisation by imposing its own 
order. Most of the Sereer-speakers in the region had bowed, after the French 
conquest, to continuities from the former order, oppressive sometimes, yet 
mostly ‘reliable’. The democratisation of the 1940s did not rapidly change this 
basic assumption: although Sereer-speakers occasionally challenged the ruling 
authorities through ethnic mobilisation, internal fissures and ambivalences 
within the group ultimately made this challenge very ineffective. Remarkably, 
the word ‘Wolof ’, and the ‘Wolof identity’ of one side of an eventual conflict, 
continued to be very rarely mentioned. Finally, the violent experiences of the 
Fulbe herdsmen in their relations with Wolophone populations posed the only 
real challenge within a situation in which the ancient state structure became a 
considerable antidote to tensions expressed through ethnic difference.
 Joal-Fadiouth: Centre of Multiple Identifications and Place of 
Strategic Employment of Allegiances (1840–1960)
The city of Joal-Fadiouth on the Petite Côte represents an outstanding case 
study for illustrating in still more detail the processes related above. The origi-
nally separate communities of Joal and Fadiouth, which then became fused 
into a single urban centre under colonial rule, were an early zone of contact 
between a number of Wolophone settlers of which at least a part had directly 
immigrated from the north, and other ethnic groups, among which the Sereer-
speakers represented the large majority. At the same time, in the nineteenth 
century, the inhabitants of Joal had to cope with the influence of different pre-
colonial state structures. Siin was obviously the most engaged of the entities in 
the region, and Joal remained during large parts of the first half of the century 
in a tributary relationship to the Buur Siin. However, the rulers of Saluum and 
Bawol were also occasionally active in the region, mostly during military cam-
paigns. The immediate surroundings of Joal are, consequently, a highly inter-
esting case to investigate the logic of solidarities.
As a community, the inhabitants of Joal defined themselves as ‘mixed’. 
This condition concerned ethnocultural terms, but, later, also a reputation 
as being a ‘neutral zone’ between Muslims and Christians. The informants of 
the Spiritan missionaries explained at a very early stage to the Order of the 
Holy Ghost Fathers that they were ‘half Sereer and half Wolof ’.215 Leaders of 
215 agcse, 3 I 1.5a5, Gallais, Complément des notes sur la mission de Joal. Royaume de Sine – 
Sérères – Wolofs – Joal. (without number), without date [ca. 1850], 16.
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local political life in Joal often boasted that they were able to employ the 
two languages; bilingualism was a fact elsewhere on the Petite Côte, but in 
the town it was much referred to. As an additional element in complex 
group relations, a good part of the local elite referred in parallel to their 
‘Portuguese’ identity, as early missionaries had indeed been Portuguese, and 
Eurafrican populations of Portuguese descent were a longstanding factor on 
the coast.
At first glance, the members of the community of Joal thus had a group 
identification marked through various factors. More remarkably, however, the 
inhabitants of the town distanced themselves in their conversation with 
French representatives from the use of both local languages, Wolof and Sereer 
– although speaking both languages in everyday life. The judgment on the 
Sereer language was damning: the residents of Joal held that Sereer was 
‘primitive’. Nonetheless, the leaders of the community argued that Wolof 
could not be employed either in any important local context, as the ‘Sereer’ 
spirits living in the interior of the holy Baobab trees of the region would 
regard the employment of the ‘foreign’ idiom as a sacrilege; they would avenge 
themselves and slay the Wolof-speakers on the spot if this language became 
too prominent!216
This overall context leads to a very peculiar picture. Joal was a mixed society 
in many respects, but one in which the regional prejudices of both of the two 
dominant local language groups were found, and were used against the world 
outside of the town. In this context, it is also apparent that a consciousness of 
particular ideas referring to different ethnic groups was clearly existent, if 
mostly combined with the criterion of language. However, this was not really 
decisive during the second half of the nineteenth century: for the inhabitants 
of Joal, the designation of themselves and of others as ‘Wolof ’ or ‘Sereer’ was 
part of a larger repertoire, which was still more flexible than in other commu-
nities on the Petite Côte.
Indeed, the populations of Joal had enlarged this repertoire by adding other 
historical components, such as their ‘Portugueseness’ and their relationship 
toward the pre-colonial state of Siin. As concerns the latter, the leaders of the 
community held that the rulers of the most powerful political entity in the area 
represented the central point of reference. The claim of ‘being Portuguese’ 
expressed the demand to be free from any legitimate control by the pre-colonial 
state of Siin. On religious terms, the elite of the town was, in the early 1870s, 
216 agcse, 3 I 1.5a5, Gallais, Quelques notes sur l’origine de Joal, sur les Wolofs et les Cérers, 
extraites des lettres datées de Joal (without number), without date [ca. 1850], 2–4.
�43Wolof and Wolofisation
<UN>
fiercely opposed to the attempts of the Muslim section of the Wolof-speakers in 
the city to erect a mosque.217
The elite of Joal actively engaged in securing its effective independence 
from Siin during the 1860s and the 1870s, and also attempted to obtain guaran-
tees of continuous French support against other claims coming from Bawol 
and Saluum. However, the link to the authorities of Siin remained present in 
the memories of the local leaders of the Joal community. The inhabitants of 
the town behaved, very visibly, as former subjects of the Buur Siin that had not 
forgotten their ancient relationship. This behaviour of local leaders was evi-
dent during the visits of Koumba Ndoffène Fa Mak Diouf in their particularly 
reverential style. During the tragic events of 1871, when the Buur Siin was mur-
dered during his visit to the town, a possible outbreak of war between the army 
of Siin and the soldiers of Joal was avoided through the numerous relations 
that existed between the town and the royal troops. Those were easily suffi-
cient to guarantee that even in a case as grave as the assassination of the Buur, 
the warriors from Siin spared the city (including the sparsely manned French 
post) from destruction.218
Between 1900 and 1945, the relationship between the different ethnic groups 
within the urban community had no place in local discussion. Sereer-speakers 
were theoretically in the majority, but the local hierarchy was led by Fulfulde-
speaking and Wolophone notables. Both the ethnic and the religious dimen-
sion remained in the background for several decades: the centre of Joal-Fadiouth 
was a place where different linguistic communities coexisted, and where the 
Murid Muslims enjoyed a status similar to that of the Catholic community.
This picture changed in the 1940s. With the impact of post-war reform, Joal 
lived through a period of important political troubles in which the question of 
belonging to communities was newly and consistently posed. For the decades 
of relative tranquillity, Meïssa Fall, the Fulfulde-speaking chief of the canton of 
Joal-Gohé (whose family came from Fuuta Tooro) including the town, had had 
a rather uncomplicated task in governing the inhabitants of the region. He was 
undoubtedly known to rule with a relatively firm hand, but – like Ely Manel 
N’Diaye in Diaganiao and Socé Fall in M’Bayard-Nianing – he had become 
popular in the region. He was one of those ‘traditional rulers’ who had rapidly 
learned to play the game, even before the first movement against abuses com-
mitted by chiefs that flared up in the 1940s: Fall respected well enough the 
political prerogatives of local headmen, he pleased the wishes of the highly 
217 agcse, 3 I 1.11b3, Lamoise, French missionary in Joal, to Schwindenhammer, Provincial 
Superior of the Spiritan Mission (without number), 30 June 1871, 3.
218 agcse, 3 I 1.11b3, Lamoise to Schwindenhammer (without number), 12 Dec. 1871, 2–4.
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corporatist Sereer-speaking fishermen, and he did his best to protect the local 
artisans from outside competition and to improve conditions of marketing 
and sales of local products. The chief had visibly ‘succeeded in Sereer 
territory’.219 As a local partner, Meïssa Fall was also held in high esteem by the 
French administrators.
An attack came, rather unexpectedly, in May 1946. The assault against 
Meïssa Fall’s chieftaincy was in part an affair of the territorial politics discussed 
above; it reflected the shifts in the regional balance of power under the impact 
of the reforms instituted in 1945. The central figure linking the local affairs con-
cerning Joal and Fadiouth to the new territorial assembly of Senegal in Saint-
Louis, was, again, Jacques d’Erneville, a sort of personal envoy of the recently 
elected deputy of Senegal, Léopold Sédar Senghor. The latter was in 1946 still in 
the ranks of the sfio from which his followers would only split in late 1947. 
Senghor’s envoy visited, in the first half of 1946, the different settlements in the 
area between M’Bour and the Siin-Saluum River Delta. After passing through 
Joal and meeting with members of the nascent party living there, he wrote a 
long letter to his patron about the particular case of Meïssa Fall.220 D’Erneville 
remarked that Fall, who was hostile to sfio activities during this period, had 
absolutely no right to stay in the post he held, as he was a ‘foreigner’, not an 
originaire of the region. The party was to return him to live in a canton of his 
own region of origin (‘dans un canton de chez lui’), insisted d’Erneville.221
The French cercle commander, informed about these proceedings, was less 
certain about the facts presented by the Senegalese deputy and his auxiliary. 
He believed that both Senghor and d’Erneville were manipulating the facts in 
the interest of their party. Undoubtedly, many of the powerful chiefs in the 
coastal cantons were still not used to making alliances with the new political 
class, namely with the leaders of the sfio, later with the bds. Therefore, 
Meïssa Fall, like many of his colleagues in rank ruling in the region, was con-
sidered an enemy by the party militants. They held that Fall retained a disqui-
eting power base to influence the voting decisions of his ‘subjects’, and sfio 
politicians used all means to discredit the legitimacy of such a potentially 
hostile ‘traditional ruler’. With Fall, this seemed to be easy: his detractors 
219 ans, 11D1/1303, Rey, Governor of Senegal, to District Commissioner of Thiès, Au Sujet 
Chefferie canton Diaganiao (n° 1112/APA), 30 June 1941, 2.
220 On the local powers of deputies between 1944 and 1957, see ans, 10D1/36, Lami, District 
Commissioner of Thiès, to Bailly, Governor of Senegal, Plai[n]te de Mr. le Député Senghor 
(n° 28/AGO), 24 Jan. 1951.




brought forward claims that cast doubt on the chief ’s rootedness in the 
canton.222
The representatives of the colonial power attempted to judge the ‘ethnic 
legitimacy’ of local protests. Hence, in 1947, Larrue, the administrator of the 
subdivision of M’Bour, carried out additional research on the Sereer-speakers 
in the Joal area. He felt considerably perplexed by the results. According to his 
informants, the Sereer-speakers of the region were a mosaic of different sub-
groups: the ‘Sereer Siin’ and the ‘Sereer Dieguène’ of Aga-Gohé canton were, if 
each one was at all to be taken as a group in its own right, in cultural and lin-
guistic terms completely different from the ‘Sereer Fadiouth’ of the area of the 
town. Larrue held that the Socé family of Joal, with its close links to the Sereer 
headmen, had exerted a real ‘tyranny’ over the two former groups; only the 
French takeover of the town in 1864 had ‘liberated those oppressed people’. 
Larrue’s information corroborated the existence of new pan-Sereer tenden-
cies, but his report insinuated that such tendencies were only the result of 
goals of political mobilisation for momentary gain.223
The police reports from Joal, transmitting details from political meetings in 
the region, give us an extensive picture of propaganda after 1945: most of the 
campaign was in fact directed against the paramount chief, and thus had to be 
anti-Tukulor. Some anti-Wolof and pan-Sereer agitation also flared up in Joal-
Fadiouth. This peaked at moments of electoral campaign activity by d’Erneville 
and Senghor in 1946. However, we find little inclination on the part of regional 
sfio leaders to continue their engagement on an ethnic ticket after the elec-
toral support of the canton had been won.224
The politically-motivated campaign against the paramount chief, led with 
ethnic arguments, did not fail to have an impact on the administrative realities 
in the region. While colonial officials tended to be sceptical about the activities 
of Senegalese party politicians, they did not remain entirely unaffected by the 
ethnic claims. Cazenave, the French district commissioner in Thiès, in the end 
employed the same ethnocultural terms for the description of the political 
situation in the area of Joal-Fadiouth. This had repercussions on the discussion 
222 See, among others, the cases of the struggle between sfio and bds for the chieftaincies 
in Kaolack in ans, 11D1/1148, Security Service of Kaolack, Renseignements: Nomination de 
Chef de quartier (n° 405/c/SU.), 11 June 1949, and for Tambacounda in ans, 11D1/1059, Sada 
Maka Sy to District Commissioner of Tambacounda and Senghor (without number), 
20 Sep. 1956.
223 ans, 11D1/1320, Larrue, Administrator of Subdivision of M’Bour, to Cazenave, District 
Commissioner of Thiès, Projet création Subdivision Joal (n° 199/C), 31 Oct. 1947, 3.
224 ans, 11D1/1320, Minot, commander of the Gendarmerie Post of Joal, to Larrue (n° 34/4), 
16 Oct. 1947, 1.
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of administrative reforms, which were conceived in ethnic terms. The outcome 
of the plans for ethnic reorganisation was, however, surprising.
Based on the information about ethnic difference he had so constantly 
received, Cazenave now proposed a neat separation of the towns of Joal and of 
Fadiouth on an ethnic basis. He argued that the fishermen of Fadiouth, ‘all 
Sereer’, were a ‘clan à part’. They were to be treated as such, and to be adminis-
tered separately. However, the inhabitants of Joal, while being seen as immi-
grants, mostly spoke both Sereer and Wolof, and they had manifold contacts, 
including through family links, with the Sereer-speakers of Fadiouth. Thus it 
proved difficult to truly establish them as a homogeneous group. When 
Cazenave attempted to enforce the administrative separation, it became evi-
dent that the locals of Fadiouth did not want this particular reform at all.225
Cazenave then tried to organise a complete reorganisation of the canton on 
ethnically-defined group terms. However, the headmen of both Joal and of 
Fadiouth came to protest vehemently. They explained to the French official 
that they entirely refused the partition of the town area, a measure against 
which they would violently mobilise if necessary! Sereer-speaking fishermen 
sided with Wolophone artisans in this wave of protests. Finally, the French 
administrators gave way and silently buried their project.226 The resulting soli-
darities coming from a common experience of the past went beyond ethnicity 
– and beyond simple community solidarity, as Joal and Fadiouth had long been 
distinct communities, and there was no automatic siding between their 
inhabitants.
Nevertheless, Meïssa Fall did not in the long run escape the political trou-
bles. Local agitation on the grounds that Fall was a ‘Tukulor stranger’ contin-
ued in the background: the local organisers of party campaigning in the 1950s, 
now representing the bds, clearly hoped for the spoils after Fall’s downfall; and 
for this reason, the ethnic card would in his case be successfully maintained. 
Fall fought back in a determined manner; only in the post-colonial state was 
his presence no longer feasible, and the ever-increasing pressure from a sec-
tion of the local population finally led to his removal.227 However, even in a 
circumscribed local arena of the Senegalese coast, it becomes obvious that 
ethnic solidarities were often not the most important element of group iden-
tity. Notably, common political experiences were far more essential.
225 ans, 11D/1382, Cazenave, District Commissioner of Thiès, to Durand, Governor of Senegal 
(n° 432/AG/CC), 23 July 1946.
226 ans, 11D/1382, Larrue, Administrator of Subdivision of M’Bour, to Cazenave (n° 214/C), 
26 July 1946.
227 ans, 11D/1382, Sow Abdul Karim, ‘Chefferies et Combines’ (without number), without date.
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 Into the Independent State: ‘Wolofisation’ and the Integration  
of ‘Tribal’ Thinking in Northern Senegal’s Post-Colonial Political 
Language
After the independence of Senegal in 1960, the existence of ethnic groups as 
primary poles of allegiance became an accepted fact among politicians. The 
leaders of the Union Progressiste Sénégalaise (ups), the unity party that was 
the successor movement of the bds and bps, in a fusion with the sfio and 
some splinter parties, claimed to represent the entire Senegalese population. 
This claim appeared to make an engagement with ethnic issues highly neces-
sary. At least at the local level, ups politicians decided that there was a strong 
demand for ethnic claims, which led to a new double language. Following the 
nationalist logic of most post-colonial African states, Senegalese statesmen 
and diplomats normally avoided mentioning the impact of the different ethnic 
groups in their country, or, at most, they drew a picture of particular ‘tribal 
harmony’. In this, the Senegalese political elite employed a discourse that, like 
in other West African countries, condemned the nefarious effects of ‘tribalism’. 
The ups leaders gave this discourse a particular attention, presenting Senegal 
as a very special society where ethnicity was balanced by the friendly relations 
of groups.
However, on the local level, the references were entirely different, at least in 
the first years after decolonisation, including on the Petite Côte and its hinter-
land. The Minister of the Interior, Valdiodio N’Diaye, while visiting the town 
centre of Fatick in the former region of Siin pointed insistently to the role 
which the Sereer populations of Senegal had played in the process which had 
led to national independence.228 Instead of a ‘regionalist’ he played an ‘ethnic’ 
card. Prime Minister Mamadou Dia was even more explicit regarding ethnicity 
during a speech delivered in the same region: he presented the ancient ethnic 
conflicts as no longer existent in Senegal, but the ethnocultural groups contin-
ued to exist and to play an important role as points of reference: ‘as the Tukulor 
that I am, [I was glad] to be adopted by the Sereer of Siin’.229
228 mae, dam, Sénégal, 3117, Valdiodio N’Diaye, Minister of the Interior of Senegal, Discours 
prononcé à Fatick le 29 Mars 1962 par Me Valdiodio N’Diaye à la Cérémonie d’Inauguration 
du Monument de l’Indépendance (without number), without date, 4; mae, dam, Sénégal, 
3117, Hettier de Boislambert, French Ambassador in Senegal, Compte-rendu hebdomadaire 
N° 13 (n° 435.CP), 2 May 1962, 3–4.
229 mae, dam, Sénégal, 3117, Hettier de Boislambert, Compte-rendu hebdomadaire N° 33 
(n° 1.044/CP), 20 Aug. 1962, 1.
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Some groups, whose leaders felt excluded from the state structures, main-
tained more aggressive ethnic formulations. This was the case for the members 
of the Union des Peuls du Sénégal et de la Mauritanie, a movement founded in 
the wake of political reform and autonomy in the territory, and rapidly banned 
by the then independent government in 1960. The most distinguished leader of 
this association, Boucar Boydo, bitterly complained in 1957 that ‘in our minis-
tries, our ministers speak Wolof and do not master the Peul dialect’.230 Boydo’s 
position was, and remained, a minority view after independence. For a semi-
democratic government, it was easy, in the 1960s, to remove institutionalised 
‘tribal’ associations like the Union. Fulbe mobilisation against Wolof peasants 
remained a minor source of tensions in the post-colonial state.231
In the end, the transformation from colonial rule to the post-colonial period 
seems to have allowed for a continuation of loyalty to state structures that 
characterised at least northern coastal Senegal. The role of the Cap-Vert 
Peninsula, and, in particular, of the city of Dakar, has contributed to this 
 continuity. Community life under urban conditions has not led to a stronger 
segregation of regional and self-declared ethnic groups, as in Senegal the polit-
ical structure dominated over ethnic sentiment. The urban setting of Dakar 
allowed for rapid linguistic assimilation, including all the phenomena of mul-
tilingual individual life that I discussed in the introduction to this chapter. As 
long as there was no regional feeling of exclusion from the state structures, 
even the argument of ‘Wolofisation’ was unlikely to lead to counter- mobilisation 
along ethnic lines. The exception to this rule is Casamance, where conditions 
had been extremely different in the period of the French conquest, and were 
exacerbated by a relatively recent immigration of Wolophone settlers. The 
Gambia is even more interesting as a comparative example, with a similarly 
fragile state structure but an older Wolof presence.
 A Glance into the Gambia: Wolof Identification at the Margins  
of the ‘Wolof State’ of Senegal
The communities of the territory of the British colony of the Gambia had been 
in longstanding contact with pre-colonial states ruled by Wolophone dynasties, 
230 ans, 10D4/33, Ka Boucar Boydo, Congrès de l’Union des Peuls (without number), 9 Oct. 
1957, 5.
231 See ans, Vice-Présidence et Présidence du Conseil de Gouvernement du Sénégal (vpp), 
000203, Abdoulaye Fall N’Dar, Kalif of the ‘Baye Fall’ Murids, to Mamadou Dia (without 
number), 29 May 1959.
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and had areas administered by Wolophone paramount chiefs. At the same 
time, they also lived under the influence of the British style of colonial organ-
isation.232 In 1876, the troops of Saluum attacked Badibu, a local political entity, 
in retaliation for the support that Badibu’s Jihad ruler, Mahmud N’Dare Bâ, had 
given to Mâ Bâ, the cleric fighting Saluum’s pre-colonial dynasty.233 Moreover, 
the Wolophone Buur Saluum, Sadiuka Mbodj, held several dignitaries in the 
central and upper river regions in a tributary relationship, which would only 
lessen with the gradual loss of power of Saluum in the 1870s and 1880s.234  
The ruler of Badibu had his family origins in Kajoor: like his brother, Ama Bâ, he 
had established himself in the river area. His enmity with Sadiuka Mbodj 
 destabilised the whole region to the north of the river. Further eastwards, there 
was some Wolophone immigration into the Upper Niani, apparently from the 
Fuuta Tooro; these settlers were quite aggressive and violent towards Wolo-
phone commercial agents working for the Compagnie Française de l’Afrique 
Occidentale (cfao). French troops, in retaliation for incidents with members 
of this group, attacked the town of Kutchar in 1889.235 The polarisation of iden-
tifications in the Gambia River region went hand in hand with Jihads.236 War 
had started on the northern bank in the 1840s and pitted ‘Soninke’ and 
‘Marabouts’, according to local terminology, against each other. The Almami 
(religious-spiritual and political leader) of Badibu was a champion of enforced 
conversion to Islam.237 The discourses of group leaders during the conflict in 
Badibu and other small political units of the area were completely dominated 
by religious questions. Mahmud N’Dare Bâ had an ethnically mixed following, 
232 Diouf, Sénégal, 34.
233 tna, pro, CO/879/13, African Confidential Print No. 152, Cooper, British Acting 
Administrator of the Gambia, to Kortright, Governor of Sierra Leone (without number, 
Enclosure 1. in No. 1), 29 June 1876, 2.
234 Quinn, Charlotte A., Mandingo kingdoms of the Senegambia: Traditionalism, Islam, and 
European expansion (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), 36.
235 tna, pro, CO/879/28, African (West) Confidential Print No. 360, Manager of McCarthy’s 
Island to Acting Administrator (n° 103, as Enclosure in No. 57.), 25 July 1889.
236 British observers of the 1840s – following Mungo Park’s example – already attempted to 
distinguish Gambian Mandinka, Wolof, and Fulbe through their physical features, com-
pare Grey, Earl, ‘Abridged Account of an Expedition of about 200 Miles up the Gambia, by 
Governor Ingram’, Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of London 17, 1847, 150–5, 153. 
In the 1890s, the British were convinced they had found five different ‘races’ (Wolof, 
Mandinka, Jola, Sarakole, Fulbe) in the Gambian territory, see Denton, George C., ‘Twenty-
Three Years in Lagos and the Gambia’, Journal of the Royal African Society 11(42), January 
1912, 129–40, 133–4.
237 tna, pro, CO/879/11, African Confidential Print No. 124, Brown to Carnavon (without 
number, n° 12 in series), 8 Feb. 1877, 2.
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whose members were eventually identifiable as ‘Mandinka’, ‘Wolof’, ‘Fulbe’, and 
others, but united through the Islamic religion.238 Amongst the Mandinka-
speakers, questions of status also outweighed those of ethnic affiliation: slavery 
remained a fact until at least the end of the First World War, as Mandinka slaves, 
while being integrated into the Mandinka-speaking leading families, were con-
sidered as socially inferior. Therefore, settlements of rebellious or refugee slaves 
were the primary target during military campaigns.239
In other parts of the Gambia River region, local populations at the margins 
of the more reliable state structures had more frequent recourse to ethnic 
identifications. Also, with the extension of their small river colony in the sec-
ond half of the nineteenth century, British officials attempted to sustain 
‘authentic structures’ and to find the appropriate ‘tribes’. Colonial ideology and 
practices of colonial rule thereby created fundamental differences in the 
behaviour of Gambia’s Wolof-speakers.240
In the late colonial period, the Gambia was characterised by the slow takeover 
of an ‘educated elite’ around the United Party (up), which represented the com-
mercial interests of Bathurst and was regarded by the British as the natural can-
didate to lead the post-colonial country after independence.241 However, on the 
occasion of the 1962 territorial elections, the People’s Progressive Party (ppp) took 
power in the then autonomous territory, to the general surprise of experienced 
commentators in the region.242 This development was frequently interpreted as 
the result of a ‘green uprising’ in which ‘the Mandinka’ as a rural majority defeated 
the aspirations of an elite of ‘strangers’: the urban Wolof-speakers concentrated 
238 tna, pro, CO/879/13, African Confidential Print No. 152, Brown to Carnavon (without 
number), 19 Sep. 1877, 1.
239 Bellagamba, Alice, ‘Slavery and Emancipation in the Colonial Archives: British Officials, 
Slave-Owners, and Slaves in the Protectorate of the Gambia (1890–1936)’, Canadian 
Journal of African Studies 39(1), 2005, 5–41, 13, 25; Webb, Patrick, ‘Guests of the Crown: 
Convicts and Liberated Slaves on McCarthy Island, the Gambia’, Geographical Journal 
160(2), 1994, 136–42, 140.
240 On the ‘Wolof ’ as a group in the Gambia, see Hughes, Arnold, and David Perfect, A Political 
History of the Gambia, 1816–1994 (Rochester/ny: University of Rochester Press, 2006), 16–7. 
The navétanat in Senegal reappears as ‘strange farming’ in the Gambia, see Swindell, Ken, 
‘Family Farms and Migrant Labour: The Strange Farmers of the Gambia’, Canadian Journal 
of African Studies 12(1), 1978, 3–17, 4–5, 14–6.
241 Hughes and Perfect, History, 132–3, 136–7, 144–5.
242 See mae, dam, Sénégal, 3117, Hettier de Boislambert, Compte-rendu hebdomadaire N° 23 
(n° 722.CP), 11 June 1962, 9. On the mobilisation of Mandinka ‘tradition’ by the ppp, see 
Bellagamba, Alice, ‘Entrustment and its changing political meanings in Fuladu, the 
Gambia (1880–1994)’, Africa (London) 74(3), 2004, 383–410, 399–400, for the distribution of 
the vote, Hughes and Perfect, Policy, 150–1.
�5�Wolof and Wolofisation
<UN>
in the population centre of Bathurst.243 Later, however, President David (Dawda) 
Jawara increasingly played the card of regional solidarity with Dakar to protect 
his rule, and these tactics were interpreted as ‘Wolof networks’.
In the current-day Gambia, unlike in Senegal, the idea of ‘ethnic harmony’ 
is not a part of national elite ideology. ‘Ethnicity’ is frequently debated as a 
factor to explain contemporary political frictions in Gambian politics. In 1981, 
the government of Dawda Jawara, the eternal political leader of independent 
Gambia, was menaced by a coup d’état, allegedly by Jola-speaking army units 
rebelling against the marginalisation of their ethnic group in a Mandinka- 
and Wolof-dominated society.244 Jawara was saved by Senegalese troops, and 
this was eagerly read as an introduction of ‘Wolof rule’ to the detriment of 
other ‘ethnic’ groupings, in a country where a ‘Mandingo party’ – the ppp – 
had dominated political life.245 The subsequent and final fall of Jawara, due to 
a putsch of the Gambian army under Yahya Jammeh in 1994, has since been 
regarded as the normalisation of the ethnic balance of power in the small 
country.246
These views on ethnicity need to be tempered by a more local perspective. 
In the Gambia’s Lower Saloum District, chieftaincy conflicts and group soli-
darities illustrate a complex pattern. First of all, conflicts existed within the 
‘chiefly family’. In August 1950, the Lower Saloum District became a place of 
constant unrest after the return of its former seyfu (‘traditional chief ’), Bara 
Turay.247 Turay, a Wolof-speaker, had been dismissed by the British administra-
tion for abuses and had been in exile in Senegal for a couple of years. During 
this exile, his material possessions had repeatedly been used by ‘trustees’ in 
their own interest. His successor had been his own son, Ali Turay, who had no 
sympathy for his father and had confiscated his father’s possessions to support 
his personal and dynastic position in the district. This led to a fierce conflict 
arising after Bara Turay’s return, which brought questions of broader group 
243 Hughes, Arnold, ‘From Green Uprising to National Reconciliation: The People’s Progressive 
Party in the Gambia, 1959–1973’, Canadian Journal of African Studies 9(1), 1975, 61–74, 
63–4.
244 Sallah, Tijan M., ‘Economics and Politics in the Gambia’, Journal of Modern African Studies 
28(4), 1990, 621–48, 635–6.
245 There is no reference to the ethnic dimension of Senegalese involvement in the Gambia 
in the early 1980s in most studies, see Hughes, Arnold, ‘The Senegambia Confederation’, 
Contemporary Review 244(1417), 1984, 83–8.
246 Hughes, Arnold, ‘“Democratisation” under the military in the Gambia: 1994–2000’, 
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 38(3), 2000, 35–52, 48; and Hughes and Perfect, 
History, 280–1.
247 nrstg, pub 13/12, Minute, 30 April 1951.
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solidarities in the Lower Saloum District onto the agenda.248 For decades, the 
declared objective of the British administration had been to guarantee an ‘eth-
nically appropriate’ administrative set-up for this district. However, in 1950 the 
administration was faced with the historical dimensions of ‘Jola’ and ‘Wolof ’ 
identifications in the Saloum district and its vicinity.
When Bara Turay had been unseated in 1941 as paramount chief of the dis-
trict because of his ‘constant abuses’, the local British administrators had been 
convinced they would not find any other candidate acceptable to all of the 
district’s populations. They believed the population of Lower Saloum was so 
unstructured and diffuse that there was no collective loyalty or group of iden-
tification large enough: ‘no single man, without…active canvassing [of the dis-
trict administrator], could secure a majority if left to the people’.249
The decade-long vulnerability of political structures in many parts of the 
pre-colonial territory later becoming the Gambia, including the area of Lower 
Saloum, is crucial to this instability. Since 1880, the British colonial government 
had been engaged in establishing a stable administrative structure on the 
middle and upper Gambia River and installing ‘authentic’ chieftaincies in 
small districts. The British tried to interpret the situation according to ethnic 
classifications, which proved to be difficult.
This brings us back to the pre-colonial history of group identifications of the 
future colonial districts of Lower (and Upper) Saloum. In the nineteenth cen-
tury, this region was evidently a complex geographical ensemble, the political 
realities of which the British conquerors did not quite understand. Originally, 
the new district had been part of Balangar, an autonomous political entity, 
albeit under the political influence of the Buur Saluum. Patron-client relations 
were more explicit between Saluum and the various smaller entities of Kaur, in 
the eastern part of what was to become the Lower Saloum District; the rulers 
of the latter had to pay tribute to the Buur. Their rulers were Wolof-speakers 
and they had been in power before the European conquest.250 These 
248 nrstg, pub 13/12, Neil Weir, Senior Commissioner, Lower Saloum District Administration 
(without number), 9 Jan. 1945; nrstg, pub 13/12, Bara Turay, Extract from Enclosure 136 on 
M.P.HQ. 358/1942. (without number), without date; nrstg, pub 13/12, Brief Report on the 
Lower Saloum District Administration (without number), without date; nrstg, pub 13/12, 
Commissioner of the North Bank Division, Lower Saloum District Administration 
(n° DIC.30/1(12)), without date; nrstg, pub 13/12, Humphrey Smith, [Confidential Note on 
Bara Turay] (n° c/7/71), 15 Aug. 1950, 1–2.
249 nrstg, pub 13/12, Lian, District Commissioner of MacCarthy Island Province, to Colonial 
Secretary of Gambia (without number), 26 May 1942.
250 nrstg, pub 13/12, Lian to Colonial Secretary of the Gambia (without number), 26 May 
1942, 2; nrstg, pub 13/12, G.A. Evans, Commissioner of MacCarthy Island Province, The 
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Wolophone chiefs did not, however, show much solidarity as members of the 
same ‘ethnic group’. If something tied them to a larger ensemble, it was indeed 
the loyalty to the Buur Saluum.
The British colonial administrators sought first-hand information about 
‘tribes’, but had to admit that in ‘normal’ times they did not find any real ‘ethnic 
identity’. ‘Sub-groups’ dominated the picture, while larger ‘tribal identities’ 
were pushed into the background. The description of the Wolophone commu-
nities of Lower Saloum emphasised the fact that ‘the Jolofs of this District are 
anything but a pure strain’ and that ‘even the Turays are said to be more 
Tillibonko than true Jolof ’. The British claimed that ‘the Jolof language and 
dress is assumed by traders, settlers and in-laws as much as an alien in Europe 
changes his nationality by naturalisation’!251 Therefore, in the Gambian case, 
language and chosen identification depended a great deal on the professional 
situation of an individual, and ‘Wolof-ness’ rarely appeared as a stable ethnic 
identification.
In linguistic terms, the majority of the inhabitants of the district in 1860 
appeared as Mandinka-speakers, in spite of the formal overlordship of the 
Wolophone Buur Saluum. Therefore, at the moment of conquest, the Jane fam-
ily from Janekunda managed to make credible claims to the British that they 
held the ‘authentic’ right to the chieftaincy of the district: the principal argu-
ment they presented to the British authorities was that of being ‘Mandinka’ 
and representing the ‘autochthons’. Mansajo Jane and his direct successor 
Amuli Jane thus became the first paramount chiefs of the newly created Lower 
Saloum District under British rule in the Gambia.
The information on which the British based their decision to favour the Jane 
family was extremely limited. British administrators did not have any accurate 
details about the specific elements of the pre-colonial situation, and often mis-
understood the older, border-crossing solidarities. Initially unnoticed by the 
colonial authorities, remarkable shifts in ethnocultural loyalties were under 
way. From 1860 to 1940, the reported population distribution in the Lower 
Saloum changed in an impressive and unexpected way. Suddenly, the ‘Wolof ’ 
appeared in the British documents as a clear majority of the population.252 
Administrative position in the Saloum M.I.P. subsequent to the removal of the Seyfou, Lower 
Saloum, and some possible lines of reorganisation (without number), 31 July 1942; nrstg, 
pub 13/12, Brief Note on the History of the Chieftainships of the Saloums Compiled by 
Professor Daryll Freds (without number), 14 May 1945.





This major shift was to play an important role in local politics. The successive 
Wolophone candidates for the chieftaincy, Bara Turay and Ali Turay, profited 
from these changing perceptions: now they could compete for the paramount 
chieftaincy and base their claim on the colonial statistics of ethnicity.
It is difficult to find an explanation for such changing numbers and percent-
ages. First of all, while there were migratory flows crossing the Senegalese-
Gambian border over the whole of the colonial period and beyond, this was 
not a principal factor, as migration was never confined to a single linguistic 
community or cultural group.253 Only the Fulfulde-speaking herdsmen of 
Lower Saloum were significantly more mobile than other local population 
groups, while Wolof-speakers and Mandinka-speakers show patterns similar to 
each other.
More importantly, there was a notion of remarkable flexibility in identifica-
tions. One particular factor was the affiliation of the large numbers of domes-
tic slaves to the powerful, Wolof-speaking merchant families. Over the decades, 
the former slaves came to be counted as ‘Wolof ’, regardless of their former 
group origins. This integration of slaves into kinship groups was an essential 
mechanism to provoke change in identifications (which is difficult to analyse 
in other regions, such as northern Senegal). Multilingualism also added to 
flexibilities.
The leading Wolophone families in the region based their influence on con-
tacts in Senegalese territory, to which the links were easy to maintain. 
Wolophone populations regularly crossed the border into the region of 
Kaolack.254 However, ethnic solidarity was not the decisive criterion within 
these networks: Omar Sisi, the twice-deposed paramount chief of Upper 
Saloum District during the 1910s and 1920s claimed that he was a direct heir to 
the ruling dynasty of Saluum, the Gëlwaar, and mobilised a 547-year old ‘tradi-
tion’ for his cause…255 Here again, solidarity with pre-colonial states was the 
more attractive option, but the British conquest had cut contenders off from 
this alternative source of legitimacy. If they wanted to play the game under the 
conditions set by the British colonial state, they had to refer to ethnocultural 
links, but these links could be ‘adjusted’ if necessary. This becomes clear from 
contrasting a number of local elite biographies in the region for the 1950s, 
including local dignitaries who were not Wolophone.
253 ans, 10D4/4, Alsace, to Director of Native Affairs of Senegal (n° 936), 9 Aug. 1893, 1–2.
254 tna, pro, CO/87/226/17, Macklin, [Report] (without number), 26 Jan. 1927, 21.
255 tna, pro, CO/87/226/17, E.F. Small, Editor of ‘Gambia Outlook’, Memorandum of the Case 




One such personality is Biram Bâ. Over long periods of the first half of the 
twentieth century, Bâ was regarded as the most important representative of 
the Fulfulde-speakers in the district and a possible candidate for a chieftaincy 
in the Saluum area. However, Bâ was not at all an ‘indigenous’ candidate. He 
was, in the geographic ensemble of Senegambia, a ‘northerner’: his cultural-
linguistic origins were Tukulor, and while he was a Tijani Muslim, he was 
detached from the local Fulbe. Nonetheless, he managed to become the 
spokesman of the Fulbe herdsmen, as he was attractive as a representative of a 
certain standing.
In the Lower Saloum District, local dignitaries voted in chief elections. 
However, the latter’s electoral behaviour does not fit at all with the picture of 
strict ‘ethnic loyalties’ in the Gambia. Such complexities in the behaviour of 
local headmen spoiled the possible career of Kebba Jane. He was a Mandinka-
speaker and candidate of the mighty Jane family that had held the paramount 
chieftaincy of Lower Saloum for a couple of decades after British conquest. 
After the dismissal of Bara Turay in 1941, he was thus one of the obvious favou-
rites for Bara’s succession. To obtain the paramount chieftaincy, he most 
urgently needed the votes of all the headmen of the region of Janekunda, the 
majority of whom were Mandinka. However, somewhat against any ‘ethnic’ 
logic, many of these dignitaries elected Katar Cissé, the Wolof-speaking chief 
of the neighbouring district of Upper Saloum, who had also become a candi-
date for Bara Turay’s succession. Cissé was appreciated as an efficient ruler; 
this seemed to be the most important criterion for his voters. The British 
administrators, waiting for a result that followed ‘tribal logics’, were completely 
perplexed. While Katar Cissé in the end did not receive as many votes as Ali 
Turay, his relative success is remarkable: the votes of the majority of the 
Mandinka went to the Wolof-speaker Cissé, which destroyed the chances of 
the ‘Mandinka candidate’.256
Ethnic solidarity was more attractive in the Gambia than in the case of the 
French colony, due to the structures of British colonial organisation. They 
allowed for mobilisation via ‘ethnic’ arguments, if it was possible in a given 
situation to explain to potential followers that a rival for material or political 
resources (or both) was an ‘outsider’, someone having immigrated later with 
‘his people’ into the region.257 However, Wolof-speakers in Lower Saloum 
256 nrstg, pub 13/12, Saloum District: 1st Ballot taken on 8:2:45 to choose a new Head Chief. 
(without number), without date; nrstg pub 13/12, Weir, Lower Saloum District 
Administration: Four Observations in your letter No. dic 30/I/(12) of May 11th 1945 (without 
number), 12 June 1945.
257 Bellagamba, ‘Entrustment’, 385.
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District did not have enough motivation to follow such ‘ethnic’ arguments. 
Wolophone merchants already controlled the majority of local resources as 
related to trade and were at the core of a network; several of the most powerful 
individuals in the district had originated from families who had their former 
regions of origin further northwards, but were now well entrenched.
Regarding this background of migration, the Jane, members of the influen-
tial family of ‘Mandinka chiefs’ in the region, had an easy task in labelling the 
Wolof-speaking merchants as ‘strangers’. Kebba Jane tried hard to convince the 
British district commissioner that the ‘Wolof ’ knew nothing of local customs, 
and had pre-colonial knowledge ‘in matters of trade and customs but not in 
the court’.258 However, even with this emphasis on cultural difference and 
autochthony, the Jane were not able to win the majority of Mandinka-speakers 
in the district for their claim. The victory of Ali Turay was possible through an 
interethnic alliance.259
In such conflicts, the crossing of ethnic boundaries was simple in the 
Gambia: when it was useful for the creation of alliances, the involved groups 
did not show any hesitation. After 1962, the Wolof-speakers in Upper and 
Lower Saloum, who had before been unwavering adherents of the urban, 
Wolophone Bathurst elite dominating the United Party, switched sides to the 
ppp. The chiefs and local dignitaries hoped that this change of side would 
allow them to obtain the same benefits concerning national investment that 
had been promised by the autonomous government of Jawara to the Mandinka-
speaking ppp followers among the ‘traditional rulers’ in the neighbourhood.260 
However, even in the post-colonial period, alliances in the local environment 
could be forged on ethnic terms whenever this was regarded as useful. Thus 
during the 1975 election of a new seyfu of Lower Saloum, the Wolof-speakers of 
Ballanghar attempted again to play the ethnic card to prevent the victory of a 
candidate of the Mandinka-speaking dynasty. On this occasion, the Fulbe of 
the district nominated their own ‘ethnic’ candidate.261
The case of the Gambia shows that different systems of indirect rule created 
distinct conditions for ethnic solidarity, although the question of the pre-colonial 
political situation remained the most decisive variable. While it is true that in the 
258 nrstg, pub 13/12, District Commissioner of McCarthy Island to Colonial Secretary of the 
Gambia (number illegible), 19 Aug. 1942.
259 nrstg, pub 13/12, Bailes, Commissioner of Central Commission, to Senior Commissioner 
of Protectorate Administration, Ex-Seyfu Barra Turay (n° DI.7.42/6/102.), 15 July 1950.
260 Hughes, ‘Uprising’, 66.
261 Kingsland, James, ‘A Gambian Chieftaincy Election’, Journal of Modern African Studies 
15(4), 1977, 651–6, 652–3.
�57Wolof and Wolofisation
<UN>
Gambian case, the category of being ‘Wolof’ has often not been the essential one, 
it fulfils an important function more frequently than in Senegal. In questions of 
land rights and rights to chieftaincies, contenders were aware of the importance 
of the category; they even attempted to use colonial statistics on ethnic groups in 
a given district whenever those calculations worked in their favour. Unlike in 
Senegal, the states could not have a major role in shaping local identifications, as 
the early British insistence in focusing on ‘tribally’ correct political units encour-
aged ethnic mobilisation. In the northern parts of Senegambia, i.e. in Senegal, 




Fragmentation and the Temne: From War Raids 
into Ethnic Civil Wars
 The Temne and Their Neighbours: A Long-Standing Scenario of 
Inter-ethnic Hostilities?
The former British colony of Sierra Leone is today regarded as one of the classic 
cases of a society that is politically polarised by ethnic antagonism. By the 
1950s, the decade before independence, ethnic fault lines had an impact on 
local political life and the inhabitants of the colony appeared to practise ethnic 
voting. Both the Sierra Leone People’s Party (slpp) government formed after 
1957, led by Milton Margai, and the All People’s Congress (apc) government of 
Siaka Stevens coming to power in 1967/68, relied on ethnic support and cre-
ated ethnic networks: the slpp appeared to be ‘southern’ and ‘eastern’, and 
Mende-dominated, the apc ‘northern’ and Temne-led.1 Between 1961 and the 
1990s, such voting behaviour can be found in sociological and political science 
survey data.2 However, the period of brutal civil war in the 1990s weakened 
some of these community links, as local communities were more interested in 
their survival than in ethnic solidarities.3 We have seen that the 2007 legislative 
elections contradicted this apparent trend.
Before the second half of the nineteenth century, the territory of present-day 
Sierra Leone was politically fragmented into a number of different small structures, 
which were often much smaller than the pre-colonial states of Senegambia 
(Map 4). The only regional exception was the ‘federation’ of Morea, which, 
however, was an unstable entity. The slave trade and the ‘legitimate commerce’ in palm 
1 Cartwright, John R., Politics in Sierra Leone 1947–67 (Toronto – Buffalo: University of Toronto 
Press, 1970), 101–2, 128; Fisher, ‘Elections’, 621–3; Riddell, J. Barry, ‘Beyond the Geography of 
Modernization: The State as a Redistributive Mechanism in Independent Sierra Leone’, 
Canadian Journal of African Studies 19(3), 1985, 529–45, 532; Kandeh, Jimmy D., ‘Politicization 
of Ethnic Identities in Sierra Leone’, African Studies Review 35(1), 1992, 81–99, 93–4.
2 Kandeh, ‘Politicization’, 97; Hayward, Fred M., and Ahmed R. Dumbuya, ‘Changing Electoral 
Patterns in Sierra Leone: The 1982 Single-Party Elections’, African Studies Review 28(4), 1985, 
62–86, 66–7; Riddell, J. Barry, ‘Internal and External Forces Acting upon Disparities in Sierra 
Leone’, Journal of Modern African Studies 23(3), 1985, 389–406, 402–4.
3 Hirsch, John L., Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy (Boulder – London: 
Lynne Rienner, 2001), 52–4.
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products in the nineteenth century did not lead to political centralisation. The region 
also knew little linguistic coherence; in the early nineteenth century, European 
missionaries complained that it made little sense to learn Temne as it was not a 
lingua franca among the northern languages.4 The fragmentation may explain 
4 Archives of the Church Missionary Society, University of Birmingham Library, Birmingham 
(cms), C A1/E5A – 95, Gustav Nylander, cms missionary, to Pratt, Secretary of the Church 
Missionary Society (without number), 19 Dec. 1816, 2; cms, C A1/E6 – 42, Nylander, Statement 

































































the absence of more detailed studies, as ‘Temne’ settlements such as Port Loko, 
Magbele, and Rokon, or rural political units such as Marampa, Koya, and 
Masimera, but also their non-Temne-speaking neighbours such as Morekania, 
Kalimodia, or Malghia, had only some thousand inhabitants each (Map 5). 
None of these small entities was a pre-colonial state in a larger sense.5
In contrast, once Sierra Leone had become independent, ethnicity as a cat-
egory was everywhere. The census of 1963 gave detailed statistics about ‘tribal 
groups’: from an estimate of 2.18 million inhabitants in the country, 30.9% 
were classified as Mende, and 29.8% as Temne; among the smaller ethnic com-
munities, 8.4% were Limba, 3.1% Susu, 3% Loko, 2.3% Mandinka, 2.2% ‘Kissi’, 
5 Fyfe, Christopher, A History of Sierra Leone (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962); Wylie, 
Kenneth C., The Political Kingdoms of the Temne: Temne Government in Sierra Leone 1825–1910 
(New York: Africana Publications, 1977), 92; Caulker, Patrick S., ‘Legitimate Commerce and 
Statecraft: A Study of the Hinterland Adjacent to Nineteenth-Century Sierra Leone’, Journal 




















































































Map 5 Northern Sierra Leone and Southern Guinea border regions
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and 1.9% Creole.6 Anthropological research from the colonial period, which 
had established stereotypes of dressing and walking styles of members of the 
different ethnic groups, also emphasised ‘tribal histories’ of migration.7 Those 
were subsequently transformed into ‘official’ narratives of the pre-colonial 
past.8 As Christopher Fyfe and Vernon Dorjahn have pointed out, this perspec-
tive overstated the idea of patterns of group migration.
In the colonial period, generalisations were more complicated, in spite of 
administrators’ wishes to establish clear categories.9 In colonial census data, 
‘the Mende’ and ‘the Temne’, as the large ethnic communities are categorised, 
are very unstable in size. Changes in ethnic identification, as reported in inter-
views, are enormous. Thus, in his Annual Report for 1922, the governor of Sierra 
Leone, Raymond Slater, claimed that ‘the Mendes are far more numerous than 
the other tribes’.10 Only one year later, the picture drawn by the same census 
officials was entirely different: there were suddenly many more ‘Temne’, and 
the administration reported near-parity between the two groups.11
Also, British administrators slowly learned that linguistic unity did not nec-
essarily mean cultural homogeneity: differences in family organisation 
between the Temne of the different regions of Karene, Bombali, Port Loko, and 
Koinadugu were remarkable.12 Even so, a stereotype of Temne-ness survived 
6 Devis, T.L.F., ‘Fertility Differentials among the Tribal Groups of Sierra Leone’, Population 
Studies 27(3), 1973, 501–14, 508, 513.
7 Little, Kenneth L., The Mende of Sierra Leone: A West African People in Transition (second 
edition, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967 [1951]), 70–1; Clarke, Robert, ‘Sketches of 
the Colony of Sierra Leone and Its Inhabitants’, Transactions of the Ethnological Society of 
London 2, 1863, 320–63, 325–7, 350–63.
8 Kup, Peter Alexander, ‘An Account of the Tribal Distribution of Sierra Leone’, Man 60, 
1960, 116–9, passim. The idea of massive migration into the coastal area has been ques-
tioned in Jones, Adam, ‘Who were the Vai?’, Journal of African History 22(1), 1981, 159–78, 
175–8; Dorjahn, Vernon R., and Christopher Fyfe, ‘Landlord and Stranger: Change in 
Tenancy Relations in Sierra Leone’, Journal of African History 3(3), 1962, 391–7, 393.
9 Renner, G.T., ‘Geographic Regions of Sierra Leone’, Economic Geography 7(1), 1931, 41–9, 
44–6.
10 tna, pro, CO/267/599, Slater, Governor of Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone: Annual General 
Report for 1922 (without number), without date.
11 tna, pro, CO/267/603, Sierra Leone: Annual General Report for 1923 (without number), 
without date, 2.
12 tna, pro, CO/267/595, Stanley, Provincial Commissioner of the Northern Province, 
[Report on the Northern Province] (without number), 12 April 1922, 2; Oyètádé, 
B. Akíntúndé, and Victor Fashole Luke, ‘Sierra Leone: Krio and the Quest for National 
Integration’, in Andrew Simpson (ed.), Language & National Identity in Africa (Oxford etc.: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 122–40, 126.
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into the post-colonial state. Moreover, in public discourse, Temne-speakers 
poured scorn upon the ‘savage’, and ‘generally backward and unclean’, Limba 
– a neighbouring group living in the north-eastern interior of Sierra Leone. 
They characterised the Mende-speakers as plunderers and marauders. 
Regarding the Loko, who mostly settled in close proximity to or jointly with 
Temne-speakers, the discourse was also unfriendly, and ‘Loko’ equated with 
potential slave.13
As in the case of the Wolof of Senegambia, interaction with neighbouring 
groups was also essential for the Temne of Sierra Leone, both in the late pre-
colonial and colonial periods. It is thus necessary to elaborate briefly on these 
communities. Like Temne-speakers in the north, the Mende-speakers were 
organised in rather small local communities without much centralisation, 
although the presence of female rulers constituted a difference.14 Settlements 
like Panguma, Bumpe, Mongeri, and Tikonko played a role in the political stabili-
sation of the region and regional commerce.15 Apart from that, Mende-speakers 
were particularly proud of their reputation as fearsome warriors, and they 
appeared as mercenaries in several of the conflicts in northern Sierra Leone. 
From the 1880s, British visitors called a certain region ‘Mendi-Land’, a label exclu-
sively based on language, as early missionaries in the coastal Sherbro had not 
even heard of the category of ‘Mende’.16 Early anthropological reports also point 
to a certain ‘fragmentation’ of Mende identifications: in the 1940s, Mende-
speakers in eastern Sierra Leone pointed to the inhabitants of the region of Kpaa 
Mende, the most renowned source of mercenaries, as being ‘not really Mende’ or 
13 Dorjahn, Vernon R., ‘Migration in central Sierra Leone: the Temne chiefdom of Kolifa 
Mayoso’, Africa 45(1), 1975, 29–49, 45–6. Temne-speakers did sometimes consider the 
‘Limba’ as part of the ‘Mandinka’ of the north, see tna, pro, CO/879/17, African 
Confidential Print No. 206, Lawson, Secretary of Native Affairs in Freetown, to Rowe, 
Governor of Sierra Leone (without number, Enclosure No. 1), without date; tna, pro, 
CO/879/15, African Confidential Print No. 173, Rowe to Hicks Beach, British Secretary of 
State for the Colonies (n° 200, in series as No. 11), 18 Dec. 1878, 2.
14 Jambai, Amara, and Carol MacCormack, ‘Maternal Health, War, and Religious Tradition: 
Authoritative Knowledge in Pujehun District, Sierra Leone’, Medical Anthropology 
Quarterly, New Series 10(2), 1996, 270–86, 279; Nyerges, A. Endre, ‘Ethnography in the 
Reconstruction of African Land Use Histories: A Sierra Leone Example’, Africa (London) 
66(1), 1996, 122–44; Day, Linda, ‘Nyarroh of Bandasuma, 1885–1914: A Reinterpretation of 
Female Chieftaincy in Sierra Leone’, Journal of African History 48(3), 2007, 415–37, 416–7, 
435–6.
15 Little, Mende, 29; Alldridge, T.J., ‘Wanderings in the Hinterland of Sierra Leone’, 
Geographical Journal 4(2), 1894, 123–40, 126.
16 cms, C A1/E7A – 52, Cates, cms missionary, to Pratt (without number), 19 April 1819, 1–2.
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‘half-Temne’. Even in the 1950s, the solidarities among Mende-speakers often 
concentrated on the local community. Mende-speakers had their own Poro 
secret societies, but those were not particularly linked to ethnic sentiment.17 
Only with the establishment of the slpp regime in the late 1950s is it possible to 
speak of a ‘Mende solidarity’, expressed in common voting behaviour.
The Limba-speakers in northern Sierra Leone were regarded, by many Sierra 
Leoneans, as a community of ‘deep autochthons’ – who lived in the country 
before all the other immigrants – and were both peaceful peasants and occa-
sional plunderers of caravans.18 Scholarly research tends to characterise this 
group in a simplified manner, as particularly homogeneous. However, during 
the nineteenth century, the Limba-speaking ruler, Almami Amadu Suluku, 
formed a small pre-colonial state in Biriwa ruling over a diverse group of 
inhabitants with a variety of languages.19 Group solidarity among the Limba 
was not automatic, and they had no exclusive political entity.
Communities of speakers from the Mande linguistic group have certainly 
been privileged by scholarly attention. This is particularly so for the Dyula 
family networks active in regional commerce in the river system, including 
Forékaria, Melikori, and the Skarcies Rivers. Dyula families also established 
political power and Islamic influence in some cases, and Dala Modu Dumbuya, 
a Dyula merchant and leader of warriors from the city of Wonkafong between 
1801 and 1841, was instrumental in this process.20 However, these conversion 
processes were sometimes slow and we have to avoid over-simplification: 
even the town centre of Wonkafong only became a Muslim settlement around 
1880, and other communities only converted under colonial rule later in the 
17 However, it is true that several expressions describing Mende Poro have been imported 
into the Temne language, see Turay, A.K., ‘Language contact: Mende and Temne – a case 
study’, Africana Marburgensia 11(1), 1978, 55–73, 56–7.
18 Fanthorpe, Richard, ‘Limba “Deep Rural” Strategies’, Journal of African History 39(1), 1998, 
15–38, 17–9.
19 Fyle, C. Magbaily, Almamy Suluku of Sierra Leone c. 1820–1906: The Dynamics of Political 
Leadership in Pre-Colonial Sierra Leone (London – Ibadan: Evans Brothers Ltd., 1979), 4–6, 
12–3; Finnegan, Ruth, ‘How to Do Things with Words: Performative Utterances Among the 
Limba of Sierra Leone’, Man, New Series 4(4), 1969, 537–52, 542–4.
20 tna, pro, CO/270/8, Reverend J. Bright, Journal of Mr. Bright’s Expedition to the Mandingo 
Country performed in Sept.r and Oct.r 1802 (without number), 50–1; cms, C A1/E1 – 57, 
Hartwig, cms missionary, to Pratt (without number), 10 May 1806; Skinner, David E., 
‘Islam and Education in the Colony and Hinterland of Sierra Leone (1750–1914)’, Canadian 
Journal of African Studies 10(3), 1976, 499–520, 501; Skinner, David E., ‘Mande Settlement 
and the Development of Islamic Institutions in Sierra Leone’, International Journal of 
African Historical Studies 11(1), 1978, 32–62, 35–7, 47.
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twentieth century.21 Although we do find cultural transfer, as Temne-speaking 
rulers took part of their titles and government terminology, but also ideas of 
social stratification, from Mande models, Temne Islam remained integrated in 
local cults and Poro practices.22 Moreover, even with gradual Islamisation 
amongst the Temne-speakers, the role of Muslim preachers was strongly iden-
tified with a ‘Mandinka ethnicity’.23 But itinerant preachers ultimately made 
considerable progress in the northern part of the Protectorate, and the Temne-
speaking regions of late colonial and post-colonial Sierra Leone therefore 
became predominantly Muslim.24
From their first encounters with European diplomats and representa-
tives, Susu, Yalunka, Mandinka, and Koranko spokesmen had periodically 
insisted on being part of a larger ‘Mandingo group’.25 In northern Sierra 
Leone, ‘Mandinka’ and ‘Susu’ appear as the adversaries of the Temne-
speaking populations for much of the nineteenth century. Susu-speaking 
war leaders exerted strong pressure on Temne communities and conquered 
important settlements inhabited by large groups of Temne-speakers, like 
Port Loko and Kambia. Then, in the twentieth century, both the Susu and 
the Mandinka found themselves cut off from the political life of Sierra 
Leone by the colonial border between this colony and the French territory 
of Guinea-Conakry.
Urban experiences through migration from an early date brought Temne-
speaking individuals into contact with other groups from more distant regions. 
The larger town centres of the Temne-speaking zones – such as Kambia, Port 
Loko, Rokel, or Magbele – were too close to the Sierra Leone Peninsula and, in 
21 tna, pro, CO/879/18, African Confidential Print No. 226, Simineh Simba, Translation of a 
letter written in Arabic addressed to his Excellency the Administrator-in-Chief, from King 
Simminee Simba, of the Soombuyah Country. (without number), 3 Dec. 1880, 1.
22 Anwyl, T.C., ‘The Timne and Other Tribes of Sierra Leone’, Journal of the Royal African 
Society 16(61), 1916, 36–51, 38–40; Wylie, Kenneth, ‘The Influence of the Mande on Temne 
Political Institutions: Aspects of Political Acculturation’, International Journal of African 
Historical Studies 7(2), 1974, 255–71, 261, 265.
23 Alldridge, T.J., ‘Wanderings’, 136–7.
24 Yambasu, Sahr J., ‘Order and Disorder: the Mende and Missionary Case’, Paideuma 39, 
1993, 111–34, 115–9.
25 tna, pro, CO/267/595, Stanley, [Report on the Northern Province] (without number), 
12 April 1922, 2; Jackson, Michael, The Kuranko: Dimensions of Social Reality in a West 
African Society (London: Hurst, 1977), 1–4; Bah, M. Alpha, Fulbe Presence in Sierra Leone: 
A Case of Twentieth-Century Migration and Settlement among the Kissi of Koindu 
(New  York etc.: Peter Lang, 1988), 44–6.
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the nineteenth century, uninteresting as an alternative for immigration.26 
Therefore, migrants concentrated in Freetown. In the urban settlement under 
British rule, alliances between different inhabitants were possible, for example 
against Lebanese merchants who became victims of violent mobs.27 Even so, 
as in Senegambia, urban settings could also strengthen an ethnic solidarity 
based on professional identification, as for the Kru community from the south, 
who specialised in navigation and piloting.
Temne-speaking regions were politically unstable, partly because of their 
participation in the slave trade and the creation of slave villages that occasion-
ally turned against the Temne rulers. Instability expressed itself in widespread 
plundering campaigns, comparable again to Senegambia. Localised wars thus 
dominated much of the nineteenth century.28
In the next sections of this chapter, I will analyse the evolution of solidari-
ties between different Temne-speaking groups north of Freetown when faced 
with the colonial presence. As we have seen, the Temne case is one where any 
stronger pre-colonial state structures were notably absent – and thus an 
important example. The methodological approach to the discussion of pre-
colonial Temne identifications will be slightly different to that of the cases of 
the Wolof and the Ewe. The documentation relevant to a study on the Temne 
still mainly comes from British archives, although additional analyses have 
been carried out at the Sierra Leone National Archives.
In the early nineteenth century, British residents in Sierra Leonean territory 
were much more active than the French in Senegal. The colony of Freetown 
and its population of ‘liberated slaves’ played the crucial role in this respect, as 
they treated the ‘Temne’ regions as the ‘hinterland’ of this settler colony.29  
26 Riddell, J. Barry, and Milton E. Harvey, ‘The Urban System in the Migration Process: An 
Evaluation of Step-Wise Migration in Sierra Leone’, Economic Geography 48(3), 1972, 
270–83, 279.
27 Abdullah, ‘Rethinking’, 210–1.
28 Rashid, Ismail, ‘Escape, Revolt and Marronage in 18th and 19th century Sierra Leone’, Canadian 
Journal of African Studies 34(3), 2000, 656–83, 664–8; Mouser, Bruce L., ‘Rebellion, Marronage 
and Jihād: Strategies of Resistance to Slavery on the Sierra Leone Coast, c. 1783–1796’, Journal 
of African History 48(1), 2007, 27–44, 38; Mouser, Bruce L., ‘Trade, Coasters, and Conflict in the 
Rio Pongo from 1790 to 1808’, Journal of African History 14(3), 1973, 45–64, 56–8.
29 Sibanda, M.J.M., ‘Dependency and Underdevelopment in Northwestern Sierra Leone, 
1896–1939’, African Affairs 78(313), 1979, 481–92, 481; Wyse, Akintola J.G., ‘The Sierra Leone 
Branch of the National Congress of British West Africa, 1918–1946’, International Journal of 
African Historical Studies 18(4), 1985, 675–98, 684; Eluwa, G.I.C., ‘Background to the 
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The liberated slaves or ‘Creoles’ residing in the settlement represented just as 
much of a crucial factor in the process as white administrators.30
The Temne-speakers living close to the Freetown peninsula initially 
attempted to destroy the settlement, and the 1790s and early 1800s were char-
acterised by regional wars.31 The British administration therefore depended 
upon comparatively good information about its neighbours, and detailed 
reports on group identifications already existing in the nineteenth century. 
The British also set up networks, which had the function of opening trade 
routes and facilitating contacts with different communities. Through these 
activities, British residents rapidly knew that the region lacked stronger pre-
colonial state structures, except the Almaminate (or ‘federation’) of Morea 
some fifty kilometres to the north, which appeared as a composition of many 
different communities.32 In the political networks of this region, Susu- and 
Mandinka-speakers were the more prominent among the rulers, but several 
local leaders spoke Temne, Bullom, Sherbro or Loko as their first language. It is 
also questionable, in the context of the early nineteenth century, to speak of a 
Mande-Dyula ‘nationalism’. The British would have wished to classify local 
populations into clear-cut ‘tribal’ groups, such as ‘Mandingo’ and ‘Soosoo’, but 
in most cases of local warfare, the smaller political units were the decisive 
Emergence of the National Congress of British West Africa’, African Studies Review 14(2), 
1971, 205–18, 206–8.
30 Goerg, Odile, ‘From Hill Station (Freetown) to Downtown Conakry (First Ward): 
Comparing French and British Approaches to Segregation in Colonial Cities at the 
Beginning of the Twentieth Century’, Canadian Journal of African Studies 32(1), 1998, 1–31, 
11–2; cms, C A1/O 83/1, John Henry Davies, cms native catechist, [Report from Magbele 
1857] (without number), without date [1857], 1, 10–1.
31 Deveneaux, Gustav, ‘The turbulent frontier: aspects of relations between the colony of 
Sierra Leone and Koya, 1787–1890’, Africana Research Bulletin (Fourah Bay, Sierra Leone) 15, 
1981, 81–125, 90.
32 In 1879, the Almami Bokari of Morea claimed that the Bullom and the Digsing Temne – 
the northernmost Temne-speaking group – had been subjects of the rulers of the federa-
tion for over 200 years already! This might be exaggerated, but at least it shows the 
conception of the Federation of Morea as a ‘multi-ethnic entity’, see tna, pro, CO/879/17, 
African Confidential Print No. 206, Statement of accredited Messenger from Alimamy 
Bocarry with reference to the Island of Matacong (without number, Sub-Enclosure No. 5.), 
18 July 1879, 2; Mouser, Bruce L., ‘Continuing British Interest in Coastal Guinea-Conakry 
and the Fuuta Jaloo Highlands (1750 to 1850)’, Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines 43(172), 2003, 
761–90, 771–3; Howard, Allen M., ‘The Relevance of Spatial Analysis for African Economic 
History: The Sierra Leone-Guinea System’, Journal of African History 17(3), 1976, 365–88, 
370–2; McGowan, Winston, ‘The Establishment of Long-Distance Trade between Sierra 
Leone and Its Hinterland, 1787–1821’, Journal of African History 31(1), 1990, 25–41, 30–2.
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point of reference.33 Timbo in the Fuuta Jallon constituted perhaps the most 
notable exception to this pattern. While coastal communities with Muslim rul-
ers accepted for part of the nineteenth century the religious overlordship of 
the Almami to whom they gave the honorary title of abbas, they nevertheless 
referred to the inhabitants of the Fuuta Jallon as ‘Fula plunderers’. However, 
this was probably by far the strongest ethnic line drawn in the region, and its 
effects were exceptional.34
British activities against the slave trade intensified European contact with 
groups in the region, as it was part of the anti-slavery strategy to convince local 
rulers of the advantages of alternative forms of production and to open new 
trade routes. Ironically, the new restrictions on the slave trade led to more brutal 
practices of enslavement and to the imprisonment of a large number of victims 
concentrated in one place. They also provoked more violent wars.35 This again 
drew the British more closely into the political developments of the broader 
region beyond the Freetown Peninsula, and led to more interaction with Temne-
speakers. Much of this interaction was initially carried out by ‘Creole’ officials 
working for the colonial government, who introduced their own opinions into 
the discussion and generally regarded local populations as ‘primitive’. In the 
second half of the nineteenth century, Creoles like J.C.E. Parkes and Thomas 
George Lawson held the post of Secretary of Native Affairs of the Sierra Leone 
33 Mouser, Bruce L., ‘The 1805 Forékariah Conference: A Case of Political Intrigue, Economic 
Advantage, Network Building’, History in Africa 25, 1998, 219–62; cms, C A1/E1 – 57, 
Hartwig, cms Missionary at Wonkafong, to Pratt, cms Secretary (without number), 
10 May 1806, 1; cms, C A1/E3 – 39, Renner, cms Missionary at Bashia, to Pratt (without 
number), 24 Dec. 1812, 1–4; Keese, Alexander, ‘Who’s King Tom? Being a “Temne”, 
“Mandinka”, or “Susu” between identity, solidarity and ethnic shifts in early nineteenth-
century Sierra Leone’, in Alexander Keese (ed.), Ethnicity and the long-term perspective: the 
African Experience (Berne  etc.: Peter Lang, 2010), 191–211, 206–8.
34 tna, pro, CO/267/149, Campbell, Governor of Sierra Leone, to Glenelg, British Secretary 
of State for War and the Colonies (without number), 19 May 1838, 19.
35 Bethell, Leslie, ‘The mixed commission for the suppression of the Trans-Atlantic slave 
trade in the nineteenth century’, Journal of African History 7(1), 1966, 79–93, 80–82; Turano, 
Maria, ‘La commission mixte luso-britannique à Boa Vista et le procès du bateau “Leão”’, 
in Centro de Estudos Africanos da Universidade do Porto (ed.), Trabalho forçado africano 
– articulações com o poder político (Porto: Campo de Letras, 2007), 117–34, 117–8; Howard, 
Allen M., ‘Nineteenth-Century Coastal Slave Trading and the British Abolition Campaign 
in Sierra Leone’, Slavery & Abolition 27(1), 2006, 23–49, 32; Wylie, Kingdoms, 62; Siddle, 




Colony and strongly influenced the colonial view on local communities.36 Even 
so, before the 1870s, much of the contact with the Temne was still based on a 
foundation of diplomatic exchange rather than domination.
The creation of the Protectorate in Sierra Leone in 1898 changed the politi-
cal scenery. Firstly, within the organisation of the colonial presence at the end 
of the nineteenth century, it is possible to speak of the end of Creole influ-
ence in the colonial administration. A new racist tendency undermined the 
role of the ‘Creoles’, although it was somewhat mitigated by the lobbying of 
‘Creole intellectuals’ and Christian networks.37 Even so, in the interwar 
period, the Freetown Creoles reappeared as leaders of political movements 
and as  activists in strikes and social protests, which partly spilled over into 
the Protectorate.38 Secondly, the creation of the Protectorate entrenched the 
position of important paramount chiefs. However, Creole politicians quickly 
learned how to use bodies like the Legislative Council to their benefit. In 
terms of flows of information and discussion about identifications, information 
was now more consistently transmitted by immigrants to Freetown coming 
from the Protectorate. Moreover, sons of ‘native chiefs’ enjoyed education in 
Fourah Bay (now part of Freetown), in Bo, and other college institutions, which 
guaranteed the link between the urban centres and the rural constituencies.39
Between the Second World War and the independence of Sierra Leone in 
1961, the dominant position of Creoles in emergent politics was undermined. 
Administrators, who feared Communist infiltration in the colony, were partic-
ularly negative about the Creole ‘educated natives’ of Freetown, such as party 
leader Isaac T.A. Wallace-Johnson.40 The removal of the boundary between 
‘Colony’ and ‘Protectorate’ was a means to neutralise Creole influence. The 
Freetown elites attempted nevertheless to broaden their support base in the 
36 Hargreaves, John D., ‘The Establishment of the Sierra Leone Protectorate and the 
Insurrection of 1898’, Cambridge Historical Journal 12(1), 1956, 56–80, 58; Howard, ‘Trading’, 
38; Skinner, David E., Thomas George Lawson: African Historian and Administrator in 
Sierra Leone (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1980), 43–9.
37 Goerg, Odile, ‘Between Everyday Life and Exception: Celebrating Pope Hennessy Day in 
Freetown, 1872–c. 1905, Journal of African Cultural Studies 15(1), 2002, 119–31, 123; Fyfe, 
Christopher, and David Killingray, ‘A Memorable Gathering of Sierra Leonians in London, 
1919’, African Affairs 88(350), 1989, 41–6, 44–5; Hair, P.E.H., ‘Africanism: The Freetown 
Contribution’, Journal of Modern African Studies 5(4), 1967, 521–39, 533.
38 Goerg, Odile, ‘Sierra Leonais, Créoles, Krio: La Dialectique de l’Identité’, Africa 65(1), 1995, 
114–32, 117–9.
39 Wyse, Akintola J.G., The Krio of Sierra Leone (London: Hurst, 1989), 105–11.
40 Spitzer, Leo, and LaRay Denzer, ‘I.T.A. Wallace-Johnson and the West African Youth 
League’, International Journal of African Historical Studies 6(3), 1973, 413–52, 422.
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1951 and 1957 elections. The Creole-dominated United Progressive Party (upp) 
showed some successful resistance against the progress of the slpp, a party 
with rural support bases, and won a number of Protectorate seats in the elec-
tions. However, with the help of the British administration, Milton Margai’s 
party in the end began to dominate the institutions in the territory.41 This led 
to a retreat of the Creole elite from politics, and to their concentration on elite 
posts in the administration, education and the economic sector, where they 
could still profit from their advantages of formal school graduation. Only after 
1964 did tendencies towards a full removal of the political opposition awaken 
the resistance of the Creole inhabitants of the capital and the peninsula. 
Influential members of Freetown’s Creole elite contributed to a paving of the 
way for Siaka Stevens to take political power.42 This shows that the particular 
culture of Creole activity from the capital remained influential during the 
interwar period, decolonisation, and into the post-colonial Sierra Leonean 
state. Creoles continued to influence strongly the ways in which political dis-
courses were formulated, and they thus had an impact on the manner in which 
the different parts of Sierra Leonean society would describe themselves. The 
Temne were the first to borrow categories and concepts of group cohesion to 
present themselves as an ethnic group with a common destiny.
 Living at Knifepoint: The Silent Temne Majority in Northern Sierra 
Leone, 1820–1850
The experiences of Temne group identification in the period before the colo-
nial conquest were therefore shaped by a complex interplay of relations to 
neighbouring linguistic communities, which involved cultural contact with 
Creoles in Freetown. Political entities were frequently fragmented. This situa-
tion needs to be contrasted with claims by Temne-speakers to have a common 
culture of political institutions, a common tradition of land rights and customs 
of land use, and various founding myths propelled into a legendary past. In 
Temne accounts collected in the early twentieth century, only the ‘Bai’ were 
regarded as sovereign political rulers, while the positions of ‘Alkali’, ‘Pa Suba’, 
41 Wyse, Akintola, H.C. Bankole-Bright and Politics in Colonial Sierra Leone 1919–1958 
(Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 133–62.
42 Allen, Christopher, ‘Sierra Leone Politics since Independence’, African Affairs 67(269), 
1968, 305–29, 308, 314; Riley, Stephen, and Trevor W. Parfitt, ‘Party or Masquerade? The All 




and ‘Santigi’ were understood to be clearly subordinate functions. In the nine-
teenth century, however, such a vision was as idyllic and fictional as the idea of 
six ‘original’ Temne sub-groups, which is sometimes discussed in ‘traditional’ 
accounts.43 British travellers regularly obtained information about an earlier, 
more united Temne nation – but this was obviously what they were looking for! 
For some of the more ambitious Temne-speaking rulers, as in Port Loko or 
Masimera, this was also an occasion to formulate claims as informants.44
Organisation of access to land may explain the political fragmentation of 
Temne communities. Collective control over land, in the sense of the ‘crown 
lands’ of Senegambia, was rare. Land was mainly organised through its indi-
vidual use and possession by free men, an arrangement in which the local rul-
ers could rarely interfere. Such land practices are in contradiction to the 
practice of lambê that regards the land as principally leased by the rulers – a 
practice that had disappeared at least by the end of the nineteenth century.45 
With regard to origin legends, it is striking that founding myths contained very 
little about autochtony (like for Wolof-speakers) or long-distance migration 
(like for Ewe-speakers). Some of the Sierra Leone Creoles, as discussed by a 
member of the Freetown elite, depicted the Temne as identical with the ‘Mane’ 
– but they relied, as ‘authority’ on this apparently vanished group, on the clas-
sic seventeenth-century account by the French merchant Jean Barbot, and 
attempted to bolster the position of their linguistic community by the alleged 
link to the legendary conquerors.46
Traditions collected by British administrators in the late nineteenth century 
appear to reflect the tense relations between Susu-speakers and Temne-
speakers during a good part of this century: in fact, some Temne-speaking 
informants claimed that the Temne had been able to push the Susu coastwards 
over a period.47 Esu Biyi, one of the important Creole informants of the 1910s, 
referred to such an account: it claimed that the Temne-speakers had formerly 
lived in the vicinity of the Rio Nuñez, namely in Melikori, but had been driven 
out by Susu and Mandinka groups. The categories employed, however, remain 
43 Schlenker, C.F., A Collection of Temne Traditions, Fables and Proverbs with an English 
Translation;…(London: Church Missionary Society, 1861), iv–vi, 3–13; Biyi, Esu, ‘The Temne 
People and How They Make Their Kings’, Journal of the Royal African Society 12(46), 1913, 
190–9, 192–3, 198–9.
44 Griffith, T.R., ‘On the Races Inhabiting Sierra Leone’, Journal of the Anthropological 
Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 16, 1887, 300–10, 304–5.
45 Anwyl, ‘Timne’, 47; Biyi, Esu, ‘Temne Land Tenure’, Journal of the Royal African Society 
12(48), 1913, 407–20, 411.
46 Biyi, ‘People’, 191–192.
47 Anwyl, ‘Timne’, 37.
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vague.48 While the formulation of a history of origins with regard to the groups 
remains therefore sketchy, the evolution of Temne group sentiment, which had 
such a huge impact on the political panorama of the post-colonial country, 
must be sought in a long process of conflicts within pre-colonial and colonial 
experiences.
We can find information about Temne-speakers in European reports before 
1787. The label ‘Temne’ existed already in the sixteenth century, but accounts 
concerning the Sierra Leone coast switch repeatedly between this and other 
labels. Accounts of major events, such as the so-called ‘invasion’ of the ‘Mane’, 
suggest that there may have been a different or overarching group identifica-
tion described as ‘Sape’, but its long-term influence is unclear.49 Some slaves 
transported into the Caribbean by the British Royal Africa Company – present 
on Bance Island from 1678 – were sold as ‘Temne’ in the eighteenth century, but 
it remains unclear what this label referred to.50
In the first half of the nineteenth century, the British near-obsessive effort to 
create ‘open trade routes’, and to finish with slavery and the sale of slaves alto-
gether, led to increased information on the ‘hinterland’ of Freetown.51 British 
administrators hoped to mediate in conflicts and to create zones of fertile pro-
duction and of importation of useful trade goods, to benefit the interests of the 
metropolitan industry. Slowly, this gave an increasing impression of local soli-
darities. Initially, the missionaries of the Church Missionary Society were the 
main contact partners for Temne-speaking communities in the area of Port 
Loko or further northwards. The cms organised teaching in the Creole villages 
of the Sierra Leone Peninsula, but also created mission stations in different 
parts of the ‘hinterland’ of Freetown, including in the Temne-speaking settle-
ments such as Port Loko and, for a period, Magbele and Kambia. Missionaries 
were not really concerned with political relations, and they usually only inter-
acted with different rulers when they had to travel overland and needed to 
receive permits and food rations. In the second half of the nineteenth century, 
48 Biyi, ‘Temne’, 192–3.
49 Brooks, George E., Eurafricans in Western Africa: Commerce, Social Status, Gender, and 
Religious Observance from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century (Athens/oh: Ohio 
University Press – London: James Currey, 2003), 167; Hair, ‘Continuity’, 254–5.
50 Rodney, History, 229; Hall, Douglas, In Miserable Slavery: Thomas Thistlewood in Jamaica 
1750–86 (Kingston: University of West Indies Press, 1999 [1750–1786]), 135.
51 For an account of slave villages in the Port Loko area from the 1850s to the 1870s, see the 
report of active cms missionaries in cms, C A1/O 83/1, John Henry Davies, cms native 
catechist, [Report from Magbele 1857] (without number), without date [1857], 4–5; cms, 
CA1/0 60/55, Reverend Archdell Burtchaell, Six days itinerance in the Temne Country from 
Port Loko to Mangay (without number), 16 June 1879, 3, 7.
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‘native pastors’ educated by the mission partly replaced the white missionar-
ies, but they did not get into the leading positions.52 In spite of the lack of 
interest of the cms personnel in political matters, they were, however, inter-
ested in the linguistic affiliations of villagers in the region, as they were engaged 
in translating their catechisms into Temne, Susu, and Bullom.
Regional solidarities were changed in the second half of the nineteenth cen-
tury by the decline of the Federation of Morea. The Almami had always had to 
create his own alliances with chiefs within his own federation. After 1850, this 
ruler and his allies found themselves in a weak bargaining position in negotia-
tions with French and British diplomats who were attempting to establish a 
protectorate over Forékaria. For the Temne-speaking rulers, and their Susu-
speaking or Limba-speaking colleagues, the room for manoeuvre increased. 
Local authorities from now on turned to the British administration in Freetown.
With the exception of certain groups during the succession in Morea and 
around the wars with the Freetown Colony after 1800, the different Temne-
speakers involved in these wars had been little inclined to employ ethnic iden-
tifications as criterion for mobilisation. In this, the Temne-speakers of northern 
Sierra Leone were at a clear disadvantage in comparison with the Susu, and the 
Fulbe of the Fuuta Jallon Highlands. British travellers normally identified the 
Temne-speaking inhabitants of the Koya region as members of one homoge-
neous ‘Timanee’ tribe, but this tendency was clearly a simplification for 
European convenience. cms missionaries touring these villages make it clear 
that their inhabitants did not normally speak about larger group solidarities.53
However, the Temne of Koya were faced with pressures exerted by the 
Freetown settlers, and needed strategies to cope with this situation. They grad-
ually turned existing linguistic ties into categories according to ethnicity. As in 
the case of Port Loko, mobilisation under the ethnic label allowed conditions 
to be improved in war-torn Koya, in the face of a growing Creole settler pres-
ence. The behaviour of Temne-speakers on Bance Island, the small British set-
tlement originally set up for slave-trading purposes, is instructive in this 
respect: to build a military alliance with different Temne-speaking leaders on 
the mainland in 1809, they insisted on their common roots.54
52 Lynch, Hollis R., ‘The Native Pastorate Controversy and Cultural Ethno-Centrism in Sierra 
Leone 1871–1874’, Journal of African History 5(3), 1964, 395–413, 409–10.
53 cms, C A1/E7 – 99, Johnson, cms missionary, Journal of an Excursion taken by Mr. Johnson 
J.B. Cates, Wm. Tamba & others round the Colony of Sierra Leone (without number), with-
out date [January 1819], 24–5.
54 tna, pro, CO/267/28, Thompson, Governor of Sierra Leone, to White, Governor of Cape 
Coast (without number), 8 Nov. 1809, 1; tna, pro, CO/267/28, Sierra Leone Legislative 
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Otherwise, on the European side, the vision of the Temne as a cultural and 
political bloc prevailed. British officials in Freetown were convinced that land 
questions between the Creole settlements under British rule and their neigh-
bours in Koya, or problems existing between Freetown and adjacent commu-
nities, could be negotiated through general ‘tribal’ agreements.55 Some of the 
Temne-speaking chiefs understood this particular ‘tribal character’ of British 
interpretations and attempted to draw individual profit out of it. These chiefs 
in some negotiations claimed to have an authoritative voice to speak ‘for all 
Temne’: in 1819, the Temne-speaking headmen from Koya, Pa London and Ka 
Canko, attempted to improve their weak bargaining position, and thus to 
maintain some access to land in negotiations with the governor in Freetown, 
Charles MacCarthy. To bolster their standing in these negotiations they claimed 
to represent a ‘tribal Temne King’, Pa Naimbana.56
Such rhetorical tactics, which initially were no more than instrumental, had 
still little to do with the political realities in the coastal areas north of the 
Freetown Peninsula, where incursions by armed groups remained common-
place. Thus, in 1826, various coastal populations mobilised in a large alliance 
against the pillaging campaigns of a member of the local Tina family, Amurati, 
who, as a Dyula, had started to control a considerable part of the coastline. 
Bullom-speakers and Susu-speakers used ethnic arguments; Temne-speaking 
rulers who had entered this alliance only selectively, normally did not. Amurati 
was finally defeated by a ‘multi-ethnic’ coalition, and his own Tina kinship net-
work let him down; it did not help Amurati to be a ‘Mandinka’, as other 
Mandinka-speaking chiefs joined the camp of his opponents. Ethnic allegiance 
was not a reliable factor.57
In the following decades, British intermediaries attempted to organise 
meetings, bringing together various groups. British officials intervened in the 
selection of the new ruler (Alkali) of Port Loko in 1825, and British arbitration 
was also decisive in 1826, when Almami Amura stepped down and a new ruler 
had to be elected.58 European residents believed they mainly had to arbitrate 
between Mandinka-speaking and Susu-speaking rulers, and hoped that, in the 
Council, Council Session (without number), 14 Oct. 1809, 1. Fyfe, History, 108–9, relates the 
riots on the island, but omits to mention the attempts at creating a Temne solidarity with 
mainland populations.
55 tna, pro, CO/267/47, MacCarthy to Bathurst (n° 208), 19 July 1819, 2.
56 tna, pro, CO/267/49, MacCarthy, Pa London and Ka Canko, Convention (without num-
ber), 5 May 1819.
57 tna, pro, CO/267/72, Macauley, Governor of Sierra Leone, to Bathurst (n° 57), 4 July 1826, 1–3.
58 tna, pro, CO/267/72, Macauley to Bathurst (n° 57), 4 July 1826, 6–8.
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meantime, the Temne-speaking rulers would accept and abide by these agree-
ments. Indeed, the Temne-speakers initially retained a low profile in the con-
flicts about the internal relations within Morea.
However, constant warfare in the 1830s, partly fuelled by slave-raiding, 
changed the whole political panorama. In 1836, the political situation in the 
triangle between the Sierra Leone Peninsula, the city of Forékaria and the 
Rokel River had become so insecure that a general peace conference was desir-
able to many of the local rivals for power. These leaders seem to have become 
exasperated with the permanent threat of destruction that hung over their 
communities. The governor of Sierra Leone, Henry Dundas Campbell, was 
chosen as a neutral intermediary, and he attempted to identify and invite the 
maximum number of different groups to negotiate.59 The peace conference 
was held in the town of Magbele. Dala Modu Dumbuya, the Susu-speaking 
chief of Madina, most formidable ally of the British in the north and major 
spokesmen of the peace initiative, described the meeting as an ‘all-ethnic con-
ference’: ‘the foulahs, Soosoos, Bundues and all the countries join with the 
Timanees, and said we put our Country in Your [Campbell’s] hands’, Dala 
Modu stated.60 Most of the other participants also assured the British that this 
was a previously unknown inter-group initiative.
The British side was clearly too optimistic that a ‘tribal’ solidarity amongst 
the Temne would help to solve the conflicts. They believed that the Temne as 
one ‘nation’ or ‘tribe’ would be able to end the conflicts if they only wanted to. 
These misinterpretations explain in part the resulting confusion.61 A paradig-
matic event was the destruction of the ‘Forékaria Fence’ stockade, where bat-
tles had continued. A column of Royal African Corps soldiers of West Indian 
origins and a local ruler, Bai Sherbro of Kafu Bullom, burnt down the place, 
with the British commander, Lieutenant Findlay, believing that this was neces-
sary to expel ‘foreign’ marauders.62 This led to uproar amongst the allies of the 
defeated party at the peace conference, and Campbell had to set up for Findlay 
a local ad hoc court and to discuss with the different leaders their interpreta-
tions of local politics. The discussions confirmed that networks of different 
59 tna, pro, CO/267/149, Campbell to Glenelg (without number), 19 May 1838, 1–2; Fyfe, 
History, 205–6.
60 tna, pro, CO/267/149, Campbell, Investigation relative to the Complaints of Namina 
Seacka, Bocary Soree and Maly and the destruction of the Fouricaria Fence (n° 865), 24 April 
1837, 48–9.
61 tna, pro, CO/267/149, Group of Freetown traders to Dala Mahomadu, Chief of Madina 
(without number), 21 Jan. 1837, 1.
62 tna, pro, CO/267/149, Campbell to Benwick, Captain of Royal African Corps (without 
number), 28 April 1837, 1–3.
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rulers, such as those of Fatima Brima of Port Loko or the Bai Sherbro, were 
essential in the region, not membership of local ethnic entities. The few 
instances of recourse to ethnocultural labels were largely confused (e.g. the 
British commander of the operation erroneously described the Susu-speaking 
general Dala Mahomadu as ‘one of the leading men belonging to the Limba 
Army’).63 ‘Limba’ and ‘Loko’ were not present; the ‘Loko’ and their ruler, 
Bancha, were described as ‘warlike’ and dangerous; the ‘Limba’ as ‘savages’ and 
‘slave-catchers’.64 Mandinka-speakers occasionally described themselves as 
being a group apart, and they were threatened – as a particularly strong ‘other’ 
– by headmen and warriors from Port Loko and from the Kafu Bullom.65 Even 
so, at Forékaria Fence, one leader, Mali, as a Mandinka, cooperated with two 
Temne-speaking rulers, Namina Siaka and Boba Sori – as they pointed out 
when they testified as witnesses at the Magbele peace conference.66
Ethnic tropes were important concerning the Fulbe, who were conceived as 
a dangerous group, as the Almamis of the Fuuta Jallon were not only the mas-
ters of regional commerce, but also inclined to send punitive expeditions. 
There was no envoy of the ruler of Fuuta Jallon present in Magbele, but the fear 
of the ‘Fulas’ remained omnipresent. An important additional motive for the 
peace conference was to prevent yet another Fulbe incursion.67 But the win-
ners of the peace conference were Susu-speaking communities of the north-
ern riverine areas, who were not only successful in slowly conquering villages 
of Limba-speakers, but also in portraying these activities as defending them-
selves against dangerous ‘savages’ – while many of the rulers present were 
63 Fyfe, History, p. 206, regards the background story as an ethnic war ‘between Susu and 
Limba’. See also tna, pro, CO/267/149, Findlay, Lieutenant of Royal African Corps, 
[Detailed Report of Lieutenant Findlay] (without number), 20 April 1837, 7–8; tna, pro, 
CO/267/149, Findlay to Benwick (without number), 23 April 1837, 1.
64 tna, pro, CO/267/149, Campbell to Glenelg (without number), 19 May 1838, 12.
65 tna, pro, CO/267/149, Findlay, [Report of Operation to Fouricaria] (without number), 27 
March 1837, 5–6; tna, pro, CO/267/149, Findlay, [Detailed Report of Lieutenant Findlay] 
(without number), 20 April 1837, 20; tna, pro, CO/267/149, Campbell, Investigation rela-
tive to the Complaints…(n° 865), 24 April 1837, 103; tna, pro, CO/267/149, Copley, [Report] 
(without number), without date, 2.
66 tna, pro, CO/267/149, Abbott to Copley, both captains of Royal African Corps (without 
number), 9 April 1837, 1; tna, pro, CO/267/149, Findlay, [Detailed Report of Lieutenant 
Findlay] (without number), 20 April 1837, 18; tna, pro, CO/267/149, Findlay, Statement of 
Bogoro Sorey (without number), without date; tna, pro, CO/267/149, Campbell, 
Investigation…(n° 865), 24 April 1837, 59.
67 tna, pro, CO/267/149, Investigation, 15; Howard, ‘Trading’, 28; tna, pro, CO/267/149, 
Campbell to Benwick (without number), 25 April 1837; tna, pro, CO/267/149, Campbell, 
Investigation…(n° 865), 24 April 1837, 4.
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sceptical about the activities of the rulers further north, they at least agreed on 
the negative vision of Limba populations.68 Fatima Brima of Port Loko also 
was on the winning side: he managed to convince the British that he was a kind 
of spokesman of the Temne-speakers. During the negotiations in Magbele, the 
different sides used interpreters, although many individuals appear to have 
been well able to communicate in either language. The ostentatious use of 
competing languages during the deliberations was a ploy to mark group 
difference.69
The peace agreement of Magbele, signed by all regional leaders, brought 
only a temporary relaxation of tensions. Over the whole of the 1840s, the inter-
est of the involved parties was not great enough to find a formula to ban the 
use of force. As long as life on a knife-edge continued from the point of view of 
most local communities, questions of ethnic hostilities were indeed not the 
decisive obstacle to a general peace: Temne-speakers fought Temne-speakers, 
Susu-speakers were engaged in warfare against other Susu-speakers, with only 
the ‘savage’ others, namely the Limba, being shunned as alliance partners in 
ways that were formulated through ethnic stereotypes. From the 1850s, how-
ever, successive waves of still more unbounded military violence emerged in 
the power vacuum left in the north by the decline of the federation of Morea. 
These regional events led to an increase in the use of ethnic formulae.
 ‘Susu Invasions’, Larger Alliances, and the Integration of the Temne 
into the British Sphere of Power, 1850–1875
On the whole, the situation in the riverine north of Sierra Leone had remained 
unstable in the first half of the nineteenth century, and changing military alli-
ances and the predominance of small political units in the area prevented soli-
darity among Temne-speakers. Identifications in the region were relatively 
fluid. In regions such as Kolifa Mayoso, the clan and family histories of indi-
viduals indicated mixed Temne, Susu, Koranko and other origins, giving a pic-
ture that resisted clear distinctions and stereotypes.70
The battles for the city of Kambia and the adjacent region in the 1850s con-
stituted a turning point, as they stirred up a wave of cooperation between 
68 tna, pro, WO/32/7620, War Office, Intelligence Branch, Précis of Information concerning 
the Colony of Sierra Leone (without number), 1887, 8.
69 tna, pro, CO/267/149, Campbell, Investigation…(n° 865), 24 April 1837, 6, 70–1, 73, 92–3, 
111.
70 Dorjahn, ‘Migration’, 36.
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Temne-speakers. This led, just before the British conquest starting in the 1870s, 
to a clearer feeling of mutual solidarity between members of these communi-
ties. Such experiences coincided with the effects of Temne immigration into 
the urban area of Freetown, where the colonial administration increasingly 
pressured immigrants into following the category of ‘tribal’ identification. 
Already in the decades before, British clerks had begun to count the escaped 
slaves from adjacent regions according to a simplified ethnic background 
model: they were defined as ‘Kosso’, ‘Temne’, ‘Koranko’ or ‘Sherbro’. In the sec-
ond half of the nineteenth century, the same model was increasingly applied 
to the free immigrants coming to the colony as workers. This administrative 
effort for ‘authenticity’ finally spilled back into the different rural communi-
ties. During the internecine warfare in Sierra Leone that was so typical of the 
1850s and 1860s, local populations and their leaders used such concepts to 
build their own alliances.71
The conquest of the important town and trade post of Kambia in the area of 
the Great Skarcies River, by a well-organised war band led by two Susu-speaking 
leaders – Satan Lahai and Bori Lahai – in late 1857, had an enormous impact in 
the region. As Christopher Fyfe has pointed out, Satan Lahai had Temne rela-
tions through his mother. However, in 1857/58, this fact does not seem to have 
played a role: the Temne-speaking chiefs of the region constantly described 
the other side as ‘Susu invaders’, and Satan Lahai relied mainly on Susu-
speaking warriors. Significantly, in 1876, the same Satan Lahai presented his 
case in an entirely different way – as I will later discuss.72
The army units of the Lahais not only took the town, but also controlled 
large parts of the area between the Skarcies Rivers and the Colony of Sierra 
Leone. Until mid-January 1858, Temne-speaking headmen in the region 
attempted to create an alliance against the Lahais, but this was unsuccessful, 
and the latter’s troops were still making progress. Only with British support did 
these rulers manage to expel the Lahais from Kambia, which was burnt to the 
ground during the battle, and to drive them back into the northern interior. 
Their opponent destroyed the mainly Temne-speaking settlements of Rogbari 
and Rokon at the Rokel River.73
71 tna, pro, CO/�67/�6�, Hill, Governor of Sierra Leone, to Lytton, British Secretary of State 
for the Colonies (n° 129), 13 July 1858, 5.
72 Fyfe, History, 283–4, who claims that Satan Lahai is very likely to have had a ‘Temne 
mother’.
73 tna, pro, CO/�67/�60, Hill to Labouchere (n° 23), 13 Feb. 1858, 6, 17; tna, pro, 
CO/�67/�60, Wise, British Commander at the Guinea Coast, to Grey, British admiral, 
Reporting operations conducted against the Sooso Chiefs by H.M. Naval Forces up the Rr. 
chapter 4�78
<UN>
Temne-speaking communities in the region had continued with plundering 
campaigns ever since the peace talks at Magbele. However, the impact of the 
temporary loss of two major Temne-speaking population centres, and the 
threat by the Lahais and their followers, reawakened the idea of Temne solidar-
ity that had already been visible as a possibility during the talks at Magbele. As 
a common base for an alliance, the idea that they defended Temne territory 
against a ‘foreign’ invader was a useful kind of commitment for local commu-
nities. This strategy was, all in all, remarkably successful, although the coali-
tion remained, in practice, fairly dependent on British military support.74 This 
alliance, based on ideas of ethnic solidarity was visibly expressed in the exis-
tence of a joint command of different Temne chiefs during the campaign – 
which was an unusual step in the politically fragmented rivers of northern 
Sierra Leone.75 This command was not too efficient, but in the end the coali-
tion marched against Romangi, the settlement of one of the paramount chiefs 
of the alliance, and retook it from the troops of the Lahais in June 1858, with 
British help and after protracted struggles.76 This success illustrated the useful-
ness of the alliance.
In the meantime, the new politics of ‘Temne unity’ also had an effect on the 
diplomatic front, as the Temne-speaking chiefs of the alliance were able to 
convince the British side that they had the authentic claim to rule over Kambia. 
The Lahais had insisted, on the contrary, to the governor of Sierra Leone that 
their family had an ancient right to rule over the city; but chiefs from the coali-
tion successfully challenged this view through the simple notion that Kambia 
was a ‘Temne city’! Both amongst the British authorities and British and Creole 
merchants, the idea prevailed indeed that Kambia was a ‘Temne city’ that had 
to be protected against ‘Susu raiders’.77 For the British, the rhetoric of an all-
Temne campaign was all the more impressive, since in other conflicts in the 
region, such as those over the control of the former Federation of Morea 
between Sumbuya, Moralo, and Forékaria, ethnic terms played no role at all.78
Scarcies on the 29th, 30th & 31st of Janr. & the 1st, 2nd & 3rd of February 1858 (without num-
ber), 5 Feb. 1858, 2–3, 7.
74 tna, pro, CO/�67/�60, Hill to Labouchere (n° 3), 1 Jan. 1858, 2–3.
75 tna, pro, CO/�67/�60, Wise to Grey, Reporting operations…(without number), 5 Feb. 1858, 8.
76 tna, pro, CO/�67/�60, Hill to Stanley (n° 117), 26 June 1858, 2–3.
77 tna, pro, CO/�67/�60, Hill to Bori Lahai (without number), 16 Jan. 1858, 1; tna, pro, 
CO/�67/�60, Hill to Satan Lahai (without number), 16 Jan. 1858, 1; tna, pro, CO/�67/�60, 
Pratt, Williams, Spilsbury, Walker, Kidd, and Drake, members of the Committee of the 
Mercantile Association in Freetown, to Hill (without number), 17 Feb. 1858, 1.
78 tna, pro, CO/�67/�60, Hill to Stanley (n° 118), 28 June 1858, 1–2; tna, pro, CO/267/261, 
Hill to Stanley (n° 123), 8 July 1858, 1–2. In contrast, in earlier documents the rulers of 
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It seems that the formulation of a Temne group identification found itself 
reinforced through commercial activities of that period. Christopher Fyfe has 
emphasised this point in relation to growing tensions between Temne-speaking 
peddlers and Freetown merchants, the latter belonging mainly to the group of 
the ‘Aku’ who originated from former slaves from the Bight of Biafra. In those 
conflicts, the Temne-speakers gave an impression of evolving into a larger 
community.79 The British regarded this process both as a confirmation of a 
‘tribal’ interpretation of local politics, and as problematic, as it collided with 
the more aggressive strategy now being implemented by the colonial adminis-
tration against the populations of Koya, neighbours of the urban area of the 
Sierra Leone Peninsula. After the battle of Kambia, the British officials in 
Freetown proceeded to a new peace conference, which strove to underline the 
character of ethnic harmony in the north.
However, the usefulness of being counted as ‘Temne’ was quickly realised by 
other leaders. A number of rulers whose communities were not Temne-
speaking claimed they needed to be counted as part of the larger Temne group. 
Kala Modu, a chief of Madina on the Bullom Shore, insisted on being included 
in the overall peace procedures and complained that the treaty was too exclu-
sive.80 The new sense of group unity among the Temne-speakers thus had its 
attractiveness among neighbouring rulers, who attempted to enter the net-
works in spite of ethnic solidarity.
By contrast, some Temne-speaking individuals, with experience as merce-
naries further southwards, tried to create for themselves their own strongholds 
in the southern coastal zones of Sierra Leone. In 1858, Pa Lamina, a former resi-
dent of Bumpe and Sembehun and successful leader of a warrior group, 
claimed from the British authorities the paramount chieftaincy of what he 
called the whole of the ‘Mende territory’. The British were sceptical and did not 
take these claims too seriously. It later came out that the self-styled ruler was 
perfectly Temne-speaking and had an obvious Temne name!81 Such initiatives 
went against the British logic of categorising communities through ethnic 
Morea normally described themselves as ‘Mandinka’ chiefs, see tna, pro, CO/879/15, 
African Confidential Print No. 173, Almami Amura Turé; Gabbidon, and Savage, the latter 
being traders on the island of Matakong, [Declaration] (without number, Enclosure 
No. 5), without date [1825], 1. On the evolution of Morea, see Skinner, Lawson, 72–77.
79 tna, pro, CO/879/14, African Confidential Print No. 159, Rowe to Michael Hicks Beach 
(n° 100, as n° 12 in series), 28 June 1878, 2–3; Fyfe, History, 415–6.
80 tna, pro, CO/267/261, Hill to Lytton (n° 144), 30 July 1858, 1–2.
81 tna, pro, CO/267/261, Pa Lamina, The humble Petition of Pa Laminah Native Chief of the 
Mendi Nation residing at Sanahu, in the Mendi Country (without number), 14 Sep. 1858, 2, 
8; tna, pro, CO/267/261, McCormack to Hill (without number), 16 Oct. 1858, 3.
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labels, and European officials feared ‘unauthentic’ rulers, who were quite con-
temptuously called ‘robber chiefs’.82
In consequence, the 1850s and 1860s saw two contradictory tendencies. 
Caught in a web of violent conflicts, and under the influence of the British 
authorities who remained adamant in their belief that they had to achieve, 
ultimately, the opening of interregional trade routes, the long-established 
dynasties such as those in Morea, but also the more powerful individual rulers 
like those in Port Loko, lost their remaining control over the regional warfare. 
This was a good opportunity for leaders of ‘war gangs’ to establish their own 
strongholds in the area. Similar processes had started earlier in the south of 
Sierra Leone, where the political entities were even weaker. In the north, on the 
contrary, we find at first other developments that had the reverse effect. Above 
all, the impression created by the invasion of Susu-speaking raiders under the 
Lahais had an impact far stronger than the expressions of a general weariness 
of warfare that had characterised the peace negotiations of the 1830s. In the 
late 1850s, the worries about an expansion of dangerous, Susu-speaking war 
parties led for the first time to a more sustained movement of Temne unity. For 
the time being, these trends towards a new solidarity, however, remained frag-
ile: many Temne-speaking leaders of armed groups preferred the alternative of 
themselves aspiring to a primary position as war leader.
The conquest of political power by such rulers constituted a challenge for 
the British, who had to explain why overarching group identifications were so 
unsuccessful. In the most well-known case, it was even worse: the new rulers 
attempted to formulate their territorial claims through a sub-group identity – 
that of the ‘Yoni’ – instead of referring to broader Temne ethnic sentiment. 
This confused the British, who held that many of the adversaries in the battles 
to come, like the Yoni and the populations of Masimera, were just ‘families of 
the Timmanee tribe’.83 The Yoni war, therefore, was a watershed as regards 
influencing and understanding group identifications of the Temne.
 Group Polarisation and Warfare: The Yoni Affair and the Hut Tax 
War (1875–1898)
After a less active period in the 1860s and 1870s, the British administration in 
Freetown attempted to formalise its presence in the surroundings of the Sierra 
82 tna, pro, CO/267/270, Hill to Duke of Newcastle (n° 34), 12 March 1861, 2–3.
83 tna, pro, CO/879/15, African Confidential Print No. 173, Rowe to Hicks Beach (n° 90, as 
n° 2 in series), 22 Nov. 1878.
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Leone Peninsula during the following decade. The French success in bringing 
the territory of Forékaria – the former heartland of the ‘Federation of Morea’ 
– under their control alarmed the British.84 This provoked a more aggressive 
appearance of British representatives and a more marked approach to the clas-
sification of communities. To bring order to their ideas of the composition of 
groups in the Sierra Leonean territory, the Freetown Native Affairs Department 
became quite active in collecting more (and more detailed) accounts of infor-
mants that seemed useful for an understanding of group loyalties in the region.
In the southern and eastern parts of current-day Sierra Leone, Mende-
speakers were engaged in crafting regional alliances. Temne-speaking commu-
nities of the north were after only a short period well-informed about those 
events, as political developments in the whole of the coastal region were 
reported and widely discussed.85 In Koya, the region adjacent to the Sierra 
Leone Peninsula, the activities of Loko-speaking refugees led to a situation in 
which Temne appeared to fight Loko. This type of tension had disappeared for 
a good part of the period after 1837, and only now reappeared in the spotlight; 
in this context, the Loko-speakers were described by their Temne-speaking 
neighbours as an entirely distinct ‘people’.86 Koya’s Temne-speakers had, in the 
late 1870s, and in consequence of conflicts between settlements, been engaged 
in capturing and selling as slaves a number of the inhabitants of some Loko 
communities. These acts then led to retaliation, and the conflict intensified 
friction in the whole region, as a good part of Koya’s Temne-speakers and Loko-
speakers lived in the villages in question, and it was quite difficult for both 
observers and the populations themselves, to find categories of distinction.87
Around the Temne-speakers in the north, there were also important com-
munity changes taking place. In Sumbuya, the area of the northern rivers 
around Wonkafong and Moribea, it was Susu-speakers who pushed consider-
able numbers of Bullom-speaking individuals out of the region. However, 
84 Schnapper, Bernard, La Politique et le Commerce Français dans le Golfe de Guinée de 1838 à 
1871 (Paris – The Hague: Mouton, 1961), 235–9.
85 tna, pro, CO/879/10, African Confidential Print No. 114, Rowe to Carnavon, Secretary of 
State for the Colonies (n° 89A.), 19 June 1876, 4; tna, pro, CO/879/11, African Confidential 
Print No. 139, Rowe, Memorandum by Dr. Rowe, C.M.G. (without number, Enclosure in 
No. 36), 1st Aug. 1877, 2.
86 tna, pro, CO/879/15, African Confidential Print No. 173, Bome Rufa and Bome Warrah, 
‘Queens of Quiah’; Balu Modu, Chief of Koya, and others, Address of the Queens of Quiah 
and other Chiefs (without number), 22 Jan. 1879; tna, pro, CO/879/15, African Confidential 
Print No. 173, Lawson to Rowe (without number, Enclosure No. 5), 6 Jan. 1879, 3.
87 tna, pro, CO/879/15, African Confidential Print No. 173, Rowe to Hicks Beach (n° 200, in 
series as No. 11), 18 Dec. 1878, 1–2.
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Temne-speakers, like the Susu-speakers, were gaining ground. The presence of 
the Temne-speaking Digsing in the interior of the Samu region was a visible 
sign of the expansion of the Temne language and of Temne-speakers in the 
second half of the nineteenth century.88 It also shows, together with the events 
of Sumbuya, that Sierra Leone was, only two decades before the creation of 
formalised colonial rule, a region where the migration of armed groups was 
still possible, and even an increasing phenomenon, quite unlike Senegambia 
in the same period.
It is interesting to note what, in the years leading up to this, became of Satan 
Lahai. In the 1850s, this leader had acted as a feared ‘Susu warrior chief ’. In the 
1870s and early 1880s, he not only maintained his base as ruler of Rowula but 
he increasingly appeared as member of a political ensemble (and network) of 
Temne-speaking chiefs! He used this as an act of political propaganda.89 
During the peace talks in the Skarcies Rivers region in 1876, the ruler of Rowula 
presented himself as spokesman of Temne-speaking fellow rulers, such as 
Almami Lusani of Digsing. Lahai also occasionally presented himself as a ‘del-
egate’ of Bai Farima of Kambia.90 In 1878, he was therefore sometimes 
described, by the British and even by some of their informants, as ‘Temne’!91 In 
1881, Satan Lahai, like ‘other Temne chiefs’, was criticised for carrying war from 
the Temne into the Susu territory.92 Finally, Lahai was able to profit from these 
more flexible descriptions to act as a mediator between the Limba-speakers 
and the Susu-speaking population of Kukuna, who were in a violent conflict 
regarding the question of refugee slaves.93
88 tna, pro, WO/32/7620, War Office, Intelligence Branch, Précis of Information concerning 
the Colony of Sierra Leone (without number), 1887, 8.
89 tna, pro, CO/879/17, African Confidential Print No. 214, Bokari, [Declaration] (without 
number, Enclosure 3 in No. 104), 9 July 1880.
90 tna, pro, CO/879/10, African Confidential Print No. 114, Samuel Rowe, Governor of Sierra 
Leone; Almami Satan Lahai of Rowula; Bai Farima of Magbeti and Kambia; and other 
chiefs, Agreement signed by the Chiefs of the Scarcies Rivers on the 10th June, 1876. (without 
number), 10 June 1876; tna, pro, CO/879/14, African Confidential Print No. 159, Rowe to 
Hicks Beach (n° 100, as n° 12 in series), 28 June 1878, 3.
91 tna, pro, CO/879/14, African Confidential Print No. 159, Status of Parties to the Agreement 
made at Kambia, Great Scarcies River, on the 27th April 1878, between the Timmanees and 
Soosoos. (without number, Enclosure 6), without date, 1.
92 tna, pro, CO/879/18, African Confidential Print No. 226, Streeten to Almami Satan Lahai, 
‘king of Rowula’; Bai Farima, ‘king of Kambia und Magbeti’; Bai Inga, ‘king of Small 
Skarcies’ (n° 1, as Enclosure 5. in No. 27.), 4 Jan. 1881.
93 tna, pro, CO/879/14, African Confidential Print No. 159, Proceedings of a Meeting held at 
Kambia, Great Scarcies River, 24th April 1878 [25th April 1878]. (without number), without 
date, 6.
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Other ‘Susu’ were also flexible about operating in collaboration with differ-
ent sides, in clear contrast with the picture of a fundamental Temne-Susu 
antagonism, which the British believed themselves to be faced with. Sankong, 
another Susu-speaking warrior leader, appeared as an important ally of Lusani 
of Digsing, and Karlilu of Bashia also sided openly with Temne-speakers.94 All 
in all, while the Temne-speakers had shown their intention, between the 1850s 
and the 1870s, of selling themselves to the British as a homogeneous popula-
tion, Susu-speakers of the north were seriously threatened by fragmentation.95 
The rulers in opposition to Bokari in Forékaria, while conceding that Morea 
was the home of a population different ‘from their neighbours, the Timmanees 
and Soombuyahs on the north and south’, insisted that there was no central 
power in the country, and that indeed the Susu-speakers should be seen as 
being divided into different ‘tribes’.96
As the Temne-speakers of Digsing felt threatened by the growing presence 
of Susu-speaking war leaders in their region, and were determined to defend 
their autonomy, and as Satan Lahai was again, in 1876, actively expanding his 
own area of influence, the Temne–Susu antagonism appeared again to be at a 
new peak.97 This was also visible in new forms of diplomatic interaction pro-
moted by the British: agreements were now read in Susu, Temne, and Limba, 
while before they had mainly been presented exclusively in Temne. This 
reflected the progress that specialised British officials had made with profi-
ciency in the latter two languages, but it was principally an expression of a 
94 tna, pro, CO/879/11, African Confidential Print No. 139, Memorandum on French and 
English Treaties with Chiefs of the Moriah and Samu Countries (without number), without 
date, 1; tna, pro, CO/879/14, African Confidential Print No. 159, Rowe to Michael Hicks 
Beach (n° 100, as n° 12 in series), 28 June 1878, 3; tna, pro, CO/879/14, African Confidential 
Print No. 159, Bai Farima of Magbeti and Kambia; Satan Lahai, of Rowula, in the Casseh 
Country; and others, Agreement made at Kambia, Great Scarcies River, the 27th day of April 
1878, between the Timmanees and Soosoos and the Chiefs of Surrounding Countries. (with-
out number, Enclosure No. 2), 27 April 1878, 1.
95 tna, pro, CO/879/15, African Confidential Print No. 173, Satan Dawoda and others, 
[Statement] (without number, Enclosure No. 4), 18 July 1879, 2.
96 tna, pro, CO/879/11, African Confidential Print No. 139, Rowe to Carnavon (n° 148, n° 49 
of series), 29 Sep. 1877, 3; tna, pro, CO/879/17, African Confidential Print No. 206, Lawson, 
[Installation of Alimamy Bokharry] (without number, Sub-Enclosure No. 11), 3 Nov. 1879; 
tna, pro, CO/879/17, African Confidential Print No. 206, Notes, Geographical and Political, 
on the position of the French port at Binty in the Mellicourie River, on the Kissi Kissi Country, 
and on the Native Tribes on its Borders (without number, Sub-Enclosure No. 13), 3 Nov. 1879.
97 tna, pro, CO/879/14, African Confidential Print No. 159, Rowe to Hicks Beach (n° 45, as 
n° 2 of series), 21 April 1878.
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deeper awareness of the group-building role of these idioms.98 However, the 
apparently clear antagonism was again superseded by other interests, and by 
engagement in plunder. The town of Bileh on the Great Skarcies River, a local 
centre of Islamic scholarship, was burnt down during the war although both 
sides spoke in a reverential manner of the school lessons in Muslim scripts and 
consequently had ample reasons to spare the teachers.99
In the early 1880s, with the battles in the Skarcies Rivers region coming to a 
halt, the momentum of inter-Temne cooperation in the north seemed to disap-
pear. Given the absence of notable threats – Susu-speaking communities were 
occupied in local warfare amongst ‘themselves’; the rulers in Forékaria were 
fairly weak and engaged in a conflict to decide for or against a French protec-
torate; the Fuuta Jallon had, with internal wars and the campaigns of Samori 
Touré in the interior of West Africa, been increasingly distracted from any 
interest in the coastal regions – ethnic difference was obviously not of a suffi-
ciently great attraction to be a guiding principle. Only in situations of the most 
extreme emergency had it been tested as a useful strategy; now, it again became 
obvious that pan-Temne solidarity did not help villagers in smaller conflicts.100 
Instead, as had already been the case in the late 1860s, individual Temne-
speaking leaders took the opportunity to create for their own power bases.
The most successful process of creation of such a local armed power-base 
occurred in a region more than a hundred kilometres east of the Sierra Leone 
Peninsula, in the so-called ‘Yoni Country’. In 1885, a group of warriors formed 
an aggressive alliance with other local war groups. Over the next two years 
these warriors intensified their engagement in plundering campaigns in the 
surrounding lands. We do not find any stronger centralised power behind this 
Yoni expansion. Since 1879, the Yoni group had no longer had a Bai Sherbro, 
which had during former decades been a form of ‘paramount chief ’. Although 
this position had never fulfilled the role of a ‘supreme ruler’ as imagined by 
British officials, the Bai Sherbro had been, in the case of military conflict, a 
coordinating force. However, the Yoni group did not seem to need such a ruler 
to be successful in warfare. The different local leaders, informally headed by 
Kapra Toli of Ronieta and Pa Kundi of Makundu, organised with huge success 
98 tna, pro, CO/879/14, African Confidential Print No. 159, Rowe to Hicks Beach (n° 46, as 
n° 2 of series), 29 April 1878, 3.
99 tna, pro, CO/879/14, African Confidential Print No. 159, Rowe to Hicks Beach (n° 84, as 
n° 9 in series), 14 June 1878, 2. On Bileh’s function, see Skinner, ‘Islam’, 55.
100 cms missionaries reported in 1879/80 on a good number of villages in the region of 
Magbele and Port-Loko, from which all the inhabitants had fled; see cms, C A1/O 29/7, 
Alley, Journal Jan. 1st – March 31. 1880 (without number), without date, p. 18.
�85Fragmentation and the Temne
<UN>
an alliance that engaged in successful pillaging across the whole of the region. 
In these activities, the Yoni troops showed no respect for the ‘Temne identity’: 
in 1878, they had destroyed Magbele, the once important town centre and sym-
bolic place of nascent Temne unity during the 1836/37 peace conference.101 
Furthermore, while the Yoni managed to include in their alliance Bai Simera of 
Rokon and some other important Temne-speaking leaders, they never had any 
ethnic programme.
The coalition of their opponents, which had been created under British 
influence, mostly had members who were not Temne. These included mainly 
Mende-speakers, but also the odd chief from the Sherbro. However, some 
members of the anti-Yoni alliance, such as the participating rulers of Koya, 
were Temne-speakers. Their participation against the Yoni was partly the 
expression of their dependence on Freetown as they were held to fulfil the 
terms of an earlier peace agreement, but their presence gave the anti-Yoni 
coalition a clear non-ethnic character.102 In the description of subsequent 
events, the perception of British commanders in Freetown was evidently dis-
torted. Seeing the power within this part of the Temne ‘tribe’ as having been 
‘highjacked’ by ‘robber chiefs’, the British were eager to ‘re-establish’ what they 
regarded as ‘traditional systems’. They believed that the defeat and removal of 
Kapra Toli and of Pa Kundi were appropriate steps to return the Yoni to their 
proper place within the Temne community.103
However, when the British Commander, Colonel Francis de Winton, 
advanced in 1887 to Mafengbe and started to defeat the Yoni leaders in battle 
with the mixed group of allies under his command, he quickly learned that 
local populations did not at all interpret the conflict according to ethnic cate-
gories.104 Therefore, the British also tended to deal with the different groups of 
Temne-speakers under other, regional labels such as ‘Masimeras’ or ‘Mabangs’. 
Some officials reporting to the Secretariat of Native Affairs were quite afraid of 
a future ‘alliance between Yonnis and Timanee’; in which they showed their 
failure to understand that the Yoni were themselves Temne-speakers!105
101 tna, pro, CO/879/15, African Confidential Print No. 173, Rowe to Hicks Beach (n° 192, as 
n° 3 in series), 28 Nov. 1878.
102 tna, pro, WO/32/7620, War Office, Intelligence Branch, Précis of Information concerning 
the Colony of Sierra Leone (without number), 1887, 11–3.
103 tna, pro, WO/32/7620, Edward Stanhope, British Secretary of War, to Colonel F. de 
Winton (n° 074/419), 21 Oct. 1887.
104 tna, pro, WO/32/7620, De Winton to War Office (without number), 15 Nov. 1887; Fyfe, 
History, 475–6, gives little background information about the British view on communi-
ties at the River Rokel.
105 tna, pro, WO/32/7620, De Winton to War Office (without number), 22 Nov. 1887, 1, 3.
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Only when the fighting became more intense, and when they stood with 
their backs to the wall, do the Yoni appear to have made appeals for joint iden-
tification with a larger Temne community. They obviously hoped to obtain, at 
the last possible minute, increased support from other Temne-speaking rulers 
in spite of their devastating defeats. Nevertheless, at this moment the war 
was already nearly lost after the destruction of Mafokoya and the fall of 
Ronieta. Through their new, pan-Temne rhetoric, the Yoni leaders seem to have 
kept the rulers of Masimera and Marampa in their camp until the very end of 
the hostilities – British officials were quite surprised to find them amongst the 
enemies, the more so as those chiefs had remained formal allies of the British 
governor in Freetown! Here, the British clearly underestimated the capacity of 
Yoni chiefs to mobilise fellow Temne-speakers through arguments of a com-
mon ethnic identification; the British side had thought that all ‘Temne’ would 
turn against the ‘robber chiefs’.106 However, in the last phase of the struggle, 
when under immediate military pressure, the ‘Yoni’ successfully employed 
‘Temne’ group solidarities. This situation of alliances clearly points to fault 
lines defined through ethnic affiliation. Only when the British pushed hard to 
destroy the rest of the dispersed Yoni units, did some Temne-speaking chiefs 
try to return to the British camp. One such was Bai Simera, who claimed that 
the Yoni had alienated him by killing his son.107
Over the following years, ethnic solidarity again became more feasible as a 
motive for taking up arms. On the occasion of peace talks in the Rokel River 
region, Pa Suba and other Temne-speaking participants insisted categorically 
that, as a first step to an agreement, all Mende troops be withdrawn from the 
region. To ‘reintegrate the Yoni’ into the larger Temne community, it seemed 
adequate to define a common enemy: ‘the Mende’, who were now described as 
stereotypical opponents.108 Also, the assembled Temne-speaking chiefs 
claimed the right to reinstate Sey Masa as a fellow ‘Temne’ Bai Sherbro of the 
Yoni area. This was despite the fact that this act was in open contradiction to 
106 tna, pro, WO/32/7620, De Winton to War Office (without number), 8 Dec. 1887, 1; tna, 
pro, WO/32/7620, De Winton to War Office (without number), 9 Dec. 1887, 1–2.
107 tna, pro, WO/32/7620, Ernest Parkes, Secretary of Native Affairs of Sierra Leone, Notes of 
Interview between Sir Francis de Winton and Bey Simmerah, King of Masimera, and the 
Chiefs of Masimera, Marampa, and Kwaia, 4th December 1887 (without number), 4 Dec. 
1887, 2.
108 Different Mende chiefs, including Bai Lal of Malal and Madam Yoko, also showed a com-
mon group profile on that occasion: they would send ‘Mende envoys’ and formulate 
demands on behalf of the whole ethnic community, see tna, pro, CO/879/29, African 
Confidential Print No. 361, Hay, Governor of Sierra Leone, to Knutsford (n° 375, as No. 13 
in series), 20 Nov. 1888.
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earlier proceedings of elections of rulers in the region, as only ‘the Yoni’ had 
been called upon to designate their new leaders. The assembled chiefs argued 
that, as representatives of ‘Temne groups’, they had the right to decide over the 
future of a community that was regarded as having a part in the process.109 
There was a widespread feeling that the whole affair, although mediated by the 
British, had been resolved in the end by ‘Temne’ group solidarity.110
This process led to a new dimension of Mende–Temne antagonism. While, 
as we have shown, some group stereotypes had previously existed, open hostil-
ity on ethnic terms had been scarce (which was also partly due to geographic 
distance).111 In 1891, the trend was confirmed: during negotiations for another 
regional peace agreement held in Taiama, and sponsored by the British gover-
nor, James Shaw Hay, mutual accusations between ‘Temne’ and ‘Mende’ were 
very present.112 There was a clear potential for this conflict to transform into a 
larger and ethnically motivated war.
However, the Hut Tax War of 1898 interrupted this trend. There has been 
broader research on this particular event, which led to effective British con-
quest, and which need not be reiterated here. It is important to point out that 
the rebellion against increasing British control and new tax demands had a 
double face. First, it was an anti-colonial war of several local rulers against the 
British, but also a generational and social struggle. Moreover, the colonial 
power had relied heavily, in its organisation of an efficient frontier police dur-
ing the 1880s and 1890s, on the employment of immigrants from the ‘hinter-
land’ of Sierra Leone, many of these being of lower social status or even 
descendants of slaves. The revolt exploded when these policemen quite aggres-
sively voiced the British demand for a generalised tax.113 Second, the rebellion 
109 Finally, the decisive conference was, unsurprisingly from a symbolic perspective, held at 
Magbele, and was indeed an exclusive ‘Temne affair’, see tna, pro, CO/879/29, African 
Confidential Print No. 361, Parkes, List of Chiefs and Santiggies (Principal men) present at 
Meeting at Mabelin on the 9th instant, when Almamy Conteh was formally handed over to 
his people. (without number, Enclosure in No. 36.), without date; and tna, pro, CO/879/29, 
African Confidential Print No. 361, Parkes, Notes of Conversation between His Excellency 
Governor Hay, C.M.G., and Chiefs at Magbelin, at meeting on the afternoon of Sunday the 
9th December. (without number, Enclosure 2 in No. 36), 10 Dec. 1888.
110 tna, pro, WO/32/7620, De Winton to War Office (without number), 21 Nov. 1887, 1–2.
111 It appears difficult to prove Kup’s claim that there was a huge Mende invasion in northern 
Sierra Leone at the end of the eighteenth century, see Kup, History, 155–6.
112 Garrett, G.H., ‘Sierra Leone and the Interior, to the Upper Waters of the Niger’, Proceedings 
of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography, New Monthly Series 
14(7), 1892, 433–5, 453.
113 Hargreaves, ‘Establishment’, 64.
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was a result of the permanent tensions between ‘Creole’ merchants and the 
populations of Port Loko, who felt insulted by the aggressive behaviour of 
these Creole resettlers and at a disadvantage in trade.
I will look in more detail later at changing mentalities in the town of Port 
Loko during the Hut Tax War. In any case, it is remarkable that it was not only 
the British who regarded the revolt as a ‘Temne uprising’. In fact, local com-
munities who were not Temne-speakers attempted to remain neutral because 
they did not want to be drawn into a ‘Temne affair’; several of their chiefs were 
eager to demand a possibly lucrative role as mediators because of not being 
Temne, as was the case with the Limba leader Suluku from Bumban.114 In the 
end the rebellion spread into the Mende-speaking regions, but this was at a 
different stage, and it was now impossible to create a larger alliance between 
Mende-speaking and Temne-speaking leaders.
In 1898, not only were the firepower and military skills of northern Sierra 
Leonean communities insufficient to sustain battles with British troops, but 
even a charismatic war leader such as Bai Bureh, of Loko origins but a long-
standing leader of Temne-speaking mercenaries, was incapable of keeping the 
ranks of the troops together after the first heavy defeats.115 Even so, ethnic 
mobilisation was an obvious tool. In a follow-on from the ‘Yoni War’, Temne-
speakers had finally begun to appreciate the ethnic dimension of Temne-ness 
as a welcome means of mobilising the different local communities. After the 
defeat of 1898, these war solidarities could partly be translated into principles 
of local organisation. For the part of the colonial rulers, the creation of ‘native 
districts’ of a new protectorate worked these existing group affiliations from 
war periods into the tissue of the emerging civil structures of colonial rule.
 Chieftaincy and Reorganisation in the Protectorate Period:  
The Case of the Northern Province (1898–1945)
The end of the Hut Tax War profoundly changed the political and social 
 conditions of community life in northern Sierra Leone. The creation of the 
Protectorate and of official provinces gave the initiative to European officials. 
Moreover, British ‘pacification’ led to a situation in which local groups, having 
formerly coexisted in a situation of rather unorganised and frequently bloody 
rivalry, now had to live alongside one another under the rule of paramount 
114 Abraham, Arthur, ‘Bai Bureh, the British, and the Hut Tax War’, International Journal of 
African Historical Studies 7(1), 1974, 99–106, 104–5.
115 Fyfe, History, 432.
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chiefs. British district administrators expressed this process in racist terms as 
effects of their ‘civilising mission’, but they indeed had direct control over most 
of the Protectorate chiefs. Groups that had in a long process in the second half 
of the nineteenth century decided to define others as arch-enemies, now had 
to find ways to coexist within the new structures of ‘indirect rule’. This evolu-
tion was in part mediated through the creation of Protectorate-wide struc-
tures: British authorities canalised the ‘education’ of both future chiefs, and of 
their councillors and clerks as in Senegal, through education facilities for the 
sons of chiefs who were obliged to use them, and later on, through the Bo 
School of Administration whose graduates developed their own corporate 
identities as ‘old boys’.116
In spite of colonial taxation and forced labour, the colonial state in Sierra 
Leone had the paradoxical effect of allowing communities to live free from 
experiences of destruction and pillage, in relative safety. In isolated districts of 
the Sierra Leone Protectorate, British control was of course less immediate and 
European officials and merchants and Lebanese traders had to rely on porter-
age to distribute information and goods. Here, the power of local leaders was 
less controlled, as was the case in the district of Karene before the 1920s.117 
Even for such remote regions, the existence of the urban centre of Freetown 
with its range of labour opportunities became a mighty attraction. What had 
slowly started before 1898, soon expressed itself in a steady flow.118 Instead of 
refugee slaves, these immigrants were now mostly free labourers, although 
‘domestic slavery’ remained a problem in Sierra Leone, as it was in early twen-
tieth-century Senegambia.119 Subsequent provincial commissioners of the 
Northern Province claimed that the flight of slaves had become infrequent, 
and that many slaves had a strong preference for staying with their masters, 
thus explaining away the dilemma. However, in general, these reports were 
erroneous. The commissioners only repeated the opinion of the Temne-
speaking paramount chiefs, and thus avoided the delicate task of interfering in 
master–slave relations.120
116 Corby, Richard A., ‘Bo School and Its Graduates in Colonial Sierra Leone’, Canadian 
Journal of African Studies 15(2), 1981, 323–3, 331–2.
117 tna, pro, CO/267/607, Lyon, District Commissioner of Karene District, Annual Report of 
the Karene District for 1924 (without number), 19 March 1925, 32–3.
118 Little, Mende, 24.
119 Rashid, Ismail, ‘“Do dady nor lef me make dem carry me”: Slave resistance and emancipa-
tion in Sierra Leone, 1894–1928’, Slavery & Abolition 19(2), 1998, 208–31, 216–9.
120 tna, pro, CO/267/595, Stanley, Provincial Commissioner of the Northern Province in 
Mahump, [Report on the Northern Province] (without number), 12 April 1922, 10.
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The issue of slavery and the question of refugees moving into Freetown cre-
ated a consensus amongst many of the local paramount chiefs, within and 
beyond the Temne-speaking area, who opposed any unilateral measures on 
the part of the colonial administration. The British government in Freetown 
regarded a unilateral decree of abolition as dangerous, as they argued that this 
could lead again to revolt and ‘civil war’, in the style of the Hut Tax War. 
However, many officials admitted that a large number of the slaves were less 
than content with their personal situation.121 The influx of refugees furthered 
the permanent presence of a rapidly increasing group of ‘foreigners’ in 
Freetown, who were important for processes of social change.
Freetown could indeed have been a large melting pot, where ethnic senti-
ment could have been fused into urban group identification. Allen M. Howard 
holds indeed that the colonial capital knew, in the first three decades after 
1898, several conflicts of a strongly social character that united inhabitants of 
different ethnic origins.122 Strikes and mobilisation against Lebanese mer-
chants during the 1919 riots are typical of this form of social conflict.123 
However, the British administration was active from the early twentieth cen-
tury in countering these trends by the employment of principles of ‘indirect 
rule’. To protect ‘tribesmen’ from ‘detribalisation’ in the population centre of 
Freetown, British officials now increasingly relied on the system of ‘tribal rul-
ers’. For the newly created Headquarters District, they now based selection 
processes for chiefs on what they believed were solid anthropological results.124 
This new approach of searching for ‘authentic chiefs’ coincided, interestingly, 
with a second tendency that helped these rulers to build up a considerable 
authority.125 Both the Temne-speakers and the Mende-speakers of Freetown 
appear, in the 1920s, to have largely accepted the role of those suburban chiefs 
as their principal spokesmen. Individuals arriving in the urban agglomeration 
as refugee domestic slaves respected the prestige of the city’s ‘tribal chiefs’.
121 tna, pro, CO/267/604, Slater, Governor of Sierra Leone, Slavery: Reviews history of – in 
S.L. & action taken to abolish it & submits recommendations for accelerating the abolish-
ment (without number), 20 June 1924, 4.
122 Howard, Allen M., ‘Contesting Commercial Space in Freetown, 1860–1930: Traders, 
Merchants, and Officials’, Canadian Journal of African Studies 37(2), 2003, 236–68, 261–2.
123 See, also, for the 1930s Abdullah, Ibrahim, ‘“Liberty or Death”: Working Class Agitation and 
the Labour Question in colonial Freetown, 1938–1939’, International Review of Social 
History 40(2), 1995, 195–221.
124 Goerg, Odile, ‘Chefs de quartier et ‘Tribal Headmen’: Deux visions des colonisés en ville’, 
in Jean-Pierre Chrétien and Gérard Prunier (eds), Les ethnies ont une histoire (second edi-
tion, Paris: Karthala, 2003), 267–82, 272.
125 Northrup, ‘Becoming’, 12.
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This allegiance of Temne-speakers to the ‘tribal ruler’ in the urban agglom-
eration played a major role, although it would have been relatively easy for 
members of the group to leave the suburban areas where Temne-speaking 
immigrants normally settled. This occurred only rarely.126 The Temne commu-
nity, having established itself during the course of the second half of the nine-
teenth century as the numerically strongest group in the urban area of the 
colonial capital, showed a remarkable degree of cohesion.127 Other communi-
ties, such as the Kru in Freetown who were a longer-established group of new 
settlers and quite numerous, were far more subject to internal struggles and 
challenged the chiefs installed by the colonial power.128
In the 1920s and 1930s, however, the importance of ethnic links became 
notably weaker, both in the urban environment and in the rural districts. In the 
Headquarters District, the Temne-speaking (and, also, the Limba-speaking) 
populations were slow to elect new, ‘tribal’ paramount chiefs after the deaths 
of the former post-holders. The British complained of a surprising lack of inter-
est on the part of the communities. The post of ‘Temne tribal ruler’ was not 
filled for 22 months after the death of the old chief in November 1922. The 
Limba-speakers did not hold any election whatsoever after their ‘tribal ruler’s’ 
death in 1923.129 Former attempts of Temne ‘tribal rulers’ to bring under their 
control the Limba community in the urban agglomeration were abandoned. 
‘Tribal’ politics in the region of the capital slid into the background.130
In the rural constituencies of northern Sierra Leone, the reliance of groups – 
both Temne-speakers and their Loko-speaking and Limba-speaking neighbours 
126 tna, pro, CO/267/595, Annual Report on the Headquarters District 1921. (without num-
ber), without date, 2.
127 Harrell-Bond, Barbara E.; Allen M. Howard, and David E. Skinner, Community Leadership 
and the Transformation of Freetown (1801–1976) (The Hague: Mouton, 1978), 77–9.
128 tna, pro, CO/267/595, Maxwell, Acting Governor of Sierra Leone, to Churchill, British 
Secretary of State for the Colonies (n° 157), 18 April 1922, 10; tna, pro, CO/267/595, 
‘Representatives of Kroomen in Freetown’ to R.J. Wilkinson (without number), without 
date, 1, 4; tna, pro, CO/267/595, Delegates of Freetown’s Kru Community to Maxwell 
(without number), without date, 1; Frost, Diane, Work and community among West 
African migrant workers since the nineteenth century (Liverpool: Liverpool University 
Press, 1999), 135.
129 tna, pro, CO/267/607, James, District Commissioner of Headquarters District, Annual 
Report of the Headquarters District for the Year 1924 (without number), without date, 4.
130 Moseley, K.P., ‘The Safroko Limba of Freetown, I: taingains time’, Africana Research 
Bulletin (Fourah Bay, Sierra Leone) 15, 1985, 41–80. On abuses by Temne-speaking chiefs 
– in which ethnic allegiance did not play any role – see sla, Box 698/3, Bai Maro Camarah 
and Folah Camarah, Mamara, Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District, to Taylor, Acting District 
Commissioner of Port Loko (without number), 28 Jan. 1931, 1–2.
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– on ethnic formulae relaxed even earlier. This development was in fact a reverse 
trend to British colonial planning: the administration clearly wished to organise 
the inhabitants of the new districts according to an ethnic perspective. The 
British authorities, who, in the immediate aftermath of the Hut Tax War, had for 
a while concentrated on removing opponents and rewarding allies, tried to 
establish principles according to which the northern chiefs were reinvested with 
considerable power and influence.131 The organisation of local rule was expressed 
in ethnic terms. This had effects on the terminology used by local rulers in their 
dealings with the British Native Administration: in the different rural zones of 
Sierra Leone, ‘strangers’ coming from other regions were now normally described 
according to their ethnic affiliation. This became quickly visible in court records 
in all of the districts.132
In Karene District, the British district commissioner distinguished between 
four main groups in 1924, pointed out to him by the respective local auxiliaries 
of the administration. On the basis of such information, he categorised them as 
‘Limba’, ‘Susu’, ‘Loko’, and ‘Temne’, referring thus to the pre-colonial labels. In 
his comments, however, the British official admitted that with reference to 
‘social customs and law’, those groups were ‘very similar’. He also described the 
two first and the two last as overlapping as to their political entities. With this 
comment, the colonial official merely generalised on military events of the late 
nineteenth century, as Limba-speakers of the district had been victims of 
aggressive incursions by Susu-speakers, and Loko-speakers had been attacked 
and enslaved by Temne-speakers. He insisted that the four groups were never-
theless clearly distinguishable, as their members discussed in oral accounts. In 
those accounts, language was the principal criterion of distinction: thereby, 
informants from all four groups insisted on their uniqueness in linguistic terms.
Much of ‘Temne-ness’ was defined by locals with reference to ‘stranger’ 
minority groups living in the district, such as ‘Fulbe’, ‘Mandinka’ or ‘Koranko’. 
The members of such smaller communities were to be denied the right to self-
rule: Temne-speaking informants argued that such ‘foreigners’ had never 
before had their own chiefs or political privileges. They were to be kept in 
‘benevolent’ networks of patronage.133 As with the Laobe and Sarakole of 
131 Dorjahn, Vernon R., ‘The Changing Political System of the Temne’, Africa (London) 30(2), 
1960, 110–40, 114–5; Sibanda, ‘Dependency’, 488.
132 See tna, pro, CO/267/600, Bowden, Chief Commissioner of the Central Province, 
Enquiry into the Causes of Discontent in the Lunia Chiefdom (without number), 17 to 31 
August 1923, 33.
133 tna, pro, CO/267/607, Lyon, Annual Report of the Karene District for 1924 (without num-
ber), 19 March 1925, 2–3.
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Senegambia, Temne-speaking chiefs and headmen attempted to minimise the 
political role of small groups, in order to enlarge their own constituencies.
While it seems obvious that self-perception on ethnic terms during the first 
thirty years of the Protectorate could have advantages, the principle actually 
lost some of its appeal, instead of, as propagated by the colonial power, becom-
ing the decisive criterion of local organisation. During conflict-ridden chief-
taincy successions in the north in the 1910s and 1920s, we find few attempts by 
local groups to take over chieftaincies through ethnic claims. Even in the cases 
of Upper Lokko or Sanda Chenraron, inhabited by a majority of Loko-speaking 
populations with a minority of Temne-speakers, the conflicts around the suc-
cession in those chieftaincies were remarkably free from ethnic propaganda. 
The respective claims of ‘traditional families’ were essential for the succes-
sion, and these claims mobilised both Temne-speaking and Loko-speaking 
electors.134
Just as in the south of Sierra Leone, where the identification as ‘Mende’ did 
not become the critical variable for some time, the north also did not obey 
ethnic principles. There was no policy of ‘Temneisation’ in the Northern 
Province. Even so, some conflicts re-emerged after a period of tranquillity: 
and it was indeed the members of smaller communities who claimed that 
they were being mistreated by Temne-speakers. In the 1920s, some protests 
occurred in different districts of the north, which became louder and deplored 
the fact that ‘the Temne’ attempted to marginalise other populations by domi-
nating the chieftaincies. In Bombali, where Loko-speakers and Limba-
speakers defended a minority position in six of the 28 chiefdoms, they 
protested against attempts to impose on them a native authority dominated 
by Temne-speakers. The Limba and Loko populations of the six chieftaincies 
insisted that they should not be put under Temne majority rule.135 This aggres-
sive rhetoric by Limba-speakers was, however, contradicted by internal con-
flicts of the Limba community. In Bombali District, the two Limba-speaking 
chiefs of Tamiso and Biriwa were caught in deep mutual hostility, and were 
thus unable to work together. During their struggles, the then Chief of Tamiso 
manipulated Limba-speaking populations in his chiefdom, in an attempt to 
bring the neighbouring Limba under his own control.136 This led to frictions 
and benefited the Temne-speaking chiefs in the district, who profited from 
134 tna, pro, CO/267/607, Lyon, Annual Report of the Karene District for 1924 (without num-
ber), 19 March 1925, 12.
135 tna, pro, CO/267/595, Kemp, District Commissioner of Bombali, to Provincial 
Commissioner of the Northern Province (without number), 1 Feb. 1922, 1, 4.
136 tna, pro, CO/267/595, Annual Report 1921: Koinadugu District (without number), 8–9.
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the weakness of the Limba chiefs to enlarge their control over local 
populations.137
As regards the interwar period, the most important picture in the north is 
one of remarkable stability and absence of violence on ethnic terms. Several 
of the abuses that led to rural revolt in the 1950s already existed, but their 
existence was not linked to ethnically expressed conflict. In other words, in 
this phase of the colonial period, the trends towards ethnic polarisation that 
had become apparent in the wars of the late nineteenth century, were not yet 
transformed into long-lasting hostilities. All in all, rural Sierra Leoneans 
appear to have been very eager once again to lock the principle of ethnic iden-
tification in the closet, without any clear perspective that it would become 
useful in the future.
Ironically, during these years, it had the ‘benign’ effect that local paramount 
chiefs and their families were mostly detached from any political interest in 
Freetown, as the decline of Creole power had made obsolete any attempts by 
this group to enlarge their influence in the countryside. The racist assumptions 
of British officials effectively shut the chiefs out of political networks, except 
from their presence in Protectorate assemblies, where they sat, however, in a 
quite reduced number and amongst themselves, and united on collectively 
interesting issues, such as the above-mentioned problem of refugee slaves. The 
politicisation of first the urban agglomeration, and then the rural constituen-
cies after 1945, entirely changed this picture. It drew Sierra Leone’s north (and, 
indeed, other rural provinces) into a process in which ethnicity again became 
an emotive variable.138
 Polarised Democracy? The Creation of Electoral Bodies,  
Ethnic Mobilisation, and the Challenge of the Northern 
Chieftaincies, 1945–1961
In the colonial territory of Sierra Leone, we first find violent protests against the 
authorities in the late 1920s and the 1930s. Those protests were initially an urban 
phenomenon mainly in Freetown and the Sierra Leone Peninsula. They were con-
nected to economic decline in the context of the Great Depression, to falling 
wages of dock workers and urban personnel, and to the energetic activities of 
137 Fanthorpe, Richard, ‘Locating the Politics of a Sierra Leonean Chiefdom’, Africa 68(4), 
1998, 558–84, 568–70.
138 Cartwright, Politics, 75–6.
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some leading personalities of the urban area, such as Isaac T.A. Wallace-Johnson.139 
During these struggles – which were often interpreted by British authorities in 
the context of very diffuse anti-Communist fears – the ‘northerners’, and, more 
clearly, the ‘Temne’ in the Headquarters District, were regarded as conforming 
exactly to ethnic patterns: they seemed particularly loyal to their elected ‘com-
munity leaders’.
After the Second World War, the northern parts of the Protectorate appeared 
to remain largely untouched by any conflicts between ethnic groups. Colonial 
officials believed that the slow material improvement of local societies would 
further weaken ethnic group sentiment. Kenneth Little, leading British sociol-
ogist of the Mende working in the late 1940s with the British government, com-
mented that ‘tribal affairs’ would be of limited importance in the future.140 For 
the Temne-speaking parts of Sierra Leone, the late 1940s seemed to confirm 
these claims, as was argued in a detailed report on the social relations within 
the districts of the Northern Province. In Bombali District, Temne-speaking 
and Limba-speaking groups (the Biriwa Limba) were now said to ‘live amicably 
side by side’: reports pointed to a large number of intermarriages, and in the 
chiefdom of Mapaki, one paramount chief governed two linguistic ‘sections’ 
that were roughly equal in size.141 In Kambia District, the same was reported 
for Temne-speaking and Bullom-speaking populations, as the latter seemed 
practically absorbed into the larger group.142 However, further northwards, old 
fissures remained present. Susu-speakers did not mix with the Temne-speaking 
majority, reflecting old rivalries. In Sanda Loko, distinctions between Temne-
speakers and Loko-speakers were alive in the institutional set-up: the para-
mount chief in the 1940s insisted on maintaining two different sections with 
their respective representatives.143 Fulbe pastoralists were regarded with sus-
picious glances by members of all the other communities in these northern 
districts, which in part reflected the past fears of invasion from the Fuuta 
139 See Spitzer, Leo, and LaRay Denzer, ‘I.T.A. Wallace-Johnson and the West African Youth 
League. Part ii: The Sierra Leone Period, 1938–1945’, International Journal of African 
Historical Studies 6(4), 1973, 565–601, 585.
140 Little, Kenneth L., ‘Social Change and Social Class in the Sierra Leone Protectorate’, 
American Journal of Sociology 54(1), 1948, 10–21.
141 tna, pro, CO/1018/65, Cox, [Lord Hailey’s Questionnaire], Bombali District (without num-
ber), without date [1948], 1.
142 tna, pro, CO/1018/65, District Commissioner of Kambia, Kambia District (without num-
ber), without date.
143 tna, pro, CO/554/1993, David Edwards, Commissioner of Inquiry in Makeni, Report 
under Section 36(2) Protectorate Ordinance (Cap. 185): Sanda Loko Chiefdom – Paramount 
Chief Bai Samura (without number), 28 Jan. 1957, 1.
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Jallon.144 In some cases, cattle-breeders were forced to pay levies that were of 
doubtful legality or were even clearly illegal according to colonial law, on the 
grounds that they had to support financially the agricultural efforts of the 
Temnes’ as the real ‘natives’.145
Most important, however, was the renewed conflict between ‘Temne’ and 
‘Mende’. Bai Kobolo, interviewed by Lord Hailey in 1948 during the latter’s stay 
in Freetown, argued that the fundamental differences between Temne-
speakers and Mende-speakers were expressed in the organisation and the 
powers of the secret societies, the Poro: he claimed the Temne Poro were stron-
ger and more authentic; he also held that among Temne-speakers, cultural 
homogeneity was strong, and far more important as a factor of allegiance than 
Islamic faith. This was a constructed opposition that had little to do with trends 
in political life.146 Still, in the Northern Province in the late 1940s, the incidence 
of group hostilities was at its lowest.
In 1948, the Temne-speakers tended to rely on the ruling dynasties for nomi-
nating successors, which reduced the number of effective conflicts.147 In most 
of the northern chiefdoms, the paramount chiefs ruled with their inner circles 
of trusted councillors rather than with the native authority. Most British offi-
cials believed that this state of things was, more or less grudgingly, accepted by 
the populations and by headmen who stood lower in the hierarchy, which pre-
served local peace in a principally illegal, but ‘informally correct’, manner.148 
Only in the second half of the 1950s would those officials see their mistake.
The picture changed considerably during the 1950s. A number of increas-
ingly violent rural revolts against local paramount chiefs hit different commu-
nities all over the Protectorate. While it is difficult to construct a political 
connection between such events – as opposed to the Senegambian case where 
one could point to the impact of party politics – the riots nonetheless amounted 
to a strong challenge to the prestige of ‘traditional rulers’ in general, with the 
northern areas also being increasingly affected.149
144 tna, pro, CO/1018/65, District Commissioner of Kambia, Kambia District (without num-
ber), without date, 4.
145 tna, pro, CO/554/1993, Edwards, Report under Section 36(2) Protectorate Ordinance (Cap. 
185): Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom – Paramount Chief Kande Ture iii (without number), 
28 Jan. 1957, 4.
146 tna, pro, CO/1018/65, Cox, Chief Bai Kobolo (without number), without date, 3.
147 tna, pro, CO/1018/65, Burns, Acting Provincial Commissioner, [Remarks to Lord Hailey’s 
Questionnaire:] Northern Province – Makeni. 13th March. (without number), without date, 5.
148 tna, pro, CO/1018/65, Cox, [Lord Hailey’s Questionnaire:] Port Loko District, Present – 
D. Bayley, District Commissioner, Port Loko (without number), 12 March 1948, 1–2.
149 Tangri, Roger, ‘Conflict and Violence in Contemporary Sierra Leone Chiefdoms’, Journal of 
Modern African Studies 14(2), 1976, 311–21, passim.
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Anti-chieftaincy riots became typical for the whole of the Protectorate in 
the 1950s.150 Some of the formerly most prominent paramount chiefs thus 
came under serious pressure. The pressure groups included in some cases the 
‘native authorities’, the councils of dignitaries elected according to ‘customary 
rule’: they used the tendency towards introducing voting rights for an all-Sierra 
Leonean Parliament to challenge the autocratic power of individual para-
mount chiefs. The protests targeted the exploitative ways in which these chiefs 
behaved. Over the course of the 1950s, as a result of the protests, a large num-
ber of Protectorate chiefs were implicated in trials for the overstepping and 
misuse of their administrative powers.151 In the north, out of the six most 
important paramount chieftaincies, at least four were under suspicion of seri-
ous abuse of power. Flexibility and improvisation now made it possible for 
contenders to present themselves, without relying on the strict rules often 
written down in the Government guidebooks of customary law. Remarkably, 
these processes were at first almost confined to the Mende-speaking south of 
the Protectorate, but from there they made themselves known further afield, 
with an impact in the Limba, Loko and Temne zones of the Northern Province. 
As will become clear from the four most violent and most exemplary cases of 
local unrest in late colonial Sierra Leone which were reported from regions all 
over the country, it is possible to identify a general pattern of protest, which, as 
we will see, was in its initial phase non-ethnic. This general pattern subse-
quently became a certain model for the events in Temne-speaking regions, 
and, therefore, it is necessary to discuss the territorial typology of events. Four 
particularly large scandals illustrate the initial similarities of protest all over 
the Protectorate, and it makes sense to have a look at them.
In Luawa in Kailahun District – a Mende-speaking region in the far south-
east of the Protectorate – Paramount Chief Sama Kailundu Banya had reintro-
duced since the interwar period the ancient practice of Manje forced-labour 
farms. This practice had been an instrument for producing food for warfare, 
and had as such been omnipresent in southern Sierra Leone before 1898, but it 
had disappeared under British Protectorate rule.152 Manje practices were not 
automatically an abuse from the point of view of the local populations. Indeed, 
150 Rashid, Ismail, ‘Rebellious Subjects and Citizens: Writing Subalterns into the History of 
Sierra Leone’, in Sylvia Ojukutu-Macauley and Ismail Rashid (eds.), The Paradoxes of History 
and Memory in Post-Colonial Sierra Leone (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2013), 13–36, 29.
151 tna, pro, CO/554/1993, Dorman, Governor of Sierra Leone, to Eastwood, Assistant 
Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office (without number), 16 Feb. 1957, 1–2.
152 tna, pro, CO/267/701/1, Hancock, Provincial Commissioner of the Northern Province, 
Report on the Evidence on Charge 1 against Paramount Chief S.K. Banya (without number), 
9 July 1950, 1.
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when Banya had started with these practices, he had behaved according to the 
expectations and with the encouragement of the nobles of his chieftaincy. As 
he had obtained the chieftaincy at quite a young age, and had thus started with 
a rather weak standing, the headmen had advised him to strengthen his 
authority by creating such Manje farms.153 This plan went undeniably wrong. 
When Banya had become an established ruler, with a secured authority, he 
became more demanding towards the labourers, and used them openly for his 
own private profit. Contrary to the former practice that had conformed to local 
usages, this was no longer tolerable from the point of view of the headmen. 
The latter in the end agreed to mobilise the populations through the Native 
Authority, and in consequence expelled the paramount chief from Kailahun.154
Baoma in Bo District in the South-western Province, a mixed Mende-
speaking region, was a similar case. Here, the three ‘ruling houses’ of the 
Kondor, Kragbate, and Demby had competed for the chieftaincy during the 
whole of the colonial period.155 Alfred C. Demby’s coming to power in 1912 had 
found the support of the headmen. Afterwards, Demby had pursued the nomi-
nation of his own appointees to the Tribal Authority, but this was a rather ‘nor-
mal’ practice, and had thus not caused any protest from the populations. 
However, when the paramount chief overstepped his rights and privileges, 
these abuses aroused a storm of protest. In the event, Demby attempted to 
force his subjects into unpaid road labour – reviving a practice that the colo-
nial power had tacitly banned after the Second World War. He also directed a 
rather large state payment for rice exportations from his chiefdom into his own 
pocket.156
In this particular case, the Tribal Authority was passive – which is not sur-
prising because it consisted mainly of Demby’s followers and clients. 
Nevertheless, local populations were organised enough to help themselves out 
of this situation. In 1949, the opponents of Demby’s rule created a protest 
153 tna, pro, CO/267/701/1, Bang, Nassama, Morikku, Assessors of Enquiry against Sama 
Kailundu Banya, Report of the Assessor Chiefs on the Commissioner’s Report (without num-
ber), 11 July 1950.
154 tna, pro, CO/267/701/1, Bluk, P.C. Sama Kailundu Banya (without number), 16 Oct. 1950; 
sla, Box 567, Waldock, Acting Commissioner of the Southeastern Province to Hancock, 
Acting Chief Commissioner of the Protectorate at Bo, Disturbances at Luawa. (without 
number), 30 Oct. 1950, 1; sla, Box 567, Hancock to Colonial Secretary at Freetown, Luawa 
Chiefdom. (n° C.C.P.1346), 9 Nov. 1950.
155 tna, pro, CO/267/701/8, Weir, Baoma Chiefdom Disturbances, November 1948: Report of 
Commission of Inquiry (without number), 31 Oct. 1949, 5–7.
156 tna, pro, CO/267/701/7, Beresford-Stooke to Griffiths (n° 76/7069/12(T.S.)/CONF.), 
22 April 1950, 1, 3.
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movement that became, over the weeks and months, increasingly violent. 
The activities of this movement forced the chief into exile, and persuaded 
the British administration to agree to the nomination of another, allegedly 
more popular candidate. Nonetheless, the members of the protest movement 
respected the ancient rights of the ‘traditional’ ruling houses, and, significantly, 
they chose the new candidate from the ranks of these houses.157
In Soro in the Pujehun District of South-western Province – a Mende-
speaking region – we have all the typical components of forced labour abuses 
and exploitation, which united to give rise to the violent protests of local popu-
lations. The paramount chief, Mana Luseni, had had a ruling strategy different 
from that of Sama Kailunda Banya, or Alfred Demby: he relied on a violent 
group of supporters. The strength from this support also allowed him for a time 
to exact forced labour to have his own land cultivated, which was not only 
against the colonial legislation, but violated the ‘Mende Customary Laws’ that 
the colonial power had codified in the 1930s.158
Luseni soon went too far. In consequence, a coalition emerged against him 
amongst the Native Authority headmen, who called upon the local popula-
tions to expel their ruler from the chiefdom. Luseni saw the signs and simply 
chose not to return from one of his prolonged stays outside of the province, 
choosing exile to avoid physical attacks. Even in his absence, however, the 
memory of Luseni’s particular brutality was enough to provoke an especially 
violent aftermath. After it became obvious that the chief had fled the region, 
the local people destroyed the houses of the former ruling family, to symboli-
cally punish the Luseni dynasty for the old chief ’s behaviour.159
Finally, in Kaiyamba chiefdom in Moyamba District – a Mende-speaking 
region, but with a strong Temne-speaking minority – violent clashes were 
motivated by a succession conflict. In 1951, this conflict was triggered by 
debates about the right of Ella Koblo Gulama, daughter of the deceased chief 
157 tna, pro, CO/267/701/8, Weir, Baoma Chiefdom Disturbances, November 1948: Report of 
Commission of Inquiry (without number), 31 Oct. 1949, 35; sla, Box 567, D.L.G. Gbenga, 
Secretary of the ‘Political Honours Scrutiny Committee’, Bo, to Governor of Sierra Leone 
(without number), 4 June 1950; sla, Box  567, Tommy Tendia, Amara Saowa, Alpha 
Kondoh, ‘Members of the Opposition Party, Baoma Chiefdom’ to ‘the Organising 
Secretary’ of the West African Youth League (without number), 27 June 1950, 1.
158 tna, pro, CO/554/704, Beresford-Stooke to Lyttelton, British Secretary of State for the 
Colonies (n° 193/S.L.M.P./11216), 13 Nov. 1951, 1; tna, pro, CO/554/704, Childs, Chief 
Commissioner, Southwestern Province, Bo, to Lyttelton, Paramount Chief Mana Luseni 
(n° 1361/50/C.C.P.), 29 Oct. 1951 (Appendix).
159 tna, pro, CO/554/704, Osborne, Head of West African Department, Colonial Office, 
[Comment] (n° 193), 13 Sep. 1951.
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Julius Gulama, to herself become chief of Kaiyamba. The headmen in the 
Native Authority had decided in her favour, obviously respecting the prestige 
of the ruling family and its eventual right to nominate a successor.160 A minor-
ity of those headmen complained, however, that the election was unfair, as 
Julius Gulama had installed his own favourites in the local institutions. The 
beginnings of differentiation on ethnic terms were a part of these complaints: 
Gulama’s opponents argued that the old chief had ruled with the particular 
support of Temne ‘strangers’, and pointed to the fact that his daughter was 
married to an influential Temne-speaker which was perceived as treason.161 
The discussions first resulted in a political deadlock, then in major distur-
bances all over the region of Kaiyamba. The result of the dispute was that Ella 
Kobolo took the chieftaincy in 1952, but the local community remained bitterly 
divided over this question.
Thus, in all four cases – and in several others that did not reach such a vio-
lent stage – the conflicts in the hinterland of Sierra Leone were not a revolt 
against outmoded ‘traditional rule’. They were, on the contrary, part of a 
 process of renegotiating and redefining how chieftaincy ideally had to func-
tion. Protesters and rioters in rural Sierra Leone demanded that the behaviour 
of chiefs had to be more sensitive to the clear interests of the local popula-
tions. The targets of revolt (where it happened) were, at first, those who had 
 committed the most blatant abuses; they suffered violent, vengeful reactions. 
Chieftaincies were prestigious enough to attract new contenders who wished 
to profit from the outrages committed by the former title-holders. In the case 
of the well-respected Sierra-Leonean chiefdoms, many rival candidates ap -
peared; however, they were normally members of a maximum of three or four 
eligible houses and there was less space for outsiders. British colonial policy in 
the 1950s had difficulties in coping with such tensions, and administrators 
oscillated between, on the one hand, the idea of supporting ‘democracy’ under 
all circumstances, and, on the other hand, the need for good cooperation with 
long-standing rulers. The emergence and evolution of political parties only 
complicated this picture. The British authorities agreed to the position formu-
lated in London that it was useful to work increasingly through well-educated 
and elected representatives of the local populations and the Executive Council 
160 tna, pro, CO/554/710, Rowland to Williamson, official of the West African Department, 
Colonial Office (without number), 15 Sep. 1952.
161 tna, pro, CO/554/710, Sandercock, District Commissioner of Moyamba, to Childs (with-
out number), 22 Sep. 1952. On the career of Ella Koblo Gulama, see, also, Lucan, Talabi 
Aisie, The Life and Times of Paramount Chief Madam Ella Koblo Gulama (Freetown: 
PenPoint Publishers, 2004).
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in the colonial capital, and they promoted networks between the ‘ministers’ in 
council in Freetown and local clients.162
This allowed the same ministers to create for themselves a following of 
chiefs or to introduce chiefs into their own parties, which is also typical of the 
situation in Senegambia, and, amongst multiple approaches, in the Trans-
Volta area. The second objective of the colonial state, namely to create a good 
and ‘fairly democratic’ everyday policy in the chiefdoms, remained weak, 
 however.163 British administrators in the end focused on guaranteeing a rela-
tively smooth transfer of power at the level of the central government. The 
fact that violence in the 1950s never seemed to represent an attack against the 
colonial power seemed to be reassuring.164 Also, at the start of the 1950s, while 
British officials had rapidly understood that chieftaincy continued to matter, 
they did not comprehend in which sense the continuing role of the chiefs 
would function, and the party leaders in Freetown were unable to explain to 
the British the basic reasons for rural conflict. As the representatives of the 
colonial power did not want to ‘overcharge’ themselves with too many inqui-
ries regarding those issues, they rather decided not to interfere in the hope 
that they would finally grind to a halt.165
Such a strategy of non-intervention and putting off taking action regarding 
the conflicts around local power till a future time, was difficult to maintain. 
Party politics lurked everywhere, as the leaders of the newly formed political 
movements in Sierra Leone were extremely active in creating themselves an 
appropriate following.166 Therefore, in the violent dispute about the Kaiyamba 
chieftaincy, Milton Margai and Siaka Stevens, the leading politicians in the 
new representative structures in Sierra Leone, each supported a different 
162 tna, pro, CO/554/710, Beresford-Stooke to Lyttelton, Negotiations between the Government 
of Sierra Leone and the Sierra Leone Selection Trust (n° 1088), 29 Oct. 1953.
163 On the inherent contradictions, see tna, pro, CO/554/710, Wallace-Johnson, Secretary-
General of the West African Liberties and National Defence League and West African 
Youth League (Sierra Leone Section) to Colonial Secretary of Sierra Leone (without num-
ber), 27 Aug. 1952.
164 tna, pro, CO/267/701/4, Beresford-Stooke, Extract from Letter from Governor, Sierra 
Leone, to Mr. L.H. Gorsuch, dated 22nd January, 1951 (without number), without date.
165 tna, pro, CO/554/710, Extract from a letter from the Governor of Sierra Leone to 
Mr. W.L. Gorell Barnes dated 21st January, 1953 (Orig. in WAf 62/4/02) (without number), 
without date.
166 Fred Hayward rightly argued that both Milton Margai and the leaders of the movement 
later transforming itself into the apc, did not play the ethnic card from the outset, see 
Hayward, Fred M., ‘Political Leadership, Power, and the State: Generalizations from the 
Case of Sierra Leone’, African Studies Review 27(3), 1984, 19–39, 22–3.
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candidate.167 This meant that both Ella Gulama and her main opponent, 
Lamina Kpangbavi, obtained help through unofficial channels and sought 
political patrons. Leading members of the Sierra Leone People’s Party partic-
ularly set the tune in ‘Mendeland’, their home region, where they now also 
began to intervene in chieftaincy issues in favour of family members. In the 
most famous case, in the chiefdom of Imperi in November 1960, Hjabu Sei 
Kenja, the wife of the Prime Minister, secured for herself the paramount 
chieftaincy with the support of the slpp machine.168
The experiences of ‘Mendeland’ constituted a general trend for the whole of 
the Sierra Leone Protectorate. As C. Magbaily Fyle rightly points out, chiefs 
were, from the 1950s, put in place by different political patrons. Nonetheless, 
Fyle is mistaken in claiming that those political measures ‘distort traditions’.169 
On the contrary, the battle for rulerships had been similarly flexible in the 
nineteenth century, as had been the tactics of ethnic affiliation. Only from the 
perspective of the colonial power did those problems now emerge at the fore-
front of consciousness, particularly because the British administration had 
planned to finish with the power of the paramount chiefs and to come to ‘mod-
ern forms’ of government. In Sierra Leone’s Northern Province, both objectives 
were seriously challenged.
I have discussed the broader panorama of the spectacular cases of ‘chief-
taincy troubles’ in Sierra Leone in such detail, because we need to interpret the 
events in the Northern Province through this prism. In the first weeks of 1957, 
the tide of anti-chieftaincy riots reached a first spectacular climax in this prov-
ince. The immediate cause was the misdeeds of the paramount chief of Safroko 
Limba, Almami Dura ii, a Limba-speaking ruler. Dura was a central figure of 
local relations in the north: he was president of the Bombali District Council 
and a staunch slpp supporter. He was part of a patronage network of para-
mount chiefs and sub-chiefs in the region, and enjoyed high prestige among 
his group of peers, who contributed a large number of presents on the occasion 
167 tna, pro, CO/554/710, Rowland to Williamson (orig. WAF/C.66), 4 Oct. 1952, 2; tna, pro, 
CO/554/710, M.S. Turay, George Kebby, and others to Colonial Secretary of Sierra Leone, 
Re the Appointment of two Assessor Chiefs to go into and examine the Constitutional set-up 
that is, to verify the credentials and appointment of existing members of the Kaiyamba 
Tribal Authority (without number), 27 Aug. 1952, 1.
168 tna, pro, CO/554/2363, Telegram from Dorman, Governor of Sierra Leone, to Macleod, 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, Imperri Chiefdom Election (n° 92/1/019/1), 27 Jan. 1961; 
tna, pro, CO/554/2363, Sierra Leone (without number), without date.
169 Fyle, C. Magbaily, ‘Oral Tradition and Sierra Leone History’, History in Africa 12, 1985, 
65–72, 67.
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of his installation to the presidency.170 In 1956, this reputation among fellow 
paramount chiefs was still unspoilt – but clearly this was no longer the case 
amongst local populations.
Regarding this context, we know Dura’s own point of view in detail, and it is 
obvious that the changes in the attitudes of his subjects were, for him, entirely 
inexplicable: he believed himself to be behaving in ‘traditional’ ways. Dura 
claimed he had ‘always’ organised ‘traditional’ labour services, and did not 
understand why this was now to become a problem.171 However, the Temne-
speaking spokesman of the Tribal Authority, Samba Koromah, sent the district 
commissioner details of an overwhelming number of abuses – forced labour 
and illegal levies – which are in fact representative of the general situation in 
the north:
That the Chief caused unpaid Labour to be used for his farms of both 
land and swamp and those of some of his Chiefdom officers. He even 
used forced Labour on Children under age (both male and female) even 
without food and without any pay. More aggravating was his practice of 
sending people to imprisonment [sic] for failing to do the work. They 
remained in prison until they paid whatever fines he further imposed.
A levy was forced from us for the purpose of buying himself a car he 
later disposed of, to Sahid Mohamed, Syrian Trader, Makeni. Another levy 
was imposed on us for the purchase of a lorry for him which was also 
disposed of, to late Paramount Chief Alimamy Kalawa of Bumban, Biriwa 
Chiefdom. Another levy for a purchase of a Humber car costing £1,200 
one thousand two hundred pounds was imposed on us; and this car was 
disposed of, to Mr. R.C. Metzger, Motor Fitter, Makeni. A further levy was 
again imposed on us for the purchase of another car which [he] in turn 
disposed of, to Mr. J.M. Gbakiwa, Secretary, Bombali District Council, 
Makeni. Another levy still was imposed on us for the purchase of a car 
170 tna, pro, CO/554/1993, Edwards, Report under Section 36(2) Protectorate Ordinance (Cap. 
185): Bombali Sebora Chiefdom – Paramount Chief Bai Sebora Kamal ii – Alhaji Kamara 
(without number), 29 Jan. 1957, 3; tna, pro, CO/554/1993, Edwards, Report under 
Section 36(2) Protectorate Ordinance (Cap. 185): Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom – Paramount 
Chief Kande Ture iii (without number), 28 Jan. 1957, 1.
171 Dura’s networks with Lebanese merchants, combined with his engagement to appear as a 
pious Muslim, brought him the invitation to travel to Lebanon in 1952. See cadn, Fonds 
‘Anciennes Colonies’, Fonds Dakar, 374, Bureau d’Etudes of the Government-General of 
French West Africa, Dakar, Sierra Leone: Un Paramount Chief invité à se rendre au Liban.- 
(n° 611), 21 June 1952.
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whilst he visited the United Kingdom; this car he used was costing £1,700, 
now also disposed of, to Mr. Berthan Macauley, a Barrister in Freetown.172
His extravagant lifestyle had allowed Dura to create a network of supporters – 
but in the 1950s this was no longer tolerated by the locals. His abuses led to 
serious riots. As a result of the protests, Dura was swiftly removed by the British 
administration. This interplay between violent challenges and British remov-
als of chiefs became a familiar pattern in the Northern Province.173 Currently, 
we only have a small number of documents on these events in Sierra Leone’s 
Northern Province in the former National Archives, and the civil war has made 
memories of the late colonial phase in this particular region highly unreliable. 
It therefore makes sense to view these repeated events through the available 
data from the commissions of inquiry. Herbert Cox, a former Gold Coast 
Provincial Commissioner, was the first of a group of British officials who 
reported information from the chiefdoms. The ethnic dimension remained 
notably absent from the actual group relations reflected in this testimony, 
while social conflict was very much commented upon.
In most cases, practices of forced labour were the central issue of the riots. 
In Marampa Masimera, the second speaker of the chiefdom, Yamba Bia, had 
organised compulsory labour on his land, with the agreement of the para-
mount chief, Bai Koblo Patbana. ‘Illegal fines’ were less important in the case 
of Marampa, as such fines appear to have been organised with the active help 
of many of the section chiefs, who now reappeared as plaintiffs.174 In Samu, 
where Temne-speakers had eclipsed the Bullom-speakers over the decades, 
the main argument in interpreting local riots was the rivalry between two local 
families. The Yek family, excluded from the paramount chieftaincy, was behind 
many of the local confrontations: a strike movement they organised against 
the labour policy of the paramount chief ‘degenerated’ into widespread vio-
lence, during which a number of police constables were killed.175
172 tna, pro, CO/554/1993, Samba M. Koromah, spokesman of the Native Authority of 
Safroko Limba, to District Commissioner of Bombali (without number), 25 Feb. 1957, 2.
173 See Moseley, K.P., ‘Land, labour and migration: the Safroko Limba case’, Africana Research 
Bulletin (Fourah Bay, Sierra Leone) 7, 1979, 14–44.
174 tna, pro, CO/554/1993, Harold Willan, Commissioner of Inquiry, Report under 
Section 36(2) Protectorate Ordinance (Cap. 185): Marampa Masimera Chiefdom – Bai Koblo 
Pathbana; Alimamy Sheriff – First Speaker; Yamba Bia – Second Speaker (without number), 
19 Dec. 1956, 2–3.
175 tna, pro, CO/554/1993, Paul Storr, Special Commissioner in Kambia, Samu Chiefdom – 
Paramount Chief Bai Sherbro Yumkella ii (without number), 23 Nov. 1956, 1, 3; tna, pro, 
CO/554/1995, Godden, Summary for position in Samu Chiefdom (without number), without 
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In Makeni, the question of abuses was less acute: Paramount Chief Bai 
Sebora Kamal ii employed a ‘regionalist’ strategy that concentrated taxes on 
‘strangers’, thus provoking criticism from the British officials. Local santigis 
(sub-chiefs) were, nonetheless, quite annoyed about the autocratic style of this 
Temne-speaking ruler, who had, in spite of being an ‘educated’ ex-employee of 
the United Africa Company – a large retail company belonging to Unilever – 
not had the necessary tact towards his subjects and had apparently insulted 
the different representatives of the local authority.176 Kande Ture, the para-
mount chief of Gbanti Kamaranka, had also practised strategies of exclusion 
and of financial exploitation of ‘strangers’, particularly targeting the Fulfulde-
speaking herdsmen. However, he had also demanded unpaid labour on his 
farms from the Temne-speakers, and by 1955 this led to widespread riots.177
In Sanda Loko, as regards which area I have already pointed to the more 
strongly ‘ethnic’ style of local organisation, Paramount Chief Bai Samura was 
accused of having demanded illegal fines, and of staffing his own farm in 
Makoli with involuntary labourers, abusing the institution of ‘chiefdom labour’, 
a type of ‘traditional’ regional labour tax. The commissioner saw the findings 
of the Cox Report as a plot. Even so, Bai Samura was removed as a consequence 
of the protests.178 In Loko Masama, the issue was again forced labour, with 
Paramount Chief Bai Sama exonerated by the commissioner of inquiry on the 
grounds that he had long been in his post, and had been used to employing 
compulsory labour on his farms.179 The situation was similar in Buya Romende, 
where Bai Banta Bento admitted the recourse to forced labour on eight planta-
tions, but was also accused of confiscation of land and of having beaten a local 
headman. In Mambolo, accusations were similar.180
date; tna, pro, CO/554/1995, Telegram from Provincial Commissioner of the Northern 
Province, to Lennox-Boyd, British Secretary of State for the Colonies (n° 16), 15 Jan. 1957.
176 tna, pro, CO/554/1993, David Edwards, Commissioner of Inquiry in Makeni, Report 
under Section  36(2) Protectorate Ordinance (Cap. 185): Bombali Sebora Chiefdom – 
Paramount Chief Bai Sebora Kamal ii – Alhaji Kamara (without number), 29 Jan. 1957, 3.
177 tna, pro, CO/554/1993, Edwards, Report under Section 36(2) Protectorate Ordinance (Cap. 
185): Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom – Paramount Chief Kande Ture iii (without number), 28 
Jan. 1957, 2, 4.
178 tna, pro, CO/554/1993, Edwards, Report under Section  36(2) Protectorate Ordinance (Cap. 
185): Sanda Loko Chiefdom – Paramount Chief Bai Samura (without number), 28 Jan. 1957, 2–6.
179 tna, pro, CO/554/1993, Willan, Report under Section 36(2) Protectorate Ordinance (Cap. 
185): Loko Massama Chiefdom – P.C. Bai Sama – Alimamy Koroma – Alimamy Kamara 
(without number), 25 Nov. 1956, 6.
180 tna, pro, CO/554/1993, Willan, Report under Section 36(2) Protectorate Ordinance (Cap. 
185): Buya Romende Chiefdom – Bai Banta Bento (without number), 6 Dec. 1956, 3–4; tna, 
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In Malal, the chief and his speakers had enforced involuntary labour on the 
roads and confiscated part of the rice harvests.181 Among the Yoni, ‘traditional 
labour’ was institutionalised in the form of a labour tax of two days of work 
payable to the paramount chief. Moreover, the Yoni chief, Bai Sherbro iii, took 
immense fees through the local branch of the Poro Society, and brutally pun-
ished critics among the local headmen.182 Most shocking, however, from the 
point of view of the colonial government, was the evidence given by Bai Farima 
Tass ii of Magbema, ruling over the Temne-speakers of Kambia and its sur-
rounding region. The paramount chief, conversing in fluent English with the 
commissioners of inquiry, being a Minister without Portfolio in Milton Margai’s 
government, and whose eldest son was living as a law student in the United 
Kingdom, was nonetheless convicted of practising extensive forced labour on 
his farms.183
Thus, in Port Loko and other districts of the Northern Province, Temne-
speakers discussed widespread abuses, with forced labour being at the centre 
of the conflicts. British officials still believed they could, with an energetic 
approach of removing all those that stood in the way of good government, re-
establish both the prestige of chieftaincy as an institution, and of the (slowly 
Africanised) administrative organisation.184 The British did not expect that at 
this point, ethnic interpretations would come back into play.
Like elsewhere in West Africa where chiefs had come under attack in the late 
1940s and the 1950s – I have already pointed to similar processes in Senegal – 
tensions seemed to have social motives and little significance in ethnic terms. 
pro, CO/554/1993, Willan, Report under Section 36(2) Protectorate Ordinance (Cap. 185): 
Mambolo Chiefdom – Paramount Chief Bai Sherbro Woni Kebir ii – Pa Kumrabai (without 
number), 18 Jan. 1957, 3.
181 tna, pro, CO/554/1993, Edwards, Report under Section 36(2) Protectorate Ordinance (Cap. 
185): Malal Chiefdom – Paramount Chief Bai Bairoh and Alimami Koroma (Speaker of 
Manewa) (without number), 28 Jan. 1957, 2–4.
182 tna, pro, CO/554/1993, Edwards, Report under Section 36(2) the Protectorate Ordinance 
(Cap. 185): Yoni Chiefdom – Paramount Chief Bai Sherbro iii (without number), 28 Jan. 1957, 
4–6.
183 tna, pro, CO/554/1993, Willan, Report under Section 36(2) Protectorate Ordinance (Cap. 
185): Magbema Chiefdom – Paramount Chief Bai Farima Tass ii. – Alimami Morifoday – 
Alimamy Kamara (without number), 13 Jan. 1957, 2–4, 7–8. On the situation in Kambia 
District, see also sla, Box  576, Commissioner of the Northern Province to Chief 
Commissioner of the Sierra Leone Protectorate, Tonko Limba Chiefdom – Kambia District 
(n° C.F.498/10), 6 Sep. 1957, passim.
184 tna, pro, CO/554/1993, Telegram from Dorman to Eastwood (without number), 19 Feb. 
1957, 1–2.
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In Sierra Leone’s Northern Province, the ethnic point of view appeared even 
less important than in the struggle between Sereer-speakers and Wolof-
speakers on the Petite Côte: a chief like Dura ii might have favoured Limba-
speaking partners, such as the chief Kalawa of Biriwa Chiefdom, but his 
network included a large number of Temne-speakers. Even so, we find a rapid 
evolution from challenges against chiefs who had ultimately wished to present 
themselves as ‘tribal leaders’ to a renaissance of ethnic thinking, which was 
then reflected in voting behaviour in the new Sierra Leonean institutions.
In the second half of the 1950s, the leaders of the slpp and the future apc 
almost simultaneously changed their political strategy. The future apc politi-
cians decided they were marginalised in the political institutions, and felt that 
a programme mainly appealing to the northerners, as distinct from, in particu-
lar, Mende-speakers, could turn the tide. At first, voters did not respond to the 
use of ethnic formulae. However, when Siaka Stevens became more aggressive 
in his tone, claiming that the Northern Province and, more directly, the Temne-
speakers were excluded from both appropriate political representation and 
from the benefits of late colonial investment, the argument began to have 
more effect. The Margai brothers and other slpp leaders, noticing that the 
north had increasingly become a difficult terrain for their electoral campaigns, 
focused more strongly on securing the entirety of the Mende-speakers as a reli-
able support base.185
However, while slowly ethnicising their campaigns, politicians from both 
parties remained eager to maintain in their camp at least some prominent sup-
port from the respectively opposing geographical region. Therefore, the 
Margais were active in courting a number of prominent Temne-speaking 
chiefs, even giving them government posts (although rather marginal ones). 
These chiefs now profited from slpp protection when their abuses were related 
to the British governor in the late 1950s. This explicitly linked the interests of 
‘traditional’ authorities and of ethnicised party politics for the last years of the 
colonial state. Not all of the paramount chiefs stood against a homogeneous 
opposition; in the case of Samu, the chiefdom was divided between the adher-
ents of two families fighting each other, although belonging to one dynasty.186 
In other cases, however, the resistance movement was far more violent.
The patronage of the autonomous government of the two prominent para-
mount chiefs, Bai Farima Tass ii of Magbema and Alkali Modu of Maforki, led 
to a chain reaction. In view of various abuses, the British governor nonetheless 
185 Wyse, Bankole-Bright, 164–78.
186 Minikin, Victor, ‘Indirect Political Participation in Two Sierra Leone Chiefdoms’, Journal of 
Modern African Studies 11(1), 1973, 129–35, 130–2.
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vacillated considerably in removing them from their positions. In 1957, these 
two had remained the only prominent Temne in Margai’s leading and British-
supported slpp.187 Such hesitations created fresh outbursts of anger among 
the Temne-speaking populations: local headmen interpreted the slpp as a 
party of ‘southerners’ merely wanting to keep its two remaining clients in the 
north in their positions, supporting corrupt structures and exploitation.
Finally, the two chiefs in question stepped down, but the reputation of the 
slpp government in Sierra Leone’s Northern Province was entirely ruined. 
The perception that the slpp wanted to aid corrupt allies at the expense of 
the interests of the region’s inhabitants was widespread. In the following five 
years, this experience made the Temne-speakers in the north very hostile 
towards politics formulated in Freetown.188 It was an easy task for Siaka 
Stevens and the other opposition leaders to convince the local populations 
that abuses in the north were the fruit of a ‘Mende’ conspiracy. Only then, and 
because of a conflict that involved the modes of chieftaincy in general far 
more than any ethnic dimension, did the latter criterion again enter Sierra 
Leonean politics, through the back door.
The documentation of the 1950s leaves no doubt about the fact that the 
battles over chieftaincy were decisive in the process of ethnicisation. The 
affairs of Kaiyamba and elsewhere in Sierra Leone’s south – the former involv-
ing Temne-speaking chiefs – had expressed a general feeling: chiefs were to be 
reminded that they had to work ‘for the common good’:
The time when Chiefs were looked upon as Gods is past. It is the duty of 
the Tribal Authority to advise the Chief, particularly a young Chief, 
when they see he is going astray. Should he not heed to their advice, 
worse still should he fine someone for giving such advice, they ought to 
report him to the District Commissioner, who, undoubtedly, would at 
most give him a warning for the first time. The Tribal Authorities have a 
duty to perform, and they should not fear to do so, or else the Chiefdom 
is bound to go wrong.189
The late colonial state was unable to react to these changes. Such passivity 
allowed politicians in Freetown to integrate the ‘traditional structures’ into 
their own networks of patronage: those structures would easily survive well 
187 tna, pro, CO/554/1993, Dorman to Eastwood (without number), 16 Feb. 1957, 2.
188 tna, pro, CO/554/1993, Godden to Bennett, Assistant Secretary of West African 
Department, Colonial Office, and Eastwood (without number), 26 Feb. 1957, 2.
189 tna, pro, CO/267/701/1, Bang; Nassama; Morikku, Report (without number), 11 July 1950.
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into the post-colonial state. However, locals in the north began to interpret the 
shortcomings of both the colonial administration, and, in particular, of the 
slpp government in punishing abusive chiefs as the result of an ethnic 
conspiracy.190
The political realities were complemented by particular patterns of migra-
tory behaviour, which differed strongly from the more relaxed situation of the 
interwar period. During the 1950s, migratory movements in rural areas had 
taken forms that tended to reinforce the self-perception of groups as ethnic 
blocks. Vernon Dorjahn has shown, for the example of Kolifa Mayoso, that 
between 1955 and 1963 the rate of immigration from other, ‘non-Temne’ chief-
doms became extremely low, while ‘Temne’ migrated increasingly either into 
Temne-speaking towns, or into the Temne-speaking immigrant settlements of 
the Sierra Leone Peninsula.191 With the transition into the post-colonial state, 
such forms of closing ranks translated themselves into a clear allegiance to a 
regional and ethnic pro-Temne party, the apc – and made Siaka Stevens’s take-
over of political power and the end of the Sierra Leonean democracy 
possible.
 Through the Conjuncture of Ethnic Mobilisation and ‘Peaceful 
Coexistence’: Port Loko as a Crossroads in Northern Sierra Leone
At the moment of the arrival of European administrators and black settlers on 
the Sierra Leone peninsula, Port Loko was already a significant commercial 
and political centre. In a strategically important position at an easily accessible 
creek, this city had control of a considerable hinterland.192 The rulers of Port 
Loko underlined this claim through the raising of tribute in smaller villages, 
where they regularly appeared.193 Superficial Islamic proselytisation had given 
these rulers the title of ‘Alkali’, and a certain prestige as protectors of the 
Muslim faith. Nevertheless, cms missionaries quickly described the town as a 
particularly promising base for Christianisation in the region. This subse-
quently led to an early European presence in the settlement – and to European 
source material on Port Loko’s political situation. Freetown Creoles coming as 
190 Allen, ‘Politics’, 308.
191 Dorjahn, ‘Migration’, 34.
192 Howard, Allen M., and David Skinner, ‘Network Building and Political Power in 
Northwestern Sierra Leone, 1800–65’, Africa 54(2), 1984, 2–28, 10–7.
193 cms, CA1/0 60/55, Burtchaell, A day’s itinerancy in the Temne Country Port Loko to Romanka 
(without number), without date [1879], 2.
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merchants and British diplomats also felt attracted by the strategic position of 
the town. In the nineteenth century, when Port Loko for the first time trans-
formed itself into an ostensibly Temne settlement, these exchanges reflected a 
stronger ethnic identification.
When the British established themselves on the Sierra Leone Peninsula, 
Port Loko was all but an exclusively Temne-speaking community. In the town 
and hinterland, Mōri Burēma, a Susu-speaking ruler and successful Muslim 
war leader of the Sanko family, had established his own stronghold in the early 
1800s.194 The extension of his power at first went unnoticed by the British 
whose had at that time been absorbed by warfare against settlements in Koya 
and by their subsequent diplomatic efforts in Morea. In the first decade of the 
century, they seem to have largely ignored the importance of the neighbouring 
town. When the British started to become more active in the area of Port Loko, 
Mōri Burēma had already fortified his position in the port centre and chal-
lenged British control over the region. One of Burēma’s major sources of 
income (running counter to British goals since the Abolition of 1807) was his 
major involvement in the sale of war captives. For this particular reason, British 
authorities in Freetown oscillated between the attempt to establish good rela-
tions with the ruler and support for his adversaries.
British observers unanimously believed throughout the decade that Burēma 
was a ‘stranger’ and, as such, a usurper. However, it is obvious that in the period 
around 1810, Burēma was popular with at least a section of the local political 
hierarchy. He had originally come from a Mandinka-speaking settlement fur-
ther northwards, and had brought with him a warrior band, whose military 
force had helped him to secure control over the town. Subsequently, he played 
in part the card of ethnic affiliation by concentrating his Mandinka followers 
in the newly-built town centre of Romakbum outside of the fortifications of 
Port Loko. This policy provoked some resistance.195 However, Burēma courted 
several of the local Temne-speaking chiefs to stabilise his rule, and they proved 
to be reliable partners during a whole decade. He masterfully played the card 
of group identifications whenever it suited him, although in this respect the 
British reports from Freetown are full of exaggerations, as British officials 
regarded the ‘Mandingos’ as the principal slavers, and as members of a danger-
ous and hostile network. Even so, Burēma mobilised diplomatic contacts with 
the Mandinka rulers in regions in the north and north-west of Port Loko 
194 Fyfe follows later British documentation that sees this ruler as a Muslim of Sarakole ori-
gins, see Fyfe, History, 6.
195 tna, pro, CO/267/45, MacCarthy to Bathurst (n° 37), 5 Aug. 1817, 2.
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through the ethnic argument, which made him an influential political player 
in the whole of the river region.196
Similar strategies of selectively using ethnic group identifications can be 
seen in some comparable biographies, notably in the case of the career of the 
‘Mandingo’ Dala Modu Dumbuya in the first half of the nineteenth century. 
Although this leader never controlled the city of Port Loko, he remained an 
impressive figure in the immediate neighbourhood and major peace broker 
between different rulers and different ethnic groups at Magbele in 1836. As 
early as 1815, Dala Modu was playing the instruments of identity policy in the 
most ingenious ways: he even managed to procure for himself a leading posi-
tion amongst the Baga populations of coastal Sierra Leone, although the latter 
were hostile to Islam. At the same time, ‘the Almami’ had secured the primary 
position among the many Muslim rulers of the Bullom Shore.197 Furthermore, 
he had already started to build up enormous prestige among Temne-speaking 
rulers, to become even greater over the next decades, as a reliable spokesman 
for the common interest.
While being less documented than the case of Dala Modu, the family of the 
Sanko in Port Loko is another example of such Dyula politics, although most 
of the information we have to hand is retrospective and slightly questionable. 
Some of the facts are nevertheless obvious. In 1816, various local families revolted 
against the rule of the Susu-speaking Sanko ruler, Brima Konkuri, and expelled his 
family from the town. The overthrow of the ruler did not initially mean the expul-
sion of all ‘Susu’: Port Loko, for some time, remained a ‘mixed community’.198 
However, in the long run, the politics of identification proved counter-productive. 
This began with diplomatic relations with the Europeans: in order to obtain the 
sympathies of the British in Freetown, the rebels emphasised their Temne-ness, 
claiming that they had just expelled a dynasty of ‘strangers’.
In 1825, a British mission to Port Loko intervened in the succession of the 
city’s ruler, the so-called ‘Ali Karlie’, Alkali Moriba Kindo Bangura. This British 
intrusion in local affairs was due in particular to worries about the trade routes, 
which, in this area, were already frequently interrupted by the wars between 
different Temne-speaking chiefs and other leaders, ‘Mandinkas’ or ‘Susus’. The 
British governor, Charles Turner, did not have a deep understanding of any of 
196 tna, pro, CO/267/29, Dawes, Observations on the Situation of Sierra Leone with respect to 
the surrounding Natives (without number), without date, 4–9.
197 tna, pro, CO/267/47, MacCarthy to Bathurst (n° 156), 20 July 1818, 3–4.
198 Howard, Allen M., ‘Mande Identity Formation in the economic and political context of 
North-west Sierra Leone, 1750–1900’, Paideuma 46, 2000, 13–35, 24–6; Wylie, Kingdoms, 
37–41; Fyfe, History, 127.
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the group conflicts around the turban of the Alkali; he admitted to being not at 
all certain who amongst the contenders was a ‘correct’ candidate from an eth-
nic point of view. The fact that one contender for the throne had made himself 
a name as a protector of warrior bands that plundered ‘the Fulas’, regarded as 
the main slave merchants in the region, obviously was a point in his favour. 
Consequently, Turner’s support guaranteed that Fatima Brima, the nephew of 
the late ruler, obtained the position: in this context, the British governor 
insisted that Brima had in any case been the true heir and favourite of a major-
ity of Port Lokkans.199
In the immediate surroundings of Port Loko, Temne-speaking residents had 
quickly learned their lesson from this event. In Bara Loko, after the death of Pa 
Moriba, the representatives of the Bara and Sankong families obtained Turner’s 
support as partners in keeping the trade roads open. They managed to present 
themselves as former victims of an invasion of Susu ‘strangers’.200 During the 
1840 succession of the Alkali of Port Loko, the Susu-speakers in the region were 
not able to interfere, although the announcements during the ceremonies 
were still made in Temne and Susu.201
As a whole, such manoeuvres were quite successful from the point of view of 
a section of the leading Temne-speaking families. Susu-speakers in the area lost 
their access to central power and the chance to make another claim for the 
position of Port Loko’s ruler. The events of the 1810s and 1820s were locally 
interpreted as an ethnic takeover. They remained as such in the collective 
memories of the populations of the region, and, particularly of those who had 
lost out as a result of the settlement enforced by the British. This was confirmed 
during the invasion by the Lahai war bands in the 1850s – one or two genera-
tions after the political changes in Port Loko. The Susu-speaking warrior group 
of the Lahais occupied Kambia and wreaked havoc in many of the Temne-
speaking communities of the Skarcies Rivers region, but they had another, 
more important, target. Numerous informants explained to the British com-
mander that the Lahais wished, in particular, to take the town of Port Loko.202 
199 tna, pro, CO/267/66, Turner to Bathurst (n° 91), 20 Dec. 1825, 3–9.
200 tna, pro, CO/267/66, Turner, Convention between His Excellency Major General Charles 
Turner B. Captain General and Governor in Chief of Sierra Leone and its Dependencies &c. 
&c. and Caremo, Senior and Chief of the Barra Family, …and Possessors of the Bacca Loco 
Territories (without number), 12 Dec. 1825, 2–3.
201 cms, CA1/0 87/15, Reverend Nathaniel Denton, Journal extracts for the quarter ending 
Dec.r 25th 1840 (without number), without date, 2–3.
202 tna, pro, CO/�67/�60, Wise, British Commander at the Guinea Coast, to Grey, British 
admiral, Reporting operations conducted against the Sooso Chiefs…(without number), 
5 Feb. 1858, 2–3, 7.
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This was a risky operation, as the bases of the Susu army in the region of Kambia 
were on the whole not safe; but the campaign seemed necessary for ‘historical 
reasons’. The informants claimed that the Lahai brothers, as Susu-speakers, 
considered the historical events in Port Loko as dishonouring their ethnic 
group, and wished to ‘reconquer’ the settlement to avenge the disaster of the 
1820s.
Missionary documentation from the Port Loko area, where the cms became 
slowly re-entrenched after 1875, points to growing polarisation of identifica-
tions in ethnic group terms as a direct consequence of the episode of the Lahai 
invasions. The rulers of Port Loko, Santigi Kondito and the Alkali, now began to 
identify more intensely as Temne. They thereby attempted to mobilise the dif-
ferent families in the region of the settlement to support more firmly the 
Alkali’s power.203 In these discussions, the Temne-speaking adherents of the 
ruling family notably deplored the fact that Rogbon, a city in the surroundings 
of Port Loko, was still ruled by ‘a Susu man’.204
Religion did not help to overcome these differences. Strangers were often 
marked as ‘Mandinka’, and this in spite of the growing tendency in Port Loko 
towards Islamic conversion: no bridges were built between the different com-
munities in Sierra Leone’s north. The elites of Port Loko (and, indeed, the 
informants of the British residents) favoured defining non-Temne speakers as 
fundamentally different.205 In Port Loko, the dominant discourse of the 1880s 
concentrated, however, on attempts to obtain British material support for 
local projects, including infrastructure and armament. In this context, the 
Alkali and leading chiefs were eager to present those projects as joint initia-
tives of various Temne communities, although neighbouring chiefs did not 
accept the claims of Port Loko’s rulers. The strongest effect that this pan-
Temne rhetoric had was on the British. Sometimes, the identification of the 
‘Temne’ as one united group was quite negative: it led British Major Festing, 
passing through the town during travels, to remark that ‘the Timinis are a 
203 cms, C A1/0 29/4, John Alfred Alley, Journal (without number), without date [1879], 25; 
cms, C A1/0 29/6, Alley, Journal October 1879 (without number), dated 1879.
204 cms, C A1/0 29/4, Alley, Journal (without number), without date [1879], 23.
205 cms, C A1/0 29/5, Alley, Journal From July to September 1879. J.A. Alley (without number), 
without date, 5. Trusted Muslim advisors of the local rulers were exempted from this 
rhetoric, such as the ‘Susu man’ of Masimera, see cms, C A1/0 29/8, Alley, Journal April – 
June 30th 1880 (without number), without date, 7. Others amongst the preachers came 
from regions far more to the north and northeast, i.e. the Fuuta Jallon or even Fuuta Tooro 
in Senegambia, see cms, CA1/0 60/55, Burtchaell to Rosler, Secretary of Church Missionary 
Society (without number), 22 Nov. 1878, 2.
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despicably dilatory lot, they want the white man to help them all they can and 
render none in return’.206
In the reality, there was still no permanent ethnic confrontation amongst 
local communities in the Port Loko area. As in the rest of the north of present-
day Sierra Leone, this process of community-building was in decline after the 
creation of the Sierra Leone Protectorate in 1898. With the end of the devastat-
ing regional warfare that had characterised the region in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, ethnic claims were no longer useful. During much of the 
first three decades of the twentieth century, in which the city became the cen-
tre of the paramount chieftaincy of Maforki, arguably the most important 
chiefdom of Sierra Leone’s north, aggressive ethnic formulations were very 
much absent.207
At the end of the 1940s, Port Loko had grown into a fairly sizeable regional 
centre, and the local elite boasted the highest level of European-style educa-
tion in all of the Northern Province. For decades, during the whole of the inter-
war period, the discourses on ethnicity had been dormant; in the end there 
was little to discuss. There were no open conflicts in the town’s community, 
and no initiatives to highlight the settlement’s Temne identity.208 It is, of 
course, difficult to assess the importance of ethnic sentiment in the everyday 
life of individuals, but it had no political role. In the course of the remobilisa-
tion in the north after the Second World War, these identifications reappeared 
on the stage with renewed importance.
In the context of Port Loko, this process was more strongly visible than in 
other parts of the north: the controversial memory of group hostilities defined 
through ethnic terms had remained alive, and it was now eagerly employed 
during the new conflicts. In the late 1940s, while the north seemed still gener-
ally calm and largely unaffected by ethnic hostilities, the Temne-speaking and 
206 tna, pro, CO/879/29, African Confidential Print No. 366, Festing, Major A.M. Festing’s 
Mission to Almamy Samodu – Diary (without number), without number, 7.
207 sla, spa 507/1, Death and Elections of Paramount Chiefs, Maforki Chiefdom, Acting 
Commissioner of the Northern Province at Makump, to Colonial Secretary at Freetown 
(n° 66/10(4)), 5 Feb. 1923; sla, spa 507/1, Death and Elections of Paramount Chiefs, 
Maforki Chiefdom, Mac Robert, Commissioner of the Northern Province; Pa Kumrabai, 
Acting Chief, and others for the New Port Loko Section; Santigi Salifu of Bendugu and 
others for Sendugu Section; Alimami Suri of Kabata and others for Kabata Section; 
Alimami Konte and others for Romaka section; Alimami Suri of Karene and others for 
Rogberi Section; Alimami Kanu of Rotal and others for Malal Section; Santigi Tauya for 
Tauya Section, Agreement (without number), 5 April, 1949.
208 tna, pro, CO/1018/65, Cox, [Lord Hailey’s Questionnaire:] Port Loko District, Present – 
D. Bayley, District Commissioner, Port Loko (without number), 12 March 1948, 6.
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Susu-speaking communities of the Port Loko region demonstrated a longer 
memory. In that period, the Susu-speaking minority began to isolate itself 
entirely from the Temne-speakers, in a sort of non-violent but hostile 
separation.209
In 1955, violent conflict suddenly shook the Port Loko region. However, it 
antagonised, in the first instance, different groups of Temne-speakers. Alkali 
Modu iii, the paramount chief of Maforki residing in the city, became the tar-
get of furious protests. Modu had installed a relatively ‘authoritarian’ regime 
that now, with moves toward political democratisation in the Protectorate, 
became more difficult to uphold. He had relied on forced labour to cultivate 
rice and maize on his own farms (he claimed that this was necessary to guaran-
tee sufficient food stocks in the rural areas of Port Loko, but the British com-
missioners of inquiry would not believe him). Moreover, he demanded regular 
gifts from headmen of the surrounding villages, and would levy them if they 
refused to bring the respective goods. His right hand as messenger of the Native 
Authority, Sergeant Morlai, was infamous for his brutality towards any non-
compliant headmen, and Modu iii had also ordered corporal punishment for 
village leaders called to the Native Authority Court in Port Loko.210
These authoritarian practices had in themselves a certain ethnic note. While 
the paramount chief did not necessarily distinguish on group terms between 
individuals required for forced labour or headmen ‘encouraged’ to bring pres-
ents, he nonetheless treated Limba-speakers significantly worse than all the 
others. In court, Alkali Modu iii was quite keen to imprison Limba-speaking 
debtors who, for ‘being Limba’, would remain in the barri until their debts were 
cleared, and who could obviously expect more frequently the recourse of the 
court to corporal punishment.211 However, these distinctions were not suffi-
cient to turn the Limba-speakers against the Temne-speaking majority in the 
chiefdom. On the contrary, the short wave of riots in the 1950s was led by activ-
ists among the Temne-speaking headmen who were eager to finish with the 
Alkali’s style of rule.212
209 tna, pro, CO/1018/65, Bailey, Details required by Lord Hailey. Port Loko District. Northern 
Province (without number), 5 Feb. 1948, 1.
210 tna, pro, CO/554/1993, Harold Willan, Commissioner of Inquiry, Report under 
Section 36(2) Protectorate Ordinance (Cap. 185): Maforki Chiefdom – Alikali Modu iii (with-
out number), 7 Nov. 1956, 2, 6–7.
211 Ibid., 7.
212 sla, Commission of Enquiry: Letters Submitted, Port Loko District, CE/P/77, Bowerson 
Decker to Chairman of Commission of Inquiry at Port-Loko (without number), 6 April 
1956; sla, Commission of Enquiry: Letters Submitted, Port Loko District, CE/P/77, 
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As we have seen, Alkali Modu iii belonged to the influential chiefly mem-
bers of the slpp, and his good contacts to Milton Margai gave him a certain 
degree of protection against the attacks of his adversaries. The members of the 
alliance of headmen, seasonal migrants, and young militants who protested 
against his exactions were particularly angered by these manoeuvres. Modu’s 
removal came too late to calm their spirits. Furthermore, the machinations 
from Freetown to save the chief from removal only broadened the alliance in 
the region, and allowed for bridging the potential gap between Limba-speakers 
and Temne-speakers in the chiefdom, who thus found grounds for political 
cooperation. Only the Susu-speakers continued in opposition to the political 
majority in the district.
After the expulsion of the old chief, the overwhelming majority of Port 
Loko’s political militants remained negative towards the dominance of ‘south-
erners’ in Freetown. In early 1961, the political activities of Siaka Stevens’s All 
People’s Congress, the new main opposition force on the scene in Sierra Leone, 
were warmly embraced by these militants who loudly demanded constitu-
tional guarantees in order not to be marginalised in a future independent 
state.213
It can be said that Port Loko was indeed a microcosm that reflected very 
well the tendencies in Sierra Leone’s Temne-speaking north. From the early 
conflicts between Temne and Susu that still had a very local perspective, to the 
second, more global wave of conflicts starting in the 1850s, to a period of rela-
tive calm under colonial rule and the renaissance of the principle of ethnic 
mobilisation in the 1950s, the chronology is quite representative. In Port Loko, 
however, rather than its being a commercial centre that knew the passage of a 
relatively high number of ‘foreigners’, the conflicts between Temne-speakers 
and others were particularly bitter. They illustrate that, in the absence of other 
binding principles, the call to ethnic solidarity was always an option.
 Into the Bipolar Ethnic State: The All People’s Congress and the 
Second Politicisation of Temne-ness
The emergence of the All People’s Congress in 1960 was, from the point of view 
of the colonial authorities and of the ministers of Sierra Leone’s autonomous 
Kumaka, Bollom, Kaffeh, to Chairman of Commission of Inquiry at Port-Loko (without 
number), 7 April 1956.
213 tna, pro, CO/554/2363, Resolutions passed at a Mass Meeting held at {Port Loko} on 17th 
February, 1961. (without number), 17 Feb. 1961.
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government, a serious problem – but, initially, not at all in the sense of an eth-
nicisation of political programmes in a country that was on the brink of 
national independence. For Milton Margai and his ministerial crew, the apc 
was dangerous because it appeared to forge a coalition of urban inhabitants, in 
the same way as the defunct upp had attempted before, but without being too 
clearly a ‘Creole party’. Also, the slpp politicians were worried about their 
opponents’ campaign against corruption. This touched upon Milton Margai’s 
transactions, involving his own urban villa, with the Lebanese building com-
pany Milhem, and the obscure commercial activities of the ministers of finance 
and housing, Mohammad Sanusi Mustapha and Cyril Rogers-Wright.214 The 
British authorities remained relatively worried about this development, and 
their observations give us a picture that, while being distorted and Eurocentric, 
allows us nonetheless to follow step by step the apc strategies in the last 
months before Sierra Leone’s independence. British officials regarded Stevens’s 
party as, at the least, a movement ‘inspired by Marxist propaganda’, and they 
held that the apc received payments from Moscow and that Siaka Stevens had 
Soviet contacts organised via Ghana and Sékou Touré’s ‘Communist state’ in 
Guinea-Conakry.215
Indeed, Stevens was able to mobilise a section of the urban electorate, and 
the victory of the apc in the November 1960 municipal elections in Freetown 
was celebrated as a paradigmatic surprise success. apc leaders claimed their 
electoral success was based on the support of very different ‘tribes’.216 The 
party sought close collaboration with the leaders of the nascent Sierra Leonean 
214 tna, pro, CO/554/2363, Telegram from Dorman to Macleod, British Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, Security Situation (n° 245), 24 April 1961, 1.
215 tna, pro, CO/554/2363, Telegram from Dorman to Office of the British Prime Minister 
and Commonwealth Relations Office; Greenhill; King (without number), 26 April 1961, 1; 
tna, pro, CO/554/2363, Telegram from Dorman to Macleod (n° 79), 24 April 1961, 1; tna, 
pro, CO/554/2363, Telegram from Dorman to Macleod, Internal Security and Political 
Situation. (without number), 18 April 1961; tna, pro, CO/554/2363, Logan, British 
Embassy in Conakry, to Dorman (n° 5), 17 April 1961, 1; tna, pro, FO/371/147540, British 
Embassy in Conakry, Guinea Affairs (without number), without date; tna, pro, 
CO/554/2363, Sierra Leone (without number), without date; MacDonald, Mairi, ‘A voca-
tion for independence: Guinean nationalism in the 1950s’, in Tony Chafer and Alexander 
Keese (eds.), Francophone Africa at Fifty (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 
30–43.
216 tna, pro, CO/554/2363, Siaka Stevens for apc Working Committee, Sierra Leone’s 
Forthcoming Independence – Points to Ponder: An Appraisal of the existing political situa-
tion in Sierra Leone, prepared by the All People’s Congress of Sierra Leone (A.P.C.) (without 
number), 9 Feb. 1961, 6.
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trade unions, namely Marcus Grant and George Stone from the Sierra Leone 
Council of Labour, and gave itself the image of a social movement. In early 
1961, Stevens and other apc leaders reacted with outrage to the refusal of the 
Margai government to hold new elections before independence and called for 
social protests. Stevens and another two dozen apc politicians even ended up 
in prison for some time.217
However, even with its social rhetoric, the apc was equally successful in the 
Temne-speaking regions of Sierra Leone’s north, and it also won the vote of the 
Limba-speakers of the same region. British observers were perplexed about 
Stevens’s success. In their view, Stevens was, like the slpp leaders, a typical 
‘urban’ politician and very similar to Margai.218 They were therefore quite sur-
prised at the landslide mobilisation which the apc was able to achieve in the 
areas of Port Loko and Kambia, and also in mainly Temne-speaking Marampa, 
where the opposition party made visible inroads from 1960.219
The developments of the 1950s had not been forgotten. The impression that 
‘southern’ or ‘Mende’ politicians had attempted to change the distribution of 
resources in the territory, was long-lasting. According to inquiries by British 
administrators who wished to guarantee a smooth transfer of power in the terri-
tory, the distrust of Temne-speakers towards Mende domination in the Freetown 
autonomous government had even grown. The behaviour of local leaders 
reflected these impressions: in the northern centres of Magburaka, Makeni, 
Kambia, and Port Loko, Temne-speaking adherents were assembled to loudly 
demand constitutional changes and elections before independence. Although 
these assemblies had no immediate effect – both the slpp government and the 
British authorities were determined to proceed with the process leading to 
 independence – their impact was strong in directing the formerly diffuse 
grudges of local Temne-speakers towards a clearer political programme.220 Even 
217 tna, pro, CO/554/2363, Telegram from Dorman to Macleod (n° 71), 15 April 1961, 1; tna, 
pro, CO/554/2363, E.C. Burr, Principal of International Relations Department, Colonial 
Office, to Aaron Emanuel, Assistant Secretary, West African Department of the C.O. (with-
out number), 3 March 1961; tna, pro, CO/554/2363, Telegram from Dorman to Macleod, 
Security Situation (n° 245), 24 April 1961, 1; tna, pro, CO/554/2363, Telegram from 
Dorman to Macleod (without number), 18 April 1961, 1.
218 tna, pro, CO/554/2363, [Revision of Draft to Mr. Tilney] (without number), 7 March 
1961, 2.
219 tna, pro, CO/554/2363, Sierra Leone Intelligence Committee, All People’s Congress (A.P.C.): 
Appendix ‘A’ to S.L.I.C. Report for September, 1960 (without number), without date, 2.
220 See, particularly, tna, pro, CO/554/2363, Resolution of Participants of Public Meeting in 
Kenema [Bombali District] (without number), 17 Feb. 1961, 2; tna, pro, CO/554/2363, 
Resolutions passed at a Mass Meeting held at {Port Loko} on 17th February, 1961. (without 
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more, this mobilisation spilled back into the urban agglomeration of Freetown, 
where it further strengthened the apc support base. The ‘Temne Hungry Unions’ 
of Temne-speaking unemployed in the urban area became a very vocal instru-
ment of Siaka Stevens’s attempts at mobilisation.221
In 1961, this renaissance of Temne ethnic mobilisation was still insufficient to 
bring the apc into power. The unequivocal support of the British government 
for the Margai administration, and the years-long control of slpp ministers over 
the levers of power, would not disappear overnight. However, the foundations 
were laid. During the 1960s, the combination of a party politics that relied on 
cooperation with paramount chiefs, and the evolution of a bipolar ethnic con-
stituency, perpetuated itself. The memory of the late 1950s, which led Temne-
speakers of the north to regard the slpp elite as southern, corrupt, and hostile, 
remained vivid, and would have consequences for the post-colonial state.
After 1969, the apc would repay in kind.222 Relying on a Creole–Temne/
Loko/Limba alliance, and winning the votes of discontented populations from 
other parts of the new state, Siaka Stevens became the new ruler of Sierra 
Leone. Instead of attempting to end the ethnic polarisation that had (re-)
emerged in the 1950s, the new government perpetuated the confrontation by 
installing a cabinet and a senior administration dominated by Temne-speakers 
and Loko-speakers. Moreover, in the Mende-speaking regions, they replaced 
paramount chiefs with their own clients, paving the way for a new wave of 
discontent.223 With this platform of ethnic mobilisation, the Stevens govern-
ment repeated a pattern that had started as forms of ethnic mobilisation over 
the nineteenth century, and had only been interrupted by relative stabilisation 
of regional resource distribution by the colonial state.
number), 17 Feb. 1961; tna, pro, CO/554/2363, ‘Makeni District Community’ to District 
Commissioner of Makeni, Resolutions passed by the Bombali District Community at a 
mass meeting held at Makeni on the 17th February, 1961. (without number), without date, 1; 
tna, pro, CO/554/2363, ‘Tonkolili District Community’ to District Commissioner of 
Magburaka, Resolutions passed by the Tonkolili District Community at a mass meeting held 
at Magburaka on the 17th February, 1961. (without number), 17 Feb. 1961.
221 tna, pro, CO/554/2363, Sierra Leone Intelligence Committee, All People’s Congress (A.P.C.): 
Appendix ‘A’ to S.L.I.C. Report for September, 1960 (without number), without date, 3.
222 Zack-Williams, Alfred B., ‘The Ekutay: Ethnic Cabal and Politics in Sierra Leone’, in E. Ike 
Udogu, The Issue of Political Ethnicity in Africa (Aldershot etc.: Ashgate, 2001), 125–47, 130–3.
223 Fanthorpe, Richard, ‘On the Limits of Liberal Peace: Chiefs and Democratic Decentralization 
in Post-War Sierra Leone’, African Affairs 105(418), 2005, 27–49, 42.
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chapter 5
‘Ethnic Identity’ as an Anti-colonial Weapon? Ewe 
Mobilisation from the Late Nineteenth Century to 
the 1960s
 The Ewe: A Case of Aggressive Solidarity
Unlike for Wolof-speakers or Temne-speakers, the ethnic identity of ‘the 
Ewe’ was an issue of public and even international debate from the 1940s. 
Their spokesmen won some fame as the first case of an African political 
movement attempting to use the stage of the United Nations.1 The Ewe 
unity movement seemed to be an institution with ancient roots, defined 
through identification with a common ethnicity.2 However, for the Ewe-
speakers like for the Wolof and Temne, the interrelations of the different 
layers of identifications are complex and it is crucial to understand how 
they ‘sold’ themselves to European residents and colonisers over the 
decades.
The relation between Ewe identification and Avatime identification is 
reminiscent of the complex relationship between the categories of ‘Wolof ’ 
and ‘Sereer’ in coastal Senegambia. Today, the Avatime speak both the 
Central Togo minority language of the same name and Ewe. Their historical 
vision regards the Avatime as second-comers in an area having been inhab-
ited by a quasi-mythical older population, the so-called ‘Bayas’, and as having 
arrived before any Ewe-speakers. However, the more significant event in this 
respect is the Asante invasion of the late 1860s.3 During these struggles, the 
Avatime presented their relationship to other Ewe-speakers as a military 
1 The broad context appears in Welch, Claude E., Dream of Unity: Pan-Africanism 
and Political Unification in West Africa (Ithaca/ny: Cornell University Press, 1966), 
42–73.
2 This was first formulated by Amenumey, D.E.K., ‘The pre-1947 background to the Ewe unifica-
tion question: a preliminary sketch’, Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana 10, 1969, 
65–85, 65–6, 71.
3 Brydon, Lynne, ‘Rice, Yams and Chiefs in Avatime: Speculations on the Development of a 
Social Order’, Africa 51(2), 1981, 659–77, 659–60; Brydon, Lynne, ‘Constructing Avatime: 
Questions of History and Identity in a West African Polity, c. 1690s to the Twentieth Century’, 
Journal of African History 49(1), 2008, 23–42, 32–4.
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brotherhood. A century later, the ruling family of Fume describe themselves 
as victims of the ‘anti-Ewe policy’ of the Nkrumah regime at the end of the 
1950s.4    
4 Interview with Kwame Asiah, Regent of Fume on behalf of his brother, Fia Togbe Adzesi iv, 
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The Avatime thus had a continuous relation with the larger ensemble of ‘the 
Ewe’ in the late nineteenth century and the twentieth century.
At first glance, Ewe group mobilisation seems exceptional, and the experi-
ence of the group has attracted much interest in scholarly research on sub-
Saharan Africa. Their activity appears to be an impressive protest against 
artificial division by a colonial border (Maps 6 and 7).5 As Togo became, from 
1919, a League of Nations trusteeship territory, then a United Nations mandate 
 administered by the French and British colonial powers, the question of Ewe 














































































































































7 Agu Kebu Dzigbe (Togo)
8 Agu Kebu Toubadji (Togo)
Map 7 The Togo-Ghana borderlands
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 unification also allowed nationalist Asian governments and the Soviet Union 
to launch attacks against colonial rule. But the Ewe movement of the late 1940s 
was in the end unsuccessful. It could not prevent the incorporation of the 
trusteeship territory of British Togoland, as the main settlement zone of Ewe-
speakers under British rule, into the independent state of Ghana (it was later 
renamed as the ‘Volta Region’). The French mandate became the indepen-
dent Republic of Togo, but in 1957 – at the moment of the creation of Ghana 
and Togo – scholars still believed that the issue of ‘Ewe identity’ was signifi-
cant. Indeed, Ewe irredentism remained a constant preoccupation of the 
governments of Ghana and of Togo through much of the 1960s and into the 
1970s, leading to unfriendly border regulations, mutual accusations, and 
short-lived separatist movements.6
In post-colonial Ghana, the Ewe seem to have followed a distinctive voting 
pattern. They were opponents of various Ghanaian presidents before 1979. In 
the 1980s, they turned into staunch supporters of Flight-Lieutenant Jerry 
Rawlings and his successors under the National Democratic Congress (ndc).7
In the more authoritarian post-colonial country of Togo under Gbassinje 
Eyadéma, the military ruler in power since his coup d’état of 1967, the role of 
Ewe-ness in politics has been more severely limited. While local populations in 
the south of Togo continue to regard themselves as ‘Ewe’, ethnic identification 
has receded as a factor of political group behaviour. Before Eyadéma’s intro-
duction of single-party rule in the late 1960s, both dominant parties – the 
Comité d’Union Togolaise (cut) and the Parti Togolais du Progrès (ptp) – were 
6 Pauvert, Jean-Claude, ‘L’évolution politique des Ewe’, Cahiers des Etudes Africaines 1(2), 1960, 
161–92, 161; Austin, ‘Frontier’, 144–5; Nugent, Smugglers, 202–30; Brown, David, ‘Borderline 
Politics in Ghana: The National Liberation Movement of Western Togoland’, Journal of 
Modern African Studies 18(4), 1980, 575–609, 586–90.
7 Ametewee, Victor K., ‘Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations in Ghana’, in Steve Tonah (ed.), Ethnicity, 
Conflicts and Consensus in Ghana (Accra: Woeli Publishing Services, 2007), 25–41, 34, 38; 
Morrison, Minion K.C., and Jae Woo Hong, ‘Ghana’s political parties: how ethno/regional 
variations sustain the national two-party system’, Journal of Modern African Studies 44(4), 
2006, 623–47, 634; Brown, David, ‘Sieges and Scapegoats: The Politics of Pluralism in Ghana 
and Togo’, Journal of Modern African Studies 21(3), 1983, 431–60, 439–41; Brown, David, ‘Who 
are the Tribalists? Social Pluralism and Political Ideology in Ghana’, African Affairs 81(322), 
37–69, passim; Chazan, Naomi, ‘Ethnicity and Politics in Ghana’, Political Science Quarterly 
97(3), 1982, 461–85, 465, 475; Fridy, Kevin S., ‘The Elephant, Umbrella, and Quarrelling Cocks: 
Disaggregating Partisanship in Ghana’s Fourth Republic’, African Affairs, 106(423), 2007, 
281–305, 285, 292–4; Owusu, Maxwell, ‘Rebellion, Revolution, and Tradition: Reinterpreting 
Coups in Ghana’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 31(2), 1989, 372–97, 380–1; Nugent, 
Paul, ‘Living in the past: Urban, Rural and Ethnic Themes in the 1992 and 1996 Elections in 
Ghana’, Journal of Modern African Studies 37(2), 1999, 287–319, 307.
chapter 5��4
<UN>
similarly dominated by Ewe-speaking politicians, which precluded a tradition 
of ‘ethnic voting’. In 1985, on the occasion of the second elections under the 
Eyadéma government, there was no sign of any ethnic mobilisation against 
the  ruling party on an Ewe ticket, although Eyadéma’s Rassemblement du 
Peuple Togolais (rtp) had the reputation of being a vehicle for non-Ewe-
speaking northerners.8 Even so, the dominant approach in historical research 
takes information on the Ewe as an ethnic movement for granted, and does not 
analyse their dialogue with the colonial state in a long-term perspective.9
An additional problem is the question of whether particular communities 
belong ultimately to the group of Ewe-speakers or not. The community of 
Accra, under the rule of the Ga Manche, and the communities of Ada on the 
western side of the Volta River close to its mouth, and those of Krobo with the 
towns of Odumase and Kpong, form a western socio-geographic boundary of 
‘Eweland’. Those communities speak Gã or Adangme, which distinguishes 
them from the Ewe, although they actually claimed political influence over 
Ewe-speaking communities during the first half of the nineteenth century.10 
One particular Adangme-speaking group, the Agotime, live as a pocket among 
Ewe-speakers. Further to the north-west, Ewe-speakers bordered Twi-speaking 
groups. Akwamu, a small pre-colonial political entity, was the most immediate 
neighbour, but the relationship with the Asante was the crucial variable in the 
broader region. The Asante demanded tribute from a number of Ewe-speaking 
communities, and their invasions in the late 1860s were a traumatic experience 
for the latter.
8 Barbier, Jean-Claude, ‘Jalons pour une sociologie électorale du Togo: 1958, 1985’, Politique 
Africaine 27, 1987, 6–18, 14–15; Brown, ‘Sieges’, 437, 444–5.
9 Amenumey, D.E.K., The Ewe in Pre-Colonial Times (Accra: Sedco, 1986), 4–5; Gayibor, 
Nicoué Lodjou (ed.), Histoire des Togolais. Vol. 2: De 1884 à 1960 (Lomé: Presses de 
l’Université du Bénin, 2005); Nugent, Smugglers; Lawrance, Benjamin N., Locality, Mobility, 
and ‘Nation’: Periurban Colonialism in Togo’s Eweland 1900–1960 (Rochester/ny: University 
of Rochester Press, 2006); Meyer, Birgit, Translating the Devil: Religion and Modernity 
among the Ewe in Ghana (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999); Greene, Sandra, 
Gender, Ethnicity and Social Change on the Slave Coast: A History of the Anlo-Ewe 
(Portsmouth: Heinemann – London: James Currey, 1996); Amenumey, D.E.K., The Ewe 
Unification Movement: a political history (Accra: Ghana Universities Press, 1989); Agbedor, 
Paul, and Assiba Johnson, ‘Naming Practices’, in Benjamin N. Lawrance (ed.), A Handbook 
of Eweland: The Ewe of Togo and Benin (Accra: Woeli Publishing Services, 2005), 161–82, 
164–6.
10 European slave-traders in the early eighteenth century were largely unable to distinguish 
between Ewe-speakers and neighbouring groups speaking other languages, see Lohse, 
Russell, ‘Slave-Trade Nomenclature and African Ethnicities in the Americas: Evidence 
from Early Eighteenth-Century Costa Rica’, Slavery & Abolition 23(3), 2002, 73–92.
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To the north, the region of Buem was dominated by Lefana-speakers, a 
smaller language group, and by the Akposo. The Avatime live in the region 
between Kpandu to the north and Ho, a second important town centre in the 
region, to the south. In the east, the regions of Agu, Kuma, and Be, and the area 
of Notsie, are clearly part of the Ewe-speaking ensemble, but it becomes more 
complicated with Ge on the coast. Here, the language employed is Guin or 
Mina, which has similarities to Ewe, but whose alleged origins from the Gã 
language of the Accra region allow this community to claim that it is distinct 
from the Ewe-speaking cultural ensemble. While the rulers of Aného, the 
major town centre of the Ge community, have sometimes presented them-
selves as overlords of all of southern Togo, it remains questionable whether 
they ever were in such a situation. The representatives of other communities 
in Togo’s south-east, such as Glidji, are today unwilling to categorise them-
selves as ‘Ewe’, and refer to their manifold bonds in the eastward direction.11 As 
a whole, it is, therefore, quite complicated even to give the current geographi-
cal limits of Ewe identifications.
Both Nugent and Lawrance treat the question of local group identifications 
as being at the heart of their particular perspectives. Nonetheless, while both 
approaches integrate several examples of conflicting layers of group identifica-
tion, their implications do not point to the same problems that I intend to 
analyse from a comparative point of view. Nugent is interested, in particular, in 
how local populations made use of the colonial border, first between the 
British and the Germans, from 1884 to 1914, then between the British and the 
French from 1914 to 1957. Moreover, his study favours Likpe and the region of 
Buem over the Ewe-speaking areas to the south and south-east. Finally, Nugent 
does not concern himself with Ewe or non-Ewe group relations before the First 
World War.12
Lawrance focuses on a very particular perspective, which he calls the ‘peri-
urban’ dimension of ‘Ewe identity’: he concentrates on Ewe-speakers as inhab-
itants of the surrounding towns of a large city – Lomé – where an exceptional 
network of roads and railroads would have created an extraordinary setting for 
political mobilisation.13 This approach is stimulating – and Nugent’s even 
more so – but it does not question the basic principle of Ewe ethnic solidarity, 
nor does it discuss any alternative concepts to Ewe-ness. It is therefore chal-
lenging to focus on the engagement of the different groups and individuals 
11 Information given during an audience at the palace of the royal family of Glidji, Togo, 
8 August 2009.
12 Nugent, Smugglers, 18, 96, 132–46.
13 Lawrance, Locality, 13–8.
chapter 5��6
<UN>
that are potentially concerned with Ewe identification and Ewe mobilisation, 
with pre-colonial diplomacy and cultural relations, and with the colonial 
system.
Sandra Greene regards Ewe identification as a principle mainly formulated 
in the 1930s, as a weapon in the struggle for resources in the Gold Coast, which 
was on its way towards modernisation. For the Wifeme group in Anlo – a pre-
colonial state ruled by Ewe-speakers – Greene has shown that the view of the 
Wifeme as ‘strangers’ was increasingly questioned over the years, as members 
of the group tended more and more to appeal to a joint ‘Ewe identity’ that con-
nected them to the other clans and kinship groups within the state.14
Ewe-speaking groups had contact with the Atlantic world through their 
early participation in the slave trade. Many of the local traditions collected by 
British anthropologists, above all in the 1920s, point to a strong engagement of 
different local groups in the trade.15 Aného (‘Little Popo’) was the largest of the 
small ports of the immediate coastline of the later colony of Togo.16 Far more 
important, however, was the port of Ouidah with its three European fortresses, 
in present-day Benin, which was linked to the Ewe-speaking areas further 
westwards. This also brought the Ewe-speakers into indirect contact with the 
Kingdom of Dahomey, although Dahomean political activity was oriented 
eastwards.17 On the western side of the coastline, Keta was the most important 
slaving port for communities living close to the Volta River.
After colonial conquest, the different European powers drew borderlines 
that had an impact above all on the viability of trade networks in the region. 
They also proceeded with a rationalisation of power structures, and modified 
the latter through the organisation of ‘indirect rule’. German officials had a ten-
dency to weaken rather than to strengthen existing political structures, while 
the French gave part of the local power back to the chefs de canton, but held 
them on a short leash.18 In contrast, British administrators believed, long 
before the protest movement of Ewe spokesmen in the 1940s, in the prior 
14 Greene, Gender, 147–51.
15 praad (Accra), adm 11/1/1624, Rattray, Report by Mr. R.S. Rattray (without number), with-
out date, 42 (Vakpos); 44 (Tafi about Avatime).
16 Strickrodt, Silke, ‘Afro-European Trade Relations on the Western Slave Coast, 16th to 19th 
Centuries’ (unpublished PhD thesis, Univ. of Stirling, 2002).
17 Gayibor, Nicoué Lodjou, Le Genyi: Un Royaume oublié de la Côte de Guinée au Temps de la 
Traite des Noirs (Lomé: Haho – Paris: Karthala, 1990), 176–82; Law, Robin, Ouidah: The 
Social History of a West African Slaving ‘Port’ 1727–1892 (Athens/oh: Ohio University Press 
– Oxford: James Currey, 2004), 19.
18 Amegan, Francis Kwassivi, ‘Les administateurs allemands de la ville de Lomé (1884–1914)’, 
in Nicoué Lodjou Gayibor, Yves Marguerat, and Gabriel K. Nyassogbo (eds.), Le Centenaire 
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 existence of larger political structures, that is chiefdoms, which had lost power 
through the twists and turns of history. In this logic, paramount chiefs were 
strengthened as rulers of ‘states’, political entities created by ‘amalgamation’ of 
‘divisions’, on normally entirely ahistorical grounds, and frequently against the 
passive resistance of the locals.19
Today, the Ewe-speakers – if we exclude Adangme-speakers and Guin-
Mina-speakers – are a community of roughly one million individuals.20 
According to Jakob Spieth, missionary of the Norddeutsche Missionsge-
sellschaft (or Bremen Mission) and author of a monumental account on the 
‘Ewe tribes’ based on interviews conducted in the early twentieth century, the 
Ewe-speakers were proud of their language, and used it strongly for their self-
definition.21 Nevertheless, we have to take into account the bilingualism of 
many individuals in the region, which makes the definition of one single 
‘Ewe’ identification through language alone rather complicated. Also, con-
crete regulations for marriage and family structure seemed to vary ‘from tribe 
to tribe’.22
This problem was again expressed, in 1968, by B.W. Hodder who held that 
‘the area in which the Ewe call themselves Ewe for purposes of political action 
is not the same as the area inhabited by the Ewe “tribe”’.23
de Lomé, Capitale du Togo (1897–1997): Actes du colloque de Lomé (3–6 mars 1997) (Lomé: 
Presses de l’Université du Bénin, 1998), 95–109, 104–7.
19 Nugent, Paul, ‘“A few lesser peoples”: the Central Togo minorities and their Ewe neigh-
bours’, in Carola Lentz and Paul Nugent (eds.), Ethnicity in Ghana: The Limits of Invention 
(London – New York: Macmillan – Saint Martin’s Press, 2000), 163–82, 167–8. The ‘native 
states’ were Akpini, Asogli, Awatime (written as such), and Buem, joined by the Tongu 
Confederacy after 1945. On criticisms coming from local rulers, see praad (Accra), adm 
39/1/458, V.M. Kofi ii., Howusu of Ho, to Rooke, District Commissioner of Ho (without 
number), 24 Dec. 1951.
20 This concerns the Ewe-speaking Watchi groups, or the populations of Atakpamé. Part of 
the confusion becomes visible in Robert Cornevin’s response to D.E.K. Amenumey’s 
attempts to draw a map of ‘Eweland’, see Cornevin, Robert, ‘Note au Sujet Des Limites de 
L’Eweland’, Journal of African History 9(3), 1968, 501–2. On the Watchi, see Lovell, Nadia, 
‘The Watchi-Ewe: Histories and Origins’, in Benjamin N. Lawrance (ed.), A Handbook of 
Eweland: The Ewe of Togo and Benin (Accra: Woeli Publishing Services, 2005), 90–114, 
95–8.
21 Spieth, Jakob, Die Ewe-Stämme: Material zur Kunde des Ewe-Volkes in Deutsch-Togo (Berlin: 
Dietrich Reimer (Ernst Vohsen), 1906), 57*.
22 Spieth, Ewe-Stämme, 62*.
23 Hodder, B.W., ‘The Ewe problem: a reassessment’, in Charles A. Fisher (ed.), Essays in 
Political Geography (London: Methuen, 1968), 271–83, 276.
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In the last four decades, we have not really come closer to a profound analy-
sis of these contradictions and to a definition of Ewe claims for a collective 
identity. These complications go back to interpretations of testimonies from as 
early as 1912.24 It is unsurprising that European officials were frequently quite 
confused about local genealogies and conflicting claims to chieftaincies. 
Regents were nominated by the communities and often constituted an addi-
tional force, as did stool fathers, often being the authority to nominate the can-
didates, and Mankradowo, i.e. leading political councillors.25 ‘Amalgamation’ 
of divisions in British Togoland led to even more confusion – in extreme cases, 
such as Nkonya, a divisional chieftaincy could remain vacant for eight years.26
At the heart of these struggles, we find references to a certain notion of Ewe-
ness. This is related to the idea, uncritically reiterated in some of the literature, 
that ‘the Ewe’ relied on ‘decentralised’ institutions, expressed through the role 
of the dufia (chief), with restricted powers, and under the obligation to cooper-
ate with a council of elders representing the important lineages, the fomewo.27 
A certain political language was connected to such institutions, as different 
contenders argued about ‘the customs of Eweland’.28 In such cases, European 
officials were frequently only too ready to accept such references to customs, 
and to attack what was presented to them as ‘most unusual in an Ewe tribe and 
[that] should be regarded with suspicion’.29 However, states whose rulers 
claimed to be at the core of ‘Ewe identity’ had political institutions that were 
very similar to those of neighbouring ‘Akan’ or ‘Adangme’ states. Thus, Anlo 
was, from the eighteenth century onwards, organised with a ruling chief with 
his ‘wing chiefs’, similar to those of Twi-speaking communities like Akwamu or 
even Asante.30
24 praad (Accra), adm 11/1/1068, Crowther, Secretary of Native Affairs of the Gold Coast, 
Extract from Notes of Evidence given before a Commission of Inquiry held in the Quittah 
District by Francis Crowther, Esquire…(without number), 13 April 1912.
25 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/569, Acting Senior District Commissioner of Ho to Commissioner 
of the Eastern Province, Nkonya Native Affairs (n° S.0046/8.), 19 Dec. 1947, 2.
26 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/96, Senior District Commissioner of Ho to Chief Commissioner 
of Gold Coast Colony, Election and Installation of Chiefs. (n° S.0062/11012.), 12 Sep. 1951.
27 Verdon, Michael, The Abutia Ewe of West Africa: A Chiefdom that Never Was (Berlin – New 
York – Amsterdam: Mouton, 1983), 37–74; Laumann, ‘History’, 18–9.
28 Pauvert, ‘Evolution’, 167–8; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/460, S.K. Afege, Asafoatse of Atsiati, 
to District Commissioner of Ho (without number), 14 Nov. 1946.
29 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/460, District Commissioner of Ho to Commissioner of the 
Eastern Province, Akoepe Native Affairs. (n° 0106/S.F.1/7.), 4 Dec. 1946.
30 tna, pro, CO/96/738/6, Warrington, Commissioner of the Eastern Province, Annual 
Report for the Eastern Province for the Year 1936–1937 (without number), without date, 10.
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Moreover, the political map in the southern region of the Volta River was 
not dominated by any larger pre-colonial states, in contrast to the case of 
northern Senegambia: small political units were the rule, superseded in some 
cases by the few existing states. Only on occasions of massive external threats – 
as had become obvious during the Akwamu and Asante invasions in the Volta 
River Region – would the other communities seek military alliances with the 
paramount rulers of Peki or Anlo, the largest entities with Ewe-speaking rulers, 
and accepted for a transitory period the payment of tributes.31 Apart from that, 
‘localism’ ruled in Togoland, much to the regret of the British:
Patriotism here is extremely local, and very strong: The natural psycho-
logical tendency of the Togoland people is not to unite to create greater 
groups, but to split up into ever smaller ones. I once reported that the 
people of the Akpini State, for instance, do not call themselves by the 
name of their State, Akpinis, but rather by the names of their divisions – 
Kpandus, Sovies, Alavanyos etcetera [sic] in fact the process is more 
extreme than that; even inside a division people will call themselves by 
the names of their own towns and think primarily of the interests of their 
towns before they think of the interests of their division, − thus in the Gbi 
division they call themselves Wegbes, Attabus, Kpoetas, Blas etcetera, 
before they call themselves Gbis. And it does not stop there; every week a 
Captain in some Sub-Chief ’s town collects his people together and they 
go off to form a new town elsewhere; having set up on a new site he will 
call himself a Sub-Chief with Captains or Asafohenes of his own.32
Local divisional chiefs who were pressured to become part of larger politico-
administrative entities were not at all happy with such developments. British 
administrators were certain that most chiefs would have preferred simply to 
continue with the ‘German situation’, where hundreds of so-called ‘divisions’ 
had had their autonomous jurisdiction. In 1942, 96 so-called sub-chiefs even 
petitioned to reinstate the system existing before 1931, in which each group had 
had its own native court.33
31 Amenumey holds, on the contrary, that only an ‘unfortunate’ eighteenth-century rivalry 
between Anlo and Ge accounts for the non-emergence of an Ewe state, see Amenumey, 
Ewe, 27.
32 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/288, Mead, Acting District Commissioner of Kpandu, to 
Commissioner of the Eastern Province (n° 1755/165/1931), 27 Nov. 1942, 1–2.
33 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/288, W.R. Goskell, Commissioner of the Eastern Province to 
Secretary of Native Affairs (without number), 1 Dec. 1942, 1.
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While in the 1920s the different populations of the Ewe-speaking zones of 
the Gold Coast and the Togolands would intermittently mention their Ewe 
identification, this is difficult to corroborate as being a long-standing tradition. 
In the eighteenth century, Danish and British residents at Accra and Keta had 
had early contacts with the rulers of Akwamu, then a pre-colonial state in the 
interior, but they knew nothing of any ‘Ewe’ category.34 British and German 
officials, or missionaries from the Basle Mission or the Bremen Mission, were 
active in carving out this identification. There is nothing to indicate that Ewe-
speakers defined themselves as a homogeneous group; only later, did the idea 
of Ewe unity become fashionable, and linguistic studies seemed to sustain it.35
Moreover, pre-colonial states like Anlo and Peki had a complicated rela-
tion to Ewe culture, whether or not we take it as a historical construct. The 
‘traditional ruler’ of Peki, the Pekihene (or Deiga in Ewe), who later claimed 
the overlordship of much of the Volta Area, stood, during the first quarter of 
the nineteenth century, in a close relationship to the very efficient military 
state of Akwamu; only around 1833 did the rulers of Peki finally break this 
bond. By then the Pekihene was attempting to profit from close cooperation 
with Ewe-speaking rulers further eastwards. The case of Anlo is even more 
complex and needs to be studied with caution.36 The Awoame Fiawo (the 
‘traditional rulers’) of Anlo were long-standing allies of the Akwamuhene, in 
spite of ‘the sharp cultural, social and linguistic differences between the two 
states’.37 Although in Anlo oral traditions from the 1980s, elders had an 
34 Amenumey, Ewe, 32–6. Harnæs, Per, ‘African Power Struggle and European Opportunity: 
Danish Expansion on the Early 18th-Century Gold Coast’, Transactions of the Historical 
Society of Ghana, New Series 7, 2003, 1–92, 2–13; Wilson, Louis E., ‘The “Bloodless Conquest” 
in Southeastern Ghana: the Huza and Territorial Expansion of the Krobo in the 19th 
Century’, International Journal of African Historical Studies 23(2), 1990, 269–97, 274, 290; 
Hair, ‘Continuity’, 261; Rupp-Eisenreich, Britta, ‘L’ethnicité, critère descriptif au xviiie 
siècle: le cas de la traite danoise’, in Jean-Pierre Chrétien and Gérard Prunier (eds.), Les 
ethnies ont une histoire (second edition, Paris: Karthala, 2003), 49–60, 55–6.
35 Spieth, Ewe-Stämme, 11*.
36 Rosenthal, Judy, ‘Religious Traditions of the Togo and Benin Ewe’, in Benjamin N. Lawrance 
(ed.), A Handbook of Eweland: The Ewe of Togo and Benin (Accra: Woeli Publishing Services, 
2005), 183–96, 193–4.
37 Kea, Ray, ‘Akwamu-Anlo relations, c. 1750–1813’, Transactions of the Historical Society of 
Ghana 10, 1969, 29–63, 29. The central account of Anlo origins emphasised the participa-
tion and leading role in the mythical flight from Notsie, but also presented the forefathers 
of the Anlo communities as relatives of many local groups, not only the Ewe-speakers. See 
ant, 2APA, Cercle de Klouto, 331, A Brief Ethnographic Account of the Ewes of the Anlo 
State. The Common ‘Ewe’ Origin and the Central Group of Royal Authority (without num-
ber), without date [dated by French Administration of Togo as ‘1918’].
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 obvious tendency to understate the power of the Anlo ruler – they forgot 
that it was not until the 1930s that Togbe Sri ii was affected by sickness and 
became a weak leader – Anlo was a crucial political entity but much less 
important as a cultural centre.38
We find a dispute amongst Ewe-speakers during the colonial period as to 
which were the ‘traditionally’ important Ewe states. Most traditions empha-
sised the role of the Pekihene, Kwadzo De iv, and of his successor, built up in 
the wars against the Anlo and the Asante, and which gave a pre-eminence to 
the Peki stool (the ‘traditional’ throne). However, even these claims were chal-
lenged. In 1946 Adai Kwasi Adem ix of Awudome – then belonging to the 
administrative Native Authority of Peki State – demanded Awudome’s separa-
tion from Peki on the grounds that both ‘states’ had only once formed a mili-
tary alliance against the Asante, and that Awudome had by far been a larger 
territory than Peki. The British district commissioners were unable to verify 
this argument: hereditary rights seemed unclear.39
Questions of language were also complex. The German Ewe mission, under-
taken by the Bremen Mission and the Catholic Mission of Steyl, and continued, 
after the First World War, by the Ewe Presbyterian Church, was decisive when 
it came to standardisation and promotion of Ewe as a common language. Local 
populations, who only became part of the Ewe-speaking linguistic community 
through these efforts, are a conceptual problem, much like groups becoming 
Wolof-speakers in Senegal during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.40 
Colonial administrations took it for granted that a common language united 
populations, which was often a simplistic perception. Speakers of ‘minority 
38 Greene, Sandra E., ‘The Past and Present of an Anlo-Ewe Oral Tradition’, History in Africa 
12, 1985, 73–87, 74; tna, pro, CO/96/738/6, Warrington, Annual Report for the Eastern 
Province for the Year 1936–1937 (without number), without date, 69.
39 praad (Ho Branch), DA/D 302 (also contained in DA/D 307), Adai Kwasi Adem ix, Fia of 
Awudome, Petition of the Fiaga and People of Awudome (without number), 7 May 1946, 1, 
9; praad (Ho Branch), DA/D 307, Acting District Commissioner of Akuse to Provincial 
Commissioner (n° 1141/190/1920.), 28 May 1946, 1; Amenumey, Ewe, 81.
40 Meyer, Birgit, ‘Christianity and the Ewe Nation: German Pietist Missionaries, Ewe 
Converts and the Politics of Culture’, Journal of Religion in Africa 32(2), 2002, 167–99, 
176–80; Lawrance, Benjamin N., ‘The History of the Ewe Language and Ewe Language 
Education’, in Benjamin N. Lawrance (ed.), A Handbook of Eweland: The Ewe of Togo and 
Benin (Accra: Woeli Publishing Services, 2005), 215–29, 218–20; Alsheimer, Rainer, 
Zwischen Sklaverei und christlicher Ethnogenese: Die vorkoloniale Missionierung der Ewe in 
Westafrika (1847–ca. 1890) (Münster  etc.: Waxmann, 2007), 231–45, 270–1; Azamede, Kokou, 




languages’ at the margins of the Ewe-speaking zone were thereby forcibly 
 integrated into administrative units. A good example is that of the Lefana-
speakers of Buem. In 1967, administrative officers in the Volta Region of 
 independent Ghana were astonished by the campaign of the Kudje Head 
Chief, Akuamoa iv, to break away from the Buem Traditional Area, in spite of 
speaking the same language and allegedly belonging to the ‘same culture’ as 
the ‘traditional rulers’ of Buem:
Why then has Nana Akuamoah iv, whose people could be said to belong 
to the same stock and speak the same language of Lefana as the Buems of 
Jasikan, Borada, Guaman and Nsuta, found it necessary to declare him-
self independent of Nana Akpandja [the paramount chief of Buem]?41
The Kudje Chief held that it was erroneous to see all the Lefana-speakers as 
belonging to the same group – and he argued that the same ‘mistake’ had often 
been made for their ‘Ewe’ neighbours:
The two different groups of people, the Kedjeomas (Kudjes) and the 
Boradas and others, were total strangers to each other and although they all 
spoke (and still speak) the same Lefana dialect yet that, in itself alone, is no 
ground for any assumption that all of them were one and the same people 
similarly as all the Ewe-speaking peoples of the Volta Region or the Nkonyas, 
Anums and Bosos or the Akims and Akwamus, for instance, do not, besides 
their common citizenship of the Republic of Ghana, claim a common ori-
gin because they all speak Ewe or Guan or Twi, respectively.42
Occasionally, however, local authorities and elders formulated clear antago-
nisms based on language. In the founding legend of the Ewe-speaking Anfoega 
community, the Asante war of the 1860s was explicitly explained as a conflict 
between language groups: the Twi-speakers from the west of the Volta, led by 
the Asante, battling the Ewe-speakers.43 The idea of solidarity between 
41 praad (Ho Branch), NA/47 (dossier not classified), S.G. Okraku, District Administrative 
Officer in Jasikan, to Regional Administration Officer, Ho, Buem Traditional Council 
(sa.1/164), 28 Sep. 1967, 1.
42 praad (Ho Branch), NA/47 (dossier not classified), Nana Akuamoa iv, Nifahene of Buem 
Traditional Area and Chief of Kudje, to Clerk of Volta Region House of Chiefs, Buem 
Traditional Affairs (without number), 10 May 1965, 4.
43 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/216, Abstract of Anfoaga Traditional History (without number), 
without date, 1.
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 Ewe-speakers thus existed in the nineteenth century, as a potential category of 
identification and of mobilisation.
Founding legends helped to sustain this possibility. The famous Notsie myth 
was a principal point of reference for Ewe-ness; and it appeared indeed in 
many of the local histories collected by Europeans in the first decades of the 
twentieth century. A number of allegedly Ewe-speaking groups were said to 
have escaped from the cruel methods of government of a legendary ruler of 
Notsie, Agokoli iii. The myth appears within the account on the history of Ho 
by Spieth, and in the early anthropological work of the British scholar- 
administrator, John Sutherland Rattray, in the 1920s; it was also told to the 
British officials in the Keta Lagoon Area. The myth is ever-present as a symbol 
of a broader group experience.44 Even so, a number of non-Ewe communities 
also claimed to have been in Notsie; details of the myth changed over the 
decades; and we do not have sufficient archaeological data to confirm ele-
ments of the legend.45
The accounts of scholar-administrators such as Captain C.C. Lilley and John 
Sutherland Rattray were well known to literate persons in Togoland communi-
ties, who re-employed these British attempts at classification. Thus, in a suc-
cession dispute, the elders of the small community of Tokokoe criticised Lilley 
for describing their group as not having come from Akwapim sixty years before, 
but having migrated over hundreds of years.46 These elders held that they 
knew the community’s history better than any outsider! Like many other 
examples, this incident points to the flexibility of information on group ori-
gins. At best, an Ewe ethnic identification existed in principle in the late nine-
teenth century, but perhaps only as a latent possibility in competition with 
44 Spieth, Ewe-Stämme, 1 (for ‘Togoland’); Akyeampong, Emmanuel Kwaku, Between the Sea 
& the Lagoon: An Eco-social History of the Anlo of Southeastern Ghana c. 1850 to Recent 
Times (Oxford: James Currey – Athens/oh: Ohio University Press, 2001), 24–6 (for the 
Keta Lagoon area).
45 Gayibor, Nicoue Lodjou, ‘Agɔkɔli et la dispersion de Nɔtsé’, in François de Medeiros (ed.), 
‘Peuples du golfe du Bénin – aja-éwé: colloque de Cotonou’ (Paris: Karthala, 1985), 21–34, 
33; Greene, Sandra, ‘Notsie Narratives: History, Memory, and Meaning in West Africa’, 
South Atlantic Quarterly 101(4), 2002, 1015–41, 1019–20, 1032–4; Gayibor, Nicoue Lodjou, 
and Angèle Aguigah, ‘Early Settlements and Archaeology of the Adja-Tado Cultural Zone’, 
in Benjamin N. Lawrance (ed.), A Handbook of Eweland: The Ewe of Togo and Benin (Accra: 
Woeli Publishing Services, 2005), 1–13, 9–10. This is erroneously taken by D.E.K. Amenumey 
(Ewe, 2–6) and Benjamin Lawrance (Locality, 27–8) as corroborated.
46 praad (Ho Branch), DA/D/296, Peteprebi Danyi (of Avenyi); and others, to District 




other more local (or ‘divisional’) experiences. The narratives were often sub-
stantiated by recourse to the European interpretation.
European administrative information was subject to a number of changes. 
After the slow disappearance of the Danish presence by 1850, the British 
showed only lukewarm interest in territorial control over regions close to 
the Volta River. Until the 1880s, the British were mainly focused on neutral-
ising the power of the Asante State in the west and north-west, and their 
alliances in the Volta Region were subsidiary to campaigns financed from 
Accra by the local community. The British interpretation of events east of 
the Volta River was therefore clearly biased through an ‘Accran’ perspective.
The sudden German interference in political issues on the ‘Slave Coast’ 
changed the whole picture. The protectorate agreement signed in Aného in 
1884 consigned large parts of the coastline between Keta and Ouidah to 
German administration; it provoked a more aggressive competition and led 
both the British and the Germans to hastily collect information on the local 
communities. In 1890, the colonial border was finally negotiated, allowing both 
colonial powers to establish their own style of rule. British administration 
adhered to the principle of indirect rule and wished to take the cultural and 
political structures of the ‘divisions’ of Peki and Anlo, which had become part 
of the colony, as a model. The 1912 report of the Secretary of Native Affairs, 
Francis Crowther, reflected this bias in favour of claims coming from the rulers 
of Anlo and Peki, which continued well into the 1920s. In the 1930s and 1940s, 
the British administration remained generally interested in ‘traditional’ issues, 
which, they felt, had to be addressed in the regular reports to the League of 
Nations in Geneva.
The German version of colonialism, on the other hand, was far less attentive 
to the formulation of local identifications.47 While the Bremen missionaries 
were quite active in ‘research’ on Ewe culture, the interest of administrators in 
these issues was limited. The French, who occupied a part of the German col-
ony in 1914, and received Lomé and large parts of the Ewe-speaking zone 
around the town centres of Kpalimé and Notsie at the end of the decade, 
shared these attitudes, and concentrated on the economic exploitation of the 
colony and on taxation. Only with the outbreak of a spectacular revolt at the 
heart of the Ewe-speaking zone under French rule, did these attitudes begin to 
change. On 24 and 25 January 1933, Lomé, now the capital of the French man-
date in Togo, was the scene of an immense tax revolt, which led to widespread 
violence and a brutal reaction from the colonial government. As a consequence 
47 Zurstrassen, Bettina, ‘Ein Stück deutscher Erde schaffen’: koloniale Beamte in Togo 1884–1914 
(Frankfurt: Campus, 2008), 29–39.
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of these events, French officials improved their system of information- 
gathering, and French Governor Robert de Guise pressured officials to keep in 
closer contact with village authorities.48 Even with the very technocratic style 
of modernisation that was en vogue in Togo under the French mandate from 
1945, officials remained inclined to converse with Ewe-speakers concerning 
their particular group identification. Under these circumstances, the perspec-
tive of the interaction of Ewe-speakers with the British administration is the 
most informative one, but can be contrasted with reports from German mis-
sionaries for the period before the First World War, and information from 
French sources mainly after 1933.
 Apocalypse Now: The Test for a Larger Ewe Community, 1867–1914
The label ‘Ewe’ is not a colonial creation. Paul Nugent’s claim that ‘Ewe’ as a 
category probably appeared for the first time in 1884 does not take into account 
the missionary activities of the Basle Mission and, in particular, of the Bremen 
Mission in the Volta area.49 As early as 1858, Reverend J. Bernhard Schlegel 
wrote an article on the history of the ‘Eweer’, based on local sources.50 However, 
it is plausible that this broader label was only reactivated during the traumatic 
incursion by armies coming into the region from the exterior, that is, in the late 
1860s. In that sense, Nugent would be right.
The Asante campaign of the 1860s polarised the whole region.51 Asante 
commanders and individual Asante war-gang leaders cooperated with some 
local communities to attack villages and political units on the eastern side of 
the Volta River. Asante was allied with the Twi-speaking Akwamus – a small 
48 ant, 2APA, Cercle de Lomé, 18, De Guise, Governor of Togo, to District Commissioner of 
Lomé, Visite à Tsévié du 20 Février (n° 173), 8 March 1933, 1.
49 Nugent, Paul, ‘Putting the History Back into Ethnicity: Enslavement, Religion, and Cultural 
Brokerage in the Construction of Mandinka/Jola and Ewe/Agotime Identities in West 
Africa, c. 1650–1930’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 50(4), 2008, 920–48, 939. 
Elsewhere, Nugent holds that the term is ‘not in common currency before 1920’, which 
seems more adequate, see Nugent, Paul, ‘A Regional Melting Pot: The Ewe and Their 
Neighbours in the Ghana-Togo Borderlands’, in Benjamin N. Lawrance (ed.), A Handbook 
of Eweland: The Ewe of Togo and Benin (Accra: Woeli Publishing Services, 2005), 29–43, 29.
50 Schlegel, J. Bernhard, ‘Beitrag zur Geschichte, Welt- und Religionsanschauung des We st-
afrikaners, namentlich des Eweers’, Monatsblatt der norddeutschen Missionsgesellschaft 
8(94), 1858, 406–8.
51 Johnson, Marion, ‘Ashanti East of the Volta’, Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana 
8, 1965, 33–59, 44–7.
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but well-organised community – but also with the rulers of Anlo, an Ewe-
speaking community.52 Anlo had entered into a protracted war with the neigh-
bouring, politically stratified, communities of Accra and Ada through the 
instigation of Attehogbe, otherwise known as Geraldo Lima, the ex-companion 
of a Portuguese slave trader active on the coast, who was soon described by the 
British as the main ‘villain’ in the region.53
During these conflicts, the alliances in the region bridged linguistic differ-
ences between the groups and complicated the picture: for instance, the Ewe-
speaking communities of Volo and Dufor sided with Akwamu and were active 
as pirates on the Volta River; the Ewe-speaking state of Anlo remained allied to 
Akwamu and Asante; the Gã-speaking community of Accra, and the ruler of 
Ada, were opposed to the raiders, and allies of the majority of Ewe-speaking 
groups east of the Volta River. Among the latter groups, Peki was the most 
prominent of the groups in the anti-Asante coalition. The British only had more 
detailed information from the areas close to Accra and Keta, and from Basle 
and Bremen missionaries who at the end of the 1860s lived in Keta, in Odumase 
in the pre-colonial state of Krobo, and in Ho. This distorts our picture of politi-
cal activities, because the missionaries were not very interested in political 
matters and gave only a minimal amount of information. Mounting pressure 
on them by Asante raids increased their activity in information-gathering.
Anlo, Akwamu, and Asante invasions have a particular role in ‘traditions’ 
amongst Ewe-speakers and other neighbours. For the Avatime, Lynne Brydon 
described the experience of the invasion of the late 1860s as a ‘cataclysm’ shak-
ing the very fundaments of the group – which was anchored in collective 
memory – and this seems to have been also the case for other communities.54 
The different groups regarded as ‘Ewe’ and interviewed by Rattray in the 1920s 
integrated these events into their accounts: the Akwamu wars and the Asante 
incursions appear as traumatic incidents, which could be reinterpreted as a 
common ‘Ewe experience’.55
52 tna, pro, CO/96/88, Memo embracing a brief sketch of the facts connected with the exist-
ing disturbances in the Volta District from the commencement in March 1865 to the present 
date, drawn up for the information of His Excellency the Governor General. (without num-
ber), without date, 32–3; Amenumey, D.E.K., ‘The extension of British rule to Anlo (South-
east Ghana), 1850–1890’, Journal of African History 9(1), 1968, 99–117, 103–4.
53 tna, pro, CO/96/88, Lozogbagba, (Awoame Fia); and others, to Kennedy (without num-
ber), 10 May 1871, 1.
54 Brydon, ‘Constructing’, 28; Interview with Kwame Asiah, 17 August 2007. Spieth’s knowl-
edge of the same event must come from a different version, see Spieth, Ewe-Stämme, 19*.
55 See Rattray’s decisive remarks on the ‘Ewe’ in the 1920s in praad (Accra), adm 11/1/1624, 
Rattray, Report by Mr. R.S. Rattray (without number), without date, 46–7.
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For European officials, the 1860s brought the very first experience in the 
interior of Voltaland. From 1869, British administrators and military offi-
cers were active in battling ‘pirates’ on the Volta River. Thereby, they met 
Ewe-speaking communities in the hinterland of the Volta Estuary, such as 
those of Volo and Dufor. In the late 1870s and the first half of the 1880s, the 
British enlarged their control of the coastline to include Anlo. In 1888, 
British troops initiated a campaign to support the pre-colonial state of 
Peki against groups that had, two decades before, sided with the Asante 
invaders.
This latter operation made it possible to mark out territory against German 
activities. It also represented an attempt to avenge the murder of a British 
envoy in the Volta River Area, who had been assassinated by the followers of 
the ruler of Taviefe, a small Ewe-speaking community in the vicinity of Ho. For 
many of the local groups, this British campaign was quickly identified as a 
chance to take revenge against the few communities who had sided with the 
Asante and the Akwamu, to which Taviefe notably belonged.56 Local commu-
nities participated strongly in ‘informing’ about group relations, as they bom-
barded the British with a huge number of narrations and petitions. The same 
participation by Ewe-speaking informants happened on the German side and 
featured in Spieth’s account.57
Some of the early British views are influenced by the Accra Ga Manche (the 
highest ‘traditional ruler’), Tackie, who claimed the overlordship of the south 
of the territories in the Volta River Region, including Anlo.58 Informants from 
Accra described the ‘Volloes and Doffors’ as ‘part of the Aquamboe tribe’, and 
thus ‘tribally’ juxtaposed with the other groups in the Volta Region.59 This does 
not go together with the regional pattern of linguistic groups, but it did not 
matter: the populations in question were often simply referred to as ‘eastern 
tribes’. The Accra leaders only had rudimentary ideas about the political organ-
isation of the respective groups. The same applies to the coastal region beyond 
Anlo, where the Accra dignitaries had contacts with allies in the region of 
56 Louis, Wm. Roger, Great Britain and Germany’s Lost Colonies, 1914–1919 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1967), 20–3.
57 Spieth, Ewe-Stämme, 76*–7*.
58 Akurang-Parry, Kwabena O., ‘The administration of the abolition laws, African responses, 
and post-proclamation slavery in the gold coast, 1874–1940’, Slavery & Abolition, 19(2), 
1998, 149–66, 154.
59 tna, pro, CO/96/84, King Cudjoe of Accra; and others, to Ussher, The Petition…to His 
Excellency Herbert Taylor Ussher Administrator of the Gold Coast (without number), 11 Feb. 
1870, 1; tna, pro, CO/96/81, Lutterodt; Hesse; and others, to Russell, British Chief 
Commandant in Accra (without number), 14 Aug. 1869, 4.
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Lomé.60 Before the creation of the German protectorate, European knowledge 
about the coastline was limited. Basle missionaries based in the Krobo capital, 
Odumase, provided some information on the Lomé region.61 With regard to 
Ewe-speaking political entities, it was equally difficult for the British to make 
out details of the relationships of different groups with one another.62 The 
Akyem war chief Dompre was one source for British officials that was indepen-
dent from their Accra connection, as he was directly involved as an ally of the 
Ewe-speakers fighting incoming Asante and Akwamu troops. In August 1869, 
Dompre operated in the Avatime hills, where most of the Ewe-speakers had 
sought refuge under the command of the Pekihene (which contradicts oral 
accounts from the 1920s, in which the Avatime themselves attempted to give 
the most outstanding role to their own efforts, and in which other groups 
claimed they had not sided with Peki). At the same time, Anlo troops, in coop-
eration with units from Mlamfi and Volo, attacked the Agotime, burnt the city 
of Ho that had according to Dompre previously been under Agotime control, 
and also destroyed Sokode, another important settlement in the Ho area.63
In 1869, the Ada Manche took the role of the advocate of the Agotime popu-
lations in dealings with the British authorities, and accused the Anlo of ban-
ditry and treason. In Agotime, the situation was obviously critical at the 
beginning of the dry season. The Ada ruler insisted that he was particularly 
concerned by the events in Agotime; he named the Agotime his ‘brothers’ and 
strongly solicited a British intervention in the matter.64 This behaviour 
strengthened local claims of difference from their local neighbours and set the 
emphasis on language. Agotime informants confirmed this allegiance in 1888, 
insisting that the Agotime, while now being under ‘Krepi rule’, ‘belong to the 
Adangme tribe’, and ‘to Mr. W.N. Ocansey, of Addah [the Ada Manche]’.65 
60 tna, pro, CO/96/81, King Dosu Okanzie; King Oklu; and others to Acting Administrator 
in Cape Coast (without number), 28 Aug. 1869, 3; tna, pro, CO/96/81, Simpson to Chief 
Administrator of Sierra Leone (n° 108), 3 Sep. 1869, 3.
61 tna, pro, CO/96/81, Simpson to Chief Administrator of Sierra Leone (n° 108), 3 Oct. 1869, 
2–4; tna, pro, CO/96/81, Saketi, Krobohene, to Lees (without number), 24 Aug. 1869, 2.
62 tna, pro, CO/96/81, Simpson to Lees (without number), 21 Aug. 1869, 4.
63 tna, pro, CO/96/81, Dompre to Addo (without number), 27 Aug. 1869, 1, 3. The later Ho 
tradition excludes such a dependency of the city from Agotime, perhaps due to the quest 
for historical primacy by the Howusu of Ho; praad (Accra), adm 11/1/1624, Rattray, Report 
by Mr. R.S. Rattray (without number), without date, 33.
64 tna, pro, CO/96/81, Dosu, Ada Manche, to Simpson (without number), 7 Oct. 1869.
65 tna, pro, CO/879/28, African Confidential Print No. 351, Williams, British District 
Commissioner of Volta District, Statement taken by C. Riby Williams, District Commissioner, 
Volta District (without number), 2 July 1888, 144bis (1 of 1).
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However, in later accounts the Agotime changed their mind about the identifi-
cation of their group – in this way, Ada traditions were no longer reflected 
afterwards in Agotime accounts of the war and of the history of the group in 
the second half of the nineteenth century.66 While the language difference 
between them and their neighbours remained, of course, an existing fact for 
the Agotime, their legend of migration, which declares them distinct from the 
bulk of the Ewe-speakers, can also be found in a number of other communi-
ties. According to Spieth, the populations of Ge – in the area between the River 
Haho and the River Mono – presented themselves in an analogous way, as for-
mer inhabitants of Accra, who had had to flee an Akwamu invasion.67
For the Asante incursions, Spieth believes that ‘while this war brought few 
advantages to the Ewe, it had nonetheless as its consequence that they began 
to get an understanding of their common tasks, tasks that would lead them to 
a slow but gradual sense of unity’.68 In the British documents discussed above, 
however, the question of Ewe solidarity – so prominent also in retrospect in 
the interviews held with community leaders and chiefs in the 1920s – did not 
play the slightest role. On the contrary, one of the conflicts in which British 
troops and auxiliaries from Accra were most involved, the conflict between the 
small constituency of Bator and the warriors of Volo and Dufor, and a second 
that involved the Mafi and the ruler of Anlo – the latter four being allied to the 
Akwamu – was exactly a military conflict between different Ewe-speaking com-
munities.69 The Fiawo of Volo still commemorated the lost battle against 
British troops more than 80 years later, as the employment of a British warship 
left Volo populations with traumatic memories, but without remembering the 
66 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/216, The Preliminary History of the Agotime. (without number), 
without date; this account taken in the 1920s is strongly negative to any Agotime connec-
tion with Ada; in a probably earlier account, the Agotime claim they have in the past been 
erroneously regarded as Adas, see praad (Accra), adm 11/1/1624, Rattray, Report by Mr. R.S. 
Rattray (without number), without date, 39. However, in the early 1960s, Agotime was 
confirmed to be primarily Adangme-speaking, with Ewe as an important, but only sec-
ondary language. See Sprigge, R.G.S., ‘Eweland’s Adangbe: An Enquiry into an Oral 
Tradition’, Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana 10, 1969, 87–123, 92–3; which 
stands in contrast to the assertion of Spieth, who regarded the Adangme language as dis-
appearing, while Ewe was taking over, see Spieth, Ewe-Stämme, 41*.
67 Spieth, Ewe-Stämme, 38*.
68 Ibid., 55*.
69 tna, pro, CO/96/85, Ussher to Kennedy (n° 80), 22 June 1870, 7; tna, pro, CO/96/85, 
Glover to Kennedy (without number), 22 June 1870, 5; tna, pro, CO/96/84, Cleland to 
Lees (without number), 11 Dec. 1869, 1; tna, pro, CO/96/85, Kennedy to Granville (n° 71), 
4 July 1870, 2–3.
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ancient enmity between Ewe-speaking communities.70 In the discussions 
about the creation of a Tongu Confederacy – a new ‘Native Authority’ organ-
ised in the 1940s – the Fiawo of Volo and of Bator were close allies in diplomatic 
campaigns, as leaders of two ‘Ewe communities’ with long-standing friendly 
links.71 Notably, both the Fia of Volo and of Bator now attempted to character-
ise the Akwamu as distinct from the ‘Ewe’ of ‘Voltaland’, and thus demanded 
the separation of their villages from Akwamu, and their admission into the 
Tongu Confederacy.
The role of the Agbosome, a coastal Ewe-speaking community east of 
Keta, which had built up, in the bights of Lomé and Ve, a sort of free harbour 
for contraband trade into the territory of the British colony, was another 
apparently complex case.72 The British became increasingly interested in 
this community after the German intrusion and during the partition of the 
Volta Region between Berlin and London. The Agbosome were active as raid-
ers on Anlo territory, the territory of the mighty Ewe-speaking Awoame Fia, 
and were long-standing enemies of an Anlo sub-group, the Anyako. Once 
again, cultural identification was not the principal motive for solidarity 
here.73
The British tested the coherence of communities on the coast during their 
conflict with Anlo.74 In January 1885, Assistant Inspector Stewart was sent to 
Keta and Anloga to obtain information about the prospective enemy. Based on 
oral reports of his Keta informants, Stewart described ‘the Awoonahs and the 
Anyakos’ as the two major distinct groups, ‘with many tribes who pay them 
feudal allegiance’.75 With such terminology, Stewart managed to point out the 
70 praad (Ho Branch), DA/D 311, Togbe Kwasi Abliza iii, Dufiaga of Volo State, Tongu 
Confederacy Council, to Dixon, Senior District Commissioner of Ho (n° ka 275/SP30/50), 
27 Feb. 1950, 1–2.
71 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/108, Togbe Kwasi Abliza iii to Senior District Commissioner of 
Ho (without number), 30 April 1949, 1.
72 tna, pro, CO/96/157, Young, Governor of the Gold Coast, to Derby (n° 255), 29 April 1884, 
34–8.
73 tna, pro, CO/96/157, Firminger, Inspector of Gold Coast Colony in Keta, to Acting 
Colonial Secretary (without number), 26 March 1884, 4–7, 12–13; tna, pro, CO/879/21, 
African Confidential Print No. 268, Assistant Inspector Stewart to Colonial Secretary of 
the Gold Coast (without number, Enclosure 3 in No. 86), 30 Jan. 1885, 2.
74 tna, pro, CO/96/166, Captain Brydon to Colonial Secretary of the Gold Coast (n° 190), 
4 Oct. 1876, 2–3.
75 tna, pro, CO/879/21, African Confidential Print No. 268, Assistant Inspector Stewart to 
Colonial Secretary of the Gold Coast (without number, Enclosure 3 in No. 86), 30 Jan. 
1885, 1.
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nature of Anlo as a pre-colonial state, while Bremen missionaries described it 
as a chaotic, ‘republican tribe’.76 The state was segmented and obviously rather 
weak, and many of its different communities operated autonomously: the 
Anyako were very probably acting without any control on the part of the 
Awoame Fia.77 When, after intensive British shelling of the coastline, the differ-
ent villages gave up the war, they offered their capitulation on individual 
terms.78
Still more interesting for our analysis is the fact that informants from the 
interior described community relations in the region in the sense of a clear 
difference between Anlo and ‘the Crippies’ (Krepis). However, for years it 
remained uncertain what exactly ‘Krepi’ meant.79 This label for an imagined 
community in the interior of the coastal region practically ceased to exist at 
the moment of the final Anglo-German partition of the Volta Region.80 The 
British claimed that they had bought the right of protection over a community 
named ‘Krepi’ from the Danish residents in Keta in 1850, but, once again, this 
was a label without concrete meaning!81 In 1858, Thomas Birch Freeman in his 
report of a journey into the interior described Kwadzo De iv as ‘Paramount 
Chief of the Krepis’. Even so, afterwards he commented that the Pekihene only 
ruled over his ‘subject towns’, while neighbouring ‘divisions’ such as Sokode 
76 tna, pro, CO/96/88, Binder, Bremen missionary in Keta, to Kennedy (without number), 
6 May 1871, 1; tna, pro, CO/96/85, Ussher to Kennedy (n° 90), 8 July 1870, 17–8; Meyer, 
Translating, 5.
77 tna, pro, CO/879/21, African Confidential Print No. 268, Chase Parr, Commander of hms 
Frolic, to Young (without number, Enclosure 1 in No. 86.), 5 Feb. 1885.
78 tna, pro, CO/879/21, African Confidential Print No. 268, Dudley, Acting Inspector-
General, to Colonial Secretary of the Gold Coast (without number, Enclosure 2 in No. 86), 
5 Feb. 1885, 2.
79 tna, pro, CO/96/166, Information collected from Mr. W.A. Blavo, about the police Station 
(without number), without date, 1, 3. European eighteenth-century accounts had 
described that, according to local usage, ‘Krepi’ was ‘all the land lying east of River Volta 
and north of this lake [east of Ada], as well as several hundred miles up river’, see Rømer, 
Ludewig Ferdinand, A Reliable Account of the Coast of Guinea (1760), translated and edited 
by Selena Axelrod Winsnes (Oxford etc.: Oxford University Press, 2000 [originally 1756 and 
1760]), 129. On the vagueness of the term see also Amenumey, Ewe, 66–7.
80 In 1888, British administrators were still convinced that Krepi was a political institution in 
its own right, including nearly 500,000 inhabitants. See tna, pro, CO/879/28, African 
Confidential Print No. 356, Williams, District Commissioner of Volta District, to Griffith, 
British Governor of the Gold Coast (n° 1), 2 January 1888, 451 (1 of 1).
81 ant, Fonds Allemand, FA1/196, no title (without number), 11 Feb. 1887, 1–2; ant, Fonds 
Allemand, FA1/196, British Embassy in Berlin, Memorandum on British and German 
Claims with Respect to the Crepee or Peki Country (n° 15585.), 18 Dec. 1887, 2–4.
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were perfectly autonomous. During Freeman’s negotiations with the ‘Krepi’ 
chiefs for the introduction of a poll tax as compensation for British protection, 
Adzatekpor of Avatime, Dagadu of Kpandu, and most other leading chiefs of 
the area were apparently present. However, none of them accepted the 
Pekihene’s overlordship and none suggested that his community was part of a 
larger identity group.82
Thirty years later, most observers regarded ‘Krepi’ as the name of the ter-
ritory dominated by Peki. Basle missionaries who visited Kpandu and Peki 
in the 1880s were convinced that the Pekihene was the ruler of a federation 
over ‘the Efe’ (including Kpandu), referring to the alliance against the 
Asante. The Pekihene, Kwadzo De vi, did his best to give credence to this 
view, claiming ‘Krepi’ to be his territory.83 However, most of the other com-
munities involved on the side of Peki and Ho in the Taviefe war, were not at 
all amused by such discourses of the Pekihene. They resisted accepting 
Peki’s lasting overrule, although Kwadzo De initially had British support, as 
the British hoped to use his ‘rights’ as an argument against German territo-
rial claims. The German Commissioner of Togo, Jesko von Puttkamer, in 
June 1888, obtained information on the western parts of the German pro-
tectorate, mainly on Agotime and Ylo, and described ‘Krepi’ as an ancient 
‘federation’, which had included Peki, Akwamu, Avatime, Agotime and oth-
ers of the Volta Region communities and had ceased to exist sometime 
before 1850.84
The Avatime made a competing claim. In 1888, Adzatekpor of Vane, the 
ruler (and later paramount chief) of Avatime, had still been virtually unknown 
to British officials.85 However, in 1894 the Avatime received a British confirma-
tion that they were the rulers of the former state of Krepi (although they were 
82 tna, pro, CO/879/28, African Confidential Print No. 356, Freeman, Extract of Report of 
Mr. Freeman to Major H. Bird, dated 7th July 1858 (without number), without date, 1, 3.
83 [Christaller, J.C.], ‘Recent Explorations in the Basin of the Volta (Gold Coast) by 
Missionaries of the Basel Missionary Society’, Proceedings of the Royal Geographical 
Society and Monthly Record of Geography, New Monthly Series 8(4), 1886, 246–56, 253, 256; 
tna, pro, CO/879/28, African Confidential Print No. 351, Bennett, District Commissioner 
of Akuse, to Griffith, Governor of the Gold Coast (n° 219., as Enclosure 1 in No. 18), 4 April 
1888; tna, pro, CO/879/28, African Confidential Print No. 351, Kwadzo De ‘of Krepe’ to 
Bennett (without number), 3 April 1888, 1.
84 tna, pro, CO/879/28, African Confidential Print No. 356, von Puttkammer, (Extract.) 
[Memorandum on Peki] (without number, Enclosure 2 in No. 44), 30 June 1888, 1–2.
85 tna, pro, CO/879/28, African Confidential Print No. 351, Akers, British Assistant Inspector 
in Gold Coast, List of Countries for which English Flags are required (without number), 
3 July 1888, 146bis.
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now situated on German territory).86 Based on this confirmation, the Avatime 
demanded in the 1920s to hold the leading role in a new ‘state’ created through 
‘amalgamation’.87 The role of the ruler of Kpandu, whose territory finally came 
under German rule, was equally contested.88
In 1888, the Taviefe War, starting with the murder of British Assistant Inspector 
John Scott Dalrymple on 11 May 1888, again allowed for a refinement of local 
identifications and regional solidarities between the British conquerors and 
Ewe-speaking groups.89 Dalrymple’s mission had been to discipline Taviefe, 
Matse, and Adaklu, former allies of the Asante and Akwamu in 1870 and oppo-
nents of Peki between 1875 and 1877 – information on their ‘behaviour’ had come 
from Kwadzo De vi and the ruler (Howusu) of Ho, and they were described as 
‘traitors’ to the Ewe-speaking community.90 The British inspector had defined 
Kwadzo De vi as legitimate king ‘of all of Krepi’ threatened by unruly subjects. 
The British neither understood the interest of the Peki ruler in presenting the 
facts in a particular way, nor did they see that the alliance of the Pekihene included 
a number of Twi-speakers, in particular from Boso and Anum.91
After the failure of a planned peace conference with the Taviefe ruler, Bele 
Kobina, and Dalrymple’s death, an alliance organised by the British district 
86 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/253, Griffith, District Commissioner of Keta, to Adzatekpor I of 
Vane, Avatime (as ‘King Adjatekpor of Crepe’ [sic]) (n° 462/413), 9 Nov. 1894.
87 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/238, Adzatekpor I, Paramount Chief of Avatime, to District 
Commissioner of Ho (without number), without date [1927].
88 Bundesarchiv, Berlin (BArch), R1001, 4310, Zimmerer, Acting Governor of Cameroon, to 
Bismarck, German Imperial Chancellor (n° 158), 6 Oct. 1887.
89 tna, pro, CO/879/28, African Confidential Print No. 351, Griffith; Evans, Colonial 
Secretary of the Gold Coast; Charles Pike, Treasurer, Minutes of the Proceedings of a 
Meeting of the Executive Council, held at Christiansborg Castle, on Monday the 28th day of 
May 1888 (without number, enclosure in No. 17), without date, 54.
90 tna, pro, CO/879/28, African Confidential Print No. 351, Dalrymple, Colonial Inspector, 
to Griffith (without number, enclosure in n° 11), 30 April 1888, 46 (1 of 2); tna, pro, 
CO/879/28, African Confidential Print No. 351, Kwadjo De vi, Pekihene, to Bennett, District 
Commissioner of Akuse (without number), 3 April 1888, 76 (1 of 1); tna, pro, CO/879/28, 
African Confidential Print No. 351, Evans to Dalrymple (without number, Enclosure 3 in 
No. 18), 9 April 1888, 76bis (1 of 2); tna, pro, CO/879/28, African Confidential Print No. 
351, Dalrymple to Evans (without number, Enclosure 8 in No. 18), 20 April 1888, 78 (1 of 2). 
The nineteenth-century ‘tradition’ collected by Spieth in Ho, describes the Taviefe as clas-
sic robbers and ‘highwaymen’, Spieth, Ewe-Stämme, 12–4.
91 tna, pro, CO/879/28, African Confidential Print No. 351, Dalrymple, [Conversation with 
Kwadjo Dei in Savie, 18 April 1888] (without number), without date, 78bis (1 of 2); tna, pro, 
CO/879/28, African Confidential Print No. 351, Dalrymple to Evans (without number, 
Enclosure 12 in No. 18), 24 April 1888, 80bis (2 of 2).
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commissioner of Akuse, Akers, with the Sakiti of Krobo and the Pekihene, 
quickly conquered Taviefe and Matse. After atrocities by British Hausa merce-
naries and in view of the stern positions taken by the Pekihene, Taviefe, Matse, 
Adaklu, and Waya again took up arms and were again defeated. The Pekihene 
and the Howusu also accused the communities of Anlo of sympathising with 
and supporting their opponents. The campaign changed the balance in favour 
of Kwadzo De: even messengers from Agotime, Avatime, and Twi-speaking 
Anum, who before had fiercely insisted on their autonomy, now claimed that 
their area had always been a ‘portion of Crepee’, and that they belonged to Peki 
rule. In 1888, these claims nearly provoked a diplomatic conflict between the 
British and the Germans.92 German diplomats were angry about the alleged 
British prerogatives in ‘Krepi’, and British officials loudly demanded the acqui-
sition of the Ve Country including Lomé, in order to stop the contraband trade 
via this coast.93 The British were more concerned to find an ‘authentic’ solu-
tion. This may explain why they retreated in the end, being uncertain if they 
had understood the territorial dimensions of ‘Krepi’. They also gave up their 
92 tna, pro, CO/879/28, African Confidential Print No. 351, Bennett, District Commissioner 
of Ho, to Evans (n° 277), 11 May 1888, 87bis (1 of 2); tna, pro, CO/879/28, African 
Confidential Print No. 351, Bennett to Evans (n° 280), 14 May 1888, 89 (1 of 2); tna, pro, 
CO/879/28, African Confidential Print No. 351, Evans to Brennan, Assistant Inspector, 
Gold Coast Constabulary (n° 2406), 17 May 1888, 86 (2 of 2); tna, pro, CO/879/28, African 
Confidential Print No. 351, Akers to Evans (without number, Enclosure in No. 22), 5 June 
1888, 98 (2 of 3); tna, pro, CO/879/28, African Confidential Print No. 351, Bennett to 
Evans (n° 329), 6 June 1888, 110bis; tna, pro, CO/879/28, African Confidential Print No. 
351, Akers, Interview with Tavieve Messengers (without number), 23 June 1888; tna, pro, 
CO/879/28, African Confidential Print No. 351, Akers to Evans, Report on Tavieve Expedition 
(without number, Enclosure 1 in No. 34), 29 June 1888, 135–6; tna, pro, CO/879/28, 
African Confidential Print No. 351, Griffith to Knutsford (n° 237), 7 July 1888, 129bis; tna, 
pro, CO/879/28, African Confidential Print No. 351, Agbovi, Head Chief of Potoi; 
Akakpwaley, Head Chief of Mawlu Agotime, and others, [Declaration] (without number), 
3 July 1888, 143bis (1 of 1); tna, pro, CO/879/28, African Confidential Print No. 351, Riby 
Williams, District Commissioner, to Akers (without number), 2 July 1888, 144 (1 of 2); tna, 
pro, CO/879/28, African Confidential Print No. 351, Williams, Statement taken by C. Riby 
Williams, District Commissioner, Volta District (without number), 2 July 1888, 144bis (1 of 1); 
tna, pro, CO/879/28, African Confidential Print No. 351, Bogbi, Chief of Adaklu; 
Adzatekpor I, Chief of Avatime; Yaw Chei, Chief of Taviefe; and others, [Declaration] 
(without number), 3 July 1888, 143bis–144; tna, pro, CO/879/28, African Confidential 
Print No. 351, Kumi, ‘Chief of Anum and Head Chief of Buem’, [Declaration] (without 
number), 3 July 1888, 144.
93 tna, pro, CO/879/28, African Confidential Print No. 356, Maurice Burtt to Griffith (with-
out number, Enclosure in No. 6), 3 March 1888, 446bis–447 (1 and 2 of 2).
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claim for Agotime, in spite of earlier assurances given to the rulers of the 
Agotime villages who were abandoned to the Germans; and Kwadzo De was 
unsuccessful with his protest. The Pekihene was implicitly acknowledged by 
the British as formal paramount ruler over Agotime, but this gave him no polit-
ical prerogative – and the colonial border effectively separated Peki from 
Agotime territory.94
Buem, further to the north and at the margins of the Ewe-speaking area, had 
interested the British because of its strategic position for inland trade. The 
British had also (quite erroneously) concluded that the inhabitants of Buem 
spoke a language similar to the Ewe-speakers and were thus ‘naturally’ mem-
bers of a British protectorate.95 Further south, the German and the British gov-
ernments continued to discuss the ‘possession rights’ over Kpandu, Ho, 
Avatime, and Adaklu, until the border was fixed in 1890, with most of these 
‘divisions’ remaining in German territory, and the Adaklu villages divided 
between the Keta District of the Gold Coast and the Misahöhe District of 
German Togo.96
As British officials struggled to come to an ‘authentic’ organisation of local 
political units, many participants from the African side used their chance to 
sell themselves as rulers of their respective community. Issues of being an eth-
nolinguistic group did not play a role in that process. Smaller communities, 
such as Taviefe, Adaklu, or Ho, and pre-colonial states with Ewe-speaking rul-
ers, such as Anlo and Peki, dominated questions of group identification. 
However, the hardening of the colonial border had an impact on categories, as 
had missionaries of the Bremen Mission in defining Ewe culture and politics. 
These missionaries and some linguists and early anthropologists, showed a 
94 tna, pro, CO/879/28, African Confidential Print No. 356, Evans to Akers (without num-
ber, Enclosure 1 in No. 23), 13 July 1888, 459 (2 of 2); tna, pro, CO/879/28, African 
Confidential Print No. 356, Evans to ‘Chiefs of Agotime’ (without number, Enclosure 2 in 
No. 23), 13 July 1888; tna, pro, CO/879/28, African Confidential Print No. 356, Evans to 
Kwadzo De vi, ‘King of Krepi’ (without number, Enclosure 3 in No. 23), 459 (1 of 1).
95 tna, pro, CO/879/28, African Confidential Print No. 356, Extract from Mr. Firminger’s 
Report of the 20th March 1888 (without number, Enclosure 1 in No. 7), without date, 
447–447bis (1 and 2 of 2); tna, pro, CO/879/28, African Confidential Print No. 356, 
Williams to Griffith (n° 2), 25 July 1888, 465 (1 of 1); tna, pro, CO/879/28, African 
Confidential Print No. 356, Notes of Statement made by King of Buem, July 25, 1888 (without 
number), without date, 465–465bis (1 and 2 of 2).
96 tna, pro, CO/879/28, African Confidential Print No. 356, Puttkamer, German 
Commissioner of Togo, to Griffith (without number, translation, Enclosure 1 in No. 14), 
31 May 1888, 452bis–453 (1 to 2 of 2); tna, pro, CO/879/28, African Confidential Print No. 
356, Griffith to Puttkamer (n° 351), 9 June 1888, 453 (1 of 1).
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marked curiosity for the structure of the Eweer-Stämme (the Ewe tribes), but 
the German administration in districts such as Lomé-Land and Misahöhe was 
relatively uninterested in the ‘tribal structure’ of Togo and focused on taxes 
and forced labour without a classification through a census.97 It appears that 
only the Bremen Mission and the Catholic Steyl Mission in the German colony 
vigorously attempted to understand what they regarded as ‘Ewe group iden-
tity’, in their attempts at setting up a rudimentary education system.98
It is very easy to claim, with hindsight, that the different Ewe-speaking com-
munities had already had a strong feeling of unity under German rule.99 
However, there is no proof for such a hypothesis. German administrators were 
very much focused on labour issues, and attempts at engaging with commu-
nity structures were mainly to be found where the ever-present problem of 
labour and labour evasion was particularly acute, as in the region of Sukpe. In 
this region, the administrator defined local populations as being members of 
the ‘Aveno tribe’, who had settled in the region only in 1850. These ‘Avenos’ 
would have bought land from the Ave, Agotime, and Adaklu communities, ear-
lier settlers in the region.100 However, while in these concrete cases the 
Germans commented on the existence of different ‘divisions’, we find little 
inclination (and information) to point out larger solidarities or to install 
97 ant, Fonds Allemand, FA3/3079, District Administrator of Lome-Land, [ Jahresbericht 
Lome-Land 1908/09] (without number), 3 Oct. 1909, 4–8; ant, Fonds Allemand, FA3/3079, 
District Administrator of Lome-Land, Berichtsjahr 1909/10 (without number), 2a–f, 5; ant, 
Fonds Allemand, FA3/3079, Bezirksamt Lome-Land to Von Zech, Governor of Togo, 
Berichtsjahr 1910/11 (n° 805/14), 10 May 1911, 2–2(1), 4–5; ant, Fonds Allemand, FA3/3079, 
Bezirksamt Lome-Land to Brückner, Governor of Togo, Berichtsjahr 1910/11 [sic!] (n° 
991/12), 19 May 1912, 2–2a, 5; ant, Fonds Allemand, FA3/2123, Gruner, District Administrator 
of Misahöhe, Jahresbericht 1907/08. (without number), without date, 4–5; [Zöller, H.], 
‘Togo-Land, the German Protectorate on the Slave Coast’, Proceedings of the Royal 
Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography, New Monthly Series 7(6), 1885, 
377–80, passim; Jehle, A., ‘Soul, Spirit, Fate: According to the Notions of the Tshi and Ehwe 
Tribes (Gold Coast and Togo, W. Africa)’, Journal of the Royal African Society 6(24), 1907, 
405–15, 414; Smith, Woodruff D., ‘The Ideology of German Colonialism, 1840–1906’, Journal 
of Modern History 46(4), 1974, 641–62, 657–9.
98 Vischer, Hanns, ‘Native Education in German Africa’, Journal of the Royal African Society 
14(54), 1915, 123–42, 124–30; Ustorf, Werner, ‘“Survival of the Fittest”: German Protestant 
Missions, Nazism and Neocolonialism, 1933–1945’, Journal of Religion in Africa 28(1), 1998, 
93–114, 101–2.
99 Schuerkens, Ulrike, Du Togo allemand aux Togo et Ghana indépendants: Changement 
social sous régime colonial (Paris: Harmattan, 2001), 37–8, 52, 58.
100 ant, Fonds Allemand, FA1/92, Schlettwein, Acting District Administrator of Misahöhe, 
[Bereisung von Sokpe] (n° 527/12), 24 April 1912, 1–2.
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‘authentic chiefs’.101 The German approach ultimately remained extremely 
pragmatic: it focused on success in tax collection and labour recruitment, and 
checks for more ambitious local leaders.
In contrast, the British (as in the Gambia or in Sierra Leone) wished to cre-
ate a chieftaincy based on ‘traditional rules’ – which in Togoland opened the 
gate to constant disputes. In Ewe-speaking communities, a typical cause of 
disputes was the previously mentioned role of the ‘stool father’ (the zikpuito), 
whose function was unclear to the colonial rulers.102 With their agenda, the 
British had a clear objective of classifying populations according to their imag-
ined larger affiliation. After 1915, the British imported these patterns into the 
western part of former German Togo, based on some established models. At 
the same time, not only British rule but also the Ewe language expanded. Ewe 
entered in the 1890s into regions such as South Akposo; in 1900, the Bremen 
Mission station official at Amedzofe, Ernst Bürgi, also reported a spectacular 
rise in the use of the language.103 This process started with an influx of refugees 
from the area between Lomé and Kpalimé, fleeing northwards from the repri-
sals of German soldiers and their auxiliaries. Other local populations also dis-
covered the language to be useful.104 Moreover, German Catholic and 
Protestant missionaries contributed to this process by using Ewe as the princi-
pal language in education and codifying it, which was grudgingly accepted by 
the German colonial government. From 1904 onwards, an Ewe-speaking elite 
formulated its own interests, including in language politics.105 These elites 
were very vocal after the British conquest in 1914.
However, European rulers remained unsure as to how to employ ‘Ewe’ as a 
group label. In geographic terms, the Germans called the area of Asome, 
101 See Lawrance, Benjamin N., ‘Bankoe V. Dome: Traditions and Petitions in the Ho-Asogli 
Amalgamation, British Mandated Togoland, 1919–39’, Journal of African History 46(2), 
2005, 243–67, 250.
102 praad (Ho Branch), DA/D/301, Memorandum on Kpandu Native Affairs. (without num-
ber), without date, 13.
103 Staatsarchiv Bremen, 7, 1025 (Norddeutsche Missionsgesellschaft), 5/3, Bürgi, Mission 
Station principal at Amedzofe, Avatime, to Mission Inspector (without number), 28 April 
1901, 2.
104 Staatsarchiv Bremen, 7, 1025 (Norddeutsche Missionsgesellschaft), 6/1, Bürgi to Mission 
Inspector (without number), 27 October 1901, 2.
105 Staatsarchiv Bremen, 7,1025 (Norddeutsche Missionsgesellschaft), 6/2, Bürgi to Mission 
Inspector (without number), 29 Sept. 1904, 2; Erbar, Ralph, Ein ‘Platz an der Sonne‘?: die 
Verwaltungs – und Wirtschaftsgeschichte der deutschen Kolonie Togo 1884–1914 (Stuttgart: 
Steiner, 1991), 285–302; Crabtree, W.A., ‘Togoland’, Journal of the Royal African Society 
14(54), 1915, 168–84, 176–8.
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Dalave, Tsévié and Gbli ‘Ewe’ (or ‘Evhe’) in the 1890s, and its populations 
‘Evheer’ – without referring to language.106 At the same time, the category of 
‘Ewe’ was also occasionally utilised as a larger group name referring mostly to 
the language, such as for the Waya, Ve, and Akposo.107 Moreover, the effects of 
immigration within the Trans-Volta region exacerbated the question of belong-
ing, as ‘strangers’ were often mistreated by local rulers with regard to tax pay-
ments, forced labour, and physical punishment.108 ‘Strangers’ attempted to use 
the European obsession with ‘tribal’ groups to protect themselves. In particu-
lar, Twi-speakers in the region started to define themselves as persecuted ‘Akan’ 
and to demand rights as a homogeneous immigrant group.
In general, the experiences after colonial conquest do not confirm the hypoth-
esis of a strong and continuous pan-Ewe sentiment that challenged colonial 
boundaries. Many locals attempted to obtain improved positions by reference to 
former allegiances and dependencies. ‘Ewe-ness’ was a marginal part of this pic-
ture at best – in spite of the linguistic efforts of the missionaries.
 The New Border and the Quest for ‘Authentic’ Arrangements: 
British and French Readjustments of ‘Ewe’ Institutions after the 
First World War, 1914–1945
The French and British invasions of the German colony of Togo led to an exten-
sion, and, eventually, to an exacerbation of the administrative separation of 
different groups of Ewe-speakers. Local elites attempted, however, to ‘choose’ 
what they regarded as the more benign European power of tutelage; and to 
improve trade contacts, as Lomé merchants hoped for free access to the port of 
Keta. Important spokesmen of the coastal elite, such as Octaviano Olympio, 
actively lobbied for British rule over Lomé. However, it has to be asked how far 
these actions were motivated by a feeling of Ewe-ness, as was suggested by 
D.E.K. Amenumey.109
106 Staatsarchiv Bremen, 7, 1025 (Norddeutsche Missionsgesellschaft), 19/6, Bürgi, Errichtung 
einer zweiten Küstenstation in Lome (without number), 22 Aug. 1891, 3, 6.
107 Staatsarchiv Bremen, 7,1025 (Norddeutsche Missionsgesellschaft), 19/6, Kommentar zum 
Stationsbau (without number), without date [1898].
108 praad (Ho Branch), DA/D/296, Taifota Tahuma to District Commissioner of Ho (without 
number), 6 April 1933.
109 Louis, ‘Great Britain’, 56–8; Nugent, Smugglers, 31–5; Lawrance, Benjamin N., ‘Petitioners, 
“Bush Lawyers,” and Letter Writers: Court Access in British-Occupied Lomé, 1914–1920’, in 
Benjamin N. Lawrance, Emily Lynn Osborn, and Richard L. Roberts (eds.), Intermediaries, 
Interpreters, and Clerks: African Employees in the Making of Colonial Africa (Madison: 
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Two examples show the complexity of this interpretation. During the First 
World War, the Awoame Fia, Togbe Sri ii, continued with the claims of overlord-
ship of the eastern Volta Region, which Anlo rulers had already been formulated 
in the 1860s and 1870s. This explains the Anlo war effort in favour of the British 
side. Further east, the Lawson family in Aného appears to have claimed in 1922, 
under French rule, overlordship of populations in the south of Togo. However, 
again the label of ‘Ewe’ is nowhere employed in the evidence.110 From a broader 
perspective, it is also significant that we find no attempt by local populations to 
bring the question of the perils of the ‘Ewe community’ before the League of 
Nations. European officials would have been sensitive to  identifying what they 
saw as correct ‘tribal’ settings. ‘The Ewe’, however, did not play a prominent role 
in European reports on the Togoland mandate written in the 1920s. In the British 
1927 report on the Togoland mandate sent to the League of Nations, the authors, 
while briefly mentioning the Ewe  language, recommended installing ‘Akan’ 
structures of local government  wherever possible!111 Even in the anthropological 
work of the famous scholar- administrator John S. Rattray, who interviewed com-
munities about their Notsie experience, the fact of ‘Ewe-ness’ and wish for Ewe 
unity do not at all appear.112
After the British conquest of western and southern Togo in 1914/15, claim-
ants from the Gold Coast Colony and the Gold Coast Protectorate demanded 
their rights of political rule over ‘natives from Togoland’. The ‘Togoland com-
munities’ themselves were more interested in revising local hierarchies 
installed by the Germans, like of the Adele paramount chief over the Adjuti. 
The other goal was to prevent a return of the German administration. In Ho, 
Noepe, Adame, Aflao, and Lomé, the chiefs petitioned for the continuation 
of British rule, pointing to German atrocities with regard to forced labour, 
violent tax requisition, and corporal punishment; and the Anfoega tried to 
free themselves from the Kpandu authority, imposed on them by the 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 94–114, 108–9; Akyeampong, Sea, 191–2; Alsheimer, 
Sklaverei, 12–3, 269.
110 Lawrance, Locality, 45, 48, and 52–3 (in the latter pages, Lawrance interprets a respective 
song text).
111 Report by his Britannic Majesty’s Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the 
Administration of Togoland under British Mandate for the Year 1927, 6, in tna, pro, 
CO/96/681/13.
112 On Rattray’s work in Asante, see Von Laue, Theodore H., ‘Anthropology and Power: 
R.S. Rattray among the Ashanti’, African Affairs 75(298), 1976, 33–54, 52–3; praad (Accra), 
adm 11/1/1624, Rattray, Report by Mr. R.S. Rattray (without number), without date, 21–2, 
24, 28, 33–42, 46–7.
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Germans. Moreover, there was also little enthusiasm for coming under the 
French mandate.113
Contrary to Amenumey’s assumptions, local populations did not mention 
any idea of Ewe cohesion, and although some held that they ‘do not want the 
Krepe tribe again split up between two separate European Governments’; 
others, like the Agotime, now insisted that they had nothing to do with 
‘Krepi’.114 Indeed, communities in Togoland under British mandate were con-
tent to see the power of Anlo and Peki curtailed. The British obsession with 
the creation of ‘native states’ generated new tensions, as many chiefs refused 
any participation in that. To give one representative example: when the 
‘Divisional Chief ’ of Taingbe applied to exert a levy to improve the infrastruc-
ture of Taingbe Town, he learned he was no longer the legal authority enti-
tled to charge such a levy.115 In British administrative politics, ‘native 
jurisdiction’ and ‘native treasury’ became the privilege of ‘states’ that had 
been a product of ‘amalgamated divisions’, which only created more prob-
lems. The French officials, while choosing a less elaborate terminology, basi-
cally attempted the same: local communities were put into chefferies de 
canton, without consultation.
In subsequent community conflicts before the 1940s, previous struggles 
between pre-colonial states were much more a point of reference than ethnic 
solidarity. One good example for British Togoland is the land conflict between 
the inhabitants of Taingbe and Tokokoe (in the zone north-east of Ho). Both 
sides mobilised historical ‘tradition’, but did not refer at all to their common 
‘Ewe past’. During a stool dispute within Tokokoe, between Agamah and 
Buankrah ii, which remained a constant problem through the whole of the 
113 praad (Accra), adm 11/1/572, Hobs, District Commissioner of Mpraeso, Kwahu, to 
Commissioner of the Eastern Province (n° K./30/14.), 26 May 1915; praad (Accra), 
adm 11/1/572, Messum, British District Political Officer, to British Senior Political 
Officer in Lomé (n° 29/1/14), 15 Nov. 1914, 4; praad (Accra), adm 11/1/1621, Furley, 
[Report of a Tour through the districts of Togoland] (without number), 17 April 1918, 
5–8; praad (Accra), adm 11/1/1622, Furley, Notes of Statements taken before the 
Secretary of Native Affairs on his Tour in Togoland (without number), without date 
[1918], 10–3; praad (Accra), adm 11/1/1620, Nani Hode, Head Chief of Anfoega, An 
extract of the manuscript of the History of Anfoe (without number, Enclosure vi in 
Report), 9 Feb. 1918, 2; Crabtree, W.A., ‘The Conquest of Togoland’, Journal of the Royal 
African Society 14(56), 1915, 386–91, 390.
114 praad (Accra), adm 11/1/1621, Furley, [Report of a Tour through the districts of Togoland] 
(without number), 17 April 1918, 14.
115 praad (Ho Branch), DA/D/292, Assistant District Commissioner in Ho, to Divisional 
Chief of Taingbe, Collection of Levy (n° 288/28/1929.), 15 March 1930.
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1930s, both sides based claims on accusations that the others had collaborated 
with the Asante invaders.116
The question of the new border and its effects were another obvious prob-
lem. Most extreme was the situation of Agotime, where 29 villages became 
part of the French zone, while two villages, including the village of Kpetoe of 
the Agotime head chief, remained under the British.117 Another difficulty 
was the continuous importance of the former border between German Togo 
and the British Gold Coast Colony, now translated into an administrative 
border between Gold Coast and Togoland under British mandate. Some 
chiefs wished to settle old scores, as in the case of Agbosome, which contin-
ued its aggressive politics from the nineteenth century. The chief of 
Agbosome laid claim to the towns of Some and Have and thereby challenged 
Anlo rule.118 In all these conflicts, demands of the former pre-colonial states 
and the interests of smaller communities were far more important than any 
idea of larger (ethnic) group solidarity.
On the French side of the mandate, the situation was similar. In a 1930 report 
on the situation in the Cercle of Klouto, with the administrative centres of 
Kpalimé and Misahöhe, the French dealt with the ‘Ewe problem’ in a very 
ambivalent way. The district commissioner argued that even in view of the 
common Notsie legend, the ‘Ewe race’ did not seem to know any more sus-
tained solidarity. ‘The village is the true ethnic group’, the French commented 
on the fragmentation of political solidarity in the area. The same comment 
applied to the border regions of Mission Tové and Akoviepe.119
116 praad (Ho Branch), DA/D/292, Kwaku Agama, Divisional Chief of Tokokoe, to District 
Commissioner in Ho, Re: Anka Yawoe vs. Amedume Apomah (without number), 3 May 
1934; praad (Ho Branch), DA/D/292, Anku Yawoe, resident of Taingbe Dzafe, to District 
Commissioner in Ho, Anku Yawoe vs. Amedume Apomah (without number), 26 Sept. 1934, 
1; praad (Ho Branch), DA/D/296, Kwashikuma Peteprebi Dzogu to District Commissioner 
of Ho (without number), 30 Oct. 1934, 2; praad (Ho Branch), DA/D/296, Assistant District 
Commissioner of Ho to District Commissioner of Kpandu, Tokokoe Stool Dispute 
(n° 521/14/1929.), 31 July 1933, 4.
117 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/199, Jackson, Commissioner of the Eastern Province, 
Memorandum on Anglo-French Togoland Boundary (without number), without date, 1–2; 
Nugent, Paul, ‘The Historicity of Ethnicity: Mandinka/Jola and Ewe/Agotime Identities in 
the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries’, in Alexander Keese (ed.), Ethnicity and the long-
term perspective: the African experience (Berne  etc.: Peter Lang, 2010), 127–53, 141–2.
118 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/199, Adamah ii, Fia of Agbosome, to District Commissioner of 
Keta (n° 014/31), 26 Dec. 1930, 1.
119 ant, 1APA/1, Monographie: Cercle de Klouto (without number), without date [1930], 7–8; 
ant, 2APA, Cercle de Tsévié, 2, Nativel, Administrator of Subdivision of Lomé, Rapport de 
la tournée effectuée par l’Administrateur-Adjoint des Colonies Nativel, Chef de la Subdivision 
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The main pressures of the interwar period came, once again, from the ‘tra-
ditional states’ in the region, Anlo and Peki. In particular, the Pekihene hoped 
after 1915 for the creation of a larger regional paramountcy and reminded the 
British of earlier promises. The chiefs of Anfoega, Hlefi, Dsocho, Goviefe and 
Akrofu, Adaklu, Agotime, Dakpa, Zofe, Logba, and Botoku were all against any 
such paramountcy; the inhabitants of Akuope and Taingbe were even more 
explicit about the historical background, and they accused Peki of passiveness 
during their 1860s conflict with Anlo; and even in Abutia, which was initially 
positive, integration into Peki State was complicated.120
In the latter case, the Pekihene demanded the integration of Abutia into the 
state between the early 1920s and 1945, until the final refusal of the head chief 
of Abutia in July 1945 and Abutia’s admission into the newly created Asogli 
State in Togoland. The Asogli solution helped to favourably solve land conflicts 
with neighbours.121 Within Abutia, the sub-chief of Abutia Kloe – one of 
Abutia’s communities – tried to obtain Peki’s help against his own paramount 
chief and nearly provoked a Peki intervention under Kwadzo De X. This initia-
tive was brought down with British support.122 The ruler of the second largest 
community in the Abutia ‘division’, the Dufiaga (sub-chief) of Agove, Adja 
Dra V, had long been uninterested in the Peki initiatives. However, in 1933, he 
suddenly decided to back the petitions coming from Peki, and sent representa-
tives into the Peki State Council. The conflicts with the paramount chief of 
de Lomé dans les cantons d’Akoviépé et de Mission-Tové du 25 Janvier au 27 Janvier et du 5 
Février au 8 Février 1934 (without number), without date.
120 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/238, Ellershaw, District Commissioner of Ho, to Commissioner 
of Eastern Province in Koforidua (n° 542/725/28.), 5 Sep. 1928, 1; praad (Accra), adm 
39/1/238, District Commissioner of Ho to Commissioner of the Eastern Province 
(n° 548/166./27.), 15 March 1927, 1; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/238, District Commissioner 
of Ho to Commissioner of the Eastern Province (n° 48/240/27.), 30 April 1927; praad 
(Accra), adm 39/1/238, Dalton, Assistant District Commissioner of Ho, to Commissioner 
of the Eastern Province (n° 545/212/27.), 14 April 1927.
121 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/250, Abutia Kusadjo Gidi ii, Fiaga of Abutia, to Acting District 
Commissioner of Ho (without number), 10 July 1945.
122 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/250, Assistant District Commissioner of Ho to District 
Commissioner of Kpandu, Abutia Kloe Stool Dispute (without number), 27 July 1930; 
praad (Accra), adm 39/1/250, Martin Yawo substituting Samuel Kofi, Stoolfather of 
Abutia Kloe, to District Commissioner of Ho (without number), 27 April 1931; praad 
(Accra), adm 39/1/250, Kwadzo De X, Paramount Chief of Peki, to Abutia Kwadzo xii 
(n° 331/24/29.), 1 Sep. 1930; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/250, Fiaga Abutia Kwadzo xii of 
Abutia to Assistant District Commissioner of Ho (without number), 2 Sep. 1930; praad 
(Accra), adm 39/1/250, T.A. Mead, Assistant District Commissioner of Ho, to District 
Commissioner of Kpandu, Abutia Native Affairs. (without number), 13 July [1944].
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Abutia were reason enough for such a change of opinion; however, when the 
Agove headmen realised that the British would not concede to them even a 
loose federation with Peki, they came to terms with the Asogli solution.123
In 1945, in a last-minute attempt, the Agove sub-chief, S.K. Kumah, and the 
asafohene (military society leader) of Teti (the central division), Okai Debra, 
allied to call for integration of Abutia into Peki. The situation was little favour-
able for such an attempt: the Peki Ruler, Kwadzo De X, was seriously ill, and the 
British were not eager to change their established line of politics.124 Even so, 
Kumah and Debra mobilised part of the local populations, and organised a 
showdown at a divisional meeting of Abutia, where the Regent of Peki, Ayim V, 
and the Howusu of Ho as President of Asogli State, explained their claims. Even 
so, the attempt did not win a majority except in Agove, and in spite of the mas-
sive protests of the Peki authorities, the British urged Ayim V and his successor 
as regent, Donko, to renounce their claims. In the end, the Peki initiative 
remained fruitless.125
We have discussed the Peki-Abutia affair in so much detail because it was 
exemplary for many similar cases of the interwar period. Against their earlier 
preferences before 1914, in which the British had favoured a regrouping of 
123 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/250, Adja Dra V, Dufiaga of Agove Abutia; and subchiefs of 
Agove, to Dufia Abutia Kwadzo xii, of Teti-Abutia, In the Meeting held at Agove-Abutia 
Before Togbe Adja Dra V Fiaga. His subchiefs. Amanklatos. Stoolfathers. Linguists and Elders 
on the 17th day of March 1932 (without number), without date, 1; praad (Accra), adm 
39/1/250, Assistant District Commissioner of Ho to District Commissioner of Kpandu, 
Abutia Division. (n° 152/4/1929), 28 March 1933, 1–2; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/250, 
Assistant District Commissioner of Ho to District Commissioner of Kpandu, Abutia 
Affairs (n° 1112/4/1929.), 18 Dec. 1943.
124 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/250, S.K. Kumah, Fiaga of Agove; and others, to Kwadzo De X, 
Pekihene (without number), 12 May 1945; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/250, Assistant District 
Commissioner of Ho to District Commissioner of Kpandu, Abutia Divisional Affairs 
(n° 725/4/29.), 20 June 1945, 1.
125 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/250, Tsagbey, Peki Native Administration Secretary, Report on 
Abutia Amalgamation Meeting held at Abutia-Teti on the 27th October, 1945, to the District 
Commissioner, Volta River District, Akuse. (without number), 31 Oct. 1945, 1–2; praad 
(Accra), adm 39/1/250, Tsagbey, Minutes of the Peki and Abutia Re-Union Meeting held at 
Agove-Abutia on Th[u]rsday the 15th. November, 1945. (without number), without date, 1–2; 
praad (Accra), adm 39/1/250, Duncan, District Commissioner of Ho, to Commissioner 
of the Eastern Province, Proposed Amalgamation of Abutia Division with the Asogli State. 
(n° 20/4/1929.), 31 Oct. 1945, 1–2; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/250, McDevitt, Acting District 
Commissioner of Akuse, to Donko, Regent of Peki State, Abutia-Asogli Amalgamation. 
(n° 2320/183/43.), 26 Nov. 1945; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/250, Donko to McDevitt, Abutia-
Asogli Amalgamation. (n° 312/25/37.), 7 Dec. 1945, 1.
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 different groups – ‘Evhe-speaking tribes…from Nuatja’ who had allied against 
the Asante under Peki leadership – under Peki authority the British had to con-
cede in the interwar period that voices from Nkonya, Ve, Fodome, Liati, Sokode, 
Abutia or Kpeve, while seeing the Gold Coast-Togoland border as negative, had 
no inclination to accept the paramountcy of Peki.126
The experience of the Anlo rulers was similar: after their engagement for a 
larger political unit with common cultural characteristics during the First 
World War, they were unable even to create stronger relations with the Adaklu 
chiefs as a neighbouring community. Both groups were Ewe-speakers, adher-
ent to a common version of the Notsie legend, and had been allies of the 
Asante in the late 1860s. However, this was insufficient.127 Discord between the 
two communities was expressed in an ‘oral tradition’ centred on an attack of 
Anlo units against Adaklu villages shortly after 1870, which had forced the 
Adaklu to flee into their strongholds near Adaklu Mountain. The respective 
tradition was rebuilt in the 1920s against attempts at integrating Adaklu vil-
lages into Anlo State.128 In a second oral tradition, reinterpreting events during 
the mythical exodus from Notsie, the Adaklu founding father, Foli Kuma, was 
described as equal of the founder of Anlo, Wenya. This tradition thus refused 
Anlo any pre-eminence.129
Thus Adaklu elites moulded their own, independent politics in the region, 
and refused integration into Anlo, but also into the new Asogli State around 
Ho. With regard to the latter, the Adaklu spokesmen claimed that subjects of 
the Howusu had regularly stolen land from them and were therefore long-
standing enemies.130 When British pressure on Adaklu community leaders 
became stronger, the Adaklu adapted their traditions: they now held that their 
126 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/238, District Commissioner of Ho to Commissioner of the 
Eastern Province (n° 479/116./27.), 18 Feb. 1927, 1–3; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/238, 
Secretary for Native Affairs of Gold Coast to Commissioner of the Eastern Province, 
Unification of Tribes separated by the old Anglo-German Boundary. (n° …1713/1924.), 
23 Nov. 1929, 1.
127 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/254, Gbogbi iii, Headchief of Adaklu, to District Comissioner 
of Ho (without number), 30 Sep. 1929.
128 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/254, Assistant District Commissioner of Ho, Adaklu Affairs. 
(without number), 11 Feb. 1944, 4.
129 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/254, An Account of the Adaklus as from the Ancient Times – Our 
Origin and our Travels (without number, attached n° 2), without date, 2–3.
130 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/254, Gbogbi iii, Fiaga of Adaklu; Lablulu, Asafohenega of 
Waya; and others, to Commissioner of the Eastern Province (without number), 26 July 
1946, 1; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/254, Gbogbi iii and others, to Assistant District 
Commissioner of Ho (without number), 17 Feb. 1938, 1.
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community had always been isolated from other ‘Ewes’, already during the 
mythic settlement phase in Notsie, and that they originally spoke a different 
language (an argument that was strongly disputed by the British authorities). 
They commented that they even preferred Anlo rule to overlordship from 
Ho.131 At the same time, the Adaklu community laid claims for control over 
land that had been alienated from them, in favour of the Mafi. Fia Gbogbi iii 
attacked Mafi occupation of Adaklu land that had allegedly started since the 
First World War; and also demanded the removal of Mlefi and Avenor settlers, 
who retained allegiance to rulers further southward.132 To complicate matters, 
the inhabitants of Dakpa from the Gold Coast Colony side formulated a paral-
lel claim, in which they demanded authority as paramount chiefs in Adaklu 
areas, in which, they said, they had traditionally ruled!133
Both these conflicting goals of different communities, and the very exis-
tence of the territorial border between the Gold Coast Colony and Togoland, 
prevented a strengthening of Anlo State as a genuine Ewe-speaking political 
unit. British officials believed that it was easier first to tackle the question of 
Ewe-speaking groups that stood under the rule of the Ada Manche – also situ-
ated in the Gold Coast Colony – and to profit in this context from the circum-
stance that the paramount chief of Ada State had been suspended.134 The 
district commissioners of Keta and Ada assembled the ‘Ewe chiefs’ of Ada 
State in Tefle and inquired whether they wished to leave Ada overlordship. 
Most of those chiefs indeed claimed they would prefer to belong to Anlo, as 
they said ‘for reasons of tribal links’ – using the British ‘tribal’ argument. Some 
chiefs, such as of Sukpe and Bator, who had been suspended and expected to 
be destooled before the British initiative took shape, used the development to 
save their position.135 Thus, the divisions of Agave, Sukpe, Tefle, Vume, Bakpa, 
Bator, and Mepe – ‘the Ewe Divisions’ – within Ada State, made a ‘request for 
131 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/254, Assistant District Commissioner of Ho to Commissioner 
of the Eastern Province (n° 888/32/29.), 7 Oct. 1943, 1–2.
132 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/254, Assistant District Commissioner of Ho to District 
Commissioner of Kpandu, Adaklu Divisional Affairs. (n° 550/32/1929.), 17 May 1945; praad 
(Accra), adm 39/1/238, District Commissioner of Ho to Commissioner of the Eastern 
Province, Adaklu Villages in Keta District. (n° 29/469/27), 6 Oct. 1927.
133 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/238, Guteh, Assistant District Commissioner, Report on the 
Tribes separated by the old Anglo German Boundary. (without number), without date, 2.
134 tna, pro, CO/96/738/6, Warrington, Provincial Commissioner, Annual Report for the 
Eastern Province for the Year 1936–1937 (without number), without date, 62.
135 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/303, Lilley, District Commissioner of Keta, to Commissioner of 
the Eastern Province, Report on the Keta-Ada District for the March Quarter 1942. 
(n° 810/4/31.), 6 May 1942, 3.
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independence’, in spite of, or rather because of the chaotic internal situation 
that was so characteristic of most of them.136
Agave is the best illustrated of these cases. The Agave did not argue with 
questions of ‘Ewe identity’, but focused on relations between political entities: 
they claimed they had fought constant wars with Anlo, and that they had been 
the overlords of the Ada Manche and were thus on the same level as the 
Awoame Fia! Language was only an additional argument, with the Agave point-
ing out that as Ewe-speakers they were distinct from Ada’s Adangme-speakers. 
It is remarkable that they styled themselves with Ewe titles on this particular 
occasion, but relied elsewhere on a political terminology, the ‘wing system’, 
that was normally defined as ‘Akan’.137 As a whole, the demand of Ewe-speaking 
rulers from Ada State was pending for a period, and then merged into the large 
current of Ewe activities of the immediate post-Second World War years, which 
I will analyse below.
In Anlo State itself, the rhetorics of power also became increasingly confused, 
as the Awoame Fia lost control over the state council based in Anloga, which 
many chiefs of the neighbouring ‘divisions’ did not attend anymore. In 1943, the 
‘Ewe Union’, a nascent pan-Ewe institution counting in its ranks many ‘intellectu-
als’ and a good part of the less influential chiefs of the state, showed its strength. 
The Awoame Fia’s tax policy had enraged many of the local chiefs even further, 
and had provoked the opposition of the Ewe Union.138 However, the main thrust 
of resistance against any more centralised politics came from the old Anlo capi-
tal of Anloga, whose headmen, in 1944/45, virtually paralysed Anlo State.139
136 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/303, District Commissioner of Keta to Commissioner of the 
Eastern Province, Report on Keta – Ada District for Quarter ending 31st December, 1942. 
(without number), without date, 3.
137 praad (Ho Branch), DA/D 311, Togbe Hlitabo ii, ‘Fiaga of Agave’, and others, Petition 
addressed to His Excellency Sir Charles Noble Arden-Clarke K.C.M.G. …(without number), 
without date, 2–3. See Stahl, Ann B., ‘Ethnic Style and Ethnic Boundaries: A Diachronic 
Case Study from West-Central Ghana’, Ethnohistory 38(3), 1991, 250–75, 255, 262–3.
138 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/303, District Commissioner of Keta to Commissioner of the 
Eastern Province, Report on Keta – Ada District. Quarter ending 30th June 1943. (without 
number), 24 July 1943, 1; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/303, District Commissioner of Keta to 
Commissioner of the Eastern Province, Report on Keta – Ada District. Quarter ending 30th 
September 1943. (n° 2519/4/31.), 28 Sep. 1943, 1.
139 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/303, Mead, Report on Native Affairs – Keta District. Quarter 
Ending December 31st, 1945. (without number), without date, 3; praad (Accra), adm 
39/1/469, Elder Seshie Zodanu Kwashie, ‘Head of Chief James Ocloo iii. of Keta Stool 
Family’, to Commissioner of the Eastern Province, Petition of Elder Seshie Zodanu Kwashie, 
etc. (without number), without date, 2.
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Doubtless, the colonial border between German and British, then between 
French and British possessions, created its own dynamics that had an effect 
on identifications. Illicit commerce and seizures of cattle and even land were 
typical.140 In Kuma on French territory, villagers complained about the con-
fiscation of their lands lying in the now-British zone by Togoland villagers, 
with the alleged tacit support of the administration; in the opposite direc-
tion, villagers of Bogo Achlo in the French zone had occupied land belonging 
to peasants of Baglo, who were now living in British Togoland.141 Such acts, 
started first during the general instability of the war years, created new, long-
lasting enmities.
Migration from the French into the British mandate also became typical. 
Those migrants were described by the inhabitants of the Volta area as ‘natives 
of the French zone’ and became the occasional victims of xenophobic rhetoric 
from a ‘proto-national’ perspective, even if they were Ewe-speaking. Therefore, 
aside from local discourses, and before the idea of Ewe unity became impor-
tant, the image of the ‘proto-national’ stranger, with reference to the colonial 
territory of origin, already had an impact.142 There were some more ‘ethnically’ 
oriented exceptions to this rule. An early example was given by the political 
evolution of Buem in the British zone, where the populations were, in their 
large majority, not Ewe-speakers and did not share in the Notsie tradition.143 
As in the cases of Asogli and Awatime States, British administrators wanted to 
140 ant, 2APA, Cercle de Klouto, 10, Administrator of Subdivision of Klouto, Cercle du Centre, 
1937 – 2ème Trimestre: Main d’Œuvre (n° 10), 13 Oct. 1938; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/241, 
District Commissioner of Ho to Administrator of cercle of Klouto, French Togo (without 
number), 17 Jan. 1927, 1–2.
141 ant, 2APA, Cercle de Klouto, 10, Administrator of Subdivision of Klouto, Cercle de Centre, 
Subdivision de Klouto: Rapport Trimestriel, Année 1938 – 4ème Trimestre (without number), 
23 Jan. 1939, 5.
142 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/212, Ellershaw, District Commissioner of Kpandu, to 
Commissioner of the Eastern Province, Krachi – Kpandu District Boundary. (n° 
147/82A/1921.), 17 Feb. 1937, 2; ant, 8APA/3/37, District Commissioner of Klouto in 
Misahöhe, Rapport Trimestriel pour le 2ème Trimestre 1922 (without number), without date, 
1; ant, 2APA, Cercle de Tsévié, 2, Perret, Rapport de la tournée effectuée du 19–20 et 29 
Février 1936 dans le Canton de Dalavé par l’Adjoint des S.[ervices] C.[oloniaux] Perret. (with-
out number), without date, 4–5.
143 See, for example, praad (Accra), adm 39/1/212, A Short History of Dodi. (without num-
ber), without date. See, also, Fred-Mensah, Ben K., ‘Bases of traditional conflict manage-
ment among the Buems of the Ghana border’, in William Zartman (ed.), Traditional Cures 




create a ‘native state’.144 ‘Divisions’ dominated by Twi-speakers, like Worawora, 
Kadjebi, Ahamansu, Asatu, and Apesokubi, campaigned under these circum-
stances for their separation from Borada; the tone in this conflict only became 
very sharp after the Second World War. The chiefs of these communities argued 
that the Lefana wished to destroy their identity ‘as a Twi tribe’. In the 1950s, the 
Twi-speakers were followed by the Lolobi community, who also demanded 
separation from Buem State, and the leading role in the Akpafu Division.145 
The spokesmen regretted, with regard to the Lolobi and the Akpafu, ‘the mere 
and casual accident of speaking the same dialect’; on historical grounds, the 
two communities were separated by the traumatic Asante invasion, in which 
the ‘bold resistance’ of Lolobi Chief Kekerebesi, and the ‘betrayal’ of Akpafu 
Chief Kwahu Kadiabe had underlined the difference and created a long-lasting 
enmity.146 In these conflicts, Buem showed a way of using historical, linguistic, 
or ethnic difference when that was suitable to obtain political advantages. This 
was a clear model for Togoland Ewe-speakers.
Hence, we do not find an ethnic Ewe movement in the interwar period, and 
Ewe identifications were weak if they existed. The question is whether, as 
Amenumey suggests, such solidarities were simply implicit, or if incidents 
like  the tax revolt in Lomé on 23 January 1933 can be read as expression of 
Ewe  unity, as is held by Benjamin Lawrance. We do not have the slightest 
evidence in that regard, to say the least.147 As exemplified by the Bund der 
144 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/212, Nana Kwaku Ntim Gyakari, Omanhene of Tapa State, and 
others, Reference Tapa State, and Buem State Amalgamation (without number, from Tapa 
Ahenekrom), 2 Aug. 1935; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/268, Nana Yaw Nyarko ii, Ohene of 
Worawora, and others, To the President and Members of the Buem State Council: 
Memorandum of the Akan Section of Buem State. (without number, from Buem-Kadjebi), 
20 May 1944, 1, 4; praad (Ho Branch), DA/D 309, Nana Akuamoa ii, Acting President, 
Buem State Council, and others to District Commissioner of Ho (without number), 
August 1946, 2; praad (Ho Branch), DA/D 309, Nana Yaw Nyako ii, Omanhene of 
Worawora, and others, Reminder Petition of the Akan Section of Buem State to His Excellency 
Sir Alan Cuthbert Maxwell Burns…(without number), 1 Aug. 1946, 2.
145 praad (Ho Branch), DA/D/299, Mackay, Provincial Commissioner of the Eastern 
Province, to Chief Commissioner of Gold Coast Colony (n° 1308/2009/45.), 27 March 
1946, 1.
146 praad (Ho Branch), DA/D/299, Sub-Chief Jacob Akoteh; Sub-Chief Marious Gymranos; 
and others to Burns (without number), without date, 2–3 and 7–8.
147 Amenumey, Movement, 22–7; Pauvert, ‘Evolution’, 178; Lawrance, Benjamin, ‘La Révolte des 
Femmes: Economic Upheaval and the Gender of Political Authority in Lomé, Togo, 
1931–33’, African Studies Review 46(1), 2003, 43–67, 58–60; with the argument being more 
limited in Lawrance, Locality, 69–89. See praad (Accra), adm 11/1/1624, Lome Disturbances 
(without number), without date [1933], 1–2.
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 Deutsch-Togolaender, an association led by German-trained Lomé traders 
and clerks, it is possible to find a curious initiative to get back under German 
colonial rule, but this initiative did not involve any ethnocultural visions.148
Succession conflicts under the French mandate were similar to situations in 
British Togoland – and frequent in the rural constituencies, in particular those 
close to Kpalimé, even with the theoretically stricter French control of African 
authorities. In Agu-Nyogbo, one of the large districts, the death of the paramount 
chief, Kofi Pebi, in 1939, led to weeks-long troubles.149 In the case of Danyi, his-
torical ‘traditions’ were mobilised: Paramount Chief Bassa having been replaced 
by Gabla, there was an intense production of evidence relating to the dispute, 
promoted by an Ewe Presbyterian Church (epc) preacher from Kete-Krachi, 
Reverend Wampah. This ‘tradition’ separated two groups in the region, the Daye 
Kakpa and the Daye Atigba, which both had Ewe origins and had been in Notsie 
before migration. According to this ‘tradition’ it had always been the first-comer 
of the two groups that had had the right to the paramountcy.150
148 tna, pro, CO/96/758/2, Fisher, Brigade Major, Gold Coast Regiment, Royal West African 
Frontier Force, Intelligence Report for Period ending 30th June, 1939. (without number), 
without date, 1–2; ant, 2APA, Cercle de Klouto, 10, Administrator of Subdivision of Klouto, 
Cercle de Centre, Subdivision de Klouto: Rapport Trimestriel, Année 1938 – 3ème Trimestre 
(without number), 13 Oct. 1938, 3; ant, 8APA/3/37, Renseignements: a/s. Togo Bund 
(n° 491/BC), 22 Dec. 1949, 1; Amenumey, D.E.K., ‘German Administration in Southern 
Togo’, Journal of African History 10(4), 1969, 623–39; Nugent, Smugglers, 63; Kwaku, Ken, 
‘Tradition, Colonialism and Politics in Rural Ghana: Local Politics in Have, Volta Region’, 
Canadian Journal of African Studies 10(1), 1976, 71–86, 77–8; Blackshire-Belay, Carol 
Aisha, ‘German Imperialism in Africa: The Distorted Images of Cameroon, Namibia, 
Tanzania, and Togo’, Journal of Black Studies 23(2), 1992, 235–46, 237–8; Ekoko, A. Edho, 
‘The British Attitude towards Germany’s Colonial Irredentism in Africa in the Inter-War 
Years’, Journal of Contemporary History 14(2), 1979, 287–307, 299–300.
149 ant, 2APA, Cercle de Klouto, 10, Orly, Administrator of Subdivision of Klouto, Cercle de 
Centre (Subdivision de Klouto): Rapport Trimestriel, Année 1939 – 4ème Trimestre (without 
number), 5 Jan. 1940, 3.
150 ant, 2APA, Cercle de Klouto, 330, Wampah, Teacher of the Ewe Presbyterian Church in 
Kete Krachi, to Bourgine, Commissioner of Togo (without number), 4 Sep. 1934; ant, 
2APA, Cercle de Klouto, 330, Mary, District Commissioner of Klouto, to Bourgine, Canton 
d’Atigba (Daye) (without number), 1st Oct. 1934, 1, 4; ant, 2APA, Cercle de Klouto, 330, 
Bassah iii, Chef de Canton of Daye-Atigba, and Seth Akrodou, Secretary of the Paramount 
Chieftaincy, Lettre de permission à Monsieur le Commandant, Chef de la Subdivision de 
Klouto (Palimé) (without number), 2 Feb. 1945, 1–3; ant, 2APA, Cercle de Klouto, 18 add., 
Goujon, Rapport Concernant les Tournées Effectuées par l’Administrateur des Colonies 
Goujon, Commandant de Cercle de Klouto Dans les régions de Daye Kakpa et Daye Atigba. 
Pendant le mois de Mars 1935. (without number), without date, 2–3.
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In other cases, land was at stake: such as between the two Kpele villages of 
Goudève and Elé, or Woame and Mayondi. Issues were complicated if the land 
in question was to be found between two villages lying in different cantons, 
such as between Bogo Achlo and Daye.151 Only rarely did the creation of ‘tradi-
tional histories’ to be used in land disputes have to do with Ewe myths. Finally, 
even the immigration of Muslim populations from the north into the zongos 
(‘Muslim quarters’) of Lomé and Kpalimé failed to trigger a discourse on ‘oth-
erness’ directed against northerners on the part of the Ewe-speakers.152 Thus 
mobilisation under ethnic banners never became a particularity of the Ewe-
speaking communities of Lomé, Kpalimé, and Tsévié, at least not before 1945.
As regards urban environments, Ewe identifications were discussed in the 
urban diaspora in the Gold Coast Colony, notably in Accra. However, catego-
ries of identification for these immigrants varied. In 1934, the Ga Manche, as 
the most important ‘traditional ruler’ in the capital, wished to install one 
Sotomy as elected ‘by a large section of the Ewe speaking people’. Immigrants 
from the French mandate, referring to themselves as ‘Ganyi’ or ‘people from 
French Togoland’ asked for the nomination of Akalamakpe Ansa, as their own 
headman. Organised in an association called the Glidji Union, their spokes-
men exerted pressure. The petitioners were Guin-Mina speakers (a language 
similar to Ewe, but that was not exactly Ewe) who attempted to enlist the help 
of Fia Agbano of Genyi, in the French part of Togo, and even of the Commissioner 
of Togo, de Guise.153 According to their discourse, distinctions were far more 
important than language unity:
151 ant, 2APA, Cercle de Klouto, 10, Administrator of Subdivision of Misahöhe, Cercle de 
Centre: Rapport Trimestriel, Année 1938 – 2ème Trimestre (without number), 18 July 1938, 3; 
ant, 2APA, Cercle de Klouto, 10, Administrator of Subdivision of Klouto, Cercle du Centre: 
Rapport Trimestriel, Année 1937 – 4ème Trimestre (without number), without date, 3; Nugent, 
Smugglers, 64–72; ant, 2APA, Cercle de Klouto, 10, Administrator of Subdivision of 
Klouto, Cercle de Centre, Subdivision de Klouto: Rapport Trimestriel, Année 1938 – 4ème 
Trimestre (without number), 23 Jan. 1939, 5.
152 ant, 2APA, Cercle de Klouto, 10, Administrator of Subdivision of Misahöhe, Cercle de 
Centre: Rapport Trimestriel, Année 1938 – 2ème Trimestre (without number), 18 July 1938, 4.
153 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/295, Rutherford, District Commissioner of Accra, to Johnson, 
known as Ansah (n° 1463/87/34.), 4 Oct. 1934, 1; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/295, Ansah to 
Rutherford (without number), 6 Oct. 1934; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/295, Commissioner 
of the Eastern Province to Secretary for Native Affairs of Gold Coast, Headman of the Ewe 
speaking People and the French Togoland Community in Accra. (n° 3916/2223/34), 21 Nov. 
1934; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/295, District Commissioner of Accra, to Commissioner of 
the Eastern Province (n° 1652/87/34.), 31 Oct. 1934, 1–3; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/295, 
John Feliga Adeku and others (‘Tomb ii A’Nuk Pa we’); Abraham Kpakpo Akueson, 
Secretary of ‘French Togoland Community’, to Northcote, Acting Governor of the Gold 
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We are Natives of that part of Togoland known as the French Togoland 
and we are called and styled ‘Ganyi’ by all the people who are described 
by the Gold Coast Government as the Ewe speaking people. We are 
entirely a race or tribe different and distinct from the rest of the Ewe 
speaking people. We have different customs and ceremonies. Our cere-
monial rites are entirely different. Our names are distinct from the rest of 
the Ewe People and thus you see, we do not form part of either the Anlos 
and the Pekis who are known as the Ewe speaking people.154
Exaggerations abounded during this power struggle between different Ewe-
speaking or related groups in Accra. However, whenever such groups felt 
threatened, as by Paramount Chief Keami Osaabo in the Akwapim town of 
Nsawam, they eventually applied to the British authorities pointing to their 
common ‘Ewe nationality’.155
Even so, in the British-controlled territories, most conflicts and discussions 
between Ewe-speakers tended towards rather ‘regular’ land conflicts, and were 
unrelated to any questions of Ewe solidarity. The relations between the settle-
ments of Ziavi and Klepe (west of Ho) are typical for such conflicts.156 
Sometimes, these land conflicts were reported upon in connection to histories 
of loyalty and betrayal, such as in the conflicts between the Fiervier commu-
nity and the chief of Sukpe, both Ewe-speaking units within Ada State before 
1945. Each side claimed that the other had immigrated into the land and had 
been sheltered by their own group, with the Fiervier suggesting that the Sukpe 
had illegally taken over power. This conflict went on in the 1940s when both 
entities belonged to the Tongu Confederacy, with the Sukpe paramountcy 
finally being confirmed through the intervention of the colonial power.157
Coast (without number), 16 Oct. 1934, 3–4, 7. See Sanjek, Roger, ‘Cognitive Maps of the 
Ethnic Domain in Urban Ghana: Reflections on Variability and Change’, American 
Ethnologist 4(4), 1977, 603–22, 610–4.
154 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/295, John Feliga Adeku and others…to Northcote (without 
number), 16 Oct. 1934, 5.
155 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/295, Gbekor, Secretary of ‘Ewe Community’ of settlers in 
Nsawam; J.A. Darku, Headman of the ‘Ewe Community’; and others, to District 
Commissioner of Kpandu (without number), 8 Aug. 1936, 1–2; praad (Accra), adm 
39/1/295, Gbekor to Commissioner of the Eastern Province (without number), 8 Aug. 1936.
156 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/35, Togbe Anku Saklie vi to Assistant District Commissioner of 
Ho (without number), 1 Jan. 1934; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/39, Adja Mensa Ado, Chief of 
Klepe Achatime, to Assistant District Commissioner of Ho District, The Rueful Ill-Humour 
in Klepe-Achatime and its Desistance of. (without number), 11 Jan. 1944.
157 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/294, Commissioner of the Eastern Province to District 
Commissioner of Ada (n° 2220/34.), Tongu Confederaci: Sukpe – Fiervier Dispute, 
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In Sokode Division, smaller communities also mobilised history to escape 
from the allegedly abusive Sokode paramount chief. Thus the Hoviepe elders 
complained they had once, in the battles against Asante, Akwamu, and Taviefe, 
accepted the Fia of Sokode, Ampim Danku ii, as leader in a war alliance. Now, 
the current Sokode chief, Tenkloe Koku ii, had created a false myth of the 
Hoviepe settlers coming from Klepe. Gbogame, another ‘subdivision’ of 
Sokode, followed the Hoviepe initiative and also claimed ‘independence’ from 
a false political dependency.158
Finally, we need to come back to identifications in Agotime during the inter-
war period. The Dufia of Agotime living in Kpetoe, Hene Hoe Keteku ii, was 
subject to opposition in the 1920s, as he was challenged by a legal complaint 
from the Chief of Agotime Afegame, Mahumasro, before the Supreme Court of 
the Gold Coast. The latter claimed that the paramount chiefs of ‘the Agotime 
nation’ had ‘always’ come from Afegame and that the preference for Kpetoe had 
been a product of German misunderstandings and manipulation by one Mati 
Sukpor. After Keteku’s destoolment, i.e. his removal, the Afegame claim was 
again intensified in the early 1940s, with the mankrado in Afegame also advocat-
ing Agotime’s integration into Asogli.159 Again, an opposition between rightful 
December 1945; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/294, Captain Ahoklo ii of Fiervier, Ada District, 
to Commissioner of the Eastern Province (without number), 28 Jan. 1938, 1; praad 
(Accra), adm 39/1/137, Togbe Kwami Hadjor ii, Fiaga of Bakpa, President of Tongu 
Confederacy Native Administration, and A.A. Dugbazeh, Secretary, Report on Enquiry of 
Fervier and Sokpoe Native Affairs (without number), 9 April 1949, 5.
158 praad (Ho Branch), DA/D 290, Acloo, and others of Sokode Gbogame, to District 
Commissioner of Ho (without number), 23 April 1940, 3; praad (Ho Branch), DA/D 290, 
Elders of Hoviepe, Ho District, Asogli State, to Assistant District Commissioner of Ho 
(without number), without date; praad (Ho Branch), DA/D 290, Assistant District 
Commissioner of Ho to District Commissioner of Kpandu, Sokode Native Affairs (without 
number), 30 Aug. 1940; praad (Ho Branch), DA/D 290, E.K. Adintsriju, and others, all 
Sub-Chiefs; ‘Elders’ of Sokode Gbogame, to Assistant District Commissioner of Ho (with-
out number), 4 June 1942 [?], 1.
159 praad (Ho Branch), DA/D 288, Hene Hoe Keteku ii, Divisional Chief of Kpetoe Agotime, 
to Assistant District Commissioner of Ho, Mankralo Dza & others vs: Adonu & others. 
(without number), 25 June 1926; praad (Ho Branch), DA/D 288, Supreme Court of the 
Gold Coast Colony, Eastern Province, Affidavit of Mahumansro the Head Chief of Agotime 
Afegame (without number), 10 Nov. 1930; praad (Ho Branch), DA/D 288, Mahumasro, 
Chief of Agotime Afegame, to Assistant District Commissioner of Ho (without number), 
8 July 1932; praad (Ho Branch), DA/D 288, Ahoto Legba to District Commissioner of Ho 
(without number), 13 Dec. 1937; praad (Ho Branch), DA/D 288, Elvert, District 
Commissioner of Kpandu, to Assistant District Commissioner of Ho, Kpetoe Native 
Affairs. (n° 425/108A/1930.), 18 May 1937; praad (Ho Branch), DA/D 288, Regent of Kpetoe 
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rulers and outsiders was invented to win the case, to build a divisive argument 
against the tradition of rule from Kpetoe. However, it became obvious that no 
one knew how to define a ‘stranger’ in Agotime during the interwar period. 
‘Anlos’ and ‘Kwahus’ were counted as such, but also ‘Nigerians’. These different 
groups tried to nominate headmen to defend their interests, selecting in 1943 
one Christoph Mensah Kefe as representative of the entire ‘stranger commu-
nity’, while the settlers from Anlo later attempted to have their own headman. 
Hene Hoe Keteku ii even feared that the ruler of Anlo could attempt to get lever-
age over the migrants from Avenor and other populations living in Agotime.160
All in all, the British may have hoped, in the interwar period, for a pan-Ewe 
‘tribal’ feeling that would have allowed them to better control the territory. As 
Anlo or Peki were too weak to be used for political matters in Togoland, some 
British authorities had indeed hoped in the 1930s that ‘an Ewe Confederacy will 
in due course settle this matter’. This did not seem to happen.161 Ironically, 
however, the category of Ewe unity suddenly enjoyed unexpected successes 
after 1945, and the British would in the end be forced to fight this idea of unity.
 The International Agenda: Ewe-ness as an Anti-colonial Weapon, 
1945–1957
The panorama of group mobilisation in the Trans-Volta region, which in the 
interwar period gave little room for discussions of Ewe community sentiment, 
changed completely in the 1940s. In 1945, the question of Ewe unification 
seemed easily to overshadow all the other political problems. A strong lobby 
group of so-called Ewe ‘unificationists’ had a clear intuition for the French 
political and military weakness after the war, and its members started an 
impressive campaign.162 The transition of the official administration of the 
Agotime to District Commissioner of Ho (without number), 20 March 1938, 1. praad (Ho 
Branch), DA/D 288, Hene Hoe Keteku ii to Assistant District Commissioner of Ho (with-
out number), 15 Feb. 1943, 1–2; praad (Ho Branch), DA/D 288, Klu Fiagbedzi and others 
to Assistant District Commissioner of Ho, Agotime Chieftaincy Dispute (without number), 
22 July 1943; Nugent, ‘Historicity’, 137–9.
160 praad (Ho Branch), DA/D 288, Azasu Kafe and others (‘elders’) to Assistant District 
Commissioner of Ho (without number), 18 Dec. 1942, 1; praad (Ho Branch), DA/D 288, 
Hene Hoe Keteku ii to Assistant District Commissioner of Ho, The Installation of the Anlo 
Headman (without number), 7 Dec. 1944.
161 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/250, McDevitt to ‘John’ (n° 2140/183/43.), 5 Nov. 1945, 2.
162 Kent, John, The internationalization of colonialism: Britain, France, and Black Africa, 1939–
1956 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), 119–26, 239–62; Michel, Marc, ‘Le Togo dans les relations 
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former German colonies to United Nations control raised these hopes.163 First 
resolutions for Ewe unity appeared quite rapidly, and parts of the pan-Ewe 
movement, notably its leader in the French-mandated part of Togo, Sylvanus 
Olympio, also hoped for British support.164
The pan-Ewe movement operated, during its roughly two decades of exis-
tence, under different labels, but the All Ewe Conference (aec) was the most 
famous of all those groups. aec leaders initially enjoyed enormous prestige at 
the local level, instead of being just an elitist movement: from 1945 to 1947, the 
offspring of the aec as a political party, the Comité d’Union Togolaise (cut), 
won the elections in Togo under the French mandate; Sylvanus Olympio 
became a deputy in the French National Assembly, and the cut dominated 
the Territorial Assembly in Lomé. By 1948, the party could count on a consider-
able grass-roots support in southern Togo. This was followed by a period of 
decline, which was due both to French repression and to disappointment of 
party members with the apparent failure of the rather ambitious unification 
plans. The Parti Togolais du Progrès (ptp), the main competitor party, also had 
its strongest base among Ewe-speakers, but distanced itself from any pan-Ewe 
programme.165
In British Togoland, the All-Ewe Conference was also influential, but it soon 
lost out against the Togo Union (tu), later transformed into the Togoland 
Congress. As aec activists appeared too radically ethnicist, the non Ewe-speakers 
of the Volta Region refrained from taking part in their initiatives. The tu easily 
captured these voters and the more moderate Ewe-speaking electorate.
internationales au lendemain de la Guerre: prodrome de la décolonisation ou “petite 
mésentente cordiale”? (1945–1951)’, in Institut de l’Histoire du Temps Présent (ed.), Les 
Chemins de la Décolonisation de l’Empire Colonial Français (Paris: cnrs Editions, 1986), 
95–107, 100–4; Michel, Marc, ‘The Decolonization of French Africa and the United States 
and Great Britain, 1945–1958’, in Roy Bridges (ed.), Imperialism, Decolonization and Africa: 
Studies Presented to John Hargreaves (London – New York: Macmillan, 2000), 153–77, 
160–2.
163 Lawrance, Locality, 43.
164 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/339, A.K. Amegashie; A.K. Anku; D.A. Chapman; and others, A 
Resolution on Eweland (without number), 31 Dec. 1945; see also Fieldhouse, David K., 
‘British Merchants and French Decolonization: uac in Francophone Africa (1945–1960)’, 
in Charles-Robert Ageron and Marc Michel (eds.), L’Afrique noire française: l’heure des 
Indépendances (Paris: cnrs Editions, 1992), 489–98, 491–2.
165 Keese, Alexander, ‘Rigged elections? Democracy and manipulation in the late colonial 
state in French West Africa and Togo, 1944–1958’, in Martin Thomas (ed.), The French 
Colonial Mind Vol. 1 (Lincoln – London: University of Nebraska Press, 2011), 324–46, 335–6; 
Amenumey, Movement, 156–61.
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In its early phase the pan-Ewe movement sought a particular ‘Ewe tradition’, 
which was both reinvented and popularised through the effort of Ewe-speaking 
journalism. An important role in this context was played by the Ewe News-
Letter, a journal edited by the Anlo-born activist Daniel Chapman. Chapman 
and his collaborators greatly extended the length and scope of the ‘tradition’, 
stretching ‘Ewe legends’ beyond the Notsie myth back to Oyo and the Nigerian 
city-states. The authors of the Ewe News-Letter also tended to use an inclusive 
approach that involved all the communities of southern Togoland, whether 
they were in the end Ewe-speaking or not.166 Chapman also came to the (rather 
problematic) conclusion that the ‘pure’ Ewe groups had been ‘Peki’, ‘Anlo’, and 
‘Tongu’, in spite of the fact that the creation of the Tongu Confederacy after the 
Second World War was mainly a colonial idea.167
British and French officials attempted to formulate a joint position with regard 
to the Ewe claim, but this was complicated, given that the French regarded this 
claim as subversive and invented by Communists, and did not have much inter-
est in discussing the ‘truth’ behind the ethnic arguments.168 Inside the British 
administration, the position was more ambiguous. In June 1945, the French com-
missioner of Togo, Jean Noutary, turned the Ewe argument against them: if a 
‘majority’ of the Ewe lived under French rule, this was all the better for them. To 
prove their point, the French counted all speakers of languages related to Ewe as 
ethnic Ewe, changing their older categorisations, according to which not more 
than 14.4 per cent of their mandate was to be seen as ‘Ewe’. It was a particularly 
weak point of the aec that the movement had no response to these claims.169
166 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/339, Daniel A. Chapman; A.K. Mensah; G. Ameche, The Ewe 
News-Letter 1, 21 May 1945, 1–2; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/339, Daniel A. Chapman, The 
Ewe News-Letter 3, July 1945, 3.
167 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/339, Daniel A. Chapman, The Ewe News-Letter 4, August 1945, 3. 
The idea of a ‘Tongu identity’ is, however, referred to in Amenumey, Ewe, 16.
168 Keese, Alexander, ‘A Culture of Panic: “Communist” Scapegoats and Decolonization in 
French West Africa and French Polynesia (1945–1957)’, French Colonial History 9, 2008, 
131–45, 138. The leaders of the ptp, as the major rival of Olympio’s cut, increasingly 
served up this argument in their electoral propaganda. See, for example, ant, 5APA/16, 
Parti Togolais du Progrès, [pamphlète sans titre] (without number), 2 June 1951.
169 ant, 8APA/3/37, District Commissioner of Klouto, Rapport: Cercle de Klouto 1951 (without 
number), without date, 1; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/303, Mead, Report on Native Affairs – 
Keta District. Quarter Ending September 30th, 1945. (without number), without date, 3. On 
the questions of categories such as ‘Minas’, ‘Watchi’, and ‘Ewe’, compare the early histori-
cal account on Togo by the scholar-administrator Robert Cornevin, who only distin-
guishes the ‘Adangme-Ga’ from the ‘Ewe’, in Cornevin, Robert, Histoire du Togo (Paris: 
Editions Berger-Levrault, 1962), 76–7.
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For British officials, it was seemingly easier to accept the basic assumption 
that ‘the Ewe’ as defined by the activists, were indeed a single unit and that 
there had previously been ‘Ewe states’, such as Peki and Anlo.170 ‘Ewe identity’ 
now became an issue in the Togoland Reports to the United Nations commit-
tee, where the British authors claimed that ‘Ewe’ was the majority culture in all 
of the southern section of Togoland, with the single exception of Buem State, 
where ‘Akan’ was said to be dominant. Smaller, non Ewe-speaking groups were 
said to be totally ‘eclipsed’ by ‘the Ewe or the Akan’. British officials had thus 
entirely bought the story of ‘Ewe unity’: the Central Togo minorities, or the 
Lefana in Buem, no longer counted.171 Nevertheless, British officials argued 
that the two mandates could not be integrated into the Gold Coast – although 
they sympathised with Ewe ‘tribal’ sentiment.
Officials on both sides of the colonial border were in agreement about 
seeing a ‘strong national feeling’ among Ewe-speaking populations. When 
Ewe-speakers from Anlo went to clinics recently built in the nearby Lomé 
area, British officials held that ‘the Ewe people do not consider themselves 
French and British, but simply Ewe’.172 Even so, these observations frequently 
overlooked the other, parallel, discourses. One of those favoured Togoland 
identifications over Ewe identifications, and drove some of the All-Ewe 
Conference activists under British rule into the arms of Kwame Nkrumah’s 
Convention People’s Party (cpp). The latter benefited from these contradic-
tions by winning a part of the Ewe-speaking electorate of the southern sec-
tion of Togoland, during the Legislative Assembly Elections of the 1950s and 
during the Togoland Referendum of 1956. Togolese politicians in French 
institutions also played on both concepts, that is Togolese versus Ewe identi-
fications.173 Some of the former sympathisers of the Ewe reunification idea 
170 tna, pro, CO/96/790/3, Extract from the Report of the Committee on Constitutional Reform 
in the Gold Coast. (without number, as Annex ii), without date.
171 Colonial Office, Report…to the General Assembly of the United Nations on the Administration 
of Togoland under United Kingdom Trusteeship for the Year 1948 (London: His Majesty’s 
Stationary Office, 1949), 5, to be found in tna, pro, CO/96/790/3.
172 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/668, Jas Turner, Director of Medical Services, Medical 
Department in Accra, to Colonial Secretary of the Gold Coast (n° 1560/13), 28 Aug. 1948; 
praad (Accra), adm 39/1/668, J.C. Murphy, Medical Officer, Medical Department, Keta, 
to Turner, French Medical Authorities – Medical Treatment to Gold Coast Citizens. 
(n° Kl28/48–9.), 18 Aug. 1948.
173 Marguerat, Yves, ‘“Nous ne sommes pas des AOFiens”: Les difficiles relations du Togo et de 
l’aof’, in Charles Becker, Saliou Mbaye, and Ibrahima Thioub (eds.), aof: réalités et héri-
tages: Sociétés ouest-africaines et ordre colonial, 1895–1960 (Dakar: Direction des Archives 
du Sénégal, 1997), 273–82, 280.
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amongst the chiefs, like Léléklélé I of Agu-Agbetiko, became supporters of 
the ‘Togoland idea’.174
British administrators accepted the claim for an ethnic ‘Ewe identity’, but 
worried from the outset about the ‘chauvinism’ of ‘the Ewes’ who wished to 
marginalise other southern Togoland populations, as for example in Buem.175 
However, during the peak of pan-Ewe militancy, in the late 1940s, we even 
find a conflict within the movement about the definition of ‘Ewe-ness’. The 
activists did not want to see a Peki or Anlo dominance within the movement, 
as those communities were not original ‘Togolanders’.176 The meetings of 
the chiefs of the four existing ‘native states’ on Togoland territory under 
British mandate, Akpini, Asogli, Awatime, and Buem – officially discussing 
the nomination of a delegate of the southern section of Togoland to the 
Legislative Council in Accra – had indeed an ambiguous position towards 
pan-Ewe statements. The Togo Union rapidly dominated these occasions, 
and most chiefs lost their sympathies for the more radical positions of the 
All-Ewe Conference. Therefore, ‘Ewe unification’ disappeared from the 
agenda by the late 1940s.177
Between 1944 and 1949, however, the question of ‘Ewe identity’ also became 
part of a generational conflict. In Anlo, the younger literate populations sup-
porting the Ewe Union campaigned for pan-Ewe activist Daniel Chapman of 
Achimota as future ‘Ewe representative’ for the Gold Coast Legislative Council 
in January 1945, against the candidate of the Awoame Fia, Julius Tamakloe.178 In 
British Togoland, young activists rebelled against their limited rights under 
‘Ewe customs’, which subordinated them in political communication to their 
asafofiawo (age set leaders) and their stool fathers. Under the cover of Ewe 
174 ant, 2APA, Cercle de Klouto, 350, District Commissioner of Klouto to Cédile, French 
Commissioner of Togo, a/s chefferie du Canton d’Agou-Nyongbo: examen des requêtes en 
date du 14 et du 21 Novembre 1949 du Chef Léléklélé, du village indépendant d’Agou-Agbétiko 
(n° 305.), 25 Feb. 1950, 3.
175 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/94, Chief Commissioner of Gold Coast Colony, Note: [Situation 
in Southern Togoland] (without number), 30 April 1949.
176 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/446, District Commissioner of Kpandu, Quarterly Report on the 
Kpandu Area of the Ho/Kpandu District for the Quarter ending 30th June, 1946. (without 
number), without date, 1; Callaway, ‘Politics’, 127.
177 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/94, Dixon, Senior District Commissioner of Ho, to Mangin, 
Chief Commissioner of Gold Coast Colony (n° S.0167/16), 21 Dec. 1948; praad (Accra), 
adm 39/1/94, Dixon to Mangin, Representation of the Southern Section of Togoland in the 
Legislative Council (n° S.0167/25), 11 Jan. 1949, 1.
178 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/303, Assistant District Commissioner of Keta, Keta District 
Native Affairs Report 1st Quarter, 1945. (without number), without date, 1.
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activism, they attacked ‘traditional’ structures and what they described as 
autocratic rule.179
The Togo Union and the Togoland Youth Association pushed the Ewe issue 
increasingly into the background in favour of the joint Togoland discourse – 
which turned against the ‘Gold Coast Ewes’ organised first in the aec, and, 
later on, in the cpp. The inhabitants of southern Togoland complained that 
‘foreigners’ were attempting to take over political power in ‘their country’.180 In 
French Togo, the political competition between two ‘Ewe’ leaders pursuing dis-
tinct programmes lowered the interest in the Ewe issue from the late 1940s. The 
colonial administration believed in ‘Ewe propaganda’ as a conspiracy by the 
Nkrumah government in Accra to annex the French-mandated territory.181 
This was a misinterpretation. While Sylvanus Olympio and the cut achieved 
unexpected political success in 1958 and took over political power in the man-
date, the Ewe issue had by then long disappeared from the cut’s agenda.
In British Togoland, we find until 1953 an odd parallelism between local 
demands and British belief in the amalgamation of divisions that followed 
the strategies of the interwar period. This became obvious during a 1949 
meeting of representatives of the four ‘native states’ and of delegates from 
the ‘unamalgamated divisions’ in Sovie. The Ewe issue had disappeared; the 
All-Ewe Conference was not present; and Ewe-speakers from the Gold Coast 
Colony were excluded from the discussions.182 In local conflicts, some ‘Ewe 
179 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/446, Hammerhurst, District Commissioner of Ho, Quarterly 
Report on Ho District for the Period 1st January, 1946 to 31st March, 1946. (without number), 
without date, 1.
180 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/94, Michael Batse, Secretary-General of the Togo Union, to 
Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations, Togoland Affairs (without number), 
11 May 1951, 3; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/94, Andrews S.K. Ekpey, Secretary of Togoland 
Youth Association, to Trygve Lie, Togoland Affairs and Urgent Demand. (without number), 
31 July 1951, 2; see Skinner, Kate, ‘Writing and Rallies: The Politics of “Freedom” in Southern 
British Togoland, 1953–1956’, Journal of African History 48(1), 2007, 123–47, 132; and the 
brand-new Skinner, Kate, The Fruits of Freedom in British Togoland: Literacy, Politics and 
Nationalism, 1914–2014 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 122–53.
181 See ant, 2APA, Cercle de Klouto, 10, District Commissioner of Klouto to Péchoux, 
Commissioner of Togo (n° 97/CK), 18 Sep. 1952; ant, 2APA, Cercle de Klouto, 10, Procès-
Verbal – Introduction sur le Territoire du Togo du Journal « Motabiabia » publié en langue 
indigène (Ewhe), par le nommé Alfred Kpedu, de Kpedze (n° 227), without date, 1; ant, 
2APA, Cercle de Klouto, 23, Examen du Plan Secret du Gouvernement du Gold-Coast Relatif 
à l’Annexion du Togo sous Tutelle Britannique – Divulgué en Juillet 1953 – Traduction in 
extenso (without number), without date, 2, 5.
182 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/94, Dixon, Senior District Commissioner of Ho, to Mangin, 
Representation of the Southern Section of Togoland in the Legislative Council (n° S.0167/25), 
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divisions’ wished to break away from Peki State (belonging to the Gold 
Coast) and ultimately to enter Togoland. Apparently – according to observ-
ers from Nkrumah’s cpp – Ewe-speaking groups of Togoland and Ewe-
speaking groups of the Gold Coast Colony did not seem to feel many 
sympathies for one another. Electoral violence in the Anlo region added to 
the antagonism.183
In 1951, in Togoland under British mandate, the pan-Ewe idea had lost its 
impetus. The question now was whether Togoland could become an indepen-
dent territory outside of the Gold Coast, and leaders of the Togo Union now 
accused the Gold Coast cpp of ‘subverting’ the region and lobbied for a com-
mon territory for all ‘Togolanders’.184 Nevertheless, Nkrumah’s cpp made 
inroads in parts of the populations of Voltaland’s southern section and won the 
support of discontented populations of several smaller areas. This was not suf-
ficient to win the referendum for integration into the Gold Coast in the south-
ern part of the trusteeship territory – they received the necessary votes through 
an overwhelming cpp majority in the north – but the regionalist ‘Togolander’ 
sentiment, even in the south, only had a narrow majority. As the votes were 
counted as a single regional block, British Togoland finally became Ghana’s 
Trans-Volta Togoland District in 1957.185
In French Togo, the cut’s 1958 electoral victory made Olympio the Prime 
Minister of a now autonomous state, and brought about the country’s inde-
pendence in 1960. This could have brought the unification issue back onto the 
agenda of the larger region, but it did not. Leaders of Olympio’s party were 
content to establish cut rule in the ‘recalcitrant’ parts of the country and to 
punish ptp supporters through levies for having voted for the ‘wrong party’.186 
11 Jan. 1949, 1; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/94, Chief Commissioner of the Colony, Note: 
[Situation in Southern Togoland] (without number), 30 April 1949.
183 praad (Ho Branch), DA/D 307, Copy: Draft Statement by the Minister of Justice (without 
number), without date; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/120, President of Ewe Youth Movement 
in Keta, to Arden-Clarke, Governor of Gold Coast, The Shooting Incident at Suipe in Avenor, 
Anlo State (without number), 10 Nov. 1950, 1.
184 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/94, Michael Batse, Secretary-General of Togo Union, to Trygve 
Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations, Togoland Affairs (without number), 11 May 1951, 
2; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/94, Andrews S.K. Ekpey, Secretary of Togoland Youth Association, 
to Trygve Lie, Togoland Affairs and Urgent Demand. (without number), 31 July 1951, 1.
185 Nugent, Smugglers, 189–92.
186 These réglements de comptes become visible in a number of documents, see ant, 2APA, 
Cercle de Klouto, 23, Kokevi to District Commissioner of Klouto-Kpalimé (without num-
ber), 22 Dec. 1958; ant, 2APA, Cercle de Klouto, 23, Aff. Sowonou Antonio (without num-
ber), 27 Dec. 1958; ant, 2APA, Cercle de Klouto, 23, Adjoint du Chef de Circonscription of 
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This settlement of scores went on at the regional level until the assassination 
of Olympio in 1963: former important advocates of the Ewe issue such as 
Paramount Chief Pebi iv of Agu Nyogbo took an active part in persecuting 
local ptp politicians as henchmen of ‘French oppression’.187 Far from being 
resurrected, the pan-Ewe project was buried. Sylvanus Olympio was not at all 
ready to give up any of his power, and the unification idea only remained a 
source of irritation between the two independent governments.
 ‘The Bigmen Get Small; The Small Ones Big’:188 The Regional Scope 
of the Battle for Autonomy and Resource Allocation
Apart from the international discussion, the reorganisation of Togoland in 
the British-mandated part, and communal reform on the French side, cre-
ated a hidden local dimension of conflict and change, in which ‘Ewe mobili-
sation’ had a different sense.189 Some local struggles involved established 
paramount rulers and sub-chiefs, others mobilised so-called ‘youngmen’.190 
These conflicts appeared, above all, in Anlo and the Tongu Confederacy: they 
led to the creation of militias – such as by the fiawo of Tefle, Sukpe, and Vume 
– and to violent clashes in the first half of the 1950s.191 Everyone referred to 
United Nations trusteeship: in September 1945, the divisional chiefs of the 
mainly Ewe-speaking communities of Liati, Fudome, and Vli refused to pay 
Klouto, Etat des sommes perçues par les dirigeants du C.U.T. après les élections du 27-4-1958 
et 9-4-61 dans les villages Agou Nyongbo Dalave et Agou Nyongbo Agbetiko (without num-
ber), 28 Oct. 1963; Nieuwaal, E. Adriaan B. van Rouveroy van, ‘Ewe Chiefs and Ewe Legal 
Traditions in Togo and Benin: The Evolution of Traditional Authority, 1940–1990’, in 
Benjamin Lawrance (ed.), A Handbook of Eweland: The Ewe of Togo and Benin (Accra: 
Woeli Publishing Services, 2005), 145–60, 157.
187 ant, 2APA, Cercle de Klouto, 350, E.K. Peby iv, Paramount Chief of canton of Agou 
Nyogbo; Hilaire Biem, President of cut section of Agou Nyogbo, and others, to 
Administrator of Subdivision of Klouto (without number), 24 March 1962, 1.
188 Quote is from Interview with Togbe Kutumua viii, Village Chief of Agu Kebo Dzigbe, Agu 
Region, Togo, 22 March 2009.
189 For the example of Have, see Kwaku, ‘Tradition’, 79–80.
190 See, on these generational conflicts, Waller, Richard, ‘Rebellious Youth in Colonial Africa’, 
Journal of African History 47(1), 2006, 77–92, 89.
191 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/712, Caldow, Assistant District Commissioner of Keta, Quarterly 
Report – Keta District January – March, 1951. (without number), 13 April 1951, 1; praad 
(Accra), adm 39/1/342, Gardner, Assistant District Commissioner of Keta, to Commissioner 
of the Eastern Province, Dabala Riot (without number), 4 Feb. 1947, 2.
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the taxes that the Akpini State Council had introduced with reference to 
New York!192
Anlo in the 1940s was a particularly violent case. The nobility of Anloga was 
annoyed that Togbe Sri ii preferred to live in Keta, close to the office of the 
British district commissioner.193 The issue of ‘Ewe-ness’ was strategically used 
to impress the colonial power: the Anloga headmen claimed that the Awoame 
Fia’s ‘absence’ damaged the administration of taxes, which led to a lack of 
funds for the New Africa College, according to them the best such institution 
‘in the entire area occupied by the Ewe speaking tribes’.194 Also, during the 
internal debates in Anlo before 1949, representatives of the ‘Ewe parties’ were 
duly invited to boost the prestige of the chiefs.195 Reference to Ewe-ness was, 
however, most useful when it came to excluding groups on ‘traditional grounds’. 
In 1946, the Awoame Fia of Anlo withdrew authority from the Atiavi Council, 
and defined the Lostofi clan as autonomous from the Atiavi. Furious, the Atiavi 
chiefs first tried to convince the Awoame Fia of his ‘error’. Then, in a long peti-
tion to the British authorities, they explained that they were the descendants 
of the respective Ewe groups coming from Notsie and settling in Anlo, and that 
the Lostofi were former slaves coming from somewhere else. Thereby, the 
Atiavi managed to bring ethnic matters to the fore against a local decision 
regarded as unfair.196 The second issue involved discussions about pre- 
eminence amongst clans within the states: the members of the kinship group 
192 praad (Ho Branch), DA/D/301, Asafoche Gavi, Chief of Liati Division, Akpini State, to 
Goldsworthy, Governor of the Gold Coast, The Petition of the People of Laiti [sic], Fudome 
and Vli (without number), 25 Sep. 1945, 1.
193 Greene, Sandra E., ‘Sacred Terrain: Religion, Politics and Place in the History of Anloga 
(Ghana)’, International Journal of African Historical Studies 30(1), 1997, 1–22, 12–5.
194 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/120, Kotsikui ii, Asafohene in Tsiame, Ve Division; Sogbe ii, 
Asafohene in Tsiame; Senu ii, Asafohene in Tsiame, all from the vicinity of Anloga, Anlo 
State, to Burns, Governor of Gold Coast (without number), 13 Nov. 1944.
195 See praad (Accra), adm 39/1/120, Sri ii, Awoame Fia of Anlo, as president; and other 
asafohenewa, and S.E. Akrobotu, Councillor and President of the Ewe Union in Keta, Anlo 
State Council Resolution – No. 3 of 1943: Resolution passed by the Anlo State Council in 
Regard to the Appointment of Finance Board Members. (n° 3), 4 March 1943; praad 
(Accra), adm 39/1/120, District Commissioner of Keta to Commissioner of the Eastern 
Province (n° 207/35/S.F.9.), 30 April 1945.
196 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/120, Atiavishi, Fetish Priest, self-declared Descendant of 
‘Ancestor Dzoglamate’; Chief Adia ii, President of the Town Council of Atiavi; and others, 
Petition from all the Chiefs and the Members of Atiavi Addressed to His Excellency the 
Governor Sir Alan Burns, K.C.MG etc. against Encroachment upon the National Rights of the 
People and the Continuous Injustice meted out to them by Hon. Togbi Sri ii, C.B.E. (without 
number), 15 March 1946.
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of Adzovia, regarding themselves as the ‘Paramount Ruling Tribe’ of Anlo, pro-
tested against the particularly powerful position of the Anlo Awadada, Awusu 
Katsriku ii, holding that in Peki such deviations from the ‘customary rules’ 
would be impossible.197 In 1952 the state council even suspended the Awoame 
Fia, which meant the end of de facto power of Anlo institutions over neigh-
bouring communities. This was not what young protesters in Keta or Anloga 
had wanted, and it provoked new riots, now in favour of a strongly conserva-
tive cause.198 These activities seriously disturbed the creation of a newly 
elected body, the South Anlo Local Council. The Nkrumah government 
employed police forces against rioters, as this government was hostile to the 
sympathisers of Togbe Sri ii and feared for its own party members as victims 
of the riots. In 1953, a ‘mob’ of ‘youngmen’ plundered the houses of ‘separat-
ists’, leading to the murder of the councillor of Avevor and the disappear-
ance of Chief Adjorlolo of Atorkor. Many voters from the other constituencies 
in the region went straight over to the cpp in fear of these riots; the uproar 
on the Keta Peninsula only calmed down around the 1956 election.199 In this 
context, it is absolutely remarkable that the ‘traditional authorities’ in 
Anloga and Keta did very little to reactivate the question of Ewe solidarity 
during this particular conflict. Quite obviously, the principle of Ewe unity 
was no longer seen as appealing enough to be mentioned in local conflicts 
– even in Anlo.
The Pekihene encountered a period of similar difficulties in the 1940s and 
the rest of his power eroded. The Fia of Awudome and Benkumhene of Peki 
State, Togbe Adai Kwasi Adom ix, withdrew from this native state, challenging 
the ‘traditional paramountcy’ of Kwadzo De X of Peki. The Awudome sup-
ported this decision with alleged ‘historical tradition’, claiming that their com-
munity had been the first to revolt against Akwamu rule, back in 1829. They 
also demanded, repeatedly, a United Nations inquiry into the matter. However, 
the British, who at this point were still convinced that the future lay in Ewe 
197 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/120, Agotelor to Mangin, Chief Commissioner of Gold Coast 
Colony (without number), 10 June 1949, 1; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/712, Peake, Assistant 
District Commissioner of Keta, Quarterly Report – Keta District. October – December, 1950. 
(without number), 17 Jan. 1951, 2.
198 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/712, Cowley, Government Agent in Keta, Quarterly Report – 
Keta District April – June, 1952. (without number), 14 July 1952, 3; praad (Accra), adm 
39/1/712, Cowley, Quarterly Report – Keta District July – September, 1952. (without number), 
14 Oct. 1952, 1, 3.
199 Callaway, Barbara J., ‘Transitional Local Politics: Tradition in Local Government Elections 
in Aba, Nigeria; Keta, Ghana’, African Studies Review 15(3), 1972, 403–12, 406–8.
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unity, ignored these pledges.200 While in the end the paramount chief of Peki 
and the district commissioner of Akuse managed to convince the Regent of 
Awudome, Etiku, to accept continued allegiance to the Peki Native State, the 
Fia and other chiefs refused to pay taxes and to participate in state organisa-
tions.201 In 1952, Peki technically became a part of the Volta District, under the 
administration of the Government Agent (former district commissioner) in 
Ho, but even this did not bolster the Pekihene’s lost reputation. The members 
of the Awudome State Council again demanded their independence from Peki, 
relying on a relatively sterile ‘Eweland’ argumentation, which insisted on an 
‘Ewe custom’ that favoured divisions over ‘native states’.202
In the ‘amalgamated states’, problems were similar, and the power of the 
paramount chiefs waned. In the case of Akpini, the state council in Kpandu 
failed to intervene in the struggle for the chieftaincy of Wusuta, which had 
become increasingly violent.203 In Alavanyo, the Akpini State Council also 
attempted to press the reinstallation of formerly destooled ex-chief Godwin 
Anku as Atakora V, but failed as much as in Tsrukpe.204 As no established 
mechanisms had been created for conflict resolution, ‘native states’ such as 
200 praad (Ho Branch), DA/D 302, Togbe Adai Kwasi Adom ix, Fia of Awudome; Togbe 
Adzesi Dzago vi, Fia of Avenui; and others, Resolution (without number), without date; 
praad (Ho Branch), DA/D 307, Acting District Commissioner of Akuse to Commissioner 
of the Eastern Province (n° 1141/190/1920.), 28 May 1946, 1; praad (Ho Branch), DA/D 302, 
Acting Provincial Commissioner of the Eastern Province to Chief Commissioner of Gold 
Coast Colony, Awudome-Peki Relation (without number), 24 June 1946, 1–2; praad (Ho 
Branch), DA/D 302, Adai Kwasi Adem ix, Fia of Awudome, Petition of the Fiaga and People 
of Awudome (without number), 7 May 1946, 4–5.
201 praad (Ho Branch), DA/D 302, District Commissioner of Akuse to Chief Commissioner 
of Gold Coast Colony, Awudome Affairs. (n° 0141/SF.5/56), 29 May 1951.
202 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/529, Crawford for Chief Commissioner of Gold Coast Colony, to 
Government Agent in Akuse (n° 554/13), 27 May 1952; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/529, Saka 
Vume, Secretary of Awudome State Council, Address of Welcome by the People of Awudome 
to the Government Agent Ho on 1st Official Visit. (without number), 29 July 1952.
203 praad (Accra), Ho Branch, DA/D/301, John Green, Assistant District Commissioner of 
Kpandu, to Acting Senior District Commissioner of Ho, Wusuta Native Affairs 
(n° 0019/S.F.1/2), 18 June 1947, 1–2; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/673, Togbe Abiu Gedodoe, 
Adontenhene of Wusuta Division, Akpini State, to Assistant District Commissioner of 
Kpandu, Wusuta Constitutional Dispute (without number), 13 Oct. 1951.
204 praad (Ho Branch), DA/D/301, Senior District Commissioner of Ho to Chief 
Commissioner of Gold Coast Colony, Alavanyo Native Affairs (n° S.010/SF.3/26.), 24 April 
1948, 1; praad (Ho Branch), DA/D/301, Senior District Commissioner of Ho to Chief 
Commissioner of Gold Coast Colony, Amalgamation of the Tsrukpe Division with the 
Akpini State (n° S.0097/23.), 21 May 1948, 1.
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Akpini were very vulnerable to conflicts in their key division: when in Kpandu, 
after the death of Dagadu iv, a stool conflict broke out between stool father 
Charles Agbodra and self-installed Paramount Chief Dionisius Yao Nyavor, this 
paralysed not only Kpandu but the whole ‘native state’.205
In these internal conflicts, the attention was focused on hostilities between 
the ‘central division’ of the ‘native states’, and groups in other ‘divisions’, which 
led to memoranda and reflections on pre-colonial history. The asset of ‘Ewe 
unity’, and the related ‘traditions’, seemed useful for a short time. Even so, very 
quickly after the peak of international pan-Ewe campaigns, the Ewe issue dis-
appeared as an argument. In 1953, divisional chiefs within the Tongu 
Confederacy even demanded the deletion of the reference to ‘Ewe states’ in the 
State Councils (Colony and Southern Togoland) Ordinance No. 8, to the aston-
ishment of the British administrators.206
Many Togoland communities believed nonetheless that they needed legal 
protection against future interventions of the Pekihene or of the Awoame Fia: 
the fear of the ‘classical’ states lingered on. This was in part irrational, but 
chiefs such as in the Tongu Confederacy tried to shut out the Awoame Fia and 
the Pekihene from Trans-Volta Togoland regional entities forever. Local chiefs 
feared historical prerogatives of these ‘traditional Ewe rulers’. Even so, most 
local rulers did not refrain from strategic alliances with Anlo and Peki, when-
ever they were politically advantageous.207
A good example of the manoeuvres of population groups between states are 
the Mafi, who were divided between Anlo and Ada, and later the Tongu 
Confederacy. In 1912, the British had described this separation as ‘traditional’. 
This idea was based on Mafi behaviour in an 1865 war, and indeed supported 
by the Anlo Mafi Union – an association that included many local dignitar-
ies.208 In the 1940s, however, many leaders of Mafi villages wished to bring the 
205 praad (Ho Branch), DA/D/301, Memorandum on Kpandu Native Affairs. (without num-
ber), without date, 16–7.
206 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/697, Acting Senior District Commissioner of Ho to Chief 
Commissioner of Gold Coast Colony, Tongu Confederacy Resolution. (n° S.0114/10.), 
23 April 1948; praad (Ho Branch), DA/D 311, Togbe C.K. Ruipah iii, Fiaga of Mepe, 
President of the Tongu Confederacy; Togbe Hlitabo ii, Fiaga of Agave; and others, Tongu 
Confederacy Resolutions. (without number), without date, 1.
207 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/712, Caldow, Assistant District Commissioner of Keta, Quarterly 
Report – Keta District October – December, 1951. (without number), 28 Jan. 1952, 1, 3; praad 
(Accra), adm 39/1/712, Caldow, Quarterly Report – Keta District January – March, 1952 
(without number), 8 April 1952, 1.
208 praad (Ho Branch), DA/D/300, Appendix ‘C’: Summary of the Historical Background to the 
Division of the Mafis. (without number), without date [1950?].
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whole of the group into the Tongu Confederacy, as taxes were lower than in 
Anlo, and prospects of political influence greater. As a ‘traditional’ narrative, 
these Mafi petitioners argued they had a ‘natural heritage’ that made them 
‘Tongus’, which was ‘et[h]nologically’ proven and involved ‘common dialecti-
cal, cultural, religious and industrial characteristics’; thus they were members 
of a ‘Tongu race’ that was ‘ethnical[ly] homogenous’. All groups in question 
spoke Ewe – there was thus no particular advantage in referring to Ewe identi-
fication, in particular because Anlo was a principal ‘Ewe state’.209 However, the 
petitioners claimed that as part of the ‘Ewe nation’ they could better under-
stand the injustice of refusing to allow people of one stock to live together in 
one country!210
In a pending case whose resolution remained unclear until 1953, representa-
tives of Mafi communities from both sides of the Gold Coast-Togoland border 
employed the Notsie myth of ‘all Ewe tribes’ and the joint exodus.211 A minority 
part of the communities on Gold Coast territory refused the new arrangement 
209 praad (Ho Branch), DA/D/300, Kwazi Abliza iii, Fia of Volo and President of Tongu 
Confederacy Council; Hadjor ii, Fia of Bakpe and Vice-president; J.K. Zogah, Fia of Sukpe; 
C.K. Asipati iii, Fia of Mepe; Tongu Group Council Meeting – Fifth Session at Mafi Abidome 
on Wednesday the 17th of January, 1945. (without number), without date; praad (Ho 
Branch), DA/D/300, Assem iii, Fia of Mafi; J.K. Asafo iii, Makralo of Mafi; and others, 
Petition passed by the Mafi Divisional Council held at Adidome on the 14th Day of June, 1950, 
under the Presidency of Togbe Assem iii, of Mafi and the following members…(without 
number), 14 June 1950, 1; praad (Ho Branch), DA/D/300, Togbe Assim iii, Fia of Mafi; 
E.K.Awittor-Bedi, Secretary of Mafi Division, to Chairman of Select Committee on Local 
Government and Chief Commissioner of Gold Coast Colony, Re Unification of Mafi 
Divisions and Joining of Tongu Confederacy Council. (without number), 13 Sep. 1950, 1.
210 praad (Ho Branch), DA/D/300, Assem iii and others, Petition passed by the Mafi 
Divisional Council held at Adidome on the 14th Day of June, 1950 …, 2.
211 praad (Ho Branch), DA/D/300, ‘People of Northern Side Mafi’, including Assem iii, Fiaga 
of Mafi and others; to Chief Commissioner of Gold Coast Colony (without number), 
7 Sep. 1951, 2; praad (Ho Branch), DA/D/300, Asafo iii of Mafi to Gbedemah, Minister of 
Local Government of Gold Coast, Resolution passed by the Mafi State Council held at 
Adidome this 27th Day of July under the Chairmanship of Mankralo J.K. Asafo iii., of Mafi.: 
Resolution of the Unification of North/South of Mafi. (without number), 27 July 1951, 1; 
praad (Ho Branch), DA/D/300, Kwasinyi Agyeman iii, Chief of Adidome, Copy: 
Declaration (without number), 17 Oct. 1948, 1; praad (Ho Branch), DA/D/300, Assem iii, 
Fiaga of Mafi State; Mankralo Akpafo vi; and others, to Arden-Clarke, Governor of the 
Gold Coast, Resolution of the People of Anlo Mafi and Mafi Dugame for Reunion. (without 
number), 12 June 1953, 1; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/712, Assistant District Commissioner 




of a joint Mafi division under Fia Assem iii, and argued from the standpoint of 
their own historical ‘tradition’. Most of the new Voltaland administration 
installed by the Nkrumah government favoured Assem’s position, but the com-
plaint caused endless inquiries.212
In some more marginal communities, the use of the Ewe argument in local 
conflict was even more attractive. We have already seen this for rulers of ‘Ewe’ 
communities which had previously been part of Ada State, who knew how, 
when it suited them, to play on the concept of Ewe unification to further their 
interests. In January 1945, spokesmen of these communities had convinced the 
district commissioner that ‘56,000 Ewes being controlled by the Ada Manche’ 
needed to be liberated. It was unclear how this was supposed to happen. The 
chief of Agrave, one of those ‘Ewe units’, refused to become a future member of 
a joint division of the eight communities as he feared Anlo interference.213 
Other chiefs agreed with this critique.
Another issue was the relationship of the communities of the Volta Region 
to the state of Akwamu. The relations between Ewe-speaking locals and the 
Akwamu authorities – descendants of the ‘plunderers’ of the 1870s – were 
particularly interesting. In the 1940s, the region of Volo, now a small fiaga-
dom (rulership), had been exempted from Akwamu rule and become part of 
the newly created Tongu Confederacy.214 After some violence in 1937, the 
Akwamuhene also accepted that Dufor would leave Akwamu rule.215 
However, the Akwamu Native Authority reserved for itself a part of its rights 
212 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/712, Caldow, Assistant District Commissioner of Keta, Quarterly 
Report – Keta District April – June, 1951. (without number), 20 July 1951, 4; praad (Ho 
Branch), DA/D/300, Thomas, Government Agent in Sogakope, to Regional Officer of 
Trans-Volta Togoland Region, Report on Mafi Unification and the possible Reorganisation of 
the Central Tongu Local Council (n° to.4/55), 17 Nov. 1952, 1–2; praad (Ho Branch), 
DA/D/300, G.K. Dordoye, Councillor of Mafi State; A. Die-Dordoye, Secretary-General of 
Mafi Youth Association (mya); J.K. Nutakor, Chairman of Central Tongu Local Council, 
and others, to Arden-Clarke, Unification of Mafi. (without number), 20 Aug. 1953, 1; praad 
(Ho Branch), DA/D/300, J.A. Cowley, Acting Regional Officer of Volta Region, to Secretary 
of Governor of the Gold Coast, Mafi Unification (0020/SF.4/Vol.2/315), 15 Oct. 1953, 1; 
praad (Ho Branch), DA/D/300, Appendix ‘A’: Mafi Unification – Villages visited in Mafi 
Dugame Division (without number), without date.
213 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/303, Assistant District Commissioner of Keta to Commissioner 
of the Eastern Province, Native Affairs Report [ for Keta] – 4th Quarter, 1944. (n° 116/4/31.), 
13 Jan. 1945, 3.
214 praad (Ho Branch), DA/D/295, District Commissioner of Keta to Commissioner of the 
Eastern Province in Koforidua, Duffor Native Affairs (n° 0010/35), 26 Nov. 1946.
215 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/250, Abutia Kwadzo xii, Chief of Abutia Teti, to Assistant 
District Commissioner of Ho (without number), 21 Dec. 1937.
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in some of the particularly rich villages and towns, which continued to cause 
problems.
Frankadua, a small town but with an important market, was a test case. 
Kwasi Abliza iii, the Fia of Volo, claimed rights over this town.216 The British 
administrators east of the Volta intended to solve the issue, but their col-
leagues in the Gold Coast Colony were more interested in maintaining the 
prestige of the Akwamuhene.217 For a period of five years, the situation of 
Frankadua thus remained unclear: tax payments were suspended; police 
forces from both Akwamu and the Tongu Confederacy occasionally entered 
the town and several inhabitants were shot.218 The ‘Volos’ in Frankadua pro-
duced numerous pages of ‘traditional claims’, explaining why the town had 
to be separated from Akwamu. The Akwamu councils argued with ‘tradi-
tional rights’.219 Kwasi Abliza iii accused ‘the Akwamus’ of having usurped 
the land Volo had been given in 1873.220 Part of Abliza’s interest was in 
improving his own position in Dufor, where he was a contested ruler, through 
success in the Frankadua issue and the hereditary conflict with Akwamu.221 
In the 1950s, the debate became even more heated. The Volo headmen 
pointed to a census in which 607 inhabitants of the market town defined 
themselves as ‘Ewe’ (and, oddly, 50 more as ‘Ewe-Volo’), while only 12 had 
identified themselves as ‘Akwamu’.222 Volo rulers were now insistent that the 
inhabitants of Frankadua were ‘Ewe’ who wished to live with their ‘kinsmen’ 
216 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/108, P. Gardner, Acting District Commissioner of Keta, to Kwasi 
Abliza iii., Fia of Volo (n° 1881/SAD/45.), 24 Oct. 1946; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/108, 
Acting Senior District Commissioner of Keta to Commissioner of the Eastern Province, 
Volo-Akwamu Dispute over Frankadua (n° eo.S.0073/4.), 31 Oct. 1947.
217 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/108, T.R.O. Mangin, Chief Commissioner of Gold Coast Colony, 
to Colonial Secretary of Gold Coast, Frankadua (Akwamu State) Native Affairs. (n° 025/
SF.12/33.), 5 Feb. 1948, 2; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/108, Senior District Commissioner of 
Ho to Chief Commissioner of Gold Coast Colony, Volta River – Ada Districts Boundary – 
Akwamu – Tongu Affairs (n° 0409/41), 30 Aug. 1950.
218 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/108, Senior District Commissioner of Ho to Chief Commissioner 
of Gold Coast Colony, Frankadua Affairs (n° 0409/33), 31 July 1950.
219 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/108, Senior District Commissioner of Ho to Chief Commissioner 
of Gold Coast Colony, Akwamu – Tongu Native Affairs (n° 0409/47), Sept. 1950, 1–2.
220 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/108, Kwasi Abliza iii, Fiaga of Volo, to Creasy, Governor of the 
Gold Coast, Volo – Akwamu Dispute: Petition of Kwasi Abliza iii Dufiaga of Volo State for 
and on behalf of the Duffor-Volo Native Authority (without number), 11 Oct. 1948, 1.
221 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/713, Acting District Commissioner of Keta to Commissioner of 
the Eastern Province (n° 2070/94/96), 14 Nov. 1946.




in the Tongu Confederacy. Although many  Ewe-speakers had had functions 
in the Akwamu State, the claim had the sympathies of most British adminis-
trators in Togoland who agreed that ‘those places with a preponderance of 
Ewes should be administered by Tongu’.223
In 1953, the village chief of Frankadua, Kofi Tulasi ii, and a number of the 
community’s leaders won over the deputy of the Volta Region in the Gold 
Coast Legislative Assembly, P.D. Adjani, to their cause. They complained bit-
terly in Keta that ‘from time memorial [sic] we the inhabitants of Frankadua 
are Ewe speaking people’; that they felt like Ewe and were part of the ‘Tongu 
sub-group’ of their ethnic grouping; and that they wished to become part of a 
local council that only involved Ewe communities.224 British officials were 
sympathetic to the campaign, but the final decision was left to the Nkrumah 
government.225 Even nowadays, Frankadua retains its difficult legacy, after 
becoming a part of the Volta District in post-colonial Ghana. As recently as in 
1999, ‘ethnic tensions’ provoked a near-battle between ‘Anlos’ (now meaning 
the Ewe-speakers of the town, which is somewhat curious) and ‘Akwamus’.226
Smaller groups like the Togome and Fodjoku followed the Volo and Dufor 
initiatives, and in November 1946 they obtained, after protests, the promise of 
the paramount chief of Akwamu to be integrated within the Tongu Confederacy. 
The question of symbolic allegiance to the Akwamuhene was, however, a prob-
lem.227 In a meeting before the Akwamu Native Authority, ‘traditions’ were 
mobilised. The Wirempihene challenged the Togome claim, criticising the 
group because they ‘speak Eve, yet…stay on Akwamu land’. According to this 
223 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/108, Dixon to Kerr, Senior District Commissioner in Akuse 
(n° 0068/SF.3/125), 5 Dec. 1950, 1.
224 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/108, Smeham, Frankadua (n° 0068/S.F.3), 14 Feb. 1953; 
praad (Accra), adm 39/1/108, Kofi Tulasi ii, Tefia, and others; to Gbedemah, Minister 
of Local Government of the Gold Coast (without number), 12 Feb. 1953; praad 
(Accra), adm 39/1/108, District Commissioner of Keta to Adjani (n° S.0068/SF.3/149), 
15 Feb. 1953.
225 praad (Ho Branch), DA/D 311, George Sinclair, Regional Officer of Togoland, to Secretary 
of Government of the Gold Coast, The Tongu Confederacy (n° S.0114/117), 20 Oct. 1952, 2.
226 United Nations, Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (cerd), Reports 
submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the Convention – Seventeenth Periodic Reports 
of States Parties due in 2002: Addendum Ghana, 31 May 2002 (Geneva: United Nations, 
2002), 31; Khan, Naefa, ‘The Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice in 
Ghana: Working in the micro and around the macro’, in Parlevliet, Michelle, Guy Lamb, 
and Victoria Maloka (eds.), Defenders of Human Rights, Managers of Conflict, Builders of 
Peace? (Cape Town: University of Cape Town, 2005), 64–82, 76–7.
227 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/713, District Commissioner of Akuse to Commissioner of the 
Eastern Province, Togome and Forjoku Affairs. (n° 2715/186/08 Vol.iii.), 22 Nov. 1946.
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version, the Togome were ‘strangers’ tolerated by the Akwamuhene, while the 
Togome described themselves as ‘autochthons’ on the land.228
British officials agreed that those groups ‘are quite clearly Ewes’ and ‘should join 
their brothers in the Tongu Confederacy’, but they struggled to understand the old 
Akwamu-Togome-Fodjoku alliance or the realities of local rule. Nkwanta, the Fia of 
Togome, insisted on the existence of a historical border with Akwamu; the Fodjoku 
added to the confusion by holding that the Togome were ‘Anlos’ and, hence, 
another type of ‘Ewe’. Also, the accounts of behaviour during the Akwamu invasion 
were very contradictory.229 At the end of the 1940s, the senior district commis-
sioner in Ho was desperate: the Togome and Fodjoku communities were ‘Ewe 
speakers’ and wanted to ‘join their Ewe brethren’, but had various claims against 
each other. This led colonial officials to fear the worst for other, larger cases.230
‘Ewe’ solidarity in times of the impressively large, ethnically expressed 
group mobilisation of the aec and of similar organisations, was often only a 
part of the picture. Elsewhere, the old, local conflicts continued unaffected by 
the pan-Ewe idea. At the heart of the various ‘native states’, conflicts were often 
local: within the Tongu Confederacy, Tefle inhabitants claimed they had to 
defend themselves against Bakpa attempts at occupying their land; the para-
mountcy of the Ho Division – the central division of the Asogli Native State – 
was contested over decades between the villages of Dome and Bankoe.231 In 
the latter case as in many, ethnic arguments were sometimes employed, when 
convenient: thus the contenders from Ho-Bankoe accused the Howusu of being 
a member of a ‘stranger’ group that had only learned its proficiency in the Ewe 
language after its arrival in the Ho region.232
228 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/713, Discussion on Togome and Forjoku Affairs – during Akwamu 
Native Authority Meeting on Tuesday 12th November, 1946. (without number), without date.
229 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/713, Gardner, District Commissioner of Keta, to Commissioner 
of the Eastern Province, Torgome and Forjoku Affairs. (n° 0048/5), 2 Dec. 1946 [dated 
‘2 Dec. 1936’], 1–2; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/713, Judd, Acting Commissioner of the Eastern 
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Akuse on Monday the 23rd Day of October 1933, before his Worship Leonard Warner Judd, Acting 
Commissioner Eastern Province. – Chief Asamoa Nkwanta – Plaintiff Appellant vs: Agobodjo & 
Chief Afum Asare – Defendants – Respondents. (without number), without date, 1, 6, 12, 15.
230 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/713, Senior District Commissioner of Ho to Commissioner of 
the Eastern Province (without number), without date [1948].
231 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/712, Caldow, Assistant District Commissioner of Keta, Quarterly 
Report – Keta District July – September, 1951. (without number), 16 Oct. 1951, 5.
232 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/458, Assistant District Commissioner of Ho, Comments on the 




As we have seen, in the Adaklu community the break with Anlo had been an 
obvious goal until the end of the Second World War. However, after 1945 the 
Adaklu suddenly wished for a ‘return’ to Anlo rule. They referred to the ancient 
political Anlo–Adaklu alliance formed against Ho and ‘the other Ewe divisions’ 
and their old cooperation with the Asante invaders.233
The debate on Ewe-ness could even be employed as argument for local 
debates in non-Ewe-speaking regions, such as Buem. It was used in the conflict 
about local education policy and the creation of schools in the first half of the 
1950s. Buem elites refused to send their children to Ho Secondary School, as 
they feared compulsory education in the Ewe language. Under pressure, the 
British officials had to assure that ‘no student is compelled to study Ewe’. 
However, as the conflict between Twi-speakers and Lefana-speakers escalated 
in the 1950s, the Ewe question faded into the background.234 In that respect, 
the Omanhene of Buem accused the Twi-speaking militants of ‘tribalising’ the 
conflict. Other, minority linguistic communities such as the Bowiri joined in 
the protest; and it also became connected to internal conflicts about the hier-
archy of divisions and their leaders within the Buem Native State, but this was 
no longer about the Ewe.235
233 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/254, Gbogbi iii, Fiaga of Adaklu; Lablublu iii of Waya; Agbi iii 
of Goefe; Krakani iii of Helekpe, and others, to Togbi Sri ii, Awoame Fia of Anlo (without 
number), 20 Feb. 1945, 1; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/254, Mead, District Commissioner of 
Ho, to Commissioner of the Eastern Province, Adaklu Division (Ho/Kpandu and Keta 
Districts) (n° 325/107/31.), 13 Feb. 1946, 1; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/454, W.J. Caldow, 
Assistant District Commissioner of Keta, to Senior District Commissioner of Ho, Southern 
Adaklu Affairs. (n° 0093/101.), 16 May 1951.
234 praad (Ho Branch), DA/D 309, Mangin, Chief Commissioner of Gold Coast Colony, to 
Commissioner of the Eastern Province (n° …/9/38), 13 July 1945, 1–2; praad (Ho Branch), 
DA/D/298, Nana Akuamoa iv, Omanhene of Buem, to Arden-Clarke, Jasikan Native Affairs. 
(without number), 8 May 1953; praad (Ho Branch), File No. 2009/29, Sub-File No. ‘A’, 
Omanhene of Buem, Petition to His Excellency the Governor, Sir Alan Cuthbert Maxwell 
Burns, K.C.M.G., etc. etc. etc. on the Occasion of his Visit to the Buem State, Borada. 16th. 
February 1943. (without number), without date, 2; Dickson, A.G., ‘Mass Education in 
Togoland’, African Affairs 49(195), 1950, 136–50, 137.
235 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/268, Nana Yaw Nyako ii, Ohene of Worawora; Nana Akompi 
Firam iii, Ohene of Kadjebi; Nana Kwasi Adu, and others, Petition…(without number), 
March 1945, 1; praad (Ho Branch), DA/D 309, Nana Akuamoa iv, Acting President, Buem 
State Council, to District Commissioner of Ho, Buem Native Authority Election of [sic] (with-
out number), 19 June 1946, 1; praad (Ho Branch), DA/D 309, Nana K.O.Brantuo iii, 
Adontenhene of Buem, Chief of Jasikan, and asafohenes and stoolfathers, Petition…(without 
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However, ‘Ewe mobilisation’ was used as a model outside of the Ewe-
speaking areas. In the case of the tensions between the Lolobi and Akpafu in 
Buem, the Lolobi profited from their knowledge of the Ewe process to express 
political protest. Lolobi dignitaries argued that they should have been repre-
sented in the important debates at Lake Success in the United States, where 
the spokesmen ‘of the Ewe’ formulated their claims towards the trusteeship 
council of the United Nations. They claimed they did not, of course, have an 
‘Ewe identity’, but they believed that even smaller ethnic groups should have 
the same right of mobilisation.236 Therefore, the Ewe example had an immense 
impact as a blueprint for local rhetorics.
The border continued to have its own dynamics. In 1943, the Fiaga of Bator had, 
in a land claim, described his opponents as ‘Kpele strangers from Eve’; we find no 
solidarity between ‘Ewe’ when land rights and immigration were involved. 
Frequently, Ewe-speaking local councils voted for the expulsion of Ewe-speaking 
immigrants from community land, and if the latter came from the other side of the 
colonial border, they would often be insulted as ‘French strangers’.237 By the same 
logic, in Agu Tafié, at the French side of the border in the Kpalimé region, the elders 
refused to accept the nephew of the retired paramount chief, Aboyo, as new ‘tradi-
tional ruler’, on the grounds that he had lived for the largest part of his life in the 
Gold Coast and thus adopted foreign manners!238 The colonial border could in that 
regard be exploited, in the perception of locals, beyond the ethnic solidarities.
In the region of Kpalimé, cut leaders attempted to restore the popularity of 
their movement, which had come under mounting pressure in 1950, through 
6 Oct. 1946; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/571, Duncan, Assistant District Commissioner of 
Kpandu, to District Commissioner of Ho, Bowiri Affairs – Abdication of Divisional Chief (n° 
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DA/D/298, Telegram from Nana Asafohene and Nana Ampeh Tapahene, ‘on behalf of 
Akan group’, Kadjebi, to Senior District Commissioner in Ho (n° S. 0109/Vol.3/246.), 23 
July 1952.
236 praad (Ho Branch), DA/D/299, Sub-Chief Jacob Akoteh, and others, to Burns (without 
number), without date, 2.
237 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/5, Kofi Djerekey, Acting Mankralo of Bator, and Kodjo Fiagbor 
Wusu Yao, to Colonial Secretary of the Gold Coast (without number), 12 October 1943; 
praad (Ho Branch), NA/47, Nana Kataboa ii, Agesokubihene and Krontihene; and elders, 
to Amanyagle, and others, A Letter of Warning (n° AP3/1/56), 5 May 1956.
238 ant, 2APA, Cercle de Klouto, 10, Administrator of Subdivision of Klouto, Cercle de Centre, 
Subdivision de Klouto: Rapport Trimestriel, Année 1938 – 4ème Trimestre (without number), 
23 Jan. 1939, 5.
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their appearance as brokers in local conflicts involving parties from both the 
French and the British side of the border. In Baglo, P. Dogli offered the appro-
priate services to the paramount chief, Nana Buaka iv, in organising a meeting 
with the British district commissioner.239 This role of the cut had nothing to 
do with the Ewe issue.
Most of the conflicts in the Kpalimé area remained on the strictly local level. 
They essentially reflected problems with decisions taken in the pre-colonial 
period, such as, in particular, fusions of villages in the Kuma region. The inhab-
itants of Totsi and Yokele complained that, during the confusions of the Asante 
incursions, the leader of Tsame had usurped the chieftaincy over the sub-
region of the canton. This was then connected to longstanding land conflicts 
between Tsame and Totsi, which went on from the 1930s to 1970. Other, inter-
nal, conflicts as in Kuma-Apoti, or in Agu-Apegame, were also linked to the 
traumatic experience of the Asante invasions, but not the Ewe legends.240 
Finally, the fate of the chiefs of Agu Nyogbo Agbetiko was discussed during the 
whole of the late colonial and the post-colonial phases: in the 1950s, this par-
ticular conflict was linked to the battles between the ptp (still in territorial 
power) and the cut, hostilities that reappeared once again in 1970.241 As in 
239 ant, 2APA, Cercle de Klouto, 23, District Commissioner of Klouto to Cédile, French 
Commissioner of Togo, a/s requête du Chef Nana Buaka iv de Baglo (n° 115/c.), 18 Sep. 
1950, 1.
240 ant, 2APA, Cercle de Klouto, 358, Kossi Fiasi, Planter, representative of Collectivité Bokovi 
Asuka Edi in Totsi, to District Commissioner of Klouto (without number), 25 Oct. 1951; 
ant, 8APA/3/37, Tourot, District Commissioner of Klouto, to Péchoux, French 
Commissioner of Togo (n° 011/Cf.), 7 Feb. 1953, 1–2; ant, 2APA, Cercle de Klouto, 358, 
Bokovi Emmanuel, Secretary of Chief Edi ii of Kuma-Totsi, Discours à Monsieur 
l’Administrateur de la F.O.M. Commandant le Cercle de Klouto; à l’occasion de l’Introduction 
de Joseph Koffi Edi ii, Chef de Village de Kouma-Totsi – Le 6 Septembre 1958. (without num-
ber), 6 Sep. 1958, 1; ant, 2APA, Cercle de Klouto, 358, W.M. Kludea; Bassah Eben-Ezer, 
Secretary; Thomas Gbago; Fritz Komassi, Jugement N° 35 du 27 Juillet 1959 du Tribunal 
Coutumier de Palimé: Affaire de Chefferie. Nyassem Assi Amoua Cultivateur à Kouma Apoti. 
Contre Gustave Amedome Chef du village Kouma Apoti. (without number), 27 July 1959; 
ant, 2APA, Cercle de Klouto, 358, cff, Note d’Information: Différend entre les villages de 
Kouma-Tsomé et Kouma-Totsi. (n° 26.C/cff), 6 Oct. 1969, 1.
241 ant, 2APA, Cercle de Klouto, 350, Gidéon Avogan, notable; and others, all designed as 
‘Notables, Anciens et Le Chef Léléklélé I du village autonome d’Agou Agbétiko’, to 
Commander of Brigade of the Gendarmerie Nationale, Suppression inéluctable des fauts 
rapports et plaintes injustes de notre village. (without number), 15 Oct. 1953, 1, 3; ant, 2APA, 
Cercle de Klouto, 350, K. Franklin West, Adjutant-Chief of the Gendarmerie Nationale; 
Gabriel Agbo, Gendarme, Procès Verbal (numbers illegible), 13 Oct. 1970, 1–5; ant, 2APA, 
Cercle de Klouto, 350, Laurent Y. Agboyi, Secretary of Chief of Agou-Nyogbo-Agbetiko, to 
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most parts of British Togoland and of the Ewe-speaking regions of the Gold 
Coast Colony, ethnic mobilisation in French Togoland also had relatively little 
success. Under French rule, Ewe-speakers focused less on ‘traditions’ expressed 
through pre-colonial states, and more exclusively on village conflicts.
In rare situations, Ewe identification had importance as an argument in the 
French zone, but mainly with regard to local issues. An obvious example is the 
‘village’ of Fongbe close to Tsévié, in the population centre of Lomé. In 1948, 
the chef de quartier (town ward headman) of Fongbe Apedome, Keïsso Abena, 
and his colleague in Fongbe Boeti, bitterly complained about the administra-
tor of the subdivision of Tsévié, because the latter had confirmed the election 
of one Agama Dali, chef de quartier of Fongbe Zogbedji, to the position of chief 
of the whole ‘independent village’. The claimants said they were extremely 
angry that, while the inhabitants of Apedome were ‘Mina’ originating from 
Ada, and those of Boeti ‘Ewe’ with their origins in Notsie, the colonial adminis-
tration made a ‘Fon’ from Dahomey their chief. They cited the spokesmen of 
the All-Ewe Conference to make their point clear:
Here we refer to the notion of the Councillor of the French Union, 
Mr Savi de Tove, who defends a principle adopted as well by our repre-
sentatives in the Local Assembly, which says the following: ‘The nomina-
tion of the Ewe chiefs by the administration is not in line with the 
indigenous  customs. This is the reason for great troubles. From this 
motive, it is necessary to abolish the decree [speaking of the text from 1st 
March 1945, about indigenous rule in Togo] and leave the people their 
 liberty to choose their chiefs to their convenience. This would be far more 
democratic’.242
In spite of such threats coming from local elites, most local inhabitants, includ-
ing the Ewe-speakers and Mina-speakers, were not at all interested in creating 
a real conflict. When the chief was elected, the ‘stranger’ Adama Dali managed 
to maintain, with support of a group of elders, that he was the ‘traditional heir’ 
of the ruling family, and he celebrated a crushing victory over his Ewe-speaking 
F.D. Ali, Acting Togolese Minister of the Interior (without number), 19 Oct. 1970, 1; ant, 
2APA, Cercle de Klouto, 350, Antoine Agbenou, Attaché of the Administration, to Ministry 
of the Interior of Togo (n° 874/CK), 22 Oct. 1970.
242 ant, 2APA, Cercle de Tsévié, 4, Keisso Abena, chief of ward of Fongbe Apedome; and 
others; Zotaé Torglo, chief of ward of Boeti; Goli Apenon; Sogbo Awli, notables of Fongbe 
Boeti; to District Commissioner of Lomé, aff. des Fongbés (without number), 3 Nov. 1948, 
1–3. The citation is on pages 2–3, passages in italics are underlined in the original text.
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contender. Again, under the stabilising conditions of colonial rule, local politi-
cal traditions were stronger than any ethnic solidarity.243
Therefore, the reference to Ewe identifications was subject to rather strong 
limitations. First of all, it obviously needed an ‘otherness’ present on the spot 
that could be defined as ethnically different, as against a ‘Fon’ in Fongbe, or 
between Ewe-speakers and the linguistic groups of Buem. Reference to Ewe-
ness did not serve as a language of reconciliation in matters of conflicts 
between different smaller Ewe-speaking communities. Even in the territory of 
Togo under French mandate, which lacked other larger political entities to rely 
on, ethnic mobilisation did not, in the local practice, become a particularly 
important principle.
 Ewe from Outside: The Avatime and the Question of Ewe Solidarity
To illustrate these points through a local case over the decades, we will now 
go back to the Avatime communities. The Avatime as speakers of a Central 
Togo language are, of course, at first glance distinct from Ewe-speakers in 
linguistic terms.244 Nonetheless, in the late nineteenth century the commu-
nity’s mastership of the Ewe language was so outstanding that German 
Governor Jesko von Puttkamer remarked that, in contrast to other Ewe-
speakers, the people of ‘Awatimé have the pure Ewe dialect’!245 As in the 
mixed and fluent communities of Joal-Fadiouth and Port Loko, Avatime set-
tlements thus represented a local view on different options and cleavages at 
different times.
In the 1920s, Avatime informants redefined ‘historical tradition’ into a more 
independent narrative: only some of them had come from Notsie, the rest from 
Ahanta in the Gold Coast (setting them apart from the majority of Ewe com-
munities). Also, according to this version, the Avatime had formerly been Twi-
speakers, and were linguistically part of the groups west of the Volta River. This 
version seems to be a clear invention and is particularly curious.246 Under 
243 ant, 2APA, Cercle de Tsévié, 4, D. Videau, Administrator of Subdivision of Tsévié; 
J. Houessou, Interpreter, Procès-Verbal de consultation coutumière pour la nomination du 
Chef de Village Indépendant de Fongbé. – (without number), 28 Oct. 1949, 1–4.
244 [Christaller,] ‘Explorations’, 256.
245 tna, pro, CO/879/28, African Confidential Print No. 356, von Puttkamer, German 
Governor of Togo (Extract.) [Memorandum on Peki] (without number, Enclosure 2 in No. 
44), 30 June 1888, 2.
246 praad (Accra), adm 11/1/1624, Rattray, Report by Mr. R.S. Rattray (without number), with-
out date, 28.
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German rule, the Avatime rulers had claimed to represent the ‘lost state’ of 
‘Krepi’, a political entity. These claims were probably wrong – Kwadzo De iv 
was more influential in the Trans-Volta area of the 1870s than was Adzatekpor 
– but they show that the Avatime dignitaries had no difficulties in presenting 
their community as an Ewe-speaking political entity.
European residents helped with this idea, as German missionaries tended 
to treat the Avatime as an ‘Ewe tribe’. African missionary personnel recruited 
for work in the area around Gebi Mountain were obliged to undergo training 
in Ewe, even if destined for the more isolated Avatime villages, such as 
Kolenin. Moreover, the growing group of Christian converts was, in this early 
phase, rather eager to accept an all-embracing Ewe culture (including the 
Notsie founding legend).247 Missionary attitudes in the 1900s were ambiva-
lent and mixed with very practical issues. Consequently, as one example, the 
Bremen Mission recruited local recruits from Avatime, such as Godwin 
Banimanve, who were installed as auxiliary teachers in places like Amedzofe, 
because they were able to teach undergraduates in the local language. In 
1890, Andreas Aku, a Bremen Mission catechist from Keta, described villages 
such as Amedzofe and Gbadzeme as bilingual. In Spieth’s account, the 
Avatime are implicitly considered to be one of the ‘Eweland tribes’. Around 
1900, the Avatime thus had the two options of ethnic identification in their 
repertoire.248
After the First World War, the Avatime populations attempted to main-
tain the image of being a particularly ‘independent’ community, and as 
especially anti-German. They accused their neighbours, the Tafi, of having 
been the first to ‘defect’ to the Germans in the 1890s, and described them 
and the Logba as ‘weak’ as opposed to the fierce cruelty of their own warrior 
community; the Agotime and the Adangbe north-east of Lomé have the 
same origin legend that emphasises cruel acts during wars. It makes 
good sense that three  Trans-Volta communities thereby underline their 
247 Staatsarchiv Bremen, 7,1025 (Norddeutsche Missionsgesellschaft), 6/2, Schosser to Härtter 
(without number), 5 Aug. 1904, 1; Staatsarchiv Bremen, 7,1025 (Norddeutsche 
Missionsgesellschaft), 6/2, Schröder, missionary at Amedzofe, to Ohly, Mission Inspector 
(without number), without date, 2.
248 Staatsarchiv Bremen, 7,1025 (Norddeutsche Missionsgesellschaft), 19/6, Andreas Aku, 
Bremen Mission catechist in Keta, to Mission Inspector, Eine Ferienreisebeschreibung 
(without number), 20 to 25 Feb. 1890, 10; Staatsarchiv Bremen, 7,1025 (Norddeutsche 
Missionsgesellschaft), 6/2, Stations-Konferenz: Besetzung des Amedžowe-Bezirks 1907 
(without number), 4 July 1906, 3; Spieth, Ewe-Stämme, 49*, 65*. According to Avatime 
legends, the community once had a female chief for the female population – a tradition 
that is, if I am not mistaken, not found anywhere else in the Trans-Volta region.
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 autonomous group identification at the margin of the Ewe-speaking pre-
colonial divisions.249
The British ‘amalgamation’ project of the late 1920s brought the Avatime 
under stronger pressure to define their group identification in relation to 
neighbouring communities. They continued to reject Peki’s leading role, as the 
Peki had been, from that perspective, a weaker ally during the Akwamu and 
Asante incursions.250 Their discussion with British administrators did not yet 
touch on the question of ‘Ewe identity’. With regard to Anlo, the Avatime 
claimed that there had never been any tributary arrangements, but only trade 
relations between partner ‘states’ on equal terms.251
In the 1920s, Adzatekpor nevertheless became nominated an arbitrator in 
stool disputes within ‘Ewe’ communities. For the Wadze Stool Dispute, he also 
claimed to have ‘knowledge of the native customs’ of the Ewe.252 The Avatime 
chief managed to impress the British so much that in 1931 he was exclusively 
spared from confiscations to enforce the payment of debts. However, this rela-
tive success made the head chiefs of neighbouring divisions strongly suspi-
cious of Avatime intentions: the divisional chiefs of Honuta, and, obviously, of 
Tafi were hostile to the creation of an ‘amalgamated state’. The Avatime reputa-
tion for violence did not help. In early 1928, Avatime warriors from Dzokpe 
destroyed the village of Tafi Atome, which antagonised not only the Tafi but 
also the Logba, and poisoned the atmosphere in the region.253
249 praad (Accra), adm 11/1/1621, Furley, [Report of a Tour through the districts of Togoland] 
(without number), 17 April 1918, 12; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/235, History of Avatime 
Division. (without number), without date, 1, 3; praad (Accra), adm 11/1/1624, Rattray, 
Report by Mr. R.S. Rattray (without number), without date, 38; ant, 2APA, Cercle de Lomé, 
9, Nativel, Assistant District Commissioner of Lomé, Tournée effectuée par l’Administrateur-
Adjoint Nativel au cours du mois de Septembre 1930 dans les cantons d’Adangbé, Gati, Kodjo 
et Haavé – (without number), without date [October 1930], 3–4; Nugent, ‘Historicity’, 
131–2.
250 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/238, District Commissioner of Ho to Commissioner of the 
Eastern Province (n° 479/116./27.), 18 Feb. 1927, 2.
251 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/253, Adzatekpor, Head Chief of Avatime; and others; to District 
Commissioner of Ho (without number), 12 Sep. 1927, 1.
252 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/253, Ellershaw, Assistant District Commissioner of Ho, to 
Adzatekpor, Fiaga of Avatime (n° 665/536/28.), 23 July 1928.
253 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/253, Lilley to Adzatekpor (n° 380/30/1929.), 11 Oct. 1929; praad 
(Accra), adm 39/1/258, Avatime Djokpo – Tafi Atomo disturbances. (without number), 
1 Nov. 1927, 6–7; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/258, V.W. Bratton, Assistant District 
Commissioner of Kpandu, to District Commissioner of Ho (n° 769/2/20), 19 Nov. 1927; 
praad (Accra), adm 39/1/258, Assistant District Commissioner of Ho to Commissioner 
of the Eastern Province in Koforidua (n° 794/13/28.), 11 Jan. 1928, 1; praad (Accra), adm 
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While Avatime informants presented the Tafi as spoilers of peace agree-
ments, the rulers of the other communities were infuriated by the Avatime 
attack and refused any future cooperation. In June 1930, Adzatekpor V finally 
gave in and agreed to the restitution of pillaged Tafi possessions and to legal 
arbitration from Accra. This also opened discussions on identifications. The 
villagers of Tafi stated that they were the autochthons on the land in ques-
tion, and the Avatime held that their Dzokpe branch had ‘spear-won’ the 
same land. Some reference was made to the Notsie legend, but none to ‘Ewe’ 
identity.254
In 1932, ‘Awatime State’ nonetheless became created as a larger political unit; 
this new ‘native state’ promoted by the British was an entity that included many 
Ewe-speaking communities including former adversaries. In the 1930s, the new 
State Council began to engage in questions of infrastructure, land use and heri-
tage in Ewe-speaking places like Dudome or Izola. However, Adzatekpor, as 
president of the ‘native state’, was regularly shunned by the fiawo of the differ-
ent Ewe-speaking communities in the state who preferred to apply directly to 
the British authorities.255 Awatime State remained a loose alliance of practi-
cally equal partners, in which the rulers of Avatime did not really manage to 
mark any dominance.
With regard to group identifications, the Avatime and other members of the 
‘native state’ were hostile to immigrants regarded as ‘Peki’. The question of 
making Philip Tekedu the headman of the ‘Pekis’ of Honuta was thus contro-
versially discussed; the communities feared that this headman would act as a 
39/1/258, Assistant District Commissioner of Ho to Commissioner of the Eastern Province 
(n° 791/346/28.), 10 May 1928, 1; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/501, Wimshurst, Acting 
Commissioner of the Eastern Province, to Chief Commissioner of Gold Coast Colony, 
Logba Division (Akpini State) Affairs. (n° 0179/S.F.5/4.), 6 Oct. 1947.
254 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/258, An account of incidents on 24th October, 1927. (without 
number), without date, 1; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/253, District Commissioner of 
Kpandu to Commissioner of the Eastern Province (n° 651/2/20), 15 Oct. 1929, 2; praad 
(Accra), adm 39/1/216, District Commissioner of Kpandu to Adfa Kodadia, Head Chief of 
Tafi in Atome, Tafi-Avatime Land Dispute. (n° 491/65/1920.), 14 June 1930, 1; praad (Accra), 
adm 39/1/216, Adfa Kodadia, Headchief of Tafi Adome vs: Adodome Kpondolo, Dufia of 
Avatime Djokpe and others (n° 24/28), without date, 1, 3, 4, 12, 14.
255 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/280, Maniye Gbagbo, Acting Adzatekpor V, Awatime State, Adja 
Tekpo V’s Hearty Address to the Gathering of Today, 16th June, 1932 (without number), 
16 June 1932, 1; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/66, Talafan-Dodome State Meeting (without 
number), 27 Nov. 1931; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/66, Assistant District Commissioner of 
Ho to Paramount Chief of Avatime (n° 773/193/1932.), 24 Nov. 1932, 1; praad (Accra), adm 
39/1/66, Adzatekpor V to Assistant District Commissioner of Ho (without number), 
24 Oct. 1942, 2, 4.
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vassal of the Pekihene.256 The paramount chief of Avatime wished to integrate 
these ‘Pekis’ into the native state and satisfy some of their wishes, given that 
they included an economically important group of cocoa planters. By contrast, 
the Pekihene demanded that Tedeku was to be installed as headman for all the 
‘Ewe’ in Awatime State. Kwadzo De used the terms of ‘Peki’ and ‘Ewe’ as inter-
changeable, which was seen as a clear provocation by many Ewe-speakers in 
Awatime State. However, Adzatekpor did not challenge this claim in his cor-
respondence with the other divisional chiefs, and with the British administra-
tion: instead, he described the ‘Ewe’ as a tribe of ‘strangers’ living in Avatime 
(and Awatime State) and being different from Avatime residents.257 Therefore, 
we find an interplay between linguistic elements, political prerogatives, and 
vague ethnic notions.
During the 1930s, Adzatekpor’s rule over the core lands of Avatime became 
shaky. The paramount chief had reached a peak of unpopularity by introduc-
ing the head tax, which was attacked by many elders and other opponents as a 
return to practices from German times.258 The resistance of the ‘youngmen’ 
with open and outspoken support by many elders became in the end unten-
able, and the stool father, Traugott Tekpe, even called for the destoolment of 
Adzatekpor in November 1937.259 In 1938, the Avatime chief was no longer 
being invited to the court sessions of his own State Tribunal, and he was 
replaced there by the chief of Amedzofe. However, neither the British nor the 
members of the other ‘divisions’, agreed to Adzatekpor’s destoolment. In 1939, 
an uneasy peace was brokered between Adzatekpor V and the ‘youngmen’ 
engaged in a symbolic cleaning procedure of the Vane-Dzolo-Kpoeta road. 
256 praad (Ho Branch), DA/D/293, Tachi Agble, Stool Father, in Hanvigba Station; to 
Assistant District Commissioner of Ho, Petitional Grounds of the Recidential [sic] Pekis for 
the Election of a headman at Luvudo (without number), 15 Oct. 1931, 1.
257 praad (Ho Branch), DA/D/293, Adzatekpor to District Commissioner of Ho, Election 
– Luvudo (without number), 15 Oct. 1931; praad (Ho Branch), DA/D/293, Assistant 
District Commissioner of Ho to Fiaga of Avatime, Election of Luvudo (n° 941/571929), 
23 Oct. 1931; praad (Ho Branch), DA/D/293, Adzatekpor to Assistant District 
Commissioner of Ho, Re Headman Appointment for Luvudo Community. (without num-
ber), 2 Oct. 1931.
258 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/280, Obia, Adaimsa; Stool Father Dako Tekpe substituting 
Traugott Tekpe, and others, to Lilley (without number), 21 Sep. 1937, 1.
259 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/280, Heads of Sohes (youngmen), Lawrence K. Adzoto and oth-
ers, to Commissioner of the Eastern Province (without number), 29 July 1937, 1–3; praad 
(Accra), adm 39/1/280, Fr. Traugott Adobo, Stool Father of Vane Avatime, to District 
Commissioner of Kpandu, Deposition and Installation Reports. (without number), 6 Nov. 
1937, 1–2.
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However, the prestige of the Avatime ruler was seriously damaged.260 
Adzatekpor reacted with a kind of publicity campaign, in which he demanded 
support for more moderate tax policies and investment in secondary schools 
from the colonial power.261
The emergence of the pan-Ewe campaign, in 1942, came at the right time. 
It gave a new opportunity to Adzatekpor to change the odds, and the tone of 
the Avatime paramount chief became different. He appeared at the forefront 
of the Ewe unity adherents, where he emphasised the necessity of Ewe reuni-
fication. After seven decades of a discourse insisting on Avatime’s distinc-
tiveness, this community was suddenly no longer different from the ‘Ewe’. 
Adzatekpor V demanded Ewe unification on the grounds that the borderline 
‘deprives us, the Ewe from our privileges for trade as due to the effects of the 
war of 1914’ and he wished ‘that we the Ewes enjoy our former privilege for 
harmony of our works in Togoland’.262 The ruler obviously tried to satisfy 
some of the divisional chiefs inside Awatime State, but also to profit from the 
widespread enthusiasm. The British official in charge in Ho commented in 
1945 that Awatime State as an entity was indeed ‘entirely Ewe’!263 Over 
260 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/280, S.W. Atsridom iv, Divisional Chief of Kpedze Awlime, to 
District Commissioner of Kpandu (without number), 9 May 1938, 1–2; praad (Accra), 
adm 39/1/280, District Commissioner of Ho to District Commissioner of Kpandu (with-
out number), unclear date, 1; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/288, Assistant District 
Commissioner of Kpandu to District Commissioner of Ho (without number), without 
date, 1–2; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/280, Adzatekpor V, Fiaga of Avatime; and Avatime 
chiefs, to District Commissioner of Kpandu and Commissioner of the Eastern Province 
(without number), 27 May 1939, 1; praad (Ho Branch), DA/D 309, Handing over Notes 
from Mr. John Green – Ag. District Commissioner, to Mr. R.W. Woolley – District Commissioner 
(without number), without date, 7.
261 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/288, Duncan-Johnston, Acting Commissioner of the Eastern 
Province in Koforidua, to Captain D.C. Walker, District Commissioner of Kpandu 
(n° 3730/2186/32.), 5 Sep. 1939; praad (Accra), adm 39/1/288, Secretary of Native Affairs, 
Accra, to Commissioner of the Eastern Province (n° 444/34/11.), 27 June 1939; praad 
(Accra), adm 39/1/343, Adzatekpor V, Paramount Chief of Avatime, to Chairman of 
District Education Committee, Petition from Adzatekpo V. for the Opening of a Senior 
School at Vane (without number), 15 Jan. 1947.
262 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/288, Adzatekpor V, An Address and Petition of Felix Kwami Adza 
Tekpo V. during his Visit to Wane Awatime on the 17th Day of February, 1943. (without num-
ber), 17 Feb. 1943, 1. Italics are by the author.
263 praad (Ho Branch), DA/D 309, Handing over Notes from Mr. John Green – Ag. District 
Commssioner, to Mr. R.W. Woolley – District Commissioner (without number), without 
date [1945], 3; Colonial Office, Report…to the General Assembly of the United Nations 
on the Administration of Togoland under United Kingdom Trusteeship for the Year 1948 
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decades, Avatime leaders had refused such a view, but with the ruling dynasty 
under pressure, the pan-Ewe issue had now become attractive. Moreover, 
seasonal labour migration into other parts of Togoland during the 1940s 
helped to cement this perception among a larger group of the Avatime popu-
lations.264 Thereby, Avatime easily and quite successfully blended into the 
mass of pan-Ewe demands!
This surprising flexibility of ‘tradition’ – which demonstrates the particu-
lar usefulness of our approach of ‘colonial history on the ground’ through 
written accounts – can notably be compared with Agotime. Like the Avatime, 
the members of this community normally presented themselves as non-Ewe, 
but could appear as part of ‘the Ewe’ whenever this was useful. In the 1920s, 
‘traditions’ showed a clear sense of flexibility with regard to relations 
between Agotime and Ewe-speakers.265 Some of these ‘traditions’ insisted 
there had been Ewe settlers as part of the original Agotime community foun-
dation, and argued that the schism between the Agotime and the Howusu of 
Ho had appeared through a misunderstanding during the Asante war. 
Mahumasro as a chief and candidate for the stool of the head chief in 1932 
probably had his own reasons in promoting such a version, which became 
accepted.266
Therefore, members of the so-called Central Togo Minorities or the 
Adangme-speaking Agotime were quite capable of managing their identifi-
cations according to the regional necessities. In the late nineteenth century, 
the political entity was the central point of reference. However, these enti-
ties suffered under the German intrusion, and the Awatime Native State was 
only a shadow of the pre-colonial states. During the Ewe unification cam-
paign, these chiefs supported the grand project, although their communities 
had over the years quite often insisted that they were not Ewe. Where the 
interest of the ruling dynasty was at stake, flexibility in identification was 
very possible.
(London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1949), 5, to be found in tna, pro, 
CO/96/790/3.
264 praad (Accra), adm 11/1/1624, Rattray, Report by Mr. R.S. Rattray (without number), with-
out date, 38; Ward, Barbara, ‘Some Notes on Migration from Togoland’, African Affairs 
49(195), 1950, 129–35, 131; Ward, Barbara, ‘An Analysis of the Distribution of Population in 
a Town in British Togoland’, Man 55, 1955, 35–9, 35–6.
265 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/216, Commissioner of the Eastern Province to Secretary for 
Native Affairs of Gold Coast, Preliminary History of Agotime (without number), 15 Feb. 
1932, 1–2; Nugent, ‘Putting’, 939.
266 praad (Accra), adm 39/1/216, The Preliminary History of the Agotime. (without number), 
without date, 1–2.
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 Outlook: Political Ewe-ness in the Ghana Volta Region,  
Neutralised Ewe-ness in Togo
British Togoland lost its status as a separate territorial unit in 1957. In spite of 
more than twelve years of Ewe unification campaigns, and of some ten years of 
Togoland reunification propaganda, the cpp was successful against the pro-
gramme of the Togoland Congress (tc). Some of the local chiefs participated 
actively in the defeat of the tc, such as in the case of Anfoega where Togbe 
Tepre Hodo intimidated tc activists and organised riots against tc electoral 
campaign meetings.267
After the cpp victory in the Trans-Volta Togoland Region, the Nkrumah gov-
ernment started to become more relaxed about Ewe issues in its rhetoric, and 
even to invoke ‘Ewe solidarity’ whenever this was useful. With regard to com-
munities like Mafi, Awudome, Fodjoku, and Togome, Nkrumah’s cabinet mem-
bers urged politicians and chiefs from Togoland to consider more cooperation 
with ‘Ewes in the Gold Coast’. This could now easily be used as an argument to 
refuse political reform.268 Nevertheless, and in spite of the electoral victories of 
the cpp in the tvt Region, the representatives of the new Ghanaian adminis-
tration remained distrustful. In Ho, in the first half of the 1960s, the majority of 
civil servants in place were deliberately not taken from the group of Ewe-
speakers.269 Such decisions alienated former supporters in the area from the 
cpp politics. The idea that particular ‘forces’ in the region worked for secession 
and armed resistance existed over decades.
In Togo, there was a similar uneasiness about a possible arms trade and a 
possible Ghanaian invasion in the region of Kpalimé.270 However, the post-
colonial centralised state focused on controlling the local communities and 
their chiefs through the préfets (district commissioners), and on local distri-
bution of resources. These conditions played against ethnic allegiance. In the 
canton of Agu, the seat of the paramount chief was removed from Kebu 
Dzigbe to Toubadji.271 In the neighbouring canton of Kuma, the long-standing 
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centre of power in Tokple being at its apogee under the rule of Dom Gamety 
V in the 1950s, the post-colonial state led to the installation of a parallel can-
ton chief from Dame.272 Identification with ‘Ewe-ness’, which could have 
been employed to reconcile local communications, remained very much in 
the background.
The category of ‘Ewe’ retained some of its importance in land issues and 
similar administrative practices. This can be shown in the numerous conflicts 
in the Kpalimé region of Togo during the 1960s and 1970s, as during those 
between Village Chief Léléklélé ii and the youth association of Agbétiko.273 
Similarly, when in 1972 an alliance of dignitaries and elders attempted to 
remove Théophile Dom Gamety V as paramount chief (chef de canton) of 
Kuma, they claimed that among other alleged misdeeds he had betrayed com-
mon Ewe origins. The fact that Dom Gamety V had not participated in the 
yearly festivities in Notsie, was employed to demand his retirement.274 This 
shows that sensitivities with regard to Ewe culture could indeed be employed 
under particular circumstances.
However, most group conflicts in Gbassinje Eyadéma’s Togo remained con-
centrated on the local level, including on issues of identification and group 
mobilisation. In the context of migration to Lomé, locals organised in associa-
tions of originaires. As in the case of Agu Nyogbo Agbetiko, these associations 
would attempt to influence developments in their village community of origin, 
but would no longer represent a larger group idea. Ewe-ness was unimportant 
in comparison to local affiliation.
Amongst the Ewe-speakers, ethnic solidarity was one option of mobilisa-
tion. It became more attractive as pre-colonial political entities such as Peki or 
Anlo often did not manage to offer a convincing alternative. Even so, it 
remained in the background for a long period, as ‘divisional’ group identities 
continued to be the principal form of group idenfications in the Trans-Volta 
Region. The pan-Ewe mobilisation of the 1940s was a spectacular exception. 
However, it had a surprisingly low impact on the long-term situation, as it did 
not enduringly eclipse local orientations.
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 The Hidden Factor: Experiences of Statehood and Ethnicity  
in the Long-Term Perspective
Comparing the evolution of forms of group solidarities over the long-term per-
spective is a complex project. Nevertheless, the case studies discussed in this 
study allow me to formulate a number of more general conclusions. Before 
bringing these conclusions into a larger panorama, and engaging in the broader 
discussion of their implications, I will first recapitulate some results with a 
focus on a particular point of culmination, which has become evident in our 
empirical cases: the start of the last phase of reform under late colonial rule, 
just before decolonisation. As we have already seen in the different case stud-
ies, the years between roughly, 1942 and 1957 represented a particular challenge 
to established community patterns.
In different communities of coastal West Africa, they constituted a phase of 
aggressive political claims, which in turn produced challenges to established 
local or sub-regional systems of ‘traditional government’ under colonial rule. In 
the historiography of sub-Saharan Africa, this phenomenon has only partially 
been commented on. Normally, in studies on Africa’s decolonisation, local vio-
lence has been interpreted as a reaction to a modernising world, in which new 
forms of political expression had become available, and in which the represen-
tatives of the Old Regime – the chiefs, frequently regarded as a product of colo-
nial rule – were increasingly understood as a relic that was to be removed as 
quickly as possible. Other scholars have insistently referred to waves of discon-
tent in the wake of the decolonisation process, which targeted, through protest 
against the chiefs, the very structures of European domination.
In both variants of interpretations, which are often intertwined, the focus lay 
very strongly on issues of ‘modernisation’ and ‘liberation’. It has apparently been 
impossible for some time to link the protests of the late colonial period to phenom-
ena of ethnic solidarity, and to speak of ethnic mobilisation. Of course, there were 
those new political parties that, in the literature, were occasionally categorised as 
‘tribalist’ – but such parties were, seemingly inevitably, doomed to fail, while the 
westernised movements demanding a nation state appeared to win the day.1  
1 Chabal, Patrick, ‘Emergencies and nationalist wars in Portuguese Africa’, Journal of Imperial 
and Commonwealth History 21(3), 1993, 235–49, 242.
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From this point of view, the chances for mobilisation of ‘ethnic protest movements’ 
seemed to be minimal in the whole of sub-Saharan Africa: at best, we identify a 
‘traditional electorate’ that had to be convinced through ethnic arguments, even 
during the mobilisation campaigns of the new anti-colonial politicians. However, 
the occasional ethnic slogans used were, by definition, a necessary evil that, for the 
nationalist leaders, were nothing more than a tool.
My analysis of processes in the selected West African coastal areas in the 
1940s and 1950s, has given us a distinct picture. Local populations resorted, at 
certain periods very strongly, to ethnic formulae; these strategies appeared in 
all case studies, and repeatedly. They were employed in an attempt to carve out 
opposition against unpopular chiefs, who were now defined by the protesters 
as ‘strangers’, and as ‘usurpers’ of posts for which they had no ‘traditional’ 
claim. At the same time, ethnic argumentations made the rounds in the strug-
gle for attractive posts at the heart of reformed administrations, and in newly 
created territorial governments. These posts were new assets, and, as such, 
they frequently enjoyed considerable prestige.
We have seen that the Wolof-speakers of the Petite Côte and beyond had pre-
viously been mostly passive in their employment of ethnic formulae. In the pre-
colonial period, but also under colonial rule, the larger category of ‘Wolof’ was 
something that existed only at the margins of the community. If it was men-
tioned at all, it remained an obsession of European visitors and residents, and, in 
particular, of the colonial officials organising the new local administration in the 
second half of the nineteenth century and in the twentieth century. The ‘Wolof’ 
would appear as a category in administrative reports and statistics. However, the 
practical importance of this category was extremely limited: very few cases of a 
particular Wolof mobilisation and solidarity existed during this period. Also, no 
signs can be found that the colonial engagement in categorisation triggered a 
more frequent self-definition of local Wolof-speakers under the ethnic label of 
‘Wolof’. Where groups of this category had been drawn into conflicts, local lead-
ers gladly used European anthropological work, but there was no push from the 
side of the colonial subjects to employ the category more regularly.
On the contrary, the different groups of Sereer-speaking neighbours of 
the  Wolophone populations challenged Wolof-speakers, who they held as a 
distinct ethnic group. The respective mobilisation processes were strongest in 
the two phases of extreme sociocultural change in coastal Senegal, that is, in 
the second half of the nineteenth century during colonial conquest, and in the 
1940s and early 1950s, during colonial reform and territorial democratisation. 
On both occasions, Sereer-speakers reacted to a new situation. They attacked 
the ‘Wolof dominance’ (i.e. the dominance of Wolof-speaking rulers and digni-
taries) in the pre-colonial political units, and their supremacy in structures of 
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‘traditional rule’ during the colonial period. Even under pressure from Sereer-
speakers, Wolof-speakers remained unwilling to resort to ethnic formulae, 
which continued to be exceptional in the political discussion. Only after the 
independence of Senegal did the numerical dominance of Wolof-speaking 
populations of Senegambia become translated into an active ethnic discourse, 
but even the dimensions of this ‘Wolofisation’ are still unclear. The process was 
different in the British colony of the Gambia (and in the southern regions of 
Casamance), where Wolof-speakers before colonial conquest had been a 
minority endangered by endemic warfare and characterised by the absence of 
reliable pre-colonial state structures. The reliance of the British colonial 
administration in the Gambia on ‘ethnic principles’ of organisation led to 
recurrent friction and conflicts after independence. Under these circum-
stances, local leaders and their populations ‘discovered’ the use of ethnic argu-
ments as a promising means of group mobilisation. In this context, ‘Wolof ’ was 
far more popular as a label of group mobilisation than was the case in northern 
Senegambia.
The Temne of northern Sierra Leone also mobilised in the 1950s against a 
group of local ‘traditional’ rulers, but the context of this mobilisation was 
entirely different from the Senegalese experience. Temne-speakers had actively 
employed the label of ‘Temne’ during all of the conflicts of the nineteenth century. 
In difficult political situations, that is under the pressure of neighbouring 
 ethnolinguistic groups, they had been engaged in creating group cohesion 
through the employment of ethnic arguments. While the context in which we 
can make the use of these pre-colonial slogans visible, is limited to the ways in 
which Temne-speaking leaders reported upon mobilisation strategies in dis-
cussions with the future colonisers, it is, nevertheless, quite evident that these 
ethnic solidarities were employed during the nineteenth century. The use of 
the ethnic label was subject to fluctuations according to conditions on the 
ground, and was less frequent in some particular periods. Even so, it remained 
a constant factor for self-identification and mobilisation beyond village and 
town communities.
Only after 1900 did ethnic solidarity among Temne-speakers become less 
prominent and less aggressive – and only in the 1950s, considerably later than 
was the case for similar processes in the southern parts of Sierra Leone, did 
Temne-speakers again engage in widespread mobilisation under ethnic labels. 
After 1960 (but not before), these mobilisation strategies became increasingly 
dominant in Sierra Leone’s political arena. Unlike in Senegambia, where the 
multi-party system introduced in the mid-1940s was from the outset linked, as 
in the case of the Sereer-speakers, to ethnic sentiment, Sierra Leone’s United 
Progressive Party and its successor, the All People’s Congress, were only slowly 
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transformed into an ethnic platform of Temne-speakers and other ‘northern-
ers’. However, their ethnic mobilisation had far more enduring effects than was 
the case in Senegal.
The experience of the Ewe-speakers is different again. In the late 1940s, Ewe-
speaking leaders managed to create a spectacular political movement, which 
had an impact even at the international level, through the appearance of these 
leaders on the stage of the United Nations. However, the temporary success of 
organisations like the All-Ewe Conference stood in contrast to the visible ups-
and-downs of Ewe ethnic mobilisation during the second half of the nine-
teenth and the whole of the twentieth century. Ewe solidarity had experienced 
its first peak during the 1860s and 1870s, mainly caused by the inability of dif-
ferent Ewe-speaking community leaders to organise an efficient defensive 
coalition against massive Asante and Akwamu raids. The incursions of the 
armies from neighbouring regions, under these circumstances, not only had a 
traumatising effect on the local societies, but they also led to the employment 
of ethnic solidarity as a ‘last resort’ in order to stop the pillaging groups. As is 
evident from the many ‘traditional histories’ written between 1880 and 1930, 
this experience had a lasting impact on the collective memory of the members 
of Ewe-speaking communities.
However, the German and British occupations of the area east of the Volta 
River led to the rapid demise of ethnic principles in the region: in spite of the 
promotion of ‘tribal solidarity’ through missionaries and part of the colonial 
administration, the local populations focused (or probably refocused) on the 
political unit that the British would in the future call ‘division’. In the ways in 
which locals ‘sold’ their larger group identification to the colonial powers, in the 
form of the above-mentioned local histories, they would still refer to the Ewe soli-
darity that had helped them during the Asante incursions, but we find no ten-
dency to overstate these issues. In other arenas, such as land claims, succession 
claims, and other legal issues, the locals were quite content to relate to their ‘sub-
regional’ identification, that is, at ‘division’ level. The British administration was 
frustrated with this tendency of local populations to ignore ‘tribal’ bonds, and 
some ambitious leaders of the pre-colonial states that now stood under European 
rule, like Anlo’s Awoame Fia, remained active in justifying an enlargement of 
their authority through ethnic arguments. Normally, however, Ewe identification 
did not play a prominent role in political issues during the interwar period.
It was only from the early 1940s, when a group of British-educated and French-
educated middlemen discovered the Ewe issue as a vehicle for political mobili-
sation on a broader, international stage, that the problem of the larger ethnic 
identification of ‘the Ewe’ again became a point of intense debate. For some 
years, local leaders and their opponents attempted to jump on this bandwagon 
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by using the issue in their own interests. However, after a relatively short time, 
the question of Ewe solidarity became marginalised in the reform discussions in 
both British Togoland and French Togo. Most activists of the political forces 
turned to other rallying cries, including regional solidarity or social progress. It 
appears that after 1957/58, in the new independent state of Ghana that would 
include a part of former German Togo, being ‘Ewe’ remained a pertinent cate-
gory because of its appeal under conditions in which several inhabitants of the 
Trans-Volta Togoland Region felt excluded from the distribution of resources. In 
the Republic of Togo, ‘Ewe-ness’ did not become more than a category that was 
occasionally used for administrative issues, and as an additional argument dur-
ing struggles in the local arenas.
I will now attempt to give an explanation of the tumultuous processes of the 
years after 1945 in the long-term perspective in view of my empirical results. In 
three coastal West African areas, we find similarities with regard to challenges 
facing the ‘traditional structures’ in the post-Second World War period. 
However, the reactions and types of community mobilisation described were 
sometimes extremely dissimilar. How can we explain the diverging degrees of 
recourse, by the different communities, to ethnic mobilisation? In the initial 
parts of this study, I have pointed out that one technique with which to analyse 
differences in the forms of local identities is to follow them over the long-term 
process. In this book, I have limited the perspective to the period between ini-
tial stronger European engagement in the respective West African regions 
(around 1850) and decolonisation (around 1960). If one looks at the numerous 
examples, in which local spokesmen of groups ‘sold’ their identifications to 
colonial officials, in direct conversation, during land and succession conflicts, 
in local histories put together for very different reasons, and regarding alli-
ances between communities that had been forged over the years and even 
under colonial rule, we encounter a remarkable picture: the variable that 
defined the recourse to ethnicity, seems to have been ‘the state’ as a political 
unit – or, to describe this phenomenon in more precise terms, the local and 
regional ‘experience of statehood’. Both in its pre-colonial and in its colonial 
meaning, the presence of larger state structures gave a political answer to the 
frequent problems of the nineteenth and twentieth century, while the absence 
of such entities deprived those groups of alternative means for creating cohe-
sive communities. Where entities of statehood existed, communities ulti-
mately had no need to rely on ethnicity in moments of insecurity and external 
pressures.2
2 On the relationship between weak states and warlordism, see Reno, William, Warlord Politics 
and African States (Boulder – London: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 18–35.
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As we have seen, among the Wolophone populations of the Petite Côte and 
beyond, ethnic identifications did not play a central role for the communities. 
While their neighbours, in particular those belonging to Sereer-speaking 
groups, frequently formulated their ‘Sereer identity’, Wolof-speaking individu-
als, in contact situations with the colonial authorities – but also in their direct 
interactions with Sereer-speaking inhabitants – insisted on their identification 
as members of one of the pre-colonial states. They identified as being a subject 
of the Damel of Kajoor, of the Teeñ of Bawol, of the Brak of Waalo, the Buur Siin 
or the Buur Saluum. This seems to have been far more important for the local 
definition of individual and group identifications than any overarching Wolof 
solidarity.
It has to be emphasised that the experiences Wolophone populations had 
within these pre-colonial states were mixed. The basic mechanism of all larger 
political units in Senegambia was the extraction of tribute and of contribu-
tions: to arrive at these goals, the rulers of the political entities relied on the 
ceddo system, in which specialised warriors obtained the desired contribu-
tions, sometimes through coercion and intimidation, sometimes through out-
right plunder. Wolophone village communities were subject to regular visits of 
envoys with ceddo troops, and suffered under this irregular system of tribute-
raising. In contrast, in other areas, the pre-colonial state provided a certain 
platform to rely on, as the administrative units and troops guaranteed a relative 
degree of protection, and the scenario of conflicts between pre-colonial rulers 
predisposed certain arrangements in the case of conquest, although the sale of 
captives as slaves remained a reality until the end of the nineteenth century.
For the Wolof, the ‘statehood experience’ eclipsed the concept of ethnic soli-
darity. Furthermore, the widespread success of Islam in all the Senegalese 
regions peopled by Wolof-speakers combined in part with this trend. On the 
one hand, it offered a potential second path through which to formulate a non-
ethnic group identification, which was useful in situations of conflict and 
rivalled ethnic mobilisation. On the other hand, however, many representatives 
of local dynasties became engaged supporters of the Muridiyya in the interwar 
period. Membership of the brotherhood gave them an additional legitimacy.
After the First World War, the direct link to the – now largely disappeared – 
states became weaker in the memory of Wolof-speaking populations. The pre-
colonial entities were, in any case, less frequently mentioned in the traditions 
through which locals ‘sold’ the characteristics of their group to the agents of the 
colonial power. Nonetheless, this was not a massive change. In particular, indi-
viduals among the paramount chiefs who could claim to be in a family line to 
the former ruling dynasties continued to enjoy considerable prestige. Therefore, 
it would be correct to say that the memory of relations with the pre-colonial 
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political entities remained the central point of reference for Wolof-speakers – 
together with membership of the Muridiyya or, eventually, the Tijaniyya. This 
general panorama continued as a stable pattern until independence. The major 
exception – to be found in some parts of the Petite Côte, but, most strongly, in 
the region of Louga – was conflict between Wolophone peasants and Fulfulde-
speaking cattle-breeders. This latter type of conflict was fought out at village 
level, but it concerned vital resources. It is not surprising that the usual primary 
reference to the pre-colonial state did not help under these conditions, as the 
states had always rather protected the Fulfulde-speakers on their territory; they 
had been economically useful subjects and potential auxiliary troops. On the 
contrary, the opposition constructed betweenWolof and ‘Pël’ on ethnic grounds, 
which was quickly resorted to during these conflicts, was linked to the tensions 
between the Sufi brotherhoods: Wolof-speakers would turn to Murid mar-
abouts for support during these struggles, while Fulfulde-speakers would 
mobilise the backing of the Tijaniyya.
An interesting and highly significant alternative path is the experience of 
Wolophone populations in the territory of what later became the British col-
ony of the Gambia. Here, local Wolof-speaking populations, like their neigh-
bours of other linguistic communities, could not rely on similarly stable 
pre-colonial state structures. They thus did not have a positive ‘statehood expe-
rience’. In the area of the Gambia River, the existing unstable units deterio-
rated further after the Jihads led by rulers of political entities. In this overall 
panorama, Gambian Wolof-speakers were far more eager to claim solidarity on 
ethnic terms than were Wolophone populations further northwards. The situ-
ation was similar in Casamance, where Wolophone immigrants lived under 
instability and threats of violence, and were more eager to insist on their eth-
nic identification. It is possible to consider this factor of an ethnic counter-
mobilisation of ‘Wolofs’ as a principal motive for the Casamance revolt of 1982.
On the Petite Côte – to come back to the region discussed as the case study 
– the emphasis of the Wolophone elite on state identification instead of ethnic 
identification created a possible way out of the political struggles of the 1940s 
and 1950s. The setting allowed opposed chiefs, such as Ely Manel N’Diaye, to 
‘disarm’ opposition movements that were working with ethnic claims. The 
Wolophone paramount chiefs could always claim to represent a ‘tradition’ that 
had nothing to do with ethnic solidarities; they were the heirs of political 
structures of authority, and they could claim to enjoy this authority also, at 
least in part, with the Sereer-speaking communities. The success of this strat-
egy explains, more than anything else, the surprising downturn in ethnically 
motivated mobilisation in this coastal region around 1951/52; it allowed a num-
ber of heavily attacked local leaders to survive politically.
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As far as the effects of pre-colonial ‘statehood’ are concerned, the region of 
northern Sierra Leone was entirely different from our examples from 
Senegambia. Among Temne-speakers, we had to consider a notable lack of any 
stronger political institutions. Port Loko, the main centre of the region, was 
merely a sort of small ‘city-state’. The latter expression could be used for a town 
controlling a part of its surroundings, with little impact on the life of the inhab-
itants of the neighbouring villages, and only over certain periods of the nine-
teenth century. Other town centres, such as Kambia, Magbele or Marampa, 
were similarly organised, and their rulers also had little impact in controlling 
any broader regions. The Alkali of Port Loko tried at least to claim a regional 
paramountcy in the second half of the nineteenth century, but he failed with 
these plans. He and his fellow Temne-speaking rulers did not find a formula of 
alliance, nor indeed any political overlordship of larger population groups.
Unlike the rulers of pre-colonial states in Senegambia, the leaders of ‘city-
state’ communities in northern Sierra Leone were usually unable even to claim 
regular tributes from a greater number of settlements in the region. Similarly, 
they were never in a position to give protection to the populations of broader 
regions. This situation became obvious in the nineteenth century during the 
different waves of incursions of Susu-speaking troops, or during the Yoni War 
– occasions during which the Temne-speaking rulers showed to the fullest 
their inability to limit the effects of warfare. Under these circumstances, the 
only means of the rulers of the larger Temne-speaking settlements to affect the 
lives of populations in their vicinity was through plunder and small skirmishes. 
Campaigns of this type were indeed carried out regularly.3 They added to the 
general feeling of insecurity in the region, and created, for the local popula-
tions, a ‘statehood experience’ that was entirely negative – at least if one holds 
that the local political units had any of the characteristics of ‘states’.
In the first half of the nineteenth century, but probably continuing a situa-
tion from the eighteenth century, Temne-speaking communities were situated 
at the margins of two larger pre-colonial entities: the federation of Morea, an 
alliance dominated by Mandinka-speaking rulers, and the Almamis of Timbo, 
in the Fuuta Jallon. However, the latter had only been interested in control of 
the caravan trade routes to the coast, although they remained the object of 
widespread fear. The Almami of Forékaria, leader of the federation of Morea, 
was unable to discipline even the chiefs in his closest surroundings, and from 
3 This can be considered as a counter-model to the evolution of the pre-colonial state of Segu, 
as described by Jean Bazin in ‘Etat guerrier et guerres d’Etat’, in Jean Bazin and Emmanuel 
Terray (eds.), Guerres de lignages et guerres d’Etats en Afrique (Paris: Editions des archives 
contemporaines, 1982), 321–74, 336–40.
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the 1870s, the French administration soon destroyed what remained of his 
political prestige. The colonial border thus prepared and ultimately fixed on 
the colonial maps effectively cut off northern Sierra Leone from both Forékaria 
and from the hierarchy of dignitaries that survived the French conquest of the 
Fuuta Jallon in the 1890s.
The absence of state structures in the region of northern Sierra Leone made 
wars smaller as regards scale. However, it is also evident that these wars were 
far more destructive than the average Senegambian conflict. Rules of warfare 
were less reliable, if they existed at all, and Temne-speaking villagers could not 
turn to any entity or institution that would have intervened on their behalf. In 
the 1830s, the ongoing presence of such destructive warfare brought wide-
spread despair even at the level of local rulers, and led to the invitation to 
British envoys from Freetown to become intermediaries in the regional con-
flicts. The type of warfare, conditioned by political fragmentation of the area, 
also explains with much plausibility the constant employment of an ethnic 
argumentation. Whenever settlements were menaced by a threat that could be 
classified as non-Temne, the ethnic card was a last resort to concentrate forces 
against the attackers.
The presence of Limba-speaking, Loko-speaking, and, above all, Susu-
speaking war bands in the region created the motive to resort to these strategies 
of ethnic solidarity. During the decades of British diplomatic activity in future 
Sierra Leone over the whole of the nineteenth century, the diplomats from 
Freetown were again and again confronted with the criterion of Temne-ness 
used in a number of contexts. Mainly, this criterion appeared as an argument to 
forge alliances between local Temne-speaking rulers and communities which, 
given the lack of reliable state structures, needed these argumentations as a 
sort of last resort whenever they were threatened with complete destruction.
In this logic, it is not surprising that with the imposition of the British pro-
tectorate, the eagerness of locals (and local elites) to emphasise their ‘Temne 
identity’ seems to have declined or even evaporated. The label was no longer 
really needed. As, after the Hut Tax War, destructive warfare in the formerly 
typical style was no longer possible, local populations could now turn to less 
existential problems. This is not to say that British rule over the Sierra Leone 
Protectorate was benign: as I have pointed out, among other abuses, British 
officials maintained a system of chieftaincy that allowed for the use of forced 
labour. In particular, farms and buildings of chiefs were in many cases main-
tained by the locals without receiving any payment. However, in chieftaincy 
issues including conflicts for power, there was at the beginning, in the new pat-
terns set by the colonial state, no need to emphasise ethnic configurations. The 
whole period between the start of the century and 1945 was rather ‘peaceful’ 
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in terms of broader rural relations. Even the paramount chieftaincies, in which 
local groups of the different language communities now had to coexist, were 
comparatively free from inter-community strife. In this context, ethnic argu-
mentations remained a marginal phenomenon.
The view became quite different, however, as soon as populations of Sierra 
Leone’s north started to believe that a government dominated by a distinct 
group in Freetown was attempting to withdraw from them the state guarantees 
of protection (and, for the late colonial period, the roughly even distribution of 
resources) from which they had profited under the colonial state. This general 
feeling led to a process of counter-mobilisation, starting at the local level, but 
slowly becoming a larger phenomenon. The mobilisation campaign went on 
for years, but, in the end, the sentiment of marginalisation in a renegotiated 
state laid the ground for a renaissance of ethnic Temne sentiment. The argu-
mentation remobilised an old formula. The idea that only the reliance on eth-
nic solidarity would save the Temne-speakers from a ‘dictatorship’ of the 
‘Mende southerners’ had major importance for voting behaviour in post- 
colonial Sierra Leone, where ethnicity remained the dominant cleavage. Ethnic 
voting retained its role at least until the 1990s.
In the panorama of results, I have thus pointed out Senegambia as an exam-
ple of a region whose trajectory was dominated by fairly strong pre-colonial 
political units (states), which offered an alternative means of mobilisation to 
ethnic solidarity, while northern Sierra Leone can be considered as a zone 
where the absence of any larger political entities made the fixation on ethnic 
mobilisation sometimes almost inevitable. My third case, the Volta River 
region, can be considered as a case between those two extremes. In the 
 present-day border region between Ghana and Togo, some of the political 
units were indeed stronger than those of pre-colonial Sierra Leone: Peki in the 
hinterland of the coast, and Anlo at the Keta Lagoon, developed the most vis-
ible activities towards political centralisation during the nineteenth century. 
The presence of extremely coherent and militarily successful pre-colonial 
states in their neighbourhood played an essential catalytic role in these pro-
cesses: Peki had a political and military organisation modelled on Asante and 
Akwamu, and Anlo had, at the moment of British conquest, at least partly 
developed in the same direction.
After colonial penetration into the area, the British as colonial rulers further 
strengthened these solidarities, by transforming both Anlo and Peki into so-
called ‘native states’. This decision preserved a part of the authority of the 
respective two leaders. It is thus no surprise that during political unrest in Keta 
and Anloga, particularly during the 1940s, the different sides involved all 
claimed that they had the prosperous future of Anlo State in mind. Although 
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the All-Ewe Conference was at its peak of mobilisation capacity during this 
period, the conflicts in Anlo proceeded without even mentioning the factor of 
Ewe-ness. However, it is also true that the creation of the colonial border cut 
off the Pekihene and the Awoame Fia from the constituencies for which they 
claimed effective rule. Although both leaders, and other leading figures, 
attempted to play on links with the pan-Ewe movement, they did not manage 
to return to the centre of the regional politics of Ewe-speakers.
This played all the greater a role since in other parts of the region, mostly 
under German rule from 1884 (or at the latest 1890), the impact of pre-colonial 
statehood, or ‘statehood experience’, was entirely negative. In the 1860s, many 
Ewe-speakers of the Trans-Volta area had learned a bitter lesson about the lim-
its of state power, in the event of destructive raids from outside. Faced with an 
Asante and Akwamu invasion, Peki was literally swept away. The Awoame Fia, 
in contrast, sided with the invaders, which left the rulers of Ewe-speaking com-
munities of the region with an even more significant impression. In this par-
ticular situation, it appeared necessary to have recourse to ethnic rallying cries. 
It was only by invoking a joint Ewe identification – probably also by insisting 
upon the origin myths of common migration – that the Pekihene and other 
leaders managed to forge a durable alliance. Although dramatically inferior in 
its military means in comparison to the Akwamu and Asante raiders, this alli-
ance allowed them to at least organise a more or less effective resistance in the 
hilly reaches east of the Volta River.
The memory of this cooperation remained a factor within the political situ-
ation of the region. Such a conclusion is obvious from the ways in which the 
events of the 1860s and 1870s, often combined with reflections on the Taviefe 
War of 1888, continuously appear in the historical ‘tradition’ recounted by 
members of the most different communities. However, in its practical dimen-
sions, the effects of this ethnic identification were largely dormant until 1945. 
We do not have any convincing proof for D.E.K. Amenumey’s claim, which 
insinuated that the Awoame Fia of Anlo and other Ewe-speaking rulers repeat-
edly referred to this common ethnic heritage before the Second World War. 
This problem can today no longer be approached through oral interviews, and 
the written sources (including the transcripts of, and notes on, the ‘tradition’ of 
local communities written down in the interwar period) suggest that Ewe soli-
darity was not a reality in the interwar period. By contrast, in the 1940s, Ewe-
ness was rediscovered as a successful means of mobilisation. In the regional 
logic, the reliance on ethnic Ewe mobilisation seemed first – and obviously not 
successfully – to be a means to obtain the control of an independent territory, 
although the plans of many of the leaders of the pan-Ewe movement were not 
very precise. During the 1940s and 1950s, Ewe-ness would then, however, also 
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be employed as a lever in more local conflicts, as in Atiavi in Anlo State. 
Nonetheless, the appearance of the ethnic variable was normally carefully cho-
sen, and it never became the only principle in inter-community conflicts.
 The Colonial State: A Limited Impact
The findings of this study reverse, for the examples from coastal West Africa, a 
number of dominant views on processes of ethnic mobilisation. This is impor-
tant as conventional wisdom on ethnicity in sub-Saharan Africa still holds that 
the role of the colonial administration had an immense impact in the process 
of transforming ethnic solidarity into aggressive and even genocidal activities. 
While no historian, and probably no anthropologist, would today still defend 
the idea that colonial officials and European missionaries alone ‘invented’ the 
existence of the different ‘ethnic groups’, and then transposed these categories 
upon passive and manipulated populations, it is still a common view that the 
colonial methods of administration played their part in triggering the clearer 
bond to ethnic elements in the idenfications of African individuals and African 
groups. My comparative discussion does not challenge the importance of 
European rule for the reconstitution of local solidarities and communities. 
However, it provides a different interpretation of processes and chronologies.
This study does not defy the view that colonial officials of all European sys-
tems of rule, influenced by the ideas of racial and national difference that were 
en vogue between 1875 and 1945 in the respective metropoles, were largely con-
vinced that it was most appropriate to categorise colonial populations in 
‘tribal’ ensembles. Nevertheless, there is little evidence in coastal West Africa 
that they ever implemented these views practically, nor that they forced them 
upon the minds of passive African recipients. In many cases, the structures 
supported by the agents of the colonial administration already had their refer-
ence points in pre-colonial political units. The administrators might have 
weakened the political prerogatives of these entities, they might occasionally 
have made their rulers appear ridiculous, or as mere instruments of European 
wishes, particularly when it came to tax enforcement or the organisation of 
forced labour for the colonial state. However, colonial engagement did not 
automatically cut the connection to previous ‘statehood experience’. The expe-
rience populations had with these political entities continued to matter.
Northern Sierra Leonean chieftaincies reproduced, if anything, the rule of 
established dynasties from the nineteenth century; in the Gambia, the effects 
were weaker, but in their basic mechanisms similar. Local populations had in 
both regions used ethnic arguments for mobilisation before, but these 
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mobilisations had had nothing to do with European intermediaries, nor had 
they had any lasting effect on the structure of regional political units. In 
Senegal, the French never imposed any ethnic principles of rule. They did 
not even tackle the stereotypical problem of ‘Wolof chiefs’ ruling over ‘Sereer 
peasants’ in part of the Petite Côte and its hinterland; during the peak period 
of theories expressing the adequateness and necessity of ‘tribal rule’, these 
officials stuck to their deployment of a Wolophone chieftaincy, whether the 
communities under its rule were in their majority Wolophone- or Sereer-
speaking. In the Volta River area, both the Germans and the British relied on 
a type of ‘division’, which they would, in retrospective view, describe as the 
successor entities of the former political units. Later on, the French cantons 
followed this pattern. It is true that at least the British, after 1920, tended to 
treat administrative divisions as quasi-ethnic groups. However, this point did 
not have many practical consequences in the future, and the parallel practice 
of creating ‘amalgamated states’ ran counter to any attempts at ‘ethnic cate-
gorisation’. Amalgamation created other bonds through political practice; it 
even pushed populations that were, although sometimes selectively, not 
always part of the ‘Ewe’ ensemble (according to missionary and early anthro-
pological reports), to work closely together with the different leaders of Ewe-
speaking divisions. In the case of the Avatime political hierarchies, and of 
other leading groups of ‘divisions’, this phenomenon might, paradoxically, 
have created unexpected results: in the end, under appropriate circum-
stances, very different local authorities could claim to be ‘Ewe’ and mobilise 
within the pan-Ewe movement. In Senegal and northern Sierra Leone, the 
gathering together of different linguistic groups in administrative entities 
also helped, although in less sustained ways, to diminish effects of group hos-
tility in the sense of ethnic antagonisms.
A glance at comparable cases in coastal West Africa seems to confirm these 
findings – although it would need to be pursued further through analytical 
research. In the Gold Coast, the British were not very active in encouraging the 
creation of ethnic identifications in the Colony (the southern part of current-
day Ghana) and the Ashanti Protectorate. While they did not block the emer-
gence of a Fante sentiment among coastal populations, the appearance of this 
sentiment was nonetheless a pre-colonial process of the second half of the 
nineteenth century, and it mainly transformed a political federation and the 
traumatic experience of Asante pressure into a formulation of group identifi-
cations. Asante as an important ‘traditional authority’ was maintained under 
British rule, but, then, this British engagement resulted in the preservation of a 
political structure, where ‘statehood experience’ was in spite of all existing 
opposition broadly shared, and where it had strong, participatory elements.
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In Côte d’Ivoire, the French also did very little to formalise any ethnic rule in 
the case of the larger language groups, such as the ‘Baule’ or the ‘Agni’. The chef-
ferie supérieure of the Baule was a rather recent construct, and it had not been 
created as a result of the initiative of colonial administrators. It took a long 
time to transform ‘the Baule’ into a dominant and politically active group, and 
this only happened in the face of the political tensions of the post-colonial 
period.4 In the case of Nigeria’s Yoruba-speaking groups, the pattern was simi-
lar. Although the emergence of an autonomous Yoruba literature was an earlier 
phenomenon which allowed an identity-building process to be pushed for-
ward through a ‘Yoruba historiography’, this was a process not reflected in con-
scious provincial administration. For this administration, British officials still 
relied on political and state structures (as they did in the north of the colony 
with the Sokoto Caliphate and Bornu).
In the case of the future South-western Region of Nigeria, British colonial 
planning meant a practice in which the authorities of the leading city-states 
like Oyo or Ibadan still retained a leading role. The role of these authorities 
survived for a time, in spite of the massive socio-economic transformations 
triggered by internal migration movements.5 These led only in the end to new 
challenges and conflicts in which the power of these authorities was subject to 
sometimes violent contestation, of which the first electoral campaigns of the 
1950s were the beginning. Moreover, the ethnic variable could be activated in 
the repertoire of many locals as a means both in internal struggles and in the 
defensive position against groups and populations coming in from other parts 
of Nigeria.6 This, again, was not a colonial activity. It was due to a process of 
change from the late colonial period, which relied on principles of cultural 
homogenisation that had eagerly been absorbed by local elites.
The patterns of behaviour as related to ethnic identifications and the 
state, as I have proposed them here, also give an explanation for the violent 
4 Lesourd, Michel, ‘Une remise en cause de l’ethnicité: Le comportement sociospatial des 
Baule émigrés dans le sud-ouest de la Côte d’Ivoire’, in Jean-Pierre Chrétien and Gérard 
Prunier (eds.), Les ethnies ont une histoire (second edition, Paris: Karthala, 2003), 76–90.
5 A different approach is taken in Apter, Andrew, ‘Yoruba Ethnogenesis from Within’, 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 55(2), 2013, 356–87. While Apter’s method dis-
counts the question of political opportunities much too quickly, his main findings are com-
plementary with my results for other groups of coastal West Africa, especially when it comes 
to flexibility and the question of gains.
6 Ikpe, Ukana B., ‘The patrimonial state and inter-ethnic conflicts in Nigeria’, Ethnic and Racial 
Studies 32(4), 2009, 679–97; and, especially, the new Adebanwi, Wale, Yorùbá Elites and Ethnic 




reactions during the initial introduction of colonial tax systems as discussed 
in Chapter 1. The Temne-speakers of northern Sierra Leone, the Wolophone 
populations of the Gambia, and the Ewe-speakers of the Volta River region – 
who had shown the most immediate and strongest reaction to the introduc-
tion of colonial taxation – had had their most far-reaching hopes set on the 
protective function of the future administrations. These hopes were strongest 
where a pre-colonial ‘statehood experience’ did not exist, and where only eth-
nic mobilisation had been known as a broader principle of mobilisation, 
although with unreliable successes over the decades. The ease with which 
colonial officials could, from the 1850s, secure far-reaching agreements over 
regional protectorates, was not only due to deceit, to misunderstandings, and 
to the impressiveness of the force displayed by European armies from about 
1850. In the three above-mentioned zones, locals also actively sought protec-
torates because of the insecurity under which they lived, either during a phase 
of weakness of the existing pre-colonial states, or in a position at their margins 
and as victims of plundering campaigns of these states. Sometimes (as in the 
case of the communities neighbouring Morea in northern Sierra Leone, or those 
adjacent in their territory to the area claimed by Peki or Anlo) they had lost their 
trust in the protection offered by neighbouring pre-colonial states. As we have 
seen, in northern Sierra Leone, the British protection seemed to guarantee secu-
rity from destruction as in the event of the brutal inter-community wars that had 
characterised this region over the whole of the nineteenth century; in the 
Gambia, Wolof-speakers expected help against the rampages of the Jihad troops 
of Foday Sylla and other war leaders; in the Ewe-speaking regions of the Trans-
Volta area, the British engagement seemed to offer at least some protection 
against the campaigns of Akwamu and Asante armies (or at least a middleman 
role in obtaining this help from the Kings of Accra), which in the 1870s and even 
the 1880s were still a shock fresh in local memories.
However, it is obvious that these hopes were quickly disappointed. On the 
European side, the erection of a system of ‘native tax’ was regarded as one of 
the vital and necessary parts of colonial rule. The motivations for the creation 
of exploitative tax systems, and even for the tax obsession that some European 
colonial administrators would show, were manifold: attempts to make the ter-
ritories lucrative for the metropole, and racist preconceptions that saw the 
imposition of constraint to force Africans to work as inevitable, both led to 
these tax decisions. The impact of the relatively high tax levels was evidently 
felt in many parts of West Africa, and led to resistance. However, regions in 
which local populations had not been confronted with previous systems of 
taxation, and where, normally, tribute was demanded on an irregular basis by 
oppressive outsiders, became geographical centres of revolt and tax evasion. 
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The experience with pre-colonial state structures thus not only characterised 
the patterns of ethnic mobilisation, but also contributed to the reaction of 
communities on the colonial experience of taxation.
Most of the themes in African history that have gained great prominence 
over the last twenty years have been contributed to by cultural studies: syncre-
tist religion, the impact of gender, and questions of generational relations, for 
instance, are all subjects that have greatly broadened our view of African soci-
eties. However, if we wish to understand decisions of groups to choose identi-
fications, and to show solidarity in given moments, we have to bring the 
experience of ‘statehood’ back into the picture. In a way, this conclusion also 
strengthens the case for a new political history of African populations – but 
one that analyses the agency of locals choosing their form of mobilisation and 
solidarity in the face of manifold challenges, including the conditions of colo-
nial conquest.
 West African Ethnicity and Global History
The comparison of the three coastal West African examples, in view of their 
historical dimension, suggests a model of explanation for ethnic mobilisation 
in a long-term perspective. The influence of pre-colonial states, of a ‘statehood 
experience’ (even if in still rudimentary forms), and the ways in which state 
structures were taken as a point of reference, is quite important. Where such 
structures were at work, they normally eclipsed the ethnic argument. In other 
words, where stronger state structures existed, the recourse to ethnic mobilisa-
tion was not normally regarded as a necessary strategy. By contrast, in the 
absence of reliable state structures, locals eventually turned to an insistence 
on ethnic solidarity to reach their goals.7
What could these results mean for the debate on global history? Would it be 
possible, as Toyin Falola has claimed, for the experiments with nationhood in 
sub-Saharan Africa after independence to put ethnic mobilisation in a global 
perspective?8 As I have pointed out in the first two chapters of this book, many 
of the categories of group cohesion and mobilisation – ‘ethnicity’, ‘nation’, 
7 This relationship between ethnic identity and security is also alluded to in a number of stud-
ies and handbooks, which, however, do not normally draw any larger and analytic conclu-
sions from the matter, see Collins, Robert O., and James M. Burns, A History of Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Cambridge et al: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 366–7.
8 Falola, Toyin, ‘Writing and Teaching National History in Africa in an Era of Global History’, 
Africa Spectrum 40(3), 2005, 499–519.
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‘state’ – are very relevant for groups in various parts of the globe, and it is cru-
cial to put the coastal West African experience into this view.
I suggested in the discussion on the use of categories in a global perspective 
that ‘ethnicity’ was artificially reserved for sub-Saharan Africa, ‘native America’, 
and ‘tribal Asia’, as if these world regions had been characterised by an entirely 
different type of group organisation. Obviously, the combination of colonial 
domination and repression, and the belief of the European colonisers that 
they had to classify local subjects according to racialised and negative stereo-
types, had an impact on group organisation. However, it is dangerous to see in 
the importance of ethnic labels the import of such labels from European 
invention. Global history has notably made it possible to approach the agen-
cies in entangled processes such as European colonialism (and beyond 
Eurocentric interpretations), but at the same time to take into account the fact 
that European expansion changed the perspectives of this agency.
In the decades before colonial conquest, and in the conquest phase itself, 
many parts of West Africa were characterised by massive insecurity for com-
munities. This insecurity was at least partly provoked by European activities on 
Africa’s coasts: the European demand for slaves to be transported into the 
Americas fuelled violent conflicts between communities; the change in export 
patterns from ‘human merchandise’ to ‘legal’ export crops intensified the use 
of slave labour in some agrarian zones, and therefore slave-raiding; in the con-
quest phase, European residents became the allies of local rulers who wished 
to increase their regional position and who used this support to attack neigh-
bouring communities. The presence of European residents also had an impact 
in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century South and South-east Asia, where 
European participation in local conflicts in some cases changed the balance 
and ultimately intensified violence. However, the pressure on communities 
where state structures were relatively weak, was probably strongest in the con-
text of West and West Central Africa, given its involvement in the late period of 
the slave trade and subsequent systems of enslavement.
After the establishment of colonial structures, these pressures diminished. 
Clearly, the colonial states – in sub-Saharan Africa, but also with regard to sev-
eral communities in South and South-east Asia – had their own impact in cre-
ating ‘traditions’ according to European imaginations of either useful or 
‘authentic’ rule. However, the period between 1918 and 1945 may have been 
characterised by abuses and the creation of systems of patronage in rural areas, 
but not as much by ethnic mobilisation.9 The problems of exploitation under 
9 Mamdani, Mahmood, Citizen and subject: contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonial-
ism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
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European domination were of another nature, and the recourse to ethnic argu-
ments remained rare. This does not mean that such conflicts were entirely 
absent under colonial rule.10 Even so, it is remarkable that local communities 
rather mobilised the reference to existing state structures, and used these ‘tra-
ditions’ as principal arguments. It would obviously be an interesting next step 
to put these colonial experiences from the African continent into an even 
larger, comparative analysis of different cases, including other regions, namely 
in Asia.
The late colonial period after 1945 has, for many contexts, been described as 
a phase of attempted modernisation and of experimentation with enlarged 
democratic structures. Interestingly – at least in the context of sub-Saharan 
Africa – the evolution of the colonial systems after the Second World War 
seemed to create a massive feeling of instability in the regional zones, far from 
the processes of centralised politics in the capital cities of the late colonies. As 
I have argued, in the case of many African regions, this situation can be 
regarded as the starting point of processes – processes that, after the end of the 
colonial period, led to a preference of local populations for ethnic instead of 
other forms of mobilisation. It is for the global historian, of course, a challeng-
ing question to ask whether other parts of the colonial world knew a different 
path to the creation of post-colonial societies. A principal difference might lie 
in the existence of stronger pre-colonial administrative traditions in large 
parts of South and East Asia, so that the transition left fewer opportunities for 
mobilisation via ethnic solidarities.
It is interesting to discuss the effects of state and administrative structures ver-
sus ethnic mobilisation in view of the many conflicts discussed as ‘ethnic’ in the 
post-colonial world. From the late 1970s, the emergence of ethnic mobilisation in 
parts of the Middle East and of Central Asia seems to point in this direction – 
although we are probably still too close to the events and they would indeed need 
to be disentangled from religious elements of mobilisation and freed from the 
simplifications that one often finds in political science discussion.
The important European cases of ethnic mobilisation that we find in the twen-
tieth century also fit into the model of interpretation that interprets the results of 
my comparative view on West Africa. The cases of ethnic conflict in the Balkans, 
for instance, seem to indicate a rise of such mobilisation at the principal moments 
of the breakdown of administrative structures, both before the First World War 
and after the collapse of the Yugoslavian state in the early 1990s. Ethnicisation of 
debates in the case of Spain has frequently had to do with principal conflicts over 




the internal distribution of resources and influence – and it belongs to this picture 
that the ethnic character of the contestation always remained ambiguous in cases 
such as Catalunya or the Basque Country.
Therefore, it would be totally erroneous to assume that ethnicity was a fac-
tor of mobilisation ‘automatically’ belonging to African communities. The 
mobilisation of regionalist solidarities based on an idea of cultural-linguistic 
unity in a circumscribed region, was an option in many parts of the globe. It 
was an adequate reaction to many cases of insecurity: an insecurity that could 
be created by the absence of stronger administrative structures to offer protec-
tion under conditions of violence; but it could also appear as a response to 
changes in more formalised administrative patterns, in which particular com-
munities regarded themselves at an unfair disadvantage.
The principal factor of insecurity, as a central background condition for 
ethnic mobilisation, also builds the link to studies on migration, namely in a 
global historical perspective, in which ‘ethnicity’ is employed as an element 
of group identification, but with a different meaning. The bridge between 
both ways of formulating ‘ethnicity’ lies in the creation of solidarity through 
bonds that substitute in part for a lack of protection. However, European and 
Chinese migrants in the principal global migration systems – and more so 
from the eighteenth century – already had a reference to larger existing state 
structures that they mixed with references to a common language. By con-
trast, populations living in contexts of insecurity and within very small 
political- administrative units, did not have any such points of reference. For 
the global historian, this distinction needs to be very clear. An interpretation 
that takes both types of group solidarities as the same phenomenon of 
‘ ethnicity’ is not helpful.
Regional solidarities in Europe, the settler Americas, China or India, for 
example, in particular if discussed from the end of the early modern period, 
are not automatically different from those of groups analysed as ‘ethnic groups’ 
in the African continent, or in parts of Asia and the Americas. The need to 
activate these regional solidarities, and the modalities of their employment by 
local populations and their leaders, are, however, different, as structures of rule 
(or state administrations) offer another framework on which these popula-
tions can rely. The existence of the latter often makes it unnecessary to mobil-
ise the more regional forms of group identification in the interest of the group’s 
security. In other words, it appears that if the structures of states and adminis-
trations provide a somewhat reliable set of rules, ‘ethnicity’ as a factor of group 
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